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1 Introduction  
 
The title of the study “Value Added of Corporate Venture Capital: How do CVC 
units benefit from their organizational core?” suggests that there is something 
special about corporate venture capital; something that sets it apart from both the 
core business of a corporation and its competitors, the “dedicated” venture 
capitalists. The focus of the study is “which different mechanisms and methods 
do CVC units use to facilitate collaboration with business units in a 
corporation?”. This constitutes a preemptive rejoinder to potential questions 
concerning the importance of corporate venture capital and why we need another 
study in this field. The justification for choosing collaboration between CVC unit 
and business units as the research focus for this study is based on the following 
practical and theoretical basis: the tremendous development of CVC in the past 
and the lack of attention paid to this phenomenon in the research so far. 
 
Therefore, I will first give an overview of the CVC development in the past. 
According to a study recently published by Venture Economics, corporate 
venture capital (CVC) has gained a strong position in the equity business world 
in the last couple of years.1 Furthermore, Assets Alternatives (2000) quoted that 
in 2000 the number of corporations with venture capital programs exceeded 350 
companies (after 203 in 1999, and 110 in 1998), with worldwide CVC 
investments amounting to approximately $30 billion. The share of corporate 
venture capital in the total (US) VC market increased from 8.2% in 1997 to 
18.2% in 2000, and ten of the world’s twenty-two largest venture capitalists are 
now CVC investors. Table 1-1 shows the increasing importance of CVC over the 
past few years.  
 
                                                     
1 Venture Economics (2001) stated that corporate investments exceeded US$ 18 billon in 2000. 
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Figure 1-1: The amount of invested capital in CVC programs, the number of 
CVC companies, and the number of deals and financed companies 
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After this phase of rapid growth in recent years, the corporate venture capital industry 
is experiencing a shake-out in 2002. This development of CVC follows the recognized 
cyclical nature of the venture capitalist industry mirrored by the past three decades. 
However, the most recent wave of corporate venturing activity is on a considerably 
larger scale, with greater diversity of companies involved and a more international 
orientation (Lerner 2001). Figure 1-2 reflects the cyclical nature of CVC by 
demonstrating the number of CVC programs announced. 
 
Figure 1-2: The cyclical nature of CVC 
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Looking more closely at the mirrored cyclical evolution of CVC, it becomes 
obvious that the shifts in both directions have been particularly dramatic 
compared to the traditional venture capital industry. In this sense, the latest 
example of such a hasty retreat as part of an historic pattern of advance and 
retreat shows that the swings in recent years were even wider than before: nearly 
one third of the companies actively investing corporate venture funds in start-ups 
in September 2000 had stopped making such investments 12 months later, and 
over the same period, the amount of corporate money invested in start-ups fell by 
80 %.2 Figure 1-3 points at the more conspicuous development of CVC 
compared to traditional VC. 
 
Figure 1-3: The cyclical nature of CVC: CVC market follows the development of 
VC in a “time lag” 
Source: Author, according to Venture Economics and several editions Venture Capital Journal
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However, at the same time there are positive signs in CVC: new CVCs are 
launched at times when the market is consolidating. Current press releases in 
private equity trade journals exemplify this: 
 
• Nestle fund opens for business: Inventages Ventures Capital has been 
appointed to manage the food conglomerate's €150m VC fund.  
Source: info@privateequityonline.com, 08.03.2002 
Allianz commits €300m to venture investing: The Munich based insurer has 
unveiled Allianz Venture Partner, a € 300 m early stage investment vehicle, to 
                                                     
2 According to the research firm Venture Economics, quarterly CVC investments in start-ups 
rose from $ 468 million at the end of 1998 to $6.2 billion by the beginning of 2000 and then 
tumbled to $ 848 million in the third quarter of 2001.  
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complement its existing private equity business. 
Source: info@privateequityonline.com, 07.02.2002 
 
• The pharmaceuticals industry looks to internal VC funds for new ideas and 
profits: In the last six months, two of the largest pharmaceutical companies -- 
Merck and Eli Lilly -- launched $100 million in corporate venture capital funds. 
Source: Red Herring Magazine, 13.04.2001 
  
• Unilever to create venture fund: The consumer products group is talking with 
private equity firms over the creation of a subsidiary venture capital fund. 
Source: info@privateequityonline.com, 30.11.2001 
 
Additionally, since those CVC firms that remain continue to show outstanding 
growth and profitability (Venture Economics, NVCA, EVCA, 2001), the 
interesting question awaiting closer analysis is why corporations sometimes 
devote huge amounts of money to CVC, and sometimes pull out of the market 
completely and terminate their CVC programs. What makes for the success of 
CVC?  
 
In looking for possible explanations for this “herd behavior” phenomenon (zu 
Knyphausen-Aufseß and Dowling, 2001), the impact of one unique defining 
characteristic of CVC has to be analyzed: the embedding of CVC in a 
corporation. Corporate investors have access on the one hand to non-material 
technological, market and business knowledge that independent venture funds 
rarely possess (Maula and Murray, 2000; Hellmann, 2000), and on the other hand 
to more material corporate facilities such as distribution channels and R&D 
opportunities. Such resources broaden the range of value-creating services that 
corporate investors can provide for their portfolio firms. In trying to explain the 
cyclical nature of CVC, it is necessary to consider two relevant aspects arising 
from the relationship between a CVC and a corporation and their impact in order 
to embrace both sides of CVC development.    
 
The positive shifts, showing the tremendous influx of CVC investments reflects 
the fact that CVC plays an increasingly important role in corporation strategy. 
Much is known about the motives for starting CVC programs and the general 
value proposition they offer the parent companies (e.g. Lerner, 1998). According 
to the literature and managers of corporate venturing programs, the reasons for 
developing a venture capital vehicle are manifold (Siegel et al., 1988). 
Principally, it is a combination of both ends of the CVC spectrum, seeking 
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financial return and strategic knowledge. While the distinct corporate venture 
capital programs vary by the proportion of these elements, in most cases strategic 
objectives are favored over the financial ones (Schween 1996, Siegel et al., 
1988).3 CVCs offer their parent companies an opportunity to gain a “window on 
developing markets” at relatively low levels of invested capital.  They may also 
provide a means for regenerating a sense of entrepreneurial spirit within the 
company through contact with and possible integration of new, innovative 
ventures.  
 
On the face of it, the value proposition that CVCs offer to new ventures has 
several advantages over private venture capital (Chesbrough, 2000): it has a deep 
understanding of core technologies and access to and relationships with people in 
the business market itself (Bain & Company, 2000; Mackewicz & Partner, 1997). 
The following figure shows these characteristics of CVC, which explain the 
tremendous influx in CVC investments.  
 
Figure 1-4: CVC delivers further “value added” for the start-ups that they notice 
favorably
Study of Bain & Company
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3 A survey by the European Commission on the goals of CVC investors in Europe, based on 150 
European corporations, shows that 92% have strategic, 58% financial, 12% social 
responsibility, and 17% other reasons as their goals (total: 179%; several answers were 
possible) 
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However, what explains the enormous decrease and negative swings of the CVC 
investments? Analyzing the issues of CVC programs that have failed in the past, 
it can be shown that the realization of the value to the corporation and to 
portfolio companies often goes awry because of impediments in CVC that do not 
exist with private venture capital. The issues that arise are non-cyclical in nature 
but have a significant impact on corporate venture capital activity  (Lerner, 
2001).  
 
Impediments may include an unclearly defined mission of a CVC program (Fast, 
1978; Siegel et al., 1988). Top management often sought to accomplish 
supposedly incompatible objectives such as supporting the existing strategy and, 
at the same time, generating attractive financial returns. Furthermore, CVC 
programs often fail to find the right mix of strategic and financial goals. This 
leads to the fact that corporate venture capitalists, unlike venture capitalists, hold 
onto their losing investments longer as there is a greater “strategic” interest 
involved or more reputation at stake. Similar problems are mentioned regarding 
the degree of organizational autonomy and independence in order to overcome 
bureaucratic company decision-making processes and to achieve the best 
performance. Moreover, the inability to compensate top CVC managers in a 
manner competitive with private venture capitalists through “carry of interest” 
provisions (Berry, 2000) results in less experienced investment managers 
working in CVC units. Corporations fear that they might need to make huge 
payments if their investments are successful, that it might create a double culture 
in the company and a lot of disruptive envy between the business units and the 
CVC unit, or that it may elevate revenue expectations for everyone in the 
company (Block and Ornati, 1987). Additionally, a lack of incentive to 
participate and cooperate for business units that have the resources and know-
how necessary to develop the portfolio company (Hardymon et al., 1983; Rind 
1981; Sykes, 1990) makes it even more difficult for CVC to deliver the value 
they are supposed to. Finally, the majority of companies in question that do CVC 
investments are multinational enterprises. The fact that their business units are 
scattered worldwide makes the collaboration between the CVC unit and the 
business units even more difficult.  
 
These impediments have some critical implications for CVC. First, when the 
market does not lead to expected results and CVC becomes financially less 
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successful, CVC is one of the first activities that is terminated when a corporation 
is in economic difficulties, as CVC investment does not typically belong to the 
core businesses of a corporation.  This reflects the issue that CVC often does not 
have the long-term commitment of the corporate headquarters. Second, since 
corporations’ commitment to CVC seems to be very cyclical, the CVC managers 
are not able to gain wide experience in the investment area. Therefore they tend 
to be less experienced than traditional venture capitalists. Moreover, due to the 
inadequate compensation systems used in the CVC industry, the more 
experienced investment managers try to get employment with a dedicated venture 
capital company. 
 
All of these circumstances have a negative effect on the relationship between the 
business units and the corporate venture capital unit, which is expected to create 
value for the corporation as well as for the portfolio companies. The problem is 
that they cannot promise their start-up companies the potential “value added”, as 
in realizing these “support services” they depend strongly on the collaboration of 
the business units in the corporation, which the CVC unit does not directly 
control. 
 
This background information about the industry supposes that realizing the value 
for both the corporation and the start-up companies involves some difficulties 
that are worth analyzing in detail. We will only understand it in depth when we 
look closely at what corporate venture capitalists do and what problems arise. 
What limits the full range of corporate possibilities? The question is therefore, 
how do they succeed in trying to bring added value to the portfolio companies 
and the corporation? How does the CVC unit get the business units involved in 
the investment process? As there is a kind of trade-off for the corporation 
between the costs incurred by corporate venture capital investment and the value 
that comes back out of these activities, it is crucial to know how this dilemma can 
be solved as well as possible. Therefore, the purpose of this study will be to focus 
on how CVC units attempt to make the value present in their corporate 
connections available to their portfolio companies; I only consider indirectly how 
CVCs create value for the corporation itself. 
 
I propose to examine how CVCs wrestle with the problems and issues involved 
in creating and realizing value for portfolio companies. Specifically, a number of 
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questions should be discussed here: what conflicts arise as CVC units seek to tap 
the knowledge and potential of operating units? What mechanisms create and 
facilitate productive interactions between the CVC unit and other business units? 
What level of autonomy exists in the CVC business unit relations, and how may 
that level of autonomy be achieved while simultaneously promoting cooperation? 
Are there certain types of commitment - on the part of both the headquarters and 
the business unit - that work better?   How can decision processes be streamlined 
to avoid them becoming lengthy and protracted? Besides direct financial rewards, 
what motivates business units to devote time and effort to interactions with 
portfolio companies?  In short, the focus here is on how CVCs use their internal 
relationships to deliver on their value proposition vis-à-vis the portfolio 
companies.  My research objective is to understand and describe the intra-
organizational collaboration between CVC unit and business unit with the final 
goal of generating testable propositions regarding CVC business unit 
relationships. 
  
In the existing literature (e.g. Gompers and Lerner, 1998), little is known about 
how CVCs create value added for their portfolio companies by using the 
relationship with a corporation. Yet, despite myriad approaches to the topic of 
venture capital/corporate venture capital, little material can be found that 
specifically addresses the value added from the perspective of how it is finally 
realized and generated through the intrafirm collaboration with a business unit. 
 
This is all the more surprising since the literature does hint that it is precisely the 
relationship to a corporation which is of special interest. In this sense Gompers 
and Lerner (1998), for example, come to the conclusion “that corporate venture 
capital is at least as successful as venture capital if first, there is possible access 
to technical and market know-how in the company, and second, the access to 
important resources of the company is established”. Similarly, both Roberts and 
Yates (1991) and Brody and Ehrlich (1998) point out that “... another success 
factor of corporate venture capital is, that the parent company has to secure 
access to its resources, contact persons, technology and innovative know-how by 
the involvement of the corporation”. Finally, this statement in the Financial Post 
(1998) underlines the importance of this relationship: “...another success factor of 
corporate venture capital stems from the nature of the relationships between the 
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parent company and the CVC unit. One of the challenges is to establish a 
suitable, internal relationship”. 
 
Therefore, there are indications that the relationship of interest in this study – 
between the CVC unit and the business units - is fundamental for the resulting 
value of CVC investments for both actors in this relationship. On the one hand 
the business unit, which is interested in the new technology of a start-up 
company, benefits more from a more effective collaboration. On the other hand, 
if the BU help and support a portfolio company their value in the market 
increases. Therefore, the CVC unit, whose main purpose is to sell an investment 
afterwards at a financial profit, also benefits more from a better relationship. 
However, the scope of this study does not include the relationship between the 
CVC unit and the potential investments, the start-up companies. One reason for 
this is that there is already a bulk of empirical research presenting analysis of this 
external relationship. 
 
Since the anecdotal evidence of this intra-organizational relationship to be 
explored can only offer rather sketchy evidence of individual phenomena, a 
considerably more detailed approach is called for. A close description of the 
CVC industry and its development, operating companies, and most successful 
working patterns is needed if a deeper understanding is to be achieved. Detailed 
descriptions of ‘best practices’ are indispensable for eventually gaining rich 
theoretical insights. This study aims at developing a set of rigorously formed 
hypotheses that have the potential to extend the theory of intra-organizational 
collaboration and that themselves lead to subsequent tests. 
 
Hence, the research approach selected for this study is descriptive and holistic. 
However, it is more than that. This study is also analytical in nature. It not only 
asks what the incentive of a business unit is to cooperate with the CVC unit 
during the investment process, it also asks how and why CVCs are performing 
certain actions. The appropriate research methodology for a study that attempts to 
extend theory by description and analysis, and that describes in detail the 
cooperation in the relationship of the CVC unit to other business units, is a 
comparative case study research methodology (Eisenhardt, 1989). This brief 
mention of the methodological foundation may suffice for the purposes of the 
introduction, since the first section of Chapter 2 contains a profound discussion 
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of the selection and application of the comparative case study methodology. This 
section also explains the research process itself - the process of how this study 
builds theory from the cases. 
 
Furthermore, two other topics must be considered before the case analysis. The 
first is the inevitable topic of terminology and the analysis of the current situation 
of the market and its competitors. An effort has been made to limit this topic to a 
brief, yet concise explanation of some key terms. In this section, however, there 
will be no explanations of what is understood by corporate venture capital, since 
this will be done in the context of the respective sections concerning the building 
of corporate venture capital industry context.  
The second topic, the research questions of this study, has already been referred 
to. These questions will be listed at the end of this chapter and will lead to 
Chapter Two which begins by determining appropriate methodological 
procedures for answering the research questions. 
 
This study concentrates on direct corporate venture capital investments, which is 
a sub-field of corporate venturing. This investment mode has been selected due 
to the growing importance of this segment in recent years. No concentration has 
been made regarding the investment focus, meaning specific investment stages or 
investment areas. Therefore it is possible to see the implications of different 
investment focuses and objectives for the business unit collaboration. The overall 
objective of this dissertation is to identify the mechanisms that CVCs use in order 
to facilitate collaboration with the business unit in order to add value to their 
portfolio companies and to the parent company. This is a particularly good time 
to interview CVCs because from a practical perspective those CVCs that survive 
in the more competitive market want broader insights than those gained through 
their own isolated experience; I hope to provide a framework that is both 
descriptive and normative, by identifying patterns of problems and barriers in the 
relationship between CVC and BU. From a theoretical perspective, this study 
aims at an integrated theory of intra-organizational collaboration. 
 
At this point of the introduction one might typically expect a section entitled 
‘Overview of the Literature’ or similar. Is it not best practice to select, 
summarize, categorize, and discuss at length the body of literature that has been 
produced in the field of CVC research at the beginning of every new research 
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endeavor? The answer would certainly be ‘yes’ in strictly theoretical and most 
likely in hypothesis-testing and cross-sectional work. Nevertheless, this 
exploratory study follows the recommendations of leading case study 
methodologists who advocate an ideal of theory-free research (Eisenhardt, 1989, 
1991; Dyer & Wilkins, 1991). However, there is an important difference in how 
an overview of the literature is given. In order to follow the recommendations of 
theory-free research as closely as possible, I will give an overview of the earlier 
research that only focuses on the aim of the extant literature without analyzing in 
depth the theory used. This is necessary in order to avoid a research project in an 
area that has already been the focus of previous research. Therefore, in Section 
2.2.1 I will present the earlier research on CVC. In Section 2.2.2, I will present 
the definition of CVC used in this study. Chapter 2.2, which aims at building 
CVC industry context, will conclude in Section 2.2.3. that gives insights into the 
value added of CVC. This leads directly to the cases in chapters 2.3 and 2.4. 
Only after a rich and theoretically unbiased understanding of the intrafirm 
collaboration in CVC has been gained are the extant theories compared with the 
case results (Chapter 3). Ideally, this frequently propagated yet rarely practiced 
procedure of  “postponed” literature review will lead to the extension of theory 
and thus to a theoretical contribution in its own right. 
 
Before the cases can be presented, a set of research questions guiding the entire 
research process from field work to case description and analysis to theory 
extension must be specified. The formulation of these questions necessarily took 
place during the initial phase of this research project, at a point when little was 
known about the interaction between the business units and CVC units that were 
to be studied. Therefore, defining the research questions was a critical issue. On 
the one hand, the researcher may risk becoming overwhelmed by the complexity 
of the data with questions that are too broad and general in nature. How does one 
find a pattern if one does not know what kind of pattern one is looking for? On 
the other hand, with questions that are too focused or specific the issue of bias 
reappears. How does one gain a genuinely new understanding if one is looking 
for a pre-specified pattern? Faced with such a dilemma, a carefully 
compromising solution seems appropriate and, in fact, is proposed by Eisenhardt 
(1989, 1991) and Yin (1984). The research questions need to serve as ‘guiding 
lights’ without overly restricting the necessary degree of freedom of the research 
process. 
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The guiding lights selected for this research are partly taken from Picot (1991).  
The affected intra-organizational relation within the corporation between the 
CVC unit and business units can be explored by looking at four aspects which 
have so far been used for the research on inter-organizational relations: (1) 
structure, (2) processes, (3) actors and (4) context/culture, by which the 
relationship between CVC unit and related business units is characterized in 
different corporate venture capital firms.4 
 
Based on this advice, the detailed research questions that follow the four guiding 
lights ‘structure’, ‘actors’, ‘processes’ and ‘context’, include the following: 
• How is the firm’s executive board integrated into the CVC program? 
• How is the CVC unit structurally integrated into the corporation? 
• How are business units integrated in the investment process? 
• How are the interfaces between CVC and BU managed? 
• How does the exchange of resources, know-how and information work? 
• What are the incentive systems for the business units? 
• What is the role of the investment manager in the collaboration process? 
 
This study investigates these issues by exploring the relationship between CVC 
unit and involved business units in six firms: three German CVCs and three US 
CVCs. The study focuses intentionally on this small number of enterprises to 
allow a detailed analytical description of the complex processes. The following 
chapter introduces the research methodology and describes the cases. As in all 
exploratory studies of this kind, the case chapter is not only the longest chapter - 
it is at the crux of the research. 
                                                     
4 The justification for this procedure can be found in Picot (1991): “... intra organizational 
relationships can be analyzed with the same instruments as inter organizational ones: 
structure, processes, actors and context of a relationship.” 
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Figure 1-5: Structure of Work 
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2 Case studies of intra-organizational collaboration in 
corporate venture capital programs 
 
The focus of this chapter is the case studies of six corporate venture capital 
programs. In each company, interviews were conducted with investment 
managers of the CVC program itself and of business units involved in CVC 
activities. The value of this research lies in its capacity to produce a model that 
provides insights into how corporate venture capital works and to generate 
hypotheses for further tests through descriptions and analyses of the six corporate 
venture capital programs. This study attempts to develop a deep and 
comprehensive understanding of how CVC managers operate. The main unit of 
analysis in this dissertation is the relationship between CVC unit and business 
unit. 
 
In Section 2.1 I explain the research methodology which this study is based on. 
First, in sub-section 2.1.1, I explain my reasons for choosing a grounded theory. 
This includes an explanation of how I developed the research questions for this 
study. These questions lead to the selection of the method adhered to in this 
research. By making a summarized account of the state-of-the-art of case study 
methodology, it is hoped that this section can be of value to the reader in 
evaluating the methodological foundation of this study. In sub-section 2.1.2 I 
explain how and why I selected the particular companies used in the cases. This 
also includes how and why I selected the person interviewed, what process was 
followed in collecting the data, and a description of the data sources used in this 
study: (1) archival data and (2) interviews. Further, the types of questions, their 
purpose and the content of the interview guidelines that were followed will be 
presented. Sub-section 2.1.3 explains the procedure by which I designed my data 
collection. Finally, in the final sub-section (2.1.4) of the research methodology, 
the process applied to carry out the within-case analysis will be presented. This is 
followed by an explanation of the cross-case analysis.  
 
Section 2.2 aims at building the corporate venture capital industry context. 
Therefore, while Section 2.2.1 presents earlier research in corporate venture 
capital, Section 2.2.2 addresses the definition and objectives of corporate venture 
capital. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 present the within-case analysis of the selected CVC 
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programs. These sections contain in-depth analyses of the cases. Furthermore, the 
final sub-section draws some preliminary within-case conclusions by attempting 
to pinpoint the critical issues arising from the collaboration of the CVC unit and 
the BU, and the methods used to overcome these problems. 
 
Cross-case analyses are performed in the final section (2.5) of this chapter. The 
goal is to find divergent as well as similar patterns of collaboration used by the 
CVC managers in order to facilitate cooperation with the business units. Based 
on these analyses together with those in the previous section, tentative 
hypotheses can be formed. The set of tentative hypotheses represents the actual 
goal of this chapter’s case studies.  
 
2.1 Research methodology 
 
This chapter starts with explaining the grounded theory case study approach in 
Section 2.1.1. This explanation draws on the writings of several case study 
research methodologists and demonstrates the actual application of their 
recommendations in a real-life study. Section 2.1.2 intends to be of assistance to 
the reader in evaluating the bases for the case selection. While Section 2.1.3 
concentrates on the design of data collection, the final section 2.1.4 illustrates the 
process of data analysis. 
2.1.1 Grounded theory case study approach 
 
First, I will explain why I chose a case study methodology and my reasons for 
using “grounded theory”. Therefore, I will describe the purposes of this research 
and how the grounded theory approach fits these purposes. The main limitations 
and criticisms of the case methodology are discussed. 
 
This study focuses on how CVC units attempt to make the value of their 
corporate connections available to their portfolio companies. Based on the idea of 
the tension arising in the CVCs in pursuit of their daily work, the aim of this 
study is to generate hypotheses and to extend theory with a focus on the 
collaboration within corporations doing CVC.  
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The intermediate level of analysis, the strategic, procedural, personal and cultural 
aspects of the internal collaboration between CVC unit and business unit, 
presents a unique challenge regarding the availability of data. For one thing, no 
publicly available databases track data on corporate venture capital programs at 
an internal corporate level. An equally important problem is the sensitive nature 
of strategic and personal aspects, implying that firms may be reluctant to publish 
any information regarding their internal collaboration problems and their applied 
mechanisms to overcome them.    
 
Several strict specifications apply to the selection of appropriate research 
methodology.5 Yin (1984, Chap. 1) distinguishes between five research 
strategies: archival analyses, case studies, experiments, history and surveys. 
Three conditions determine the selection of an appropriate strategy for a study: 
(1) the type of research question, (2) the control an investigator has over actual 
behavioral events, and (3) the focus on contemporary as opposed to historical 
phenomena.  
 
Since I want to know how the CVC unit collaborates with business units and why 
they collaborate, my research questions deal with operational links among these 
units within the corporation that need to be traced during the investment process. 
Considering the second and third condition mentioned by Yin, this study offers 
no control on the part of the researcher and is concerned with contemporary 
events. In this situation, according to Yin’s recommendations (1984) the 
appropriate research strategy is the case study methodology. As the purpose of 
this study is to create theory rather than to test it, no quantitative method is 
applied. 
 
As (1) the process is not well understood, (2) the number of factors and 
mechanisms involved in the cooperation are large, (3) the quantification of 
processes and values is difficult, and (4) the size of the sample in this study is 
limited, Glaser and Strauss’s (1967) strategy for the discovery of “grounded 
theory” was adopted. In fact, due to the exploratory nature of the study and the 
objective of generating a descriptive model of phenomena which are as yet 
                                              
5 This study draws heavily on the authoritative, methodological writings of Eisenhardt 
(1990,1991), Pettigrew (1990) and Yin (1984). 
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incompletely documented, the case study approach appeared best. This strategy 
requires the researcher “... at first, literally to ignore the literature of theory and 
fact on the area under study, in order to assure that the emergence of categories 
will not be contaminated by concepts more suited to different areas” (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967:37). Taking this approach allows the researcher to look at more 
factors than are imaginable before starting the case studies.  
 
Due to the relative lack of previous research on the CVC intra-organizational 
corporation level, great uncertainty existed as to what conceptual framework 
would emerge from the data. Many of the variables are not known at the outset, 
but are expected to emerge during the course of the field work. Qualitative data, 
though, are most appropriate for generating an initial understanding of the 
rationale or theory of a process. The results can then be strengthened or tested by 
quantitative support (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, in a research endeavor that 
seeks to grasp the hows and whys of collaboration processes in a relationship - as 
opposed to exclusively the content - “we first need a story that narrates the 
sequence of events that unfolded” (Van de Ven & Huber, 1990; quoted in zu 
Knyphausen-Aufseß, 1995). Such narrations, however, need to be given limits, 
i.e. before initiating the case research, a clear study focus has to be developed. 
The rationale for the focus on the collaboration process between the CVC unit 
and the involved business units has been presented in detail in the first chapter.6  
 
For many years, case study as a research format has been subject to substantial 
criticism and debate which often centers around the issue of sample size and 
limitations to external validity. One of the most frequently asked questions is: 
‘How can you generalize from just one case study?’ This type of criticism is, 
however, often beside the point. Yin (1984) summarizes why:  
 
“Case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions and 
                                              
6 This focus or ‘a priori construct’ should not be overly specified, however. In the words of 
Eisenhardt (1989) researchers “should avoid thinking about specific relationships and theories 
as much as possible, especially at the outset of the program” (p. 536). Severe controversy has 
developed around this issue. On the one hand, proponents of ‘theory-free’ case studies argue 
that substantially novel and groundbreaking theory can only be expected from research that 
evolves without any initial specifications or constructs (Dyer & Wilkins, 1991). On the other 
hand, proponents of ‘construct-led’ case studies believe that theory-free research cannot 
transcend good storytelling. They maintain that theoretical impact can only by achieved by 
rigorous methods such as clear specification of research questions (Eisenhardt, 1991). 
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not to populations or universes. In this sense, the case study, like the experiment, 
does not represent a ‘sample’, and the investigator’s goal is to expand and 
generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies 
(statistical generalization).” (p. 21) 
 
When confronted with the criticism of using too small a sample, the renowned 
business strategist and case study researcher Mintzberg (1979) responded during 
the same lines: 
 
“Given that we have 100 people each prepared to do a year of research, we should 
ask ourselves whether we are better off having each study 100 organizations, 
giving us superficial data on ten thousand, or each study one, giving us in-depth 
data on 100. The choice obviously depends on what is to be studied. But it should 
not preclude the small sample, which has often proved superior” (p. 108). 
 
What then, is the ideal number of cases? Apart from pragmatic considerations 
such as time and money, that often dictate the number of cases, Eisenhardt’s 
(1989) answer is:  
 
“A number of 4 to 10 usually works well. With fewer than 4 cases, it is often 
difficult to generate theory with much complexity, and its empirical grounding is 
likely to be unconvincing.” (p. 545) 
 
Based on the discussion of the three features of case study types, the 
“Multivariate, Non-Quantitative Studies of Multiple Organizations” type (Miller 
& Friesen, 1982, p. 1019) is selected for this study. It is “probably best suited for 
generating hypotheses and theories rather than for testing them, especially where 
the researchers get close to their organizations” (p. 1020). This methodological 
decision places this study in an increasingly common stream of inductive 
research that has been largely bypassed by deductive research methodology of 
the Popper (1968) type. In his/her discussion of the evolution of empirical 
research in the field of strategic management, zu Knyphausen-Aufseß (1995) 
calls attention to the recent “renaissance of case study research” (p. 217). 
2.1.2 Bases for case selection 
 
Given the difficult trade-off between the time constraints and depth of research, 
the selection of the firms was one of the most critical elements of the case study 
CASE STUDIES OF INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION OF CVC   19 
research process. In large-sample quantitative research, random sampling is used 
to overcome the problem of bias. In case study research the population and the 
sample are deliberately selected through theoretical sampling by the researcher in 
a process best characterized by the phrase ‘planned opportunism’ (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967; Pettigrew, 1990). Based on Pettigrew’s (1979) recommendations 
on site selection, Eisenhardt (1989) advises that it “makes sense to choose cases 
as extreme situations and polar types in which the process of interest is 
‘transparently observable’” (p. 537).  
 
Hence, the first step was to identify and select the type of CVC programs for a 
meaningful study of the phenomena of interest. As I began to research CVC and 
had preliminary interviews with industry experts (e.g. investment managers of 
CVC programs, strategy consultants of Bain & Company), and BVK officials 
(German Venture Capital Association), two main differences between CVC and 
traditional venture funds became obvious to me: first, the CVC unit is a part of a 
big corporation. This leads to a defining characteristic: corporate investors have 
access to technological, market, and business knowledge. Second, as the CVC 
unit should give access to a series of BUs that exist, the resulting and related 
collaboration between the CVC unit and the BU is very important. 
 
In selecting potential companies, access to companies was decisive. First, due to 
the location of this research, German CVC units appeared to grant the most 
continuous and feasible access. As a matter of comparison and not to limit this 
study to German CVC, I chose a further market with the highest volume of CVC 
investments and longest history overlapping with CVC firm experience, which 
was without doubt the US market. The longer history of CVC activities could 
further be useful to clarify potential differences in collaboration between CVC 
located in Germany and in the USA. 
 
Within this two-country frame, I tried to follow the recommendations of 
Pettigrew (1990). 7 In order to involve companies with more established 
                                              
7 In a detailed account of his/her vast case study research experience Pettigrew (1990) points out 
the merits of this selection procedure. In addition to the ‘polar types’ already mentioned in the 
quote from Eisenhardt (1989), Pettigrew also recommends: “Go for high experience levels of 
the phenomena under study” and “go for more informed choices of sites and increase the 
probabilities of negotiating access” (p. 276).  
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collaboration practices, I focused on the large corporations doing CVC 
investments. This was carried out according to two criteria: (1) by selecting CVC 
units that had a multinational parent company, as they proportionally represent 
the companies doing CVC with the highest investment volume as well as the 
highest number of investments, and (2) by choosing ones that have been active in 
Corporate Venture Capital for at least two years, as the boom and attractiveness 
of doing venture capital in recent years encouraged many young, small, and 
relatively inexperienced CVC units into the market. The following overview of 
Asset Alternatives (2001) shows that four of the 15 most active corporate 
investors of 2000 have been chosen. These relatively mature CVCs are most 
appropriate, since the study is intended to formulate normative recommendations 
that are based on the experience of established CVC companies.   
Figure 2-1: Most Active Corporate Investors in 2000 
Name Number of Deals January-June July-Dec. 
Intel Corp. 176 98 78 
General Electric Co. 95 63 32 
Comdisco Inc. 57 26 31 
Dell Computer Corp. 50 30 20 
Cisco Systems Inc. 40 17 23 
Motorola 38 13 25 
Reuters plc. 32 19 13 
Siemens AG 32 19 13 
Sun Microsystems 31 16 16 
Hikari Tsushin 31 25 6 
Compaq Computer 30 21 9 
Hewlett-Packard Co. 30 16 14 
PSINet Inc. 28 19 9 
Microsoft 27 19 8 
Andersen Consulting 27 11 16 
Source: Asset Alternatives Inc.: The Corporate Venturing Report, Vol. I, Issue 1, 2001 
 
Further, as the technology focus of the core competencies seems to have an 
impact on a company’s CVC activities, I selected widely diverse technology-
based companies from different industries. The interviewees were selected to 
represent the diversity of industry groups found among corporate venture capital: 
telecom, computing, software, automotive, diversified engineering. All of these 
industries are threatened by newly emerging markets and technologies. Many 
firms in this group find themselves in a situation where the survival of their core 
businesses is severely affected by a new technology and therefore spend a higher 
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proportion of their budget on research and development (Kann, 2000). Moreover, 
these companies represent the most important investment partners for new 
technology-based firms, since there is often potential for value creation in 
combining complementary resources between technology based new firms and 
large corporations (Laamanen and Autio, 1996; Rothwell, 1989).8 The selected 
industries display strong standards or technology platforms regarding the 
communications, computing, and software sectors. Finally, it must be said that all 
selected corporations have an excellent reputation and brand in the market. This 
seems to appeal strongly to start-ups. The firms represent a variety of program 
structures and different levels of CVC activity. 
 
These further specifications have been made for two reasons: first, to have cases 
representing polar types, and second, an effort has been made to identify 
“observable” categories (Eisenhardt, 1989). These particular companies seemed 
to give the best insights into how and why they collaborate. 
 
Once the type of selected companies was clear, the number of companies had to 
be decided upon. Given the time and funding restraints of this Ph.D. thesis, plus 
my objective to develop contextually rich in-depth cases, I decided to limit my 
cases to six companies. “Different cases often emphasize complementary aspects 
of a phenomenon. By piecing together the individual patterns, the researcher can 
draw a more complete theoretical picture” (Eisenhardt, K.M, 1991). 
 
To generate a pool of potential corporate venture capitalists to fill the pursued 
frame a rather complicated process was established to scan trade journals for 
initial leads. All this effort was necessary as a specification cannot be determined 
a priori in CVC due to a lack of official classification systems of CVC’s. 
 
Figure 2-2: The selected German companies 
CVC Program Corporation 
Siemens Venture Capital  Siemens AG 
T-Venture Deutsche Telekom AG 
DaimlerChrysler Venture  DaimlerChrysler AG 
                                              
8 In defining new technology-based firms, this dissertation follows the extant literature: 
companies less than six years old operating in high technology sectors (Robinson and Mc 
Doughall 2001, Shrader et al. 2000, Zahra et al. 2000).  
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Figure 2-3: The selected US-companies  
CVC Program Corporation 
Motorola Ventures Motorola 
Intel Capital Intel 
GE Equity General Electric  
 
Figure 2-4 shows that an effort has been made to select long-established, 
international, most active CVCs from different industries. Furthermore, it shows 
the industries where the CVC unit invests. 
  
Figure 2-4: Companies selected for the case study: long-established, 
international, most active CVCs from different industries 
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2.1.3 Design of data collection 
 
The objective of the data collection phase was to create an accurate portrayal of 
the question: “What do corporate venture capitalists do in order to create inter-
organizational collaboration?” Data collection for the cases applied two 
instruments: archive documents and semi-structured interviews. Various sources 
were exploited using these instruments. The most important objective presented 
by using multiple evidence sources was the development of converging lines of 
inquiry to enable triangulation of information by building on the specific 
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strengths of each instrument. In this manner, I also tried to increase the validity 
of this study. These materials formed the basis for a comparative analysis of the 
six CVC programs. Given the qualitative nature of most of the data sought, 
triangulation was one of the most important means of increasing construct 
validity and substantiating findings and subsequent hypotheses. The archival 
search relied on existing academic research, independent analysis, published 
interviews, reports from Venture Economics9, ‘RedHerring’ magazines, articles 
from business and trade press. Internal company documents such as company 
leaflets and presentations, annual reports, executive speeches, and company press 
releases available on the websites of the six case study companies are also used. 
All these documents are presented at the beginning of each case write-up. The 
advantages of the documented sources include their tendency to be more 
comprehensive and less subject to memory-based bias. The amount of relevant 
documents differed by firm. Moreover, in order to get the opinions independent 
of a case, several expert interviews were performed.10 Finally, I underwent an 
internship of 3 months in a CVC unit.11 
 
Particular efforts were made to locate and interview individuals closely involved 
in the collaboration of the CVC unit and the BU unit. The majority of the 
interviewees were CVC managers, as they play a key role in the collaboration 
with the business units. Two separate face-to-face interviews were conducted 
with CVC managers in each company. In order to get a complete picture of the 
relationship between the corporate venture capital manager and the business unit, 
I conducted five interviews with people working in a business unit. A total of 20 
case study interviews were conducted. The list of interviews and affiliations of 
interviewees is presented in the appendix. 
 
In most of the companies, two rounds of interviews were conducted. In order to 
gain a better insight into each program and to build up a personal relationship 
with the interviewees, the preliminary interviews were unstructured. In the 
second round, the interviews employed a semi-structured design in order to allow 
                                              
9 However, there are no databases that track CVC investments when the corporation is the sole 
investor in a given investment. 
10 Examples include multiple interviews at Bain & Company, Accenture Technology Ventures, 
and Deutsche Effekten- und Wechselbank.   
11 This took place from February to April, 2001. 
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for an appropriate degree of comparability and, at the same time, to allow for 
ample opportunity of an unobstructed narrative flow. An interview guideline was 
used to structure and direct otherwise open-ended interviews. This two-part 
interview guideline – given in the Appendix – was used in the semi-structured 
interviews: the first section included questions designed to obtain information on 
the history, context, and goals of each company, as well as on the interviewee, 
including questions about their job, their typical working day and their 
professional background. 
 
The second section focused on the aspects structure, processes, actors and 
culture, which are often used in inter-organizational studies.12 I used these 
aspects as a guiding vision for my interviews, as Picot (1991) recommended that 
intra-organizational research could apply the same instruments as research on 
inter-organizational questions. Adopting this suggestion, I sought information 
about the mechanisms CVC use to facilitate collaboration with the business unit. 
This section embraced questions about the reporting relationship, the 
mechanisms of coordination, and the reward systems and incentive structures. 
Data were also obtained on the relationships of the CVC with the rest of the 
corporation. In particular, the collaboration between the CVC unit and the 
corresponding company headquarters was studied. Finally, data was also 
obtained on the role, the characteristics, and the abilities of the corporate venture 
capital managers, and on the corporate culture. 
 
In addition to the goals that the companies held when they decided to pursue 
corporate venture capital investments, Table 2-5 shows the CVC managers’ 
evaluation and characterization of the relationship between the CVC unit and the 
business units. 
 
Figure 2-5: CVC mission statement vs. characterization of the relationship 
CVC 
Program 
Mission statement of CVC program 
Characterization of the relationship 
between CVC unit and BU 
T-
Venture 
“T-Venture: a ‘trendsetter’ for CVC activities.” 
“In line with seeking a window on technology, T-Venture 
invests in the seed and early stages of growth and 
expansion of a company. In addition to providing the 
financial impetus necessary to foster entrepreneurial 
talent, concepts, and developments T-Venture will 
leverage the technical, management marketing skills of its 
“Basically, the collaboration with the business units 
is good. Therefore, from the point of view of the 
parent company into the direction of the portfolio 
companies, we really can deliver the value-added.“ 
“That is possible without any problems since the 
access and the collaboration of the business units is 
guaranteed, but also the commitment of the top 
                                              
12 See Antlitz (1999), or Häkansson und Snehota (1995), for example. 
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investment managers and parent organization and 
Deutsche Telekom AG, to facilitate and accelerate the 
transition from start-up to fully fledged successful 
operations.” 
management of Deutsche Telekom is established.” 
“Basically, the collaboration is very positive, but it is 
important to support the business units if necessary 
regarding required resources.” 
Daimler 
Chrysler 
Venture 
“We invest in your ideas. DC supports companies and 
employees determined to translate their vision into viable 
business solutions in the global market economy. We 
invest in leading edge technologies and business concepts 
by providing financial resources, expertise and worldwide 
networks.”    
“That really depends on the specific project.” 
“The whole collaboration pillars on networking. 
There are no formal contracts existent to the business 
units. A further realization is not reasonable.” 
Siemens 
Venture 
Capital 
“Under the banner of ‘Fostering Innovation for Economic 
Success‘ Siemens Venture Capital has been set up as a 
globally active investment vehicle, which provides ‘smart 
money’ to innovative businesses in order to create long-
term company value.”13 
“The realization differs from case to case. It depends 
on the concrete situation: how well do the people 
work together? What is the current workload? How is 
the interest of a business unit?” 
“I would characterize it as good, but with potential 
for improvement.” 
Intel 
Capital 
“We invest with strategic intent, aiming to create and 
expand new markets for Intel’s products. We want to 
stimulate growth in the internet, computing and 
communications to grow the total internet infrastructure 
now and in the future. While financial returns are not our 
primary goal, we are seeking companies that can succeed 
and have an impact on their market segment”  
“There is no competitive thinking at all between the 
business units and Intel Capital. It is clear in the 
minds of the business unit, that Intel Capital 
represents an important part of the prosperity, the 
innovation activity, and the innovation level of Intel. 
This makes a positive collaboration happen.” 
GE 
Equity 
“To be a global equity provider that creates value for its 
customers by leveraging the GE system. The objective is to 
combine investee performance with their request/need and 
our skills and knowledge.” 
“ It works. There are 2 or 3 businesses within GE 
where the relation is a little bit difficult. With all 
other businesses, we work very well on a cooperative 
basis.” 
“The collaboration is characterized more by 
cooperative commitment than by competition.”  
Motorola 
Ventures 
“The Motorola Ventures objective is to be the catalyst for 
Corporate, Labs, Business, and Regional accelerated 
investments. By being the ‘connect point’ of new 
technologies, new markets and new people, strategic 
value, profitable growth, and profitable revenue are 
obtained.”14 
“The purpose of this is to grow shareholder value by 
driving acceleration from outside in.” 
“It all depends on the BU, but most of them work 
with us pretty openly. As we have been here for a 
while now they like to work together, because they 
understand that CVC is an additional toll to help them 
to get what they need on a commercial basis. We deal 
with it well.” 
“The relationship differs from BU to BU. But most of 
our BUs definitely like to work with us and work 
pretty openly with us.” 
  
Informants were not given a questionnaire or a survey before the interviews; 
instead, as a concluding part of the interview, they were asked to summarize 
where they see the biggest hurdles in the collaboration between CVC unit and 
BU. And finally, in order to get a better insight into the actors involved (CVC, 
BU, or both together) I asked who delivered and provided the value-added of the 
corporation for the start-up companies.  
 
The collection of data included interviews in Germany, the United Kingdom and 
the United States. Interviews were conducted face-to-face in German or English 
and usually lasted about two hours, the longest exceeding three hours. 
 
Whilst gathering data I observed several rules of interviewing and qualitative 
data-handling (Spradley, 1979, Yin, 1984, Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988).  
                                              
13 http://w4.siemens.de/svc/index01.thmly, as of 2001-12-10. 
14  See statement in Motorola Ventures presentation. 
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First, I audio-taped all interviews and transcribed them verbatim.15 As the 
majority of questions were of a “how” and “why” nature and mainly open-ended, 
transcription in full is imperative for reasons of internal validity and reliability. In 
their authoritative work on the methods of data collection, Bortz and Döring 
(1995) state: “If an interview also contains open questions and narrative parts, an 
audio recording is unavoidable” (p. 230, 231).16 Second, I took notes and 
preliminary analysis in accordance with a “24-hour rule” to capitalize on the 
immediacy of the data. Third, I tried to keep the informants involved during the 
process of transcribing and first analysis. Follow-up questions were explored 
through a combination of face-to-face interviews and telephone conversations.  
 
Further, before starting with the case analysis, each respondent confirmed the 
correct transcription. All transcripts are included as part of the case study 
database. Similar to the well-established Harvard Business School case research 
approach, all interviewees were granted personal anonymity, in that all they said 
was only attributed to the corresponding CVC until and unless they approved of 
the transcript (Leonard-Barton, 1990).17 
 
Within the phase of “entering the field” in performing case studies, Eisenhardt 
(1989) reminds the researcher that a striking feature of research to build theory 
from case studies is the frequent overlap of data analysis and data collection. As 
recommended by Pettigrew (1990), “Overlapping data analysis with data 
collection not only gives the researcher a head start in analysis but, more 
importantly, allows researchers to take advantage of flexible and follow-up data 
collection.” Indeed, a key feature of theory-building case research is the freedom 
to make adjustments during the data collection process. These adjustments can be 
the addition of cases, or additional adjustment can be made to data collection 
                                              
15 Citations from interviews conducted in English were not translated into German, in order to 
keep the manner and nuance with which informants formulated the point of interest. 
16 In addition to the added rigor and internal validity, one of the main benefits of taping and 
transcribing interviews is that the interviewer can concentrate on what is being said, rather 
than being continuously distracted by note-taking. 
17  Interviewees received copies of the transcripts with requests for approval. If they objected to 
certain parts of the transcripts they were asked to mark the parts to be omitted from the final 
transcript. Interviewees were also asked to make additions or clarifications that were then 
integrated into the final transcript version.  
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instruments, such as the addition of questions to an interview protocol (e.g. 
Harris & Sutton, 1986).  
 
Therefore, by conducting the preliminary interviews and gaining the first insights 
into CVC, I used these adjustments in two ways: first, a moderate relationship 
seemed to arise between the goals of a CVC program and the intraorganizational 
collaboration. I sought a corporate venture capitalist which was obviously 
operating like an independent VC: having mainly financial goals, choosing 
primarily good financial investments, and with low involvement by the business 
unit. Second, I added specific questions which seemed to be of great importance 
in the first interviews.  
 
The entire process of data collection (including archival document research and 
performing the case studies) and analysis lasted from July 1999 to December 
2001. 
2.1.4 Process of data analysis  
 
The objective of the data analysis is to determine categories, relationships and 
assumptions which provide information about the respondent’s view of the world 
in general and the topic in particular (McCracken, 1990). Therefore “analyzing 
data is the heart of building theory, but it is both the most difficult and least 
codified part of the process” (Eisenhardt, p. 539, 1989). As the final goal of this 
work is to develop a theory and subsequently to generate hypotheses, I had to 
answer three questions: (1) which CVC concepts are important, (2) how are these 
concepts related to each other, and (3) why are they related?  
 
Building on detailed case study write-ups, detailed descriptions of each single 
case are crucial for gaining important insights. Although there is no typical way 
to get from the field notes to the final conclusions, there are several key features 
of analysis that Eisenhardt (1989) identified. One key step is the within-case 
analysis. The within-case analysis aims at identifying patterns in the 
collaboration process of each firm. 
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Following the basic elements and components of theory identification mentioned 
in Whetten (1989)18, I organized the within-case analysis of this study by 
following the investment process typical in venture capital. This was done in 
order to ensure a complete and in-depth understanding of four questions: (1) what 
are CVC units doing in order to create inter-organizational collaboration, (2) how 
they are doing it, (3) with whom they are doing it, and finally (4) why they are 
doing it? I tried to analyze and answer these questions during the six phases of 
the CVC investment process. Since the CVC process seems to be similar to the 
investment process of traditional private venture capitalists19, I applied the 
following structure:  
 
Figure 2-6: Data analysis follows the investment process 
Source: Author
How?
Why?
What?
Who?
Deal 
Generation
Deal 
Evaluation
-First Screening
-Due Diligence
Deal 
Structuring
Investment 
decision
Portfolio-
support
management
Exit 
management
Problems, Obstacles, Hurdles
Investment
Process
- Description of factors, variables, concepts, activities
- Mechanisms 
- Relation of factors
- CVC unit
- Business Unit
- Corporate executive management
Reasons, Purpose
- Effects of: organization structure,incentive systems,culture
-Dynamics to justify the factors and their relations
-Explanations
Author’s Interpretations
 
 
In order to understand what is indicated in each phase of the investment process, 
for each case I re-read the transcripts repeatedly. The process by which I 
conducted my analysis included first a reading of the whole transcript, second a 
                                              
18 See Whetten, D., “What constitutes a theoretical contribution”, Academy of Management 
Review, 1989, Vol. 14, No. 4, 490-495. In this article, Whetten specifies the factors that 
constitute a theory and explains how a researcher gets there. 
19 This assumption was confirmed in several discussions with CVC experts, e.g. in a meeting 
with Dr. Franzke, Bain&Company 
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focus on rationales of certain actions, and finally another reading of the entire 
interview. Besides examining the investment process for each company, I 
focused on the effects of the organizational structure, incentive systems, actors 
and culture on the investment process, as these components appeared to me to 
have important implications for the investment process. I based this assumption 
on Picot’s recommendation (1991:149) that inter-organizational aspects can be 
explored using the same instruments and methods as organizational aspects 
within one corporation.  
 
The overall idea was to become intimately familiar with each case as a stand-
alone entity. “This process allows the unique pattern of each case to emerge 
before investigators push to generalize pattern across cases. In addition, it 
accelerates cross-case comparison” (Eisenhardt, 1989:540). I finished each case 
by writing a narrative of it, and, as far as possible, I tried to create graphs and 
figures in order to make the analysis process more transparent. With the higher 
visualization of figures, I tried to visualize the rationales of the investment 
process.   
 
The next crucial phase of multiple firm case studies is the cross-case analysis. 
Eisenhardt (1989) points out that: “Across-case searching tactics enhance the 
probability that the investigators will capture the novel findings which may exist 
in the data” (p. 541). In order to overcome the danger of reaching premature or 
false conclusions as a result of the analysis process, I selected categories and 
dimensions, and then looked for within-group similarities coupled with inter-
group differences. The advantage of a selection of dimensions is that paired 
comparisons allow for a clear identification of similarities and differences 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Overall, the objectives of the cross-case analysis were (1) to 
go beyond the initial impressions, (2) to improve the likelihood of accurate and 
reliable theory, (3) to develop a theory with a close fit with the data, and finally 
(4) to enhance the probability of capturing the novel findings existing in the data. 
 
From the within-case analysis plus cross-case tactics and impressions, tentative 
themes, concepts and relationships were expected to emerge. The patterns 
regarding the collaboration process between CVC unit and business units (or 
even other affected actors within the firms) that gradually emerge from within 
and cross-cases analyses are then iteratively compared with the evidence from 
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each case in order to assess how well it fits with case data. A close fit is 
important as a base for some tentative hypotheses and to build theory.  
 
One step in shaping hypotheses, the refining of definitions of the constructs, was 
achieved by using a table that summarized and tabulated the mechanisms used to 
facilitate the operational work of the CVC within the different companies. This 
represents a brief portrayal of crucial facts, including my interpretations and 
explanations. The second step in shaping tentative hypotheses, the verification of 
the emerging relationships between constructs, was taken by confirming or 
revising the case evidence. The underlying logic is replication with the final goal 
of enhancing confidence in the validity of the relationships. This was done by 
confirming or disconfirming tentative hypotheses (Yin, 1984). 
 
The final step in the research process was the comparison of the emergent 
concepts, theory, or hypotheses with the extant literature. This phase, “enfolding 
the literature” (Eisenhardt, 1989:544), I started parallel to the cross-case analyses 
by looking for similarities and contradictions and their reasons. An essential 
feature of hypothesis formation and theory extension from tentative hypotheses is 
the comparison of the emerging hypotheses with extant literature (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Chapter 3 of this study is devoted to an extensive juxtaposition of the 
case-based findings of Chapter 2. By confronting the tentative hypotheses with 
the extant literature, the final hypotheses are developed. 
 
This study uses multiple ways of addressing validity, as most of the criticism of 
case studies focuses on validity. Triangulation was used to increase construct 
validity; iterations were conducted during analyses to increase internal validity, 
and reliability. I addressed repeatability by adhering to strict documentation and 
transcription standards. I also used multiple companies and comparative findings 
to increase external validity. This case study does not claim to produce 
generalized theory; its aim is rather to produce hypotheses and theory extension 
for subsequent testing to then develop a general theory. 
CASE STUDIES OF INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION OF CVC   31 
 
2.2 Building the corporate venture capital industry context 
 
The aim of the next two sections is to generate insights into corporate venture 
capital. The first section sets out to summarize what is known about corporate 
venture capital in earlier research into corporate venture capital by providing an 
overview of the extant literature. Thus, Section 2.2.1 sets the basis for the 
definition and objectives of corporate venture capital discussed in Section 2.2.2 
and also for the explanatory discussion of the value added of corporate venture 
capital in Section 2.2.3. This sub-chapter represents the contextual stage for the 
in-depth descriptions of the intra-organizational collaboration in CVC programs.   
2.2.1 Earlier research in corporate venture capital 
 
The aim of this chapter is the description of and information about the size, 
players, and the industry of CVC. Since I only look at the extant literature from a 
general perspective without specifying reasons or details, it is not my intention to 
discuss available theory on CVC.  
 
Looking at the CVC industry, there have been tremendous ups and downs in the 
development of this market. The volume of research on CVC has reflected the 
economic importance of the sector over time (Block & Mac Millan, 1993; 
Hardymon et al., 1983; McNally, 1997; Rind, 1981; Siegel et al., 1988; Sykes, 
1990; Winters, 1988). Murray and Maula (2000) reported three major surges in 
CVC activity, the most recent and dramatic of which started around 1998/1999. It 
is suggested that CVC investments by strategically related investors make a 
positive impact on the performance of portfolio companies (Gompers and Lerner, 
Maula and Murray, 2000). Maula and Murray (2000) also noted that most 
research on CVC dated back to the two previous periods of high activity. Most of 
the research on CVC has examined the issue from the perspective of the start-up 
company. Only few studies have been undertaken since 1998, with the 
exceptions of Hellmann (2000), Kann (2000), Maula and Murray (2000), and 
Kelley and Spinelli (2001). 
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While this relationship between CVC unit and portfolio company is explored 
relatively extensively (e.g. Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998; 
Yli-Renko et al., 2001), there is no research on the implications of realizing the 
value within the corporation for the relationship between CVC unit and business 
units involved. Although it is known that a collaborative relationship between the 
corporate investor and the investment affects the returns for a portfolio company 
considerably (Maula and Murray, 2000), the literature provides no answer to the 
necessary question of how this phenomenon becomes possible due to 
collaboration between the CVC unit and BU. 
 
To date, Gompers and Lerner (2001) and Maula and Murray (2000) provide the 
only rigorous quantitative analyses of potential value added. Both studies 
reported positive performance implications of corporate venture capital for the 
PF firms. However, these studies were limited to archival data. Thus, these were 
not able to provide detailed insights into the generation of value within the 
corporation. Table 2-7 provides an overview of the extant literature, success 
factors and operationalized parameters. 
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Figure 2-7: The extant literature, the success factors and the operationalized 
parameters 
Key success factor Studied parameter Author(s) 
• Clarity of focus - Brody, Ehrlich (1998); 
- Bannock (1999);  
- Franzke (2001) 
1. Strategy 
• Long-term and high level 
commitment to CVC 
- Winters, Murfin (1998); 
- Siegel (1988); 
- Bannock (1999) 
• Autonomous entity with 
independent funding 
- Siegel (1988); 
- Bannock (1999); 
- Franzke (2001) 
2. Organization 
• Flat organizations and quick 
decisions 
- Brody, Ehrlich (1998) 
• Company involvement in 
investment process 
- Heikkilä (2000) 
• Existence of corporate 
champions 
- Souder (1981); 
- Burgelman (1983) 
3. Processes 
• Appropriate portfolio 
company controlling, e.g. stop-
loss decision-making. 
- Brody, Ehrlich (1998) 
4. Compensation structure • Incentive systems - Gompers, Lerner (1998); 
- Siegel (1988); 
- Bannock (1999); 
- Franzke (2001) 
 
• Management by experienced 
venture capital managers 
- Winters, Murfin (1988); 
- Siegel (1988); 
- Heikkilä (2000) 
• Partnerships and contacts to 
top tier VCs 
- Heikkilä (2000); 
- Bannock (1999) 
5. VC experience, contacts 
and reputation 
• Reputation as attractive 
capital investor 
- Brody, Ehrlich (1998) 
• Entrepreneurial distrust and 
founding preferences 
- - -  6. Relationship between 
CVC unit and  
portfolio companies • Different time horizons of CVC unit expectations and 
venture development 
- Heikkilä (2000) 
• Strategic conflicts - Burgelman, (1985); 
- Gompers and Lerner (1998) 
• Cultural clashes - - -  
7. Relationships between 
corporate BUs and portfolio 
companies • Too closely networking - Backholm (2000) 
 
This review of the extant literature on CVC can be summarized as follows. Some 
researchers have theorized about the success factors of a CVC program from a 
corporate perspective. These studies include a description of the value added of 
CVC investments, for the invested companies on the one hand, and for the 
corporation itself on the other. Other contributors have focused on the 
relationship between start-up company and corporation. 
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However, it seems that all studies fail to provide systematic evidence of either a 
successful or failed collaboration between CVC unit and business unit. I assume 
that an efficient intra-firm collaboration is a critical prerequisite for achieving the 
objectives that a CVC program pursues. Thus, this dissertation attempts to fill 
this research gap by overcoming the challenge of highlighting the relationships 
between CVC units and BUs. In this work, I seek to address this paucity of 
research by analyzing data on the intra-organizational perspective within a 
corporation. Specifically, I address the mechanisms through which CVC units 
actually collaborate with BUs.  
2.2.2  Definition and objectives of corporate venture capital 
 
While a broad array of definitions of venture capital exists (see NVCA, 2001; 
Lorenz, 1989; Timmons, 1992; Wright and Robbie, 1998; Hellmann, 2000, for 
example), Gompers and Lerner (1994) are the first to consider in their process 
definition of venture capital that there is more to venture capital than investing 
and exiting from investments. They argue that venture capital can be viewed as a 
cycle that starts with raising a venture fund, and proceeds through investing in, 
monitoring, and adding value to firms; the cycle continues as the venture 
capitalist executes successful deals and returns capital to the investor. This 
definition points to the very important value-adding role of venture capitalists 
(Hellman and Puri, 2000; Sapienza, 1992).  
 
There are several ways to define and map the concept of CVC. The two main 
alternative perspectives are viewing CVC (1) as a mode of external corporate 
venturing from the perspective of the corporation (Henderson and Leleux, 2001; 
Kann, 2000; Keil, 2000), or (2) as an alternative source of funding from the 
perspective of an entrepreneurial company (Gompers and Lerner 1998; Maula 
and Murray, 2000). Since this study examines CVC from the perspective of the 
corporation with a focus on internal collaboration between CVC unit and 
business unit, the first perspective is primarily employed. 
 
CASE STUDIES OF INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION OF CVC   35 
While zu Knyphausen-Aufseß (2001) defines CVC more broadly regarding its 
origin,20 I define corporate venture capital as equity-linked (typically minority) 
investments of corporate funds directly in start-up companies, executed by an 
intermediary owned and controlled by a non-financial corporation.21 This 
definition excludes investments made through an external fund managed by a 
third party, even if the investment vehicle is funded by and specifically designed 
to meet the objectives of a single investing company. It also excludes 
investments that fall under the more general rubric of corporate venturing22. The 
definition does however include investments made in start-ups that a company 
has already spun off as independent businesses. In CVC the only limited partner 
is a corporation. Alternatively, a CVC fund can be a subsidiary of a corporation.   
 
According to this definition, CVC investment is identified as one group of 
external venturing modes. CVC investments resemble the operations of 
traditional venture capital firms in regard to programs residing at various levels 
of corporations where investments are made in independent external companies. 
In the case of corporations, investments were made directly into ventures or 
indirectly through dedicated funds or pooled funds managed by external venture 
capital firms.  These modes are fairly well in line with the extant literature 
(Barry, 2000; Bleicher and Paul, 1987; Kann, 2000; McNally, 1997; Sykes, 
1990). Some additional distinctions have been made concerning the organization 
of investments. McNally (1997) proposed that a distinction should be made 
between ad hoc investments and more formal funds. Similarly, Winters and 
Murfin (1988), Sykes (1990), and Mast (1991) recognized varying levels of 
formality in the organization of corporate venturing activities. An important point 
to remember from these distinctions is that the present study focuses on the direct 
investments made by corporations. The focus of this study is highlighted in the 
following framework. 
 
 
                                              
20 Zu Knyphausen-Aufseß (2001) includes (1) investment banks, (2) established technology 
corporations, (3) established non-technology corporations, (4) consulting firms, and (5) start 
up-companies. 
21 Kann (2000) found that the large majority (78%) of CVC investment channels is direct. 
22 For example, the funding of new internal ventures that, while distinct form a company’s core 
business and granted some organizational autonomy, legally remain part of the company. 
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Figure 2-8: Study focuses on direct investments 
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Overall it depends on industry and corporate structure, whether corporations are 
likely to pursue CVC investments. High-tech industries have short innovation 
cycles. Therefore, CVC is more important in high-tech industries like the IT-
industry than in low-tech industries. The corporate strategy has to decide, for 
example, whether in-house R&D or CVC investments should be made and which 
objectives should be pursued with CVC. 
 
A corporate venture capital investment is defined by two characteristics: its 
objective and the degree to which the operations of the investing company and 
the start-up are linked. Although companies typically have a range of objectives 
for their CVC investments, this type of funding usually advances one of the two 
fundamental goals. Some investments are strategic. They are made primarily to 
increase the sales and profits of the corporation’s own businesses. A company 
making a strategic investment seeks to identify and exploit synergies between 
itself and a new venture. The other investment objective is financial, wherein a 
company is mainly looking for attractive returns. Here, a corporation seeks to do 
as well as or better than private VC investors, due to what it sees as its superior 
knowledge of market and technologies, its strong balance sheet, and its ability to 
be a patient investor. In addition, a company’s brand may signal the quality of the 
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start-up to other investors and potential customers, ultimately reaping rewards for 
the original investor. Zu Knyphausen-Aufseß (2001) calls it very appropriately 
“corporate certification” (p. 5). 
 
Regarding the goals of CVC programs, existing research shows very diversified 
results over time. Maula (2001), who provides the most extensive and up-to-date 
review of the goals and objectives of corporate venture capital programs, found 
that corporations appear to pursue multiple goals and strategies in their CVC 
activities. Siegel et al. (1988) found that ‘return on investment’ was the most 
important goal of corporations, followed by ‘exposure to new technologies and 
markets’.  For Sykes (1990), identifying new opportunities and developing 
business relationships is the key. Silver (1993) highlighted finding acquisition 
targets, getting exposure to new markets, adding new products to existing 
distribution channels, externalizing R&D, exposing middle management to 
entrepreneurship, training managers, and utilizing excess plant space, time and 
people as the most important objectives. 
 
Bannock Consulting (2000) surveyed the goals of CVC investors in Europe. It is 
based on 150 corporations engaged in CVC (several answers were possible).23 
The following figure shows that while it is a combination of strategic and 
financial goals, in most cases strategic objectives are favored over the financials. 
 
Figure 2-9: Strategic objectives 
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Source: Bannock Consulting, 2000 
The most frequent goals were strategic with 92% followed by financial with 
58%. Several goals are usually pursued at the same time. Strategic and financial  
                                              
23 See Bannock Consulting, Ltd., Corporate Venturing in Europe, London, UK, 1999, p. 14 
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goals especially are often combined. Recent research has shown that strategic and 
financial objectives are not substitutes; instead, both are very important 
motivations for corporations (Alter and Buchsbaum, 2000). Keil (2000) 
concluded that while strategic objectives are often the driver for setting up 
corporate venture capital programs, investments are often made according to 
financial criteria. 
  
Following this classification of goals, this thesis classifies the objectives in the 
same way: 
• Strategic objectives 
• Financial objectives 
• Social objectives 
 
Previous work summarizes one specific dimension under strategic objectives. It 
includes: diversification (Ansoff, 1965; Rumelt, 1974), growth (Fast, 1977), 
corporate renewal, and adaptation to the environment (Utterback, 1994), 
development of new knowledge (Leonard-Barton, 1992, 1995), access to 
technology and markets (Christensen, 1997), and promotion of innovation and 
entrepreneurship (Covin, 1991). More recent work provides a more finely-
grained classification of goals and objectives in CVC programs that 
simultaneously summarizes different aspects under strategic objectives. Kann 
(2000) distinguishes between three classes of strategic objectives: (1) external 
R&D, (2) accelerated market entry, and (3) demand enhancement. Keil (2000) 
even identifies four primary strategic objectives: (1) early market warning 
signals, (2) “learning new markets and new technologies”, (3) option building, 
and (4) market enactment. Alternatively, Maula (2001) utilizes three main 
categories: (1) learning, (2) option building, and (3) leveraging. The following 
figure shows the classification of objectives, with their corresponding sub-
objectives in each category that is used in this thesis. 
 
CASE STUDIES OF INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION OF CVC   39 
Figure 2-10: Classification of Objectives 
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In specifying the strategic purposes, Kann (2000) showed that the goals of 
external R&D to acquire resources (45%) and accelerated market entry (30%) are 
the most common strategic purposes. The strategic objective enhancement of 
demand for core products (24%) follows in order to leverage existing resources 
more effectively. 
 
The second defining characteristic of CVC investments is the degree to which 
companies in the investment portfolio are linked to the investing company’s 
current operational capabilities - that is, its resources and processes. For 
example a start-up with strong links to the investing company might make use of 
that company’s manufacturing plants, distribution channels, technology, or 
brand. It might adopt the investing company’s business practices to build, sell or 
serve its products. In this sense, Kanns’ study (2000) shows that 80 % of CVC 
programs can be characterized as providing assistance to the entrepreneurial firm 
in either managerial or technical matters. 
 
This short illustration of the two defining characteristics of CVC makes a 
harmonious and highly efficient internal collaboration between CVC unit and 
business unit indispensable. Sometimes, however, a company’s own resources 
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and processes can become liabilities rather than capabilities, particularly when it 
faces new markets or disruptive technologies.24 Therefore, an internal 
cooperation between these two organizationally independent departments - CVC 
unit and business unit  - is even more important.   
  
2.2.3 Value-added of Corporate Venture Capital 
 
The primary role of corporate venture capitalists is to provide funding for young 
entrepreneurial firms. However, corporate venture capitalists (as well as venture 
capitalists) are typically different from passive investors.25 According to Gorman 
and Sahlman (1989) venture capitalists spend half of their time on monitoring 
ventures and on post-investment relationships with them.  
 
Because of their experience with numerous ventures and large exposure to 
financial, labor, and other resource markets, corporate venture capitalists are in a 
good position to support their portfolio companies. Corporate venture capitalists 
have been acknowledged as providing valuable help to their portfolio companies 
in the form of serving as a sounding board to the entrepreneurial team, for 
instance, or helping the firms obtain alternative sources of equity financing, or 
interfacing with the investor group, monitoring financial performance, 
monitoring operating performance, or helping their portfolio firms attract sources 
of debt financing (MacMillan et al. 1988). Similar results have been found by 
Gorman and Sahlman (1989), Sapienza et al. (1996), and Rosenstein et al. 
(1993).  
 
The special nature of corporate venture capital investments provides a unique 
opportunity for an additional kind of value-added. Because the parent firm of the 
corporate venture capital investor is typically a major industrial corporation, the 
relationship between CVC unit and business unit opens up access to the resources 
of the parent corporation, such as distribution channels, production facilities, 
                                              
24 For an introduction to disruptive technologies, see Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s 
Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail, Harvard Business School, 
1997. 
25 Zu Knyphausen-Aufseß (2001) goes one step further and looks at the potential value-added of 
different types of corporate venture capitalists.      
CASE STUDIES OF INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION OF CVC   41 
research and development opportunities, corporate technology, market and 
technology experts, or pricing benefits of the products and services of the 
corporation (Alter and Buchsbaum, 2000; Barry, 2000; Christopher 2000; Kelley 
and Spinelli, 2001; Maula and Murray 2000).  Large global corporations also 
conduct market research that may be valuable for new ventures operating in 
related fields (Dube, 2000; Maula and Murray, 2000). Due to the benefits 
mentioned, an investor relationship with a major corporation may provide 
valuable endorsement for a new technology-based firm (Kelley and Spinelli, 
2001; Maula and Murray, 2000). In this study the term “value-added” is used to 
refer to all non-financial benefits the portfolio companies receive from the 
corporate venture capital investor as a result of the relationship between the CVC 
unit and the business units of a corporation. This study is based on the 
assumption that the better the CVC unit and the business unit collaborate, the 
more value-added result for the financed start-up companies.  
 
2.3 The Cases of German CVC Programs 
 
In the following three sections the aim is to give a very detailed description of the  
intra-organizational collaboration of three German CVC programs, Siemens 
Venture Capital (Section 2.3.1), T-Venture (Section 2.3.2), and DaimlerChrylser 
Venture (Section 2.3.3).   
2.3.1 Siemens Venture Capital 
 
The objective of this case is to describe the intra-organizational collaboration 
between the business unit and the CVC unit throughout the investment process at 
Siemens Venture Capital. First, a brief general corporate profile of Siemens and 
Siemens Venture Capital will be presented. Second, the case will focus on 
describing the investment  process between the CVC unit and  business units, and 
finally, within-case analysis will be carried out.26 
 
                                              
26 This case study draws on transcribed interviews with Doris Blasel, Bruno Steis, and 
conversations with Dr. Hildegard Wiggenhorn. The appendix includes an overview of the 
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Corporate Profile 
Siemens is a global powerhouse in electrical engineering and electronics. With 
more than 400,000 employees in over 190 countries and sales of over €70 billion, 
Siemens develops and manufactures leading edge products, designs and installs 
complex systems, and tailors individual services for the benefit of its customers. 
By utilizing innovative technologies and comprehensive know-how, Siemens 
helps its customers to meet their business and technical needs in business 
segments of energy, industry transportation, health care, lighting, information 
and communication. In the fiscal year 2001 Siemens earned €2.1 billion in net 
income including Infineon and special items as well as restructuring charges and 
asset write-downs. EBITA from Operations (excluding Infineon) was €1.3 
billion. Last year, this figure was €2.8 billion. The following figure gives an 
overview of the corporate structure of Siemens. 
 
Figure 2-11: Corporate Structure of Siemens AG27 
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Regarding venture capital activities, Siemens AG can look back on vast 
experience. As early as the beginning of the ’80s, as the first waves washed from 
the US to Europe, Siemens founded a venture capital company and became CVC 
pioneer in Germany. In 1984, together with other investors, Siemens founded the 
Techno Venture Management group (TVM), which provided venture capital for 
                                                                                                                                    
affiliations and job titles of all interviewees. This case is also based on annual reports, public 
speeches, press releases and analysts’ reports.     
27 Apart from this, there are several incubator and accelerator units at Siemens, e.g. Siemens 
Business Accelerator, Siemens Technology, Technology-to-Business Center, ICN nCubator.   
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American and European start-up companies. In October 1998, the central 
managing board of Siemens decided on the new alignment of Siemens venture 
activities. In January 1999, Siemens Venture Capital group was transformed to 
Siemens Corporate Venture Capital (SVC). The subsidiary of Siemens AG has 
the legal form of a limited liability company (GmbH). Under the banner of 
“Fostering Innovation for Economic Success”, SVC has been set up as a globally 
active investment vehicle which provides “smart money” to innovative 
businesses to create long-term company value.  
SVC belongs to the Corporate Finance department and has about 30 employees, 
15 of which are investment managers (as per 2001). The trans-sectoral CVC 
activities of SVC establish access possibilities to all business units at Siemens and 
guarantee the securing of corporate interests regarding CVC activities. Besides 
this, VC units also developed in other specific business units, i.e. in the groups 
Information and Communication Networks (ICN) and Information and 
Communication Mobile (ICM),28 and also in the unit Medical Solutions and 
Automation and Drives. The organization structure of the venture capital 
activities arises from the opinion that the de-central organization structure of 
Siemens should therefore be followed by de-central CVC activities. The 
following figure illustrates the differences in the diverse CVC activities and 
shows the umbrella function of Siemens Venture Capital.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
28 Both of these venture units are operating under the name Mustang Ventures. Mustang 
Ventures, the largest unit, has received $370 million and has more than 45 companies in its 
portfolio. The amounts managed and deployed by Siemens Medical Solutions and 
Automation and Drive are not known. 
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Figure 2-12: Organization structure of Siemens CVC 
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However, according to the company, the venture units located in a business unit 
have been reintegrated as of 01.10.2001 in order to create “one voice to the 
market”. “We cannot distract our operating groups from focusing on their core 
businesses, which is not venture capital, but competing with Ciscos, the Nortels, 
the Ericsons, and the Nokias of the world,” says Naveed Kahn.29 The 
reorganization also aims at making the use of available resources more 
effective.30 
Siemens pursues three objectives with its CVC activities. The first is to identify 
and fund investments in emerging and innovative technologies that enhance the 
core business scope of Siemens. Second, supporting entrepreneurs for Siemens 
means not only investing capital, but also providing use of the links to Siemens’ 
businesses. In this sense, they try to establish the link to the corresponding 
business group quickly and effectively in order to maximize the financial success 
of the company. Third, by leveraging the global power and resources of Siemens, 
SVC enables entrepreneurs to gain increasing market presence and credibility. Of 
                                              
29 Naveed Kahn is the president and CEO of SVC’s U.S. operations, see Corporate Venturing 
Report, October 2001, p. 17 
30 See www.ventureeconomics.com, on the homepage under “news”, as of 12.09.2001. 
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course, the access to worldwide marketing and distribution channels, as well as 
the brand name Siemens play an important role. Putting all these objectives 
together, the effort should result in an attractive ROI for Siemens. The three 
blocks of core activities, Financing, Consulting & Coaching, and Networking, are 
summarized in the following figure. 
Figure 2-13: Core Activities of Siemens Venture Capital 
 Core Activities of Siemens Venture Capital 
Financing Consulting & Coaching Networking 
• Internal Ventures (Spin-offs) 
- department-specific 
- not department-specific 
minority investments 
by SVC 
• External Ventures 
Minority investments, 
Possible together with 
units / corporate technology 
• Venture Capital Funds in 
USA, Israel, Europa (Com- 
mitments in 98/99 
EURO 49 million) 
• Portfolio management
- legal, labor and
patent aspects); Coor-
dination of technical issues
• Venture Nurturing
• Support of the units in
establishing venture units
• Funds-Portfolio Management
In order to increase financial
return and
strategic aims 
(Information about / access to
high-tech companies
• Central  contact partner
for all VC activities of
Siemens AG 
- Siemens internal and
- external, for Venture Capita-
  lists and start-ups 
• Information and Know-
How Center 
• VC Event Management
• Best Practice Sharing
Source: Siemens Venture Capital company presentation  
 
 
SVC, headquartered in Munich, Germany, is geographically represented at 
locations of the main businesses of Siemens.31 In order to be present in the hot 
spot of the venture capital scene, in April 1999 Siemens Venture Capital L.L.C., 
based in Santa Clara, California, was founded as a 100 % subsidiary of SVC. 
Another branch of SVC is located in Boston, MA32. Since 1999, Siemens venture 
units have invested more than €500 million, accumulating a current portfolio of 
more than 70 start-up companies.33 Of the $180 million received by Siemens in 
2001, 60 percent, or $108 million, went into 30 venture funds as indirect 
investments. 
                                              
31 At the same time, Munich (Germany) is the headquarters of Siemens AG. 
32 It is also planned to open a branch in Israel. Currently, one consultant is responsible for Israel 
and therefore commutes between Germany and Israel. 
33 The appendix includes a detailed list of the portfolio firms of SVC. 
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Investment foci are on seed, early, and mezzanine stage-investments in the fields 
of Information and Communication, Automation and Control, Medical Solutions 
and Power. Through investments in horizontal technologies, SVC operates from a 
trans-sectoral perspective in order to cover “white spaces”, multiple impacts, and 
joint-competencies. Furthermore, SVC has the exclusive right at Siemens to 
invest in venture capital funds. The conceptual formulation of SVC is mirrored in 
the company organization structure: a matrix organization has been established 
that shows three business areas (Internal Ventures, External Ventures, and 
Venture Funds) and four cross-sectional functions (Technology & Markets, 
Communications, Finance & Controlling and Regions). 
 
Figure 2-14: Company Organization Structure of Siemens Venture Capital 
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companies, and finally (c) the business units of Siemens. In-house generated 
deals especially represent a better basis for the further support in the investment 
process, since regarding these deals the contact between the business units and 
the company already exists, as this comment made by one investment manager 
illustrates:  
“We have a couple of investments that have been transferred from a business unit 
to SVC regarding interest in an investment. That has the huge advantage that we are 
beyond regarding the further collaboration, since we do not have to bring the 
company in contact with a business unit.” (Steis)  
 
With regard to tracking the deal flow, the interviews reveal an interesting 
difference between Mustang Ventures and SVC. While in the first case the 
corresponding business unit has access to the deal flow database of the CVC unit, 
and vice versa, this possibility is not established in the case of SVC.  
     
Deal Evaluation 
Regarding incoming investment inquiries at SVC, it is the investment managers’ 
assignment to identify interesting portfolio firms for SVC in fields where the 
parent company is operating. With respect to the focused investment areas, SVC 
sees itself in an advantageous situation, since the operation areas of Siemens are 
broader in scope than is the case for other competitors in CVC. The following 
statement confirms this point of view:  
“The main way in which SVC differentiates itself from its competitors is that our 
parent company Siemens is positioned more broadly regarding their business 
activities than Intel, for example. Therefore, our focus is not as narrow as in the 
case of Intel Capital.”(Steis) 
 
The objective for an investment manager is to elaborate an investment proposal 
for those start-up companies that appear attractive. In doing this, the investment 
managers at Siemens are empowered by a high level of autonomy regarding the 
decision over which companies to screen and to inspect further in the investment 
process. However, the technological search-areas that have been identified in a 
business unit act as a guideline. With this in mind, the CVC manager attempts to 
select companies that close the gaps in the business units’ portfolios. Since SVC 
wants to utilize the different experiences of its investment managers, the final 
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investment proposal is electronically distributed to all investment managers. 
During a weekly, mandatory telephone conference34, questions regarding an 
investment proposal are dealt with. When a unanimous and positive decision has 
been reached regarding a potential deal, the investment opportunity will be 
pursued further in the due diligence process. An investment manager justifies the 
approach: 
“The process is configured like this, since we recognized that investment 
managers’ different experiences lead to different investments. If all investment 
managers agree, we feel relatively confident that we have a good investment 
proposal that we can present to the investment committee. Four eyes see better than 
two!”(Blasel) 
 
Interestingly, the possibility of active involvement by the business units in the 
first screening is not evaluated as favorable. The reasons illustrated for this seem 
reasonable: first, basic financial investment criteria (like investment volume, 
phase of investment, etc.) have to be checked by SVC. Second, SVC only wants 
to get in contact with business units regarding deals where they see a realistic 
chance that an investment could be of interest to a business unit. This approach 
supports the intention to use a business unit’s resources economically.  
In accomplishing the due diligence of the investment process, the business units 
are actively involved in investment activities for the first time. This is the case in 
10-20% of the total deal flow at SVC. For the due diligence process relevant 
business units of Siemens comprise the internal resources competent in 
technological questions: the corresponding operational unit, Corporate 
Technology and Corporate R&D.  On the other hand, however, it also includes 
more administrative departments like Legal Services, Tax, Controlling 
/Accounting, and Human Resources. The first reason for the involvement of 
Siemens’ departments within due diligence is quite obvious: 
“… so you see, we really can use internal due diligence skills, and we use them for 
getting feedback if there is interest in a business unit a potential portfolio 
firm.”(Blasel) 
 
                                              
34 Since it is an online conference, participation means the “dial-in” by each investment 
manager. 
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The second reason for this procedure at SVC simultaneously represents the 
establishment of the first contact between the business unit and the start-up 
company that is the basis for a subsequent cooperation between both. In this 
context, the investment manager is once more at liberty to select the persons 
he/she contacts at Siemens for cooperation in the due diligence process. 
However, it is not mandatory for SVC to have a business unit involved in the due 
diligence process in order to pursue the investment process. Unfortunately, the 
voluntary character of asking a business unit for advice entails the danger that 
SVC invests in a company that represents a competitor of one of the business 
unit’s existing cooperation partners. This problem was clearly articulated in an 
interview at the business unit ICMS35:  
“As SVC does not need our 100 % commitment in all cases, it could happen that 
they invest and we work together with the competitor. That’s nonsense. That helps 
nobody; that is not profitable for anybody.” (Dr. Wiggenhorn) 
Since SVC is aware of this situation, their general objective is to get the business 
unit involved and in contact with the investee; even if SVC has the expertise and 
knowledge among the CVC managers. Therefore, one of the primarily tasks of 
the CVC unit is to establish corporation-wide structures that allow fast decisions 
regarding investment possibilities. The interesting question is how SVC managers 
find the corresponding experts. 
 
Of particular importance is that some business units have “innovation teams”, or 
“venture units”36. The idea at Siemens is the following: on the one hand, each 
venture unit represents the single point of entry for SVC when contacting a 
business unit. They channel SVC’s inquiries to the corresponding people within 
the business units and are responsible for a speedy decision on their interest in 
the technology of a start-up company37. On the other hand, in return SVC has to 
support the establishment of these venture units, and to continually report on the 
                                              
35 ICMS stands for Information and Communication Mobile Solutions. This business unit, 
founded in 2000, tries to bridge mobile infrastructure and communication.  
36 In this sense, venture units are small teams in the areas Information & Communication 
Networks (ICN) and Infineon Technologies, Information & Communication Products (ICP), 
Medical Engineering (Med), Finance (ZF), Technology (ZT) and Automation & Drives 
(A&D), responsible at the same time for Production & Logistics Systems (PL). Other 
Siemens units are only designated contact partners.  
37 At Siemens they define ‘speedy’ as ‘within a few days’.  
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latest activities regarding venture capital to Siemens. These venture units are in 
line with SVC’s aims towards individual project-oriented work rather than relying 
on institutionalized meetings. 
 
“…since all is based on single projects, these contacts to the venture units are 
fostered and cultivated.” (Blasel) 
 
Besides this, SVC’s investment managers use their personal relationships to 
navigate their way through the company. The investment managers’ personal 
contacts accrue either from previous functions in other units of the corporation, 
or from visiting internal and external events and meetings at Siemens. In this 
sense, each investment manager is responsible for his/her own personal network, 
and is urged to expand it constantly. Furthermore, the interviews illustrate that 
the longer SVC is in operation, the better CVC units are known within the group, 
and the broader the personal networks of the investment managers with the 
business units become. This facilitates SVC to coordinate the expertise required 
within the corporation for evaluating investment proposals. The process of 
“navigating” within the company looking for advice is perceived as follows:  
 
“By ‘navigating’ our way through the company, so far we always found those we 
have been interested in. You ask all sorts of people, and you have colleagues with a 
lot of experience. Actually, it is the personal network that develops steadily. Now, 
due to our activities in the past we already have a number of contacts to the 
business units. That grows with time and experience.“ (Blasel) 
 
Moreover, in order to expand the extant network of SVC, they actively try to 
establish new relationships with business units if there is an interesting deal for a 
business unit that has not yet been involved in CVC activities. In this pursuit, 
SVC invites the business unit to participate in the sales pitch, or to join an 
investment manager visiting a potential portfolio firm. Both possibilities pretend 
to establish a first personal contact between an investment manager and new 
business units. Finally, both the online presence of SVC on the intranet homepage 
of Siemens and the published SVC articles in the corporate newsletter “Siemens-
Welt” aim to keep the business units informed about the CVC activities at 
Siemens. 
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Deal structuring and investment decision 
In the preceding investment process, SVC has selected those deals that 
correspond with investment criteria. Graphically speaking, the selected 
companies of interest are located in the intersection of the two circles “financial 
objectives” and “strategic objectives”. 
Figure 2-15: The companies of interest are located in the intersection of the two 
circles “financial objectives” and “strategic objectives” 
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This target selection is a theme in SVC’s mission: “Fostering innovation for 
economic support”. However, in spite of an officially stated equilibrium of both 
objectives in their mission, the interviews at SVC reveal a certain preference in 
favor of the financial goals. The following statement by an investment manager 
at SVC underpins this and shows the underlying reasons for it:  
“If in doubt, we prioritize the financial goals. The reasons are quite simple: first, 
financial success is easier to measure, and second, we do not invest strategically 
without financial returns.”(Steis) 
 
Companies that still have the unanimous compliance of the investment managers 
after an accomplished due diligence will be nominated as prospective portfolio 
firms at the investment committee. Interestingly, the actual composition of the 
investment committee depends on the investment volume: the executive board is 
authorized to make investment decisions of up to €2.5 million regarding fund-
investments and up to €1.25 million regarding direct investments. Siemens 
CASE STUDIES OF INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION OF CVC   52 
Venture Board reaches decisions regarding investments that exceed these limits 
in value. In the case of investments above € 5 million, the corporate steering 
committee of Siemens has to be called in. Therefore, at least with bigger 
investments a cross-unit perspective is thus established. A main success factor of 
SVC is that a decision is guaranteed within two days, independent of the actual 
composition of the investment committee. 
Regarding the final investment decision at SVC, business units only take an 
advisory function. Further, SVC does not require any sanction from a business 
unit in order to pursue an investment decision. While this freedom disguises the 
danger that SVC may invest in a company in spite of its rejection by a business 
unit, at the same time it offers the possibility of investing in very future-oriented 
technologies that are currently not relevant for any business unit, but where SVC 
is convinced of the future relevance of the technology. This freedom is based on 
the structural embedding of SVC as a separate department, enabling SVC to 
operate independently and to reach decisions fast.38 The vote of the business 
units is however taken into consideration indirectly, since the heads of Corporate 
Finance and Corporate Technology are represented on the board of SVC. 
Although board meetings only take place twice a year, it is possible for single 
members of the board to be contacted outside formal meetings as well. 
Although SVC generally decides and is solely responsible for an investment 
decision, there is one exception: if there is a co-investment with a business unit, 
the business unit is also responsible for any decisions reached. Moreover, there is 
an unwritten rule that SVC does not usually invest in a company if a business unit 
signalizes negative feedback. This could be for the following reasons: (1) no 
current interest in the technology of a start-up company, (2) potential investment 
is a main competitor of an existing partner of a business unit, (3) technology is 
not valid from a technical point of view. As one investment manager put it, the 
situation is perceived as follows: 
“…if we are convinced of the high relevance of a technology, then we would invest 
in a company without much ado, even if we could not see a possibility for 
                                              
38 With respect to the investments, the accentuation of SVC’s independence should demonstrate 
that they do not represent the extended arm of the M&A activities of Siemens, that is 
interested in taking over a company by acquisition.  
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cooperation right now. But normally, if a business unit rejects an investment, we 
also refrain from an investment in that company.” (Blasel) 
 
At the time of the investment decision, SVC does not insist that a cooperation 
contract between a start-up and a business unit be already in existence. However, 
SVC wants to have at least an indication that cooperation is realistic. For the 
future, they are currently planning to integrate the business units in the 
investment committee, where their sanction will be necessary regarding final 
approval.      
In order to meet the requirements of the business unit regarding the decision 
making in the investment process (either due diligence, product or final 
investment decision), the business units apply milestone planning. However, this 
requires that the employees are informed about the process itself, and further that 
the milestones are also coordinated, tracked, and finally accomplished. That this 
tracking mechanism does not exclude escalation within a business unit becomes 
obvious in the following statement by one business unit manager: 
“If the people do not reach the deadlines, you have to kick up a row. And further, 
the issue then escalates if you inform the next management level. Sometimes you 
have to put the pressure on; that is how it works.”(Dr.Wiggenhorn) 
 
Portfolio and support management 
Since Siemens is a technological company positioned strongly in many markets, 
it appears obvious that a high value added can be brought to the portfolio 
companies if only the internal collaboration is adequate. The transformation of 
these value-adding services in the post-investment phase will be explained in the 
following section. 
From a theoretical point of view, the portfolio companies generally enjoy access 
to all corporate facilities. However, the individual project has to show, which 
corporate facilities are required by a portfolio company. Looking at the manifold 
spectrum ranging from technology partnership to distribution partnership to 
technology transfers between portfolio company and business unit to 
collaboration with Corporate Technology39, the required involvement of a 
                                              
39 This usually takes place where basic technologies are concerned.  
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business unit becomes obvious. However, the final realization of any value added 
strongly depends first on the willingness of a business unit to collaborate, and 
second on the portfolio companies’ requirements, which are related to the 
development stage of an investment.   
For the portfolio company, the SVC investment managers are the first contact 
partners. However, they are only intermediaries, since their purpose is to get the 
portfolio company in touch with a suitable business unit. This aim is even 
determined in SVC’s balance scorecard. However, as soon as the formal 
collaboration between the portfolio company and the business unit is established, 
SVC takes one step back regarding the management of projects, which means a 
shift in the responsibilities of the investment managers. While they were 
responsible more on an active operational level during the pre-investment phase 
(e.g. accomplishing the financial due diligence, conducting negotiations, closing 
deals), their responsibilities in the post-investment phase are of a more 
representative nature: representing SVC’s interests in the shareholder meetings of 
the portfolio firms, and controlling the process of nurturing between the portfolio 
company and the business units. Since these projects take place directly between 
business unit and portfolio company, SVC is no longer actively involved.  
“…when we have established the formal basis for cooperation, we usually see that 
it works without our further input. Our purpose is that later on the portfolio 
company works directly together with the business unit without our input. We want 
to be involved in the beginning, but then we retract step by step.” (Blasel) 
 
In spite of this successive withdrawal of SVC during the post-investment phase, 
an investment manager generally calculates that one day per week will be 
required for the overseeing management of one company. This shows that in 
spite of no direct involvement, SVC stays informed about the status quo 
regarding the development of an investment. In the face of this withdrawal by 
SVC, it is even more important to have knowledge about critical contacts and 
people involved with the business units in order to ensure efficient internal 
processes. While venture units represented the entrance to a business unit in the 
pre-investment phase, in the post-investment phase SVC typically contacts 
people who do not belong to the venture unit. Now, although very working-level 
people are in charge of the daily collaboration with investments, the investment 
manager mainly stays in contact with senior management.  
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The question that has to be answered is, what are the incentives a business unit 
has to collaborate with SVC? Astonishingly, besides the profit from a strategic 
“win-win” situation there is no further incentive for a business unit to provide 
their know-how. Although the possibility to charge incidental costs can 
positively influence the incentive of a business unit to collaborate, in general 
there is no internal billing of services by business units at Siemens.40 Therefore, 
since SVC has no incentive mechanisms for a business unit to collaborate, the 
investment managers feel a certain shiftlessness regarding the resulting 
cumbersome support management of a business unit. 
“Presently, the motivation at the business units simply – unfortunately - consists of 
the possibility that the business unit recognizes a ‘win-win’ situation. That is to say 
that with the innovation of the start-up company they have to be positive about an 
improvement of their products, their processes, or their access to the market know-
how. We as SVC only can bring the business unit into contact with a start-up 
company. Afterwards, the daily business shows whether they really collaborate. 
We’re not in charge of that. We can only introduce the business unit to the 
company, but we cannot force them. Therefore, the biggest hurdle lies on the side 
of the business unit itself: sometimes we really have to wait unacceptably long for 
their feedback.”(Blasel) 
 
At Siemens, the reason that there is no financial incentive for a business unit is 
partly related to the source of the capital as well the destination of the gained 
profits: both is Corporate Finance. This is the case unless a business unit 
together with SVC co-invests in a company.41 Nonetheless, the interviews reveal 
a dilemma with respect to the financial profit-sharing of business units. On the 
one hand, the motivation for CVC of a business unit is low due to non-existent 
financial incentives for a business unit. On the other hand, however, since these 
co-investments are only long-term oriented, the interest on the side of a business 
unit to engage in this type of co-investments with their own budget is quite 
limited. The reason for this is that the time frame of thinking in vague CVC 
returns is not congruent with the operational one. The quotation of a business 
manager reveals that: 
                                              
40 Exceptionally, regarding the services provided by legal and tax departments a cost allocation 
takes place by the use of intra-company prices. 
41 Since the re-organization of SVC on October 1, 2001, business units are also participating 
financially in the investments.  
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“These kinds of investment have the disadvantage for us that the investments are 
only to exit in 3-5 years. Therefore, nobody invests 2 million of his/her own budget 
today in order to have the possibility (!) to earn 50 million in 5 years. That is not 
the time horizon we usually calculate in a business unit.” (Dr. Wiggenhorn) 
 
A central element in this post-investment scenario is represented by the 
cooperation contracts.42 On the one hand, they determine the extent to which a 
business unit profits strategically from an investment (e.g. by joint distribution or 
R&D projects between a company and a business unit). On the other hand, it 
represents the written detail of the resources the business units are finally willing 
to bring in. The task of SVC regarding these cooperation contracts is that the 
investment manager attempts to formulate a ‘win-win’ situation both for the 
business unit (regarding the technical innovation of a start-up) and the portfolio 
company (regarding the required support by a business unit). However, since 
SVC wants to avoid long-lasting investment decisions in the pre-investment 
phase, the contracts are usually finalized only in the post-investment phase. 
With regard to the characteristics of the post-investment collaboration between 
the involved actors, SVC reported three influence factors. First, the quality of the 
collaborations strongly depends on the fit of the individual “chemistry” between 
the actors involved. Second, the concrete workload of the persons involved in a 
business unit influences the level of collaboration. And finally, the interest of a 
business unit to collaborate depends on the immediate effects the technology of 
an investment has on its economic results. The situation is perceived in the words 
of one investment manager as follows:  
“…what we see regarding innovations close-by a business unit, we receive access 
to the business units very easily, whereas in very long-term oriented innovations 
we have more problems. In this case, we are better off having corporate technology 
as a contact partner, for example.” (Blasel) 
 
The interconnected critical challenge for SVC is to detach the required resources 
from the daily activities of a business unit, representing primarily time and 
personal know-how in order to support a start-up company. That in turn is 
aggravated in this case, since Siemens only applies operational figures (e.g. sale) 
as performance criteria to evaluate a business unit. The immediate consequence 
                                              
42 Between 80 and 90% of the investments cooperation contracts exist.  
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is that strategic issues are neglected in the business units, which means long 
response times for SVC regarding its strategically oriented CVC inquiries:  
“…the problem regarding long response times is due to the fact that the business 
units at Siemens are mainly driven to deliver adequate quarterly results. What SVC 
feels of that circumstance is that the strategic aspects sometimes are neglected.” 
(Steis)  
 
Putting all these obstacles together, the interesting issue is how SVC tries to 
overcome these hurdles. Of particular importance is that the investment manager 
knows relevant business unit employees and has personal contacts with them. In 
order to get voluntary support by people in a business unit, the positive influence 
of personal networking was mentioned several times during the interviews at 
Siemens. Moreover, the knowledge of the corporation structures and its 
businesses in order to locate efficiently the required expertise was emphasized as 
“USP” of a corporate investment manager. The awareness of this necessity at 
Siemens is mirrored by the composition of the SVC team. While 2/3 are former 
Siemens employees, only 1/3 of the SVC team has been hired outside the group. 
Interestingly, the same consciousness exists in the business units, as this 
quotation shows: 
“However, while all contracts and incentive systems are necessary for framing the 
collaboration, it is less important for the daily work. In this sense, the formation of 
the personal level is more elementary and important. Based on this personal 
approach, a lot of things can be handled; we don’t have to charge costs if we don’t 
want to.” (Steis) 
   
However, the personally based, voluntary engagement seems to have a limit. The 
interviews conducted in a business unit show two determinants an investment 
manager should always be aware of: the quantity and the quality of support 
inquiries forwarded to a business unit by an investment manager influence the 
motivation of a business unit. From a qualitative point of view, the investment 
manager must be convinced about the technical relevance and their significance 
for a business unit. Regarding quantity, the number of inquiries should be 
limited, since the interviews show that for large-scale CVC activities the strategic 
objectives are not sufficient and do not satisfy the expectations of a business unit. 
The comparison of the situation between SVC and Mustang Ventures, where 
financial profits are guaranteed for business units, corroborates this belief:  
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“ At ICMS the main incentive is to participate in the profit of a portfolio company. 
The incentive is much lower if we only obtain a better leverage effect in a strategic 
partnership. But strategic incentives would not be enough for an investment 
volume that we have with Mustang Ventures.” (Dr. Wiggenhorn) 
 
A somewhat different aspect influencing support management is the geographical 
location of CVC unit and business unit. Since the geographical proximity 
between SVC and Siemens divisions is highly important in order to establish a 
reasonable cooperation, the headquarters of SVC is located in the same city as the 
majority of the Siemens business units: Munich. Therefore, SVC also transfers 
investments to the specific SVC representation that the investment comes from 
(or is closest to). Both are done in order to facilitate the link to the business units.  
“I think that a geographical closeness to the business units is essential. You will not 
succeed in establishing a collaboration if you have a deal in the US but the business 
unit is located in Germany. Therefore, this has always been a strategy for us; you 
need to have a worldwide presence.” (Blasel) 
 
Further, a mutual understanding of the objectives and interests both of the CVC 
unit and the business unit is decisive for a successful collaboration. This means 
on the one hand that the operational units should know about the positive effects 
CVC could have for their business. In this pursuit, for instance, the business unit 
ICMS tries to rouse interest in CVC among their employees by clearly 
demonstrating possible venturing advantages. However, on the other hand, the 
CVC manager has, first, to demonstrate technical basic knowledge, second, to 
consider the personal interests of business unit employees, third, to know the 
political conditions at a business unit, and finally, to know when and how to 
approach the senior management of a business unit. These flexible abilities have 
been reported in the business unit as important personal characteristics that a 
CVC manager has to demonstrate in order to survive and maintain credibility at a 
business unit in the long-term.  
“The investment manager really has to be able to adapt himself to a business unit in 
order to survive. If not, he/she will not succeed in the collaboration in the long-
term. You really need to have credibility in front of the technical experts.” (Dr. 
Wiggenhorn) 
 
Moreover, since the topic of CVC in general and SVC in particular is strongly 
pushed by Siemens’ top management, the set-up of the required in-house 
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structures to a business unit seem to be facilitated. To put it precisely, at Siemens 
there is the obligation by the corporate executive management that regarding 
upcoming product decisions of a business unit the corresponding existing 
investments have to be explicitly considered as a potential alternative. Finally, 
the intensification of the personal relations and a further exchange of information 
are the purposes of frequent institutionalized events and meetings at SVC, where 
diverse business units are invited that could be interested in technologies of start-
up companies. These mere internal events are supplemented by conferences at 
Siemens where external guests also participate. The biggest and most prominent 
example are “Siemens Venture Capital Days.” The positive effect of this 
communication and ‘get to know’ platform is clearly illustrated by an investment 
manager: 
 
“From our past events, overall Siemens Venture Capital Days have developed 
manifold joint-activities ex-post; either between the portfolio companies or 
between the SVC and the business units.” (Blasel) 
 
Interestingly, SVC takes a firm negative stand regarding the definition of 
designated contact partners in a business unit for the start-up company in the 
cooperation contracts. The arguments for this rejection are quite clear. First, 
internal personal changes in a business unit make predetermining a constant 
contact partner impossible. Second, and even more importantly, SVC wants to 
retain the freedom of which business unit they address regarding a portfolio 
company, and last but not least, SVC itself wants to represent the constant point 
of contact for the start-up companies. This continuity would not be guaranteed on 
the part of the business unit due to permanent strategic changes.   
Finally, the interviews reveal a further interesting distinction in contact persons 
regarding different post-investment aims. In this sense, while SVC preferably 
contacts persons from the upper echelons (e.g. supervisors or senior management 
of business units) for the final guarantee/coordination of the operational support, 
for the daily support of a business unit they address those who are located on a 
more operational level (e.g. technical experts). In cases where problems escalate, 
SVC even has access to the corporate executive management of the group. 
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Exit management 
In general, SVC does not show any preference for a certain exit possibility. 
Although a business unit only participates on the financial returns of an exit in 
the case that a co-investment exists with SVC, again, the interviews show the 
pressing necessity of profit sharing in order to maintain the engagement in a 
business unit for further investments. This basic necessity is quite obvious in the 
words of a business unit manager:  
 
“However, what really would be essential for us in the long-term is that after the 
successful exit of a portfolio firm, we also get some profit from it. This would just 
be fair since we also contributed to the development of an investment. If not, we 
really see the danger here in the department that the topic CVC and the interest will 
drop away. That is especially true if, as in the case of SVC, the CVC unit is 
centrally organized within a corporation.” (Dr. Wiggenhorn)  
 
However, the case description regarding exit management at SVC has to be 
considerably shortened, since at the time of the interviews Siemens had limited 
experience in doing exits, since they had only carried out one exit: November 
AG, at the Neuer Markt, Germany. 
 
In order to conclude this case description I summarize following figure 
statements of the interview, categorizing them in positive and negative influence 
factors during three simplified stages of the investment process: (1) deal 
generation/first screening, (2) due diligence/investment decision, and (3) post-
investment phase. 
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Figure 2-16: Statements of the interview Siemens Venture Capital 
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Within case analysis 
The case description of Siemens shows that it is reasonable to suppose that 
integrating CVC activities into the group is of focal importance for the success of 
SVC. This supposition is based on five findings that emerged during the case 
description: first, the management board, which also approves the strategic frame 
of CVC activities, is integrated concerning all investments exceeding € 5 million. 
Second, the possibility of doing co-investment for a business unit guarantees and 
enforces the link to the units. This means the attribution of economic results from 
a portfolio firm to the involved business unit, thus giving a stronger incentive for 
co-operation. Third, a close relationship to the business units originates from 
involvement of the business unit representatives in the board of SVC. Fourth, the 
geographical locations of SVC facilitate the link to the units. Since SVC is 
geographically present in all locations of the main businesses of Siemens, SVC 
has good access possibilities to them.43 Finally, the existence of the venture units 
is a central element, since these units seem to support the link to the units as well. 
It helps the investment manager to know whom to contact, and it is guaranteed 
that the inquiries are efficiently distributed within the business units as well. 
                                              
43 In this sense, SVC in Santa Clara is even in the same building as the ICMS department. 
CASE STUDIES OF INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION OF CVC   62 
However, this case reveals some weak points as well. In this sense, the detention 
of the Siemens business divisions in the first screening could be interpreted as 
SVC trying to avoid the business units losing interest in CVC in general, if they 
were trapped in cases where their interest in a collaboration was unrealistic. 
Overall, this would be the case regarding portfolio companies that are either far-
off the current technology of a business unit, or that do not correspond to the 
financial investment criteria of SVC.  
With respect to the position of being an innovation manager44 at Siemens, the 
case description above provides evidence that the pure establishment does not 
settle the matter. To be the responsible “single point of entry” of a business unit 
for SVC may not only mean being covered with additional work, but rather 
inhering in this position a highly preferential image and significance within 
Siemens, featured by a special liability. This assumption pillars on the following 
statement that came up during an interview with a business unit:  
“The denomination may not necessarily indicate that these persons are overloaded 
with work; rather, the position should promote and enjoy a special status at 
Siemens. (Dr. Wiggenhorn)  
 
As far as corporate culture between SVC and the overall corporation is 
concerned, there is really a wide gap between both sides. While the CVC unit is 
characterized by a flat start-up-like partnership structure (with only two hierarchy 
levels), the parent company and its business units follow conservative hierarchies 
known in huge companies. On the one hand, this reveals the actual reason why 
SVC strives for organizational independence. On the other hand, it is followed by 
a certain enviousness and limited engagement by the business units regarding 
CVC. The following quotation reveals that:  
 
“On the one hand, we as SVC see the possibilities we could realize with VC. On the 
other hand we see that within the corporation the topic sometimes becomes marshy 
at Siemens. The different cultures between SVC and Siemens do not always lead to 
peace and unity. Problems arise and we try to solve them. Therefore, I would 
characterize the collaboration as good, but with potential need for improvement.” 
(Steis) 
                                              
44 An innovation manager is the responsible head of a venture unit.  
CASE STUDIES OF INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION OF CVC   63 
 
However, the case description also shows that Siemens is aware of this “cultural 
gap” and therefore applies several mechanisms: the arrangement of common 
meetings and events; the intensive use of knowledge management programs in 
order to settle a common terminology; and, finally, the decision only to invest in 
complementary (and not substitutive) technologies. All these applied methods are 
horizontal measures to align the cultures. Unfortunately, there is no 
institutionalized job-rotation between CVC unit and business units.    
 
2.3.2  T-Venture 
 
The objective of this case is to describe the intra-organizational collaboration 
between the business unit and the CVC unit throughout the investment process at 
T-Venture. First, a brief general corporate profile of Deutsche Telekom and of T-
Venture will be presented. Second, the case will focus on describing the 
investment  process between the CVC unit and  business units, and finally 
within-case analysis will be carried out.45 
Corporate profile 
 
“Deutsche Telekom positions itself as a global Telematic supplier in a 
competition environment, that is characterized by the convergence of the 
technologies and the globalization of the markets.”46 In the financial year 2000, 
Deutsche Telekom increased revenue by 15.4% to EUR 40.9 billion. Net income 
rose by EUR 4.6 billion to EUR 5.9 billion and the number of employees has 
been approx. 170,000.47 The markets in which business activities of Deutsche 
Telekom occur are termed as TIMES markets.48 The corporation concentrates on 
                                              
45 This case study draws on transcribed interviews with Dr. Georg Schwegler and Ferdinand 
Kögler. The appendix includes an overview of the affiliations and job titles of all 
interviewees. Furthermore, this case is based on annual reports, public speeches, press 
releases and analysts’ reports. 
46 See Deutsche Telekom AG, Annual Report 2000, p. 1. 
47 See annual report, 2000, p. 12 
48 The abbreviation TIMES stands for Telecommunication, Information technology, Multi-
media, Entertainment, Security Systems. 
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four strategic pillars: consumer Internet services49, mobile communication50, 
data/IP/system solutions51, and network access services52. These core businesses 
of Deutsche Telekom are mirrored in the structure of the management board of 
the group. In order to strengthen operative governance, two pillars  
– T-Tom/T-Systems and T-Mobile/T-Online - have been merged in one 
managing board function. 
 
Within this group, the T-Telematik Venture Holding GmbH - in the following 
referred to as T-Venture- was launched in October 1997 as a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom AG. The stimulus for the first discussions with 
corporate finance and innovation management was represented by Dr. Thomas 
Kühr.53 The fundamental idea was to set up a “catalyst between the group 
Deutsche Telekom and innovative start-up companies”.54 Driving this decision 
was an acute awareness at Deutsche Telekom AG of the need to address the rapid 
pace of development in the telecommunications market and to take innovative 
impulse from convergent sectors and regionally dispersed markets. By providing 
venture capital paired with other support services55, Deutsche Telekom stimulates 
“detection and realization of new technologies and applications in the area of 
communication and information technology”.56 Since T-Venture’s sovereignty 
within the group to invest exclusively in venture capital is guaranteed by the 
board of directors and by the steering committee of Deutsche Telekom, there are 
no further venture capital activities in other units at Deutsche Telekom. Figure 
2-17 shows the embedding of T-Venture within the Deutsche Telekom group: 
 
                                              
49 With 9.2 million customers as per July 2001, T-Online is Europe's Internet market leader. 
50 The mobile communications activities of the Deutsche Telekom Group have been bundled in 
T-Mobile International since 2000. 
51 With its newly formed subsidiary T-Systems International, Deutsche Telekom is an address 
for the fast-growing information technology/ telecommunications market. 
52 Deutsche Telekom bundles telecommunications services for its 41 million residential 
customers and around 350 000 small to medium-sized businesses in the Group pillar T-Com. 
53 Dr. Kühr is considered a trend-setter in CVC in Germany and has a lot of experience in 
corporate venture capital investing. 
54 See T-Telematik Venture Holding GmbH, www.t-venture.com/english/index 
55 The section “portfolio management” will refer in detail to the support services. 
56 See T-Telematik Venture Holding GmbH, www.t-venture.com/english/index 
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Figure 2-17: Embedding of T-Venture within the Deutsche Telekom group 
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Source: Author, based on the interviews. Organization structure as of July 2001.  
 
With respect to the internal organization structure of T-Venture, three 
hierarchical levels are implemented. First, there are two chief executive officers 
(CEOs) who direct T-Venture on a managerial level.57 The next level represents 
nine investment directors worldwide. Each of them coaches a number of 
investment managers on a third level.   
 
Following their mission, T-Venture is strictly investing in companies that operate 
in the TIMES markets. T-Venture’s original capital resources of DM 100 million 
have been increased to DM 300 million in Spring 1999, and to another DM 600 
million in May 2000. Currently, T-Venture has a committed capital stock of €500 
million by the executive board of Deutsche Telekom, to whom T-Venture is 
obliged to report the results of its CVC activities. With this authorized capital, T-
Venture follows a dual investment strategy: on the one hand, they directly invest 
in start-up companies (representing ca. 75%), on the other hand, they invest 
indirectly in funds (representing ca. 25 % of the investment volume).58 In search 
of exploiting developments outside Germany and to ease a knowledge transfer 
and market access, half of the invested capital went to German companies, a third 
                                              
57 Dr. Kühr (CEO worldwide) and Mr. Enge (CEO T-Venture USA).  
58 The appendix includes a detailed list of the portfolio firms of T-Venture. 
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to US companies and the rest to other European states.59 In this sense, approx. 
DM 328.2 million has been invested in direct investments and in 9 international 
VC funds.60 Since the beginning of the program, T-Venture has invested in 55 
companies. Eight of the investments have led to an IPO, listed at Neuer Markt 
and at NASDAQ.61  
 
Typically, T-Venture commits between DM 500,000 and DM 5,000,000 per 
investment in seed stage, early stage, and first growth round companies. The 
capital source of T-Venture is the consolidated balance sheet of the parent 
company Deutsche Telekom. The investments are managed by the team of 54 
employees (26 investment professionals) who are distributed between 4 offices of 
T-Venture in Germany: Bonn, Berlin, Munich, and Darmstadt. The US market is 
covered by T-Venture of America, who manages the direct investments in the US: 
Redwood City (CA), and Boston. 
 
While T-Venture began from a central perspective62, nowadays the focus rests on 
diverse fund models in order to strengthen the internationalization process.  
Fund-in-fund investments63, local funds64, and finally the “INI fund”65 have to be 
mentioned in this context. Moreover, the business units themselves provide joint 
funds, where the business divisions are represented in the corresponding 
investment and advisory board66. According to Dr. Kühr, the allocated € 100 
million to separate funds each by T-Online and T-Mobile will be managed by T-
Venture in pursue of “more motivation in working together with portfolio 
companies.” For T-Venture, these fund models provide access to technical 
                                              
59 The figures in detail are: Germany 51 %, USA 30%, Netherlands 3%, Great Britain 5%, 
France 6%, Switzerland 5%. The figures have been provided in the interviews. 
60 See www.t-venture.com/deutsch/presse/presse43.html 
61 One of the most prominent investments of T-Venture is INTERSHOP COMMUNICATIONS. 
62 At the beginning, the board of T-Venture autonomously managed the fund investments. 
63 A ‘fund in fund’ investment is defined as a fund that invests itself in several (regionally 
distributed) funds. Examples are co-investments with Apax, Dresdner Kleinwort, TBG. 
64 Local funds get the capital from local “Sparkassen”, hospitals, etc. Examples are Global IT-
Venture fund, Amsterdam, and Bonn-Innova Venture Beteiligung GmbH, Bonn 
65 The INI fund is a joint-fund of T-Venture, Fraunhofer Insititut and University of Darmstadt, 
mainly investing in early-stage investments. 
66 In this category is the T-Mobile Venture Fund (size $ 91.5 m), launched in 2001.  
CASE STUDIES OF INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION OF CVC   67 
knowledge, potential business partners, and experience in venture capital 
investing.67   
 
The investment approach of T-Venture follows a combination of high returns as 
an indispensable requirement for CVC activities of T-Venture. On the other hand, 
pursuing strategic objectives is also inherent in T-Venture’s CVC activities. The 
focal point is both the observation of relevant markets and technological 
innovation for the corporation as well as the utilization of synergies between 
Deutsche Telekom and portfolio firms.68 An inferior priority has the objective to 
add new jobs. However, “as a motor of a dynamically developing industry”69 T-
Venture wants to create a positive contribution to the image of the corporation by 
its CVC activities. While the CVC activities were mainly driven by financial 
returns to start with, in the meantime, strategic and financial objectives are equal 
for T-Venture.  
 
Investment Process 
 
“The team at T-Venture is practicing a systematic investment 
process for generating superior returns. A disciplined approach 
is taken with each stage of the investment process, from sourcing 
deal flow to screening decisions and due diligence to structuring 
and negotiating terms working actively with the management 
teams, and realizing investment liquidity.”70 
 
Having in mind this promising promotion slogan of T-Venture, the following 
sections aim at providing detailed explanations of what this means for the 
investment process followed at T-Venture. In general, the investment process at 
T-Venture is a mult-istage process that requires diverse documentation in the 
specific steps along the investment process. Due to the legal structures that have 
                                              
67 As of July 2002, T-Venture is broken up into four divisions as the company seeks to position 
its venturing investments in line with its ‘four-pillar’ development strategy. The four separate 
funds will include the T-Mobile Venture Fund, the T-Online Venture Fund, the T-Systems 
Venture Fund, and the T-Com Venture Fund; see info@PrivateEquityOnline.com 
68 The strategic purposes will be analyzed in more detail during the investment process. 
69 See Annual Report, 2000, p.26 
70 See brochure “T-Venture”, where they refer to the investment process on p. 7. 
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been implemented by the establishment of diverse fund models, the resulting 
investment process requires complex management of the operational questions.71 
T-Venture attaches high importance to a clear definition regarding labor division 
and the separation of responsibilities between T-Venture and involved 
departments from Deutsche Telekom. However, does this complexity mean that 
T-Venture struggles with cumbersome and long-lasting decision processes within 
the group? This has to be shown in the following: 
 
Deal Generation 
 
T-Venture possesses two instruments in order to generate deal flow. The first 
“pipeline” represents the case where they actively use the group Deutsche 
Telekom in order to generate deals. This internal deal flow arises from the 
participation of T-Venture in the periodical meetings of the new business 
development units at Telekom. Thus, the latest external developments in the 
TIMES markets, as well as Telekom internal ideas that have the potential to be 
realized as spin-offs, are discussed. These new business development meetings 
aim to reinforce the internal deal generation at Deutsche Telekom. The second 
“pipeline” of T-Venture represents its external deals by actively networking 
outside the corporation. By doing presentations at universities, workshops, VC 
fairs, VC associations and business plan competitions, T-Venture gets access to 
external business ideas and (potential) founders. Since T-Venture is satisfied both 
with the quality and the quantity of deal flow, they refrain from doing any kind of 
additional public advertising.  
 
However, the interviews reveal an interesting difference regarding the quality of 
processing and the attitude between internally and externally generated inquiries 
for financing. Although there is no formal notice at T-Venture to prefer internal 
inquiries, they are treated more exhaustively and with a more positive attitude 
than external ones. 
 
 
 
 
                                              
71 It has been reported that at least 3 legal units are involved where a fund is concerned. 
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Deal Evaluation 
 
The first screening strives to review investment opportunities in order to 
eliminate deals that do not meet the fundamental investment criteria of T-
Venture. T-Venture sees an integral guarantor for the achievement of the 
requested strategic objectives in the applied quality requirements during the 
investment selection. Independent from the origination of the deal-flow, the 
review of deals regarding potentially interested departments, represent the main 
part of the daily work of an investment manager at T-Venture. In evaluating 
investment opportunities on behalf of the fund, the investment manager focuses 
on the following aspects: 
 
• Significant market opportunity 
• Sustainable competitive advantages 
• Talented entrepreneurs 
• Global business opportunities 
• Effective financing structure 
• Ease of exit. 
 
With these aspects in mind the investment manager refers to the strategic search 
fields of a business unit as a guideline. In order to let the investment managers to 
know about the “white spots” of the business units, the periodical discussions of 
the T-Venture team are supplemented by quarterly strategy circles, where the 
strategies of the business units and the corresponding one of T-Venture are 
mutually exchanged and discussed. However, the more efficient and continuous 
exchange opportunities for T-Venture are represented by business unit associates 
who are locally integrated at T-Venture for a direct collaboration with the 
investment managers. 
  
“But the most efficient way is to transfer employees from the business units to T-
Venture. Then we have the experts working here in-house.” (Kögler) 
 
But with respect to the actual selection of portfolio firms after the first screening, 
the business units do not exert influence on the final decision, since it merely 
represents a reconciliation of the investment manager’s personal notions and own 
market experience of the future trends. The investment manager does not have to 
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follow strictly “must-have” criteria from a business limiting his/her autonomy in 
matching potential investments and business unit requirements. Accordingly, the 
investment manager is constantly required to be a market expert. 
 
“Actually, what we do here is to find a match between our perceptions of the future 
market development and the strategic search field we get from the businesses of 
Telekom.” (Dr. Schwegler) 
 
Having reached a positive decision regarding the selection of an investment, the 
investment manager contacts the corresponding strategic business unit of 
Telekom group. Thus, the personal network of the investment manager within the 
group defines the paths he/she uses to contact the corresponding partner in the 
business unit. Furthermore, the embedding of Deutsche Telekom in the dynamic 
telecommunications market facilitates the challenge of an investment manager to 
disseminate enthusiasm for a new technology in a business unit. In the words of 
an investment manager, the situation is perceived as follows: 
 
“We had the experience that Deutsche Telekom operates in a very dynamic market 
and, therefore, the employees are motivated and favored by new ideas to a greater 
extent than in other areas.” (Kögler) 
 
T-Venture only proceeds further with the due diligence on the prospective 
investments that have been selected as most promising by the investment 
managers. While regarding the actual selection of portfolio companies there was 
no link to a business unit of Deutsche Telekom, T-Venture has recourse in some 
cases to the capabilities of the group regarding the technical evaluation of a start-
up company. Although it is in no way mandatory that a business unit perform the 
due diligence, it is the first time in the course of the investment process that the 
investment manager directly cooperates with the relevant business units of 
Telekom. In this respect, Telekom experts participate in the presentations of 
business plans,72 which enables the maintenance of a common basis and network 
for a later collaboration between CVC unit, relevant business unit and start-up 
company. A central element in this stage of deal evaluation is represented by the 
recently founded service department at T-Venture, called Analysis. This sub-unit 
                                              
72 However, it has to be mentioned that the participation is not mandatory, and therefore it is 
finally the decision of an investment manager to invite the Telekom experts. 
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supports investment managers by focusing especially on market aspects in the 
business model of a start-up company.  
 
However, in the search for technological feedback, the question is how the 
investment manager turns to the suitable in-house Telekom experts. This is even 
more interesting since T-Venture reported that they did not run any 
institutionalized databases.73 In order to make sure that all arising questions at the 
business units regarding an investment proposal will be treated during an 
efficient decision-making process, T-Venture maintains clearly defined 
responsibilities as well as personal profiles in the corresponding business units. 
The idea at T-Venture is that the investment manager can contact defined hubs 
within the pillars as first contact partners. They represent the link between T-
Venture and the pillars of Telekom.74 These hubs facilitate the decision making 
process, as the linking elements are responsible for the delegation of tasks within 
a business unit. But moreover, these ‘nodal points’ in the network of a business 
unit pretend not only to avoid problems, but actually to represent the first contact 
partner for T-Venture in order to solve problems. The words of an investment 
manager illustrate the procedure: 
 
“Since we have specified hubs within a business unit we know whom to contact. 
This helps us in finding further contact partners in the business unit. But further, 
the hubs are also held liable in the case of problem solving. We follow the general 
rule: conflicts are discussed up to the end.” (Dr. Schwegler) 
 
But, these institutionalized hubs only represent a necessary but in no way 
sufficient condition, since it has to be completed by the knowledge of an 
investment manager about the Telekom group itself. This additional necessity 
increases the speed of the finding process. Especially regarding business units 
that deal with business development themes, the investment managers seem to 
maintain a very good overview followed by established personal contacts. 
Interestingly, the interviews at T-Venture illustrate that they do not only contact 
persons working on an upper-management level in a business unit, such as the 
innovation manager, for example. Quite the opposite is true: particularly in the 
                                              
73 Due to permanent re-structuring processes taking place at Telekom, the application of a 
database was reported as not practicable.  
74 The innovation managers of a business unit often assume these positions. 
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pre-investment phase they even prefer employees that are deeply involved in 
operational issues. These people especially seem to represent the best knowledge 
source for T-Venture during the due diligence process. The words of an 
investment manager illustrate the situation: 
 
“… therefore, we have to know the group of Deutsche Telekom. We do not wait 
until Telekom defines the corresponding structure in-house. Rather, we have to 
know from the “people-business” the competent knowledge owners here at 
Telekom. Since we are well linked in-house in order to know the corresponding 
business unit for a specific topic, it does not take too much time, just 2 or 3 
telephone calls. In individual cases it could be a technology know-how center that 
we contact regarding specific questions. But as a general rule, the people who work 
in the market represent the majority of contact partners.” (Kögler) 
 
The recourse to the business unit resources regarding their technical evaluation of 
a start-up company is even free-of-charge for T-Venture, at least when the 
inquiry does not exceed a “normal” consulting project. However, the same logic 
applies regarding the gratis provision of information by T-Venture to business 
units in the form of innovation consulting or coaching. Only, in the case of an 
evaluation project that is performed by a technology expert center affiliated to 
Telekom, there are basic contracts that define intra-company prices. 
 
Deal Structuring 
 
Once after the due diligence T-Venture comes to the team decision that an 
investment opportunity is still of interest to one of T-Ventures’ funds, the process 
of deal structuring begins. At T-Venture, deal structuring combines the 
negotiation of the amount of required capital, the determination of pre-money 
valuation of a prospective company, and finally definition of the key terms and 
conditions of the investment. 
 
Since T-Venture not only accomplishes direct investments but also indirect or 
syndicated investments the situation is more difficult to coordinate.75 In one third 
of these syndicated investments, T-Venture maintains the position of lead–
                                              
75 The author defines syndicated deals as the set-up of a fund in co-operation with other 
companies, institutes or venture capitalists. An example would be the fund set up in 
collaboration with Fraunhofer-Institut, or together with Nokia Ventures.  
CASE STUDIES OF INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION OF CVC   73 
investor. Apart from implying higher risk of losses by being the lead investor, T-
Venture intends to influence their interests more precisely in the terms of the 
investment contract.    
 
Investment decision 
 
T-Venture only presents investment proposals to the investment board where they 
successfully completed the internal process of investment evaluation. Regarding 
these deals there is complete confidence that both T-Venture and one of the 
pillars of Telekom agree and positively comment an investment without any 
restrictions.  
 
However, in the last instance this internal approval between T-Venture and a 
business unit has to be completed by a formally external consent of the 
investment board. But, the investment decision is not reached by calling together 
the investment committee once – the decision is reached rather in a recurring, 
circulatory way. Regarding the final decision to invest in a prospective company, 
there is a definitive cross-sectional link to the group of Deutsche Telekom. All 
investment decisions have to be supported both by the involved pillar and by the 
executive management of the corporation. Therefore, representatives of both the 
pillars as well as Telekom executive management are involved in the investment 
board. Nonetheless, since only three involved persons make the decision, T-
Venture does not struggle with cumbersome decision making processes. 
Although a unanimous decision is not mandatory, this three person board has the 
advantage for T-Venture that, de facto, investments are only made in cases where 
the whole board agrees.  
 
In the case where there is no unanimity in the investment board after the first 
round regarding a prospective company, T-Venture broaches the investment 
proposal again, hoping to solve the problematic topics. However, if they do not 
succeed in doing this, an investment proposal is definitely rejected. Again, the 
underlying purpose of the preceded investment process, the application of funds, 
is authorized (by the external approval), and the required support is secured (by 
the internal approval). 
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Portfolio Support Management 
 
The case study of T-Venture shows that no preliminary support possibilities are 
offered to the portfolio companies. Only when T-Venture knows what actually is 
required by an investment do they call for support from Deutsche Telekom on a 
deal-by-deal basis. In general, the spectrum of support ranges from legal, human 
resource, R&D, to marketing issues. With respect to personnel management, a 
cooperation possibility worth mentioning represents the transfer of business unit 
employees to a venture. While personal resources are often scarce in start-up 
companies, a personnel transfer helps Deutsche Telekom to safeguard jobs in 
business units. The utilization of the buying power of Deutsche Telekom by a 
portfolio company in order to obtain attractive discounts is another example of 
offered support, which does not mean further negative restrictions for a business 
unit. Although T-Venture appreciates and supports the cooperation between an 
investee and a Telekom department, the investment companies have the granted 
freedom to transact business even with direct competitors of Deutsche Telekom. 
As a matter of course, this possibility does not positively affect a business unit’s 
willingness to collaborate.  
 
T-Venture’s already mentioned participation in the new business development 
meetings helps to minimize search costs, and even more important, to implement 
a fast coordination regarding a suitable contact partner for the support 
management. Furthermore, it is the assignment of the investment manager to 
represent the direct contact and sparring partner for the investment regarding all 
decisions in the operational business. Therefore, at T-Venture an investment 
manager ideally handles approximately four portfolio firms. The investment 
managers remain actively involved in the post-investment phase and attempt to 
create the best scenario by establishing cooperation contracts.  
 
In addition, for Telekom it is of great importance to have investment directors on 
supervisory board seats in the portfolio firms. With the aid of associated 
information rights and the use of power that is related to this board involvement, 
direct control possibilities of the entrepreneurial team are guaranteed by T-
Venture. Since this representation is not only limited to T-Venture, but also 
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applies to the business units, it supports the willingness of a business unit to 
collaborate. The basic reason for the gteater willingness of a business unit is its 
pursuit to guarantee an investment development that corresponds with its 
operational interests. However, it is not obligatory that business units maintain 
board seats. 
 
“The main responsibility of an investment manager is to pick up and follow on an 
investment in the post-investment phase. We have to fight for a favorable 
development of the market circumstances for the business units. We cannot just 
define it once, and then drop everything.” (Kögler) 
 
However, while all these efforts show a pronounced relationship management 
between T-Venture and the portfolio firms, the relationships between Telekom 
employees and portfolio companies of T-Venture have more of an incidental 
character. Since it is not in the focus of this work, I only want to mention that 
these relationships are often initialized on fairs, where the portfolio firms 
represent themselves on T-Venture stands. 
 
What can be said about the relationship management between T-Venture and 
Deutsche Telekom? Regarding the hierarchy level of the actors, the investment 
managers prefer persons at higher management levels for the assignment of tasks 
in the business units. In this sense, T-Venture tries to contact decision makers of a 
business unit, since they have the capability to delegate responsibility and to 
coordinate the commitment of the resources within an operational unit. In order 
to establish and create relationships between T-Venture and the decision-makers, 
T-Open has to be mentioned as a market place and the most prominent example 
on an institutional level. In the case of T-Open, it is a question of an internal fair 
of T-Venture, where T-Venture come together with approx. 300 managers of 
Deutsche Telekom and representatives of the portfolio firms.76 Since this contact 
fair leads to a brisk exchange of information between the participants, T-Venture 
intends to organize this event on a regular basis. While this is a meeting 
organized by T-Venture, there are further business unit events, where they invite 
the investment managers of T-Venture. More on an individual level, the 
investment managers at T-Venture are constantly asked to seek personal 
discussion with Telekom experts actively in order to maintain a certain technical 
                                              
76 In this form, T-Open took place for the first time at the beginning of 2000. 
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competence. Since investment managers should apply the same terminology that 
is used in the business units, technical competence is essential for constructive 
discussion with the technology experts. 
 
In spite of the structural independence of T-Venture as a separate subsidiary, the 
CVC unit is linked to the general reporting of the Deutsche Telekom. However, 
T-Venture’s requirements of controlling and reporting to the board of directors of 
corporate finance guarantees the involvement of Telekom’s top management 
regarding the portfolio management. Moreover, top management involvement 
supports T-Venture in transferring the synergy and leverage effects to the 
business units. Additionally, T-Venture is asked to deliver synergy reports, which 
show the resulted synergies for both the corporation and the portfolio company. 
Since the investment manager has to take care of the synergy reports, he/she 
stays closely involved in the controlling process. Internally at T-Venture - also 
due to personnel growth - a part standardization of the controlling processes is 
pursued, e.g. in the form of unique check lists and files.  
 
But what about the existent incentive structures at Deutsche Telekom that 
motivate the business units to collaborate regarding CVC activities? The only 
incentive for the business units is of operational or strategic nature. Operational 
means that a business unit sees a portfolio firm as a possibility that directly 
increases its revenues or decreases the costs of its daily business. Strategically, as 
a second path, is the topic “technology scouting”. In this sense, a business unit 
strives to learn about new technologies important for its future business. These 
strategic interests arise on the one hand from personal interests of business unit 
employees, but on the other hand, strategic interests are triggered by a very long-
term oriented performance increase or only maintenance of a business unit. Both 
paths increase the shareholder value of Deutsche Telekom in the long–term. 
 
There is no direct profit sharing for the business units. However, T-Venture’s 
future focus on fund-in-fund investments with the business unit shows that a 
certain lack of incentive is perceived at T-Venture. This reorganization in 
direction of a more pillar dependence aims at strengthening the willingness of the 
business units to cooperate with the investments of T-Venture. Moreover, in 
order to provide single employees of a business unit with more incentive, the 
launch of an affiliate fund is discussed at T-Venture, where individuals have the 
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possibility to invest their personal budget. Conversely, in order to decrease the 
possibility that a portfolio firm cooperates with a direct competitor of Deutsche 
Telekom, T-Venture also considers fixing incentives for the portfolio companies 
already in the investment agreement.77 
 
Exit Management 
 
As a general rule, T-Venture pursues the termination of an investment ideally 
after five to seven years. For T-Venture one of the most important and difficult 
aspects of venture capital investing is knowing the optimum time and the kind of 
exit. In order to alleviate this problem, T-Venture makes team decisions on a 
deal-by-deal basis, where T-Venture and the company together define the further 
path of a portfolio company.  
 
Regarding the theoretical possibilities (Buy Back, Trade Sale, Integration in the 
group, IPO), buy backs are of minimal significance for T-Venture. More 
important are trade sales whereas an acquisition by Telekom also represents an 
interesting possibility. Thus, the business units have equal rights in making a bid. 
However, a corporately motivated privilege against the other tenderers is not 
guaranteed for the business units. Nonetheless, the IPO of a portfolio firm at the 
stock exchange represents T-Venture’s favorite exit channel. In spite of a 
successful liquidation, the support of a start-up company by T-Venture can persist 
for a certain time. This is especially the case when T-Venture has to offer after 
IPO support due to the lock-up period after a company goes public. 
 
In order to conclude this case description, the following figure summarizes the 
main statements of the interview, categorizing them by positive and negative 
influence factors during the three simplified stages of the investment process: (1) 
deal generation/first screening, (2) due diligence/investment decision, and (3) 
post-investment phase.  
 
 
 
                                              
77 In the US, it is already an explicit contract clause that in the case of a cooperation with a 
business unit, the shareholding stakes of T-Venture increase. 
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Figure: 2-18: Statements from the interviews at T-Venture 
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Within-case analysis 
 
The affiliation of T-Venture to the board resort Production and Technology (and 
not to the Corporate Finance) enforces the impression of the strategic orientation 
of T-Venture. Besides the common financial and strategic objectives, Deutsche 
Telekom also pretends social objectives with its CVC program. Since Telekom 
defines itself as a partner of the small to medium-sized enterprises, they pursue 
the image of a socially responsible corporation.    
 
The case description shows that the structural link of T-Venture in–house at 
Deutsche Telekom is managed by two mechanisms. On the one hand, the 
communication to the top management of Deutsche Telekom is first guaranteed 
by the composition of T-Venture’s board, second, by assigned reporting duties, 
and finally, by institutional committees and regular meetings. These mechanisms 
guarantee the bottom-up connection. On the other hand, the communication with 
the business units takes place through the daily project-oriented teamwork 
between the geographical representatives of T-Venture worldwide. All this 
enables the link downwards to the business units. 
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The cultural analysis of this case reveals that Deutsche Telekom is still 
undergoing a change in its corporate culture. Due to cultural gaps between the 
new business orientation of T-Venture and the engineering tradition of Deutsche 
Telekom, T-Venture only partially succeeds in transmitting entrepreneurial 
impulses to the corporation. Although a corresponding commitment by top-
management is necessary, it is in no way sufficient. However, the existence of T-
Venture and its CVC activities stimulates an internal cultural convergence. 
Interestingly, the longer T-Venture exits, the stronger is the awareness within the 
group of Deutsche Telekom that T-Venture has the capacity to do venture capital 
investing.  
 
Nonetheless, the case of T-Venture shows a generally positive attitude and 
dedication in the business divisions regarding CVC activities. There is reason to 
believe that the innovative high-tech industry where Deutsche Telekom operates 
positively facilitates the challenge of T-Venture to inspire employees in a 
business unit for new and innovative technologies. However, to what extent this 
dynamic character is in a higher gear than the markets of the other cases of this 
study remains under discussion. However, it is inevitable that the investment 
manager coordinates the different interests in the business units operating in the 
convergent TIMES markets, as the statement of an investment manager at T-
Venture illustrates: 
 
“Of course, our job as an investment manager is to co-ordinate the diverse interests 
that come up in a huge corporation like Deutsche Telekom, and overall in a 
convergent market as is the case in the TIMES market. The coordination is 
necessary to get the statement for support regarding a CVC project. This is our 
purpose whenever we meet the technology experts of Deutsche Telekom, who are 
interested in a specific topic.” (Dr. Schwegler)    
 
At T-Venture, the analysis of potential improvements shows two possibilities. 
The first could be the realization of a stronger commitment on the side of the 
business units regarding the resources provided by a stronger personal link 
between a business unit and portfolio company. The second potential 
improvement that would facilitate the work of T-Venture is the persistent 
flexibility and willingness on the part of the business units to re-focus their 
strategy in a new direction. The planned re-organization at T-Venture towards 
fund-in-fund investments with business units probably intends to establish a 
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stronger link to the divisions in order to guarantee the commitment of resources 
for CVC by a business unit. With the aid of these joint-fund activities, T-Venture 
attempts to synchronize CVC activities with the business units, avoiding 
uncoordinated investments parallel in different venture units of Deutsche 
Telekom. The bilateral discussion in the investment committee, where 
representatives of different business divisions participate, has the same purpose. 
The discussion concerning the launch of an affiliate fund goes even one step 
further. This effort aims at providing incentive for invested employees even on 
an individual level. To what extent this idea is feasible remains to be seen. 
 
However, the general purpose of the reorganization at T-Venture mirrors their 
opinion that the structure of a CVC unit is closely related to the profile of the 
parent company. In the future, the followed centrally hybrid78 approach of 
Deutsche Telekom reflects the increased awareness of the concrete market 
circumstances. It combines consideration of the dynamic or stiff market-
environment, service or product market, or finally single or multi product firm. In 
the words of an employee at T-Venture the situation is perceived as follows: 
 
“We started CVC at Deutsche Telekom from a very central perspective. However, 
we experienced that in a large corporation with multi-product structures (as in the 
case of Deutsche Telekom), the topic CVC is on the one hand very division driven, 
since these divisions are represented as separate companies. On the other hand, 
Deutsche Telekom wants to coordinate the CVC activities in-house. Therefore, our 
future fund investments abut more strongly on the pillars of Telekom. In other 
corporations, the structure of the CVC could be more flexible. I think it is also 
worth having a look at the young companies in the market that sometimes apply 
new, innovative solutions.“ (Kögler) 
 
With respect to the level of involvement regarding the investment managers, the 
case of T-Venture shows that they continually stay directly involved during the 
entire investment process. Interestingly, in this case the investment managers 
seem to act not only as door-openers, but to remain responsible for an investment 
“from the cradle to the grave”. Since they have to be able to find, evaluate, and 
support a company, financial as well technological aspects have to be covered by 
their personal abilities. T-Venture attempts to maintain an almost perfect balance 
                                              
78 In this thesis, centrally hybrid is defined as corporation guided CVC activities that show a 
simultaneous participation by the business divisions. 
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regarding the whole mix of the T-Venture team, as a single investment manager 
is not able to combine all required characteristics. Furthermore, the case of T-
Venture confirms the change that already emerged in other cases, that while in 
the pre-investment phase very operationally oriented employees represent the 
first choice for doing the due diligence, the upper-management level seems to be 
more appropriate for coordinating and delegating the post-investment support. 
 
Finally, T-Venture seems to have a competent and strong backbone with their 
CEO, Dr. Kühr, who was mentioned several times during the interviews. Due to 
his long VC experience, he seems to represent a reliable contact partner for the 
CVC team regarding all VC-related issues that arise. Putting all this together, this 
case at T-Venture shows that the creation of value added taking place in the 
collaboration to business units is mainly person-driven. This assumption is based 
on the illustrations that the communication and network of investment managers 
are emphasized as the “keys” for successful CVC investing. 
 
2.3.3  DaimlerChrysler Venture 
 
In this last German case the intra-organizational collaboration between 
DaimlerChrysler Venture and business units will be described and analyzed. 
First, a brief corporate profile of DaimlerChrysler and DaimlerChrysler Venture 
will be presented. Second, the emphasis will be made on the investment process, 
which is followed by the within-case analysis.79 
 
Corporate profile 
 
DaimlerChrysler is one of the world’s leading automotive companies. In 2000, it 
sold 4.2 million passenger cars, and 549,000 commercial vehicles. 
DaimlerChrysler had total revenues of € 162.4 billion, an operating profit of € 
9.6 billion, and had 416,501 employees worldwide in 2000.80 Today, 
                                              
79 This case study draws on transcribed interviews with Dr. Marianne Tümpen, Stefan Albrecht 
and Marc Henzler, and conversations with Niels Strohkirch. The appendix includes an 
overview of the affiliations and job titles of all interviewees. Furthermore, this case is based 
on annual reports, public speeches, press releases and analysts’ reports. 
80 See http://www.daimlerchrysler.com/index_e.htm 
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DaimlerChrysler is represented in more than 200 countries around the globe and 
has production facilities in 37 countries. In 2001, it continues its strategy of 
focusing on its core strengths, “building innovative automobiles in all segments 
of the market.” To meet this goal, the corporation has sold off numerous business 
units outside the core area of the worldwide automotive business81, and now 
generates more than 90 per cent of its sales in the global automotive industry. 
With Mercedes-Benz, Chrysler, Jeep®, Dodge, smart, Freightliner, Sterling, 
Western Star, Thomas Built Buses, Setra, Orion, American LaFrance, MTU, and 
TEMIC the automotive group has unique brands with which it covers all 
important market segments. Furthermore, DaimlerChrysler has global alliances 
with Mitsubishi Motors Corporation and Hyundai Motor Company in order to 
ensure access to the Asian markets. By an update of more than 80 per cent of its 
current models and launching around 60 new models in the next five years, they 
compel their product offensive. The group has two headquarters: one in Stuttgart 
(Germany) and the other in Auburn Hills (USA, Michigan), the former 
headquarters of Chrysler. 
 
Innovative ideas did not always belong to the heart of business at 
DaimlerChrysler. In order to give these product, procedure or process ideas a 
chance in the market was the main reason for the foundation of DaimlerChrysler 
Venture GmbH (DCV), a wholly owned subsidiary of DaimlerChrysler AG. 
Since the beginning of DCV in May 1997, the main purpose was to enforce the 
intrapreneurship at DaimlerChrysler. While at the beginning the achievement of 
financial returns was only of inferior importance, nowadays financial returns are 
more strongly assessed due to the better comparability with other CVC’s.82 
 
In 2000, the initial capital stock of the fund of DM 40 million was expanded by € 
100 million and opened to external investment candidates as well. Since that time 
the purpose of window on technology has gained in significance. Further, DCV 
aspires towards maintaining the competence to cooperate with small businesses, 
                                              
81 Examples of disengagement from aeronautics, railway systems, and telecommunication are 
the successful foundation of the European Aeronautic, Space and Defense Company 
(EADS), into which DASA has been incorporated, the joint IT-venture between Debis 
Systemhaus and Deutsche Telekom, and the sale of the railway engineering subsidiary 
Adtranz to Bombardier are all expressions of that strategic focus.  
82 DCV defines a financial return of 15 % p.a. as minimum goal. 
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the development of commercial relationships, and to supporting spin-offs, where 
technologies could be usable for the group later on. Irrelevant are the 
enforcement of demand for DaimlerChrysler products, as well as the creation of 
potentially acquirable companies.  
 
As of August, 2001, DCV has 21 companies in its portfolio in the areas of 
electronics, sensors, electro-mechanics, e-business, telematics, m-commerce, 
mobility services, software development, material technology, and fuel cell 
technology.83 Although DCV offers investments between € 0.25 and € 5 million 
per company from seed up to expansion phase, they prefer to invest in companies 
that are close to the market introduction (start-up-operations) and in the growth 
stages. Since the work of DCV is centering on Europe and the US, they have 
offices established in Stuttgart, Germany and in the heart of Silicon Valley, Palo 
Alto, California.84 There is no office in Auburn Hills (USA), the American 
headquarters of DaimlerChrysler. 
 
From an organizational point of view, DCV is tied to Merger & Acquisitions 
(M&A), a sub-unit of Corporate Development to which DCV is obliged to 
report.85 This connection is reasoned first by the founders of the CVC activities at 
DaimlerChrysler - Mr. Krökel, director of M&A, together with Dr. Tümpen, 
CEO of DCV - and second by the initial focus of DCV on internal spin-off 
projects of group employees. However, in their decision-making processes DCV 
positions itself increasingly independently from the rest of the corporation.86 
Moreover, DCV is excluded from the usual administrative, controlling and 
supervision requirements of the group.  
 
The commitment for the provided capital comes on the one hand from the 
management board of DaimlerChrysler, headed by CEO Dr. Schrempp, and on 
                                              
83 The appendix includes a detailed list of the portfolio firms of DCV. 
84 In Palo Alto 13 employees of DCV are located. It is worth mentioning that in October 1995, 
Daimler-Benz opened an R&D center in Palo Alto. The R&D Center’s mission is to keep 
Daimler-Benz’ global R&D efforts at the forefront of the advanced technologies, and 
especially of multimedia technology and telematics applications, e.g., Internet-based e-
commerce, architecture for online services, multimedia transportation and mobility software. 
85 M&A, Corporate Strategy and E-Business belong to Corporate Development. 
86 Examples of this are the existence of a separate factory number, and the movement to another 
office building outside the DaimlerChrysler plant site.   
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the other from the Advisory Council of DCV, that consists of four members of the 
executive board of DaimlerChrysler.87 The Advisory Council is informed twice a 
year and discusses the strategic direction of DCV on an advisory level. While the 
team and the CEO accomplishes the strategy definition of the CVC activities, the 
Advisory Council discusses the strategic direction of DCV on an advisory level. 
The steering committee guarantees the cross-unit aspect, which combines 
representatives of various business units. The central embedding of DVC within 
the group, which was reported as elementary in order to act independently, but at 
the same time enables DCV to use the corporate identity of DaimlerChrysler, is 
shown in Figure 2-19. 
 
Figure 2-19: The central embedding of DaimlerChrysler Venture within    
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87 The Advisory Council meets twice a year and consists of Corporate Finance & Controlling, 
Corporate Development, Global Procurement & Supply, and Corporate Research & 
Technology. 
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Investment process 
 
The purpose of the following analysis of the applied investment process at DCV 
is to get information about the institutionalized “approval gates”, the actors 
involved, and the reason for applying certain approaches. The detailed illustration 
of the single investment phases attempts to reveal problems arising, and even 
more interesting, the mechanisms DCV uses in order to overcome them. 
 
Deal generation 
 
While the funding activities were initially limited to internal spin-off projects at 
DaimlerChrysler the investment spectrum has expanded since 2000 by opening 
the sources of capital to external investment possibilities that show a strategic 
link to the group of DaimlerChrysler. The purpose of the extension of the 
investment spectrum was on the one hand a potential window on technology, but 
on the other hand the increase of the deal flow at DCV.  
 
Although DCV shows an external deal flow by street deals, the interviews reveal 
that the internally generated deals by business units represent a higher incentive 
for the business units to collaborate, since the business units give their right arm 
to burn and nurture their “babies”. The circumstance is illustrated quite obviously 
in the following statement of an investment manager at DCV: 
 
“If a deal originated in a business unit, they have their highest interest in these 
deals. In other words, they are in favor of the following procedure of these 
investments, or even stronger, ‘they are crazy about’ these deals.” (Henzler)   
 
Deal evaluation 
 
Since the first step in the deal evaluation consists of investment managers of 
DCV screening the deal flow of investment possibilities, the relevant 
entrepreneurial teams are asked to submit an executive summary of their business 
plan regarding their new venture. During the first screening, the following 
aspects of the investment inquiries are inspected by the investment managers: 
 
• sustainable competitive advantage, 
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• chances for economic growth, 
• relation to the DaimlerChrysler group, 
• use regarding core-products, optimization of processes.      
 
Having successfully passed the assay of these general investment aspects, 
investments are evaluated regarding financial venture capital criteria during the 
financial due diligence by the team of DCV.  
 
“If some VC criteria were not complied with at all we would pass a deal over to a 
business unit for the technical due diligence. Even if the strategic direction of a 
company were fine, we never invest where we can’t see a financial upside.” 
(Albrecht) 
 
By “sorting out the crap” (see interview with Mr. Henzler) and curtailing the 
initial number of inquiries to around 20%, the investment managers at DCV try to 
limit the start-up companies they transfer to a business unit to those deal 
opportunities that really represent a “never seen” or a “similar already accepted” 
scenario by the business unit. The investment managers at DCV are well aware of 
referring to business units and of utilizing their resources sparingly and 
economically. However, in reaching this decision, DCV takes no recourse to an 
internal database that includes detailed information about past investment 
inquiries. 
 
“If I get a business plan that is similar to one that I already transmitted to a 
business unit and has been rejected by a business unit, I will not transfer the same 
business idea to an operational unit a second time. The result would be logical, and 
the business unit would get angry.” (Henzler) 
 
If a company meets the expectations of DCV’s general and financial inspection, 
the potential investment company is asked for a detailed business plan in order to 
proceed with the due diligence. Since the financial due diligence has already 
been accomplished alongside the first screening by DCV, the assay is restricted 
to the technical due diligence. Although DCV has a basic notion about the 
technical minimal requirements of a deal by frequent conversations within the 
technical expert cycles, the positive evaluation of a technology by a business unit 
CASE STUDIES OF INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION OF CVC   87 
is mandatory for the presentation of an investment at the steering committee.88 
This further narrows the number of prospectives to 2% of the initial deal flow.  
 
“The evaluation of the technology by our business units is highly important for us. 
Only if we get positive statements regarding a prospective portfolio firm, after we 
did the financial due diligence as DCV, can the start-up company be presented to 
our steering committee. Therefore, the positive vote of a business unit is a 
necessary condition for an investment decision.” (Albrecht) 
 
While the mandatory accomplishment of the technical due diligence allows the 
business units to gather detailed information about the technology of the 
company, it avoids problems arising alongside the post-investment cooperation 
due to an insufficient commitment of a business unit. However, the technical due 
diligence represents the only mandatory approval gate by a business unit. 
Moreover, the necessity of this business unit vote makes it unnecessary for DCV 
to collect technological knowledge in a separate database. Additionally, 
regarding investments that originated in a business unit, DCV mentioned the 
necessity to look for a second technical evaluation in order to have an 
independent, more objective opinion. The whole situation is perceived in the 
words of the CEO of DCV as follows: 
 
“It is highly critical and dangerous to invest in a company if you already know by 
the time of the investment decision that your own people in the operational units 
will use the products of the competitor of an investment. Therefore, we never did 
an investment so far, where we did not have the commitment of a business unit. 
However, regarding internal deals, we strive for a second evaluation, since it could 
happen that a business unit has a certain positive sentiment regarding deals that 
they provided us with. Therefore, the business units sometimes lose their 
objectivity.” (Dr. Tümpen) 
 
From this mentioned necessity of a business unit involvement arises the crucial 
question of how DCV localizes the corresponding technology experts for the due 
diligence process within the group. The interviews at DCV reveal three methods 
DVC applies. First, DCV uses organizational auxiliary means like the corporate 
telephone list, the intranet, or the available organization charts at 
                                              
88 However, in already ca. 50% of the cases some individuals of the steering committee 
voluntarily do a “quick and dirty” due diligence before the formal steering committee 
meeting. 
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DaimlerChrysler. Second, the investment manager attends meetings of the 
operational departments in order to get to know the technical experts of 
operational groups. Last, and even more important, the former employment of the 
invest managers in other departments within the DaimlerChrysler group enables 
them to know the structure and key members of the corporation. Besides the 
latter two possibilities, the daily work of the investment manager supports the 
maintenance of the personal networks an investment manager possesses 
internally in the corporation. The supportive infrastructure of information 
technology (IT) represents a necessary but in no way sufficient medium for 
efficient intra-firm processes. 
 
“In terms of interaction, e-mail and Lotus Notes are core aspects in order to make 
the corporation workable. Without these mediums, we would not know our contact 
partners and waste resources finding experts. But this is only a starting medium, 
which supports us in maintaining our personal networks.” (Albrecht) 
.  
The planned internal reorganization of DCV aims at counter-balancing currently 
existent deficits in this corporate navigation process. First, it is planned that the 
team of DCV reflects technological key areas of DaimlerChrysler by maintaining 
competence centers.89 The idea is that through recurring and manifold 
investments in a certain technology area an investment manager accumulates 
technological expertise and strengthens his/her personal contacts to the relevant 
business units. Each competence center will show a senior and a junior 
investment manager who is responsible for the coordination and delegation 
function in the interface between DCV and a business unit. They are also required 
for a structured collection of all technical information and contacts in a database 
regarding their competence area. Further, it is planned that the evolving expert 
cycles, embracing the competence center of DCV and representatives of a 
business unit, meet weekly in order to discuss current issues of their technical 
area. And second, DCV will be informed about the direction in the strategic 
roadmap of a business unit in order to facilitate the appropriate selection of 
investment companies, which is aligned with the technological “white spots” of 
an operational unit. The necessity is perceived in the words of an investment 
manager as follows: 
                                              
89 Examples are e-business, electronic, mechatronic, information technology, telematic. 
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“The competence centers will enormously facilitate the task of finding a reasonable 
contact partner. Further, in order to be able to accomplish an appropriate selection 
of investments, we should know about the technological search fields of the 
business units.” (Henzler) 
 
In search of new technologies filling the “white spots” of the strategic roadmap, 
the investment manager has to show candor regarding the current economic and 
personal circumstances of the business units. People with the necessary drive and 
‘from the box thinking’ are needed. However, these soft skills should be framed 
by technical as well as financial hard skills. The required characteristics are 
illustrated in this statement from a business unit interview. 
 
“If an investment manager demonstrated limited horizons in his/her mindset, 
he/she would get acceptance problems in a business unit. They need to be open for 
the problems we have in a business unit, in order to deliver portfolio firms that are 
useful for following our strategic roadmap.” (Strohkirch)        
 
Deal structuring 
 
As soon as the deal evaluation has been successfully completed, the investment 
and share structure will be negotiated. This effort accumulates in drawing up the 
corresponding investment contract, necessary for the presentation of an 
investment in front of the steering committee. Since the majority of investment 
managers are former employees of the group, the question awaiting closer 
analysis is: where does DCV take the investment specific knowledge? In order to 
overcome the initial lack of financial-specific knowledge, the DCV team attended 
external venture capital and M&A seminars, and asked external consultants for 
advice when doing the first investments in the beginning of DCV. 
 
However, the negotiation of the deal structure is the sole responsibility of DCV, 
where the business units are kept out, since DCV sees itself in the role of 
accumulating financial knowledge in the context of deal structuring. The 
financial knowledge pool at DCV regarding venture capital investments further 
combines an understanding and appropriate handling of the collaboration with a 
start up-company, due to their specific entrepreneurial features.  
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Investment decision 
 
Having hammered out a deal, the steering committee is convoked for its final 
approval. Since only the start-up companies actively suggested by an investment 
manager at the steering committee come into question for a potential funding, the 
investment managers have extensive autonomy.90 In all cases, the investment 
managers only prepare decision memos for the committee where they get a very 
positive and convinced feedback from a business unit. However, the final 
approval regarding an investment and its volume has to be accomplished by a 
majority decision of the steering committee. The composition of the steering 
committee, which includes representatives of Corporate Research & Technology, 
Corporate Development, M&A, and representatives from e-business and 
information technology, guarantees a cross-sectional link and an alignment of the 
investments towards the overall corporate strategy of DaimlerChrysler.91 
However, due to the existent personal interests in the steering committee, there is 
no absolutely objective decision. The interview shows that DVC is quite aware of 
this situation. 
  
“You can only represent key aspects of business areas in that committee in order to 
keep it workable. If not, you would have 20 people or more, that in return would be 
totally inefficient. …since a successful development of the investment is only 
possible with the aid of the cooperation by the business units, it would not make 
sense to invest if the majority votes against an investment. This committee is made 
up of the people who say ‘stop or go’, ‘take it or leave it’. However, to be honest, 
we probably never had a 100% objective decision due to existing personal and 
political interests in this committee.” (Henzler) 
 
In contrast to the steering committee, the advisory board acts on a purely 
advisory level. Moreover, since the board only meets three times a year, it only 
has limited influence on the strategic development of DCV. Although the 
advisory board is informed about investment decisions, they do not have any 
decision rights or votes regarding the actual investment decision.   
                                              
90 It has to be mentioned that an investment is not presented at the steering committee even if 
there is a positive business unit feedback. 
91 But the concrete composition of this committee changes over time and depends on the 
currently booming and prospering topics on the market. In this sense, there are many e-
business representatives in the steering committee, due to the boom of the e-business market 
in the past.  
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In the event of a favorable decision, the corresponding documents, modalities of 
the required management support, milestones of the project controlling and the 
concrete financing plan are finalized. Although as a general rule DCV 
participates in the capital stock of the venture company as a minority shareholder 
(between 12% and 30%), DCV aims at rights “similar to those of a majority 
shareholder.”92 Formally, the investment decision is reached by the closing of the 
company agreement. 
 
Portfolio and support management 
 
The financial funding of a portfolio firm is set down in a jointly agreed company 
agreement with the start-up company. In addition to providing financial funding, 
DCV actively supports the venture companies in setting up and managing their 
operations.93 However, since its role is limited mostly to supervising the strategic 
decisions, the planning and budgeting processes, and to controlling tasks, the 
management support does not infringe on the daily activities of the new 
companies.  
 
Especially regarding the focused seed and early stage investments, the provision 
of  smart money is evaluated as critical in order to give the start-up companies 
the required kick in the early development phases.94 To meet the individual 
consultancy and support requirements of each portfolio firm optimally, DCV 
makes regular use both of the available group resources, as well as selected 
external experts in their network. But the support possibilities by the business 
units, quasi the “value-added of DCV”, are not defined well in advance, since the 
cooperation with the ventures is managed project specifically, and it rather 
depends on the requirements of a portfolio company: while spin-off projects 
require the creation of a business plan, external projects mainly focus on the 
establishment of any kind of cooperation-contract with DaimlerChrysler. 
However, DCV shows the deficit that in the past they (almost) never succeeded in 
                                              
92 In addition, the provision of loans to the new company is also possible. Guarantees are not 
taken over; see DVC report at http://www.dcventure.com/e_start.htm 
93 The provision of money alone is evaluated as a commodity at DCV. 
94 In this sense, examples are the network of DaimlerChrysler, their technological in-house 
expertise, cooperation contracts (R&D, sale, marketing), corporate certification, etc.  
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delivering a written commercial agreement together with the investment contract. 
Therefore, it strives merely for a noncommittal letter of intent. The scenario is 
perceived in the words of an investment manager (Henzler) as follows: 
 
“The optimum scenario for us would be to close the investment and at the same 
time have already defined a concrete order for the investment: quantity X per year 
is bought by business unit Y. We keep working on this issue. But it is difficult.” 
 
Nonetheless, the interviews at DCV show that the exchange of resources between 
CVC unit and business unit is limited to intangible resources (like information 
and know-how about markets, trends, etc.) and does not include the exchange of 
material resources. Although the exchange of immaterial resources was reported 
to be important, there is no formal process available. 
 
“There is an intensive exchange of information, since ‘know-how is power’. But 
there is no formal process, rather everything happens on a deal-by-deal basis.” 
(Albrecht)  
 
The already mentioned central embedding of DCV in the DaimlerChrysler group 
allows DCV both the use of the acquired technologies in several operational units 
of DaimlerChrysler, and the transmitting and locating of support inquiries across 
the whole corporation. But the question awaiting closer analysis is, what are the 
effects of this central structure on the incentive of a business unit to collaborate 
on an operational level? The whole exchange that happens on an operational and 
commercial level between the business unit and the investment company remains 
the sole responsibility of a business unit, and DCV has no competence to force a 
business unit to collaborate with a portfolio firm. The words of the CEO Dr. 
Tümpen show that DCV can only refer to the commitment of a business unit 
already stated in the due diligence: 
 
“The business units are completely free in their decision to use the product of a 
portfolio firm. Something that must no way happen is that a business unit only 
selects a product because DCV invested in a portfolio firm and not because it 
actually represents the better product. However, in order to avoid the situation that 
a business unit buys the product of the main competitor of a portfolio company, we 
have the institutionalized adjustment in the due diligence with the business unit.” 
 
Moreover, the business units do not hold any supervisor or advisory board seats 
in investment companies. In addition to that, DCV has emphatically deprecated 
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and denied the opportunity of financial incentives for the business units due to 
the following reasons: first, financial interest on the part of the business unit 
would cause conflicts in upcoming strategic decisions between the business unit 
and DCV. Second, DCV evaluates financial incentives as impractical since the 
collaboration of individuals in a business unit is needed. Finally, the capability of 
a business unit to manage investment shares is quite limited, since the operational 
units at DaimlerChrysler are used to thinking in budgets and not in strategic 
long-term purposes.95 Putting these thoughts together shows that the “window on 
technology”, strictly speaking the expansion of their technological ken, remains 
the only incentive for a business unit to collaborate. Moreover, for DCV internal 
cost-charging represents an unsuitable basis for a daily collaboration since it 
needlessly prolongs business unit feedback and would lead a CVC unit to the 
same situation as a dedicated VC.96 The following statement throws light on the 
personal voluntary character of individuals regarding the CVC engagement.  
However, it should be followed by a positive image gain within the company. 
  
“So far, the people did it because they liked to do it. If you once start to incentivize 
in a financial way, you trigger a long-lasting spiral. If we cannot revert to our in-
house knowledge fast and for free, we get into the same situation as a dedicated 
VC. I think the situation would become very problematic if the main purpose of all 
people involved were to earn a lot of money by CVC engagements. In my opinion, 
a business unit is not able to think in shares, they only think in budgets. What 
should be the incentive of a business unit to have some more money in their budget 
only after 5 years perhaps (!)?” Therefore, individual support should be followed 
by an increase in the personal image in the group.” (Henzler) 
 
Apart from these (moreorless) institutionalized incentive structures, four other 
factors influence the acceptance of DCV’s inquiries in the business units. The 
first factor is the actual business purpose of an operational unit and its interest in 
innovative technologies.97 The second influence factor is externally driven by the 
current boom and attractiveness of the CVC topics, like e-economy, for example. 
Third, while in the case of internally generated deals (inside-out deals) the 
interviews illustrate a more reactive involvement of the CVC managers due to an 
                                              
95 In this sense, at most strategic long-term acquisitions could be of interest to a business unit. 
96 The only thing DCV evaluated as practical to implement are “side funds”, where individuals 
invest their own money. The planned funds go in this direction in the case of T-Venture.  
97 While e-business shows high interest in CVC, the interest in process engineering is limited. 
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existent push at a business unit, the majority of investments, the outside-in deals, 
ask for a more pro-active style of DCV. In the latter case, the investment 
managers are the ones instigating the pushing-process, since the innovative 
technologies of these outside-in deals often cause a ‘not-invented here’ syndrome 
in a business unit. Since the interviewees characterized DaimlerChrysler as a 
very traditionally managed company that generally tries to avoid the topic 
outsourcing as much as possible, there are legitimate reasons for the supposition 
that in the case of DaimlerChrysler the ‘not-invented here’ syndrome is stronger 
than in other companies analyzed in this thesis. Finally, the willingness of a 
business unit is even less in cases regarding spin-off investments that become 
irrelevant for the business units after the re-structuring of DaimlerChrysler.98 
Nonetheless, DCV sees itself in a situation of competitive advantage, since the 
invested companies operate on niche markets that are only a tangent to the 
classical core technologies of a business unit. Therefore, there is no direct 
competition between the business units and portfolio firms.  
 
Concluding this sub-section, it can be said that the classical first contact partner 
and orchestrator regarding the support management during the post-investment 
phase remains the investment manager. In order to get the "right people in one 
boat", the investment manager steadily attempts to expand his/her contacts. Since 
DCV strives for an intensive hands-on support in the post investment phase, they 
limit the number of portfolio firms to three per investment manager.  
 
“…, really you constantly have to stay in a close involvement in order to avoid an 
investment ‘burning out’. (Albrecht)  
  
With respect to involvement and cooperation of the business units, it is critical 
for DCV that on an operational level there is backing and commitment by the 
superior management board.99 Moreover, the higher this commitment is located 
in a business unit, the easier it is for DCV to mingle with a very operational level 
in order to overcome the ‘not invented here’ syndrome, especially regarding the 
external outside-in deals. However, DCV only follows this top-down process 
where the investment manager has no personal contacts to operational people in a 
                                              
98 Debis Systemhaus or DASA are examples of that. 
99 This means that DCV reported that they sometimes got the best technical input even on a very 
low operational level, especially regarding very technical questions.  
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business unit. If the topic CVC is already diffused in a business unit and thus 
DCV has personal contacts, the integration of a business unit follows a “bottom-
up” process, where the detour is not necessary. Since the latter approach requires 
fewer steps, it represents the more qualitative one in order to get efficient 
support. The following quotation makes it quite obvious: 
  
“The higher the authority level on which you enter a business unit, the better you 
get the cooperation activated. Unfortunately, this is the case at a big organization 
like DaimlerChrysler, unless we already know some people in a business unit. As 
soon as the topic CVC is known in a business unit, you get the people you need on 
an operational level. That’s what determines the quality of the collaboration.” 
(Henzler) 
 
The following figure illustrates the differences between the “top-down” and the 
“bottom-up” process. 
 
Figure 2-20: The differences between the top-down and the bottom-up process 
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Putting together the advantages of having numerous contacts in DaimlerChrysler 
shows the reason why the majority of the DCV team is comprised of alumni of 
the International Career Partnership Program of DaimlerChrysler.100 Due to the 
                                              
100 The International Management Associate Programme DaimlerChrysler (IMAP) offers Top 
Talents the chance to participate in a global entry program which provides interdisciplinary 
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job rotation which has already occurred within different units at 
DaimlerChrysler, the alumni of this in-house program show the required contacts 
and networks within DaimlerChrysler that are necessary for a successful CVC 
collaboration within the corporation, as this statement by an investment manager 
illustrates.  
 
“Most of us completed the international career partnership program before working 
here at DCV. Since the participants have been active in various sites in the 
corporation during this program, they get a very good overview and insights about 
DaimlerChrysler, and they have already socialized well.” (Albrecht) 
 
Finally, the DCV also reported negative experiences regarding business unit 
willingness. The interest of a business unit in a portfolio company seems to be 
related to their product life cycle. While the product cycle in the automotive 
industry averages at 7 years, the corresponding time frame of 1-2 years regarding 
CVC investments is definitely shorter. This sharp difference leads to no attention 
and interest on the part of the business units regarding these “short-term” 
oriented CVC projects. The result of the unsuccessful collaboration, where DCV 
did not succeed in getting the interest of a business unit for an investment, is that 
the technology of an investment was implemented afterwards in a competing 
automobile corporation. The following quotation refers to these disappointing 
cases: 
 
“Sure, we also have negative cases in our repertoire, where our business units did 
not join an investment. Unfortunately, this product is now used by FORD.” 
(Henzler) 
 
Exit management 
 
Generally, after three to five years an investment company reached market 
maturity for DCV, the trigger for initiating the exit management of an investment. 
As subsequently the product/technology idea has successfully penetrated the 
market, followed by certain market influence, DCV disposes of its shares, which 
it offers to the companies' founders (buy back) or third parties, such as banks, 
industrial companies, etc. (trade sale). Another important type of exit for DCV is 
                                                                                                                                    
project assignments, a production assignment and an assignment in a branch as well as an 
intensive training series. 
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the registration of the new firms at the stock exchange (going public/IPO). The 
pursued type of exit is defined in the investment agreement. However, that DCV 
favors going public, since it throws up the lowest hurdles, is revealed by the 
statement of an investment manager: 
 
“Companies that did not reach the stage of an IPO after that time-frame will 
probably be acquired by competitors. But for us, an IPO represents the easiest exit 
since the search for buyers and the negotiations with potential investors ceases to 
apply.”(Albrecht) 
 
For DCV, the offer of an IPO support is necessary in order to ensure the long-
term development of a portfolio firm. However, since at the time of the 
interviews DCV has not conducted any exit, the achieved financial returns of 
DCV since their foundation are merely based on mathematical estimations of the 
ventures. Almost needless to mention is that the impact of the program on the 
entrepreneurial stimulation at DaimlerChrysler is very difficult to measure. Since 
this issue remains on an instinctive basis, the supervisory body of DCV has to 
rely on the perceived positive statements of the employees. However, a positive 
image of DCV within the group is fundamental for a cooperativeness of business 
units regarding further CVC activities. DCV’s CEO illustrates it quite obviously:  
 
“Only our acceptance and our positive image within the group of DaimlerChrysler 
build the success of the relationship we have with the business units.” (Dr. 
Tümpen) 
 
Congruent with the structure applied in the cases descriptions above, Figure 2-21 
summarizes the emerged issue in this case by categorizing them in positive and 
negative influence factors during the three simplified stages of the investment 
process: (1) deal generation/first screening, (2) due diligence/investment 
decision, and (3) post-investment phase. 
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Figure 2-21: Statements from the interview at DaimlerChrysler Venture 
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Within-case analysis 
 
Doubtlessly, DCV belongs to the early-movers in the German CVC market. Due 
to their relatively long existence, DCV has established a certain corporate internal 
track record and also best practices regarding CVC investments.   From a 
procedural point of view, this case shows a cross-sectional approval from the 
group of DaimlerChrysler, since there is a mandatory approval gate in the 
investment process by the technical due diligence of the business units. 
Nevertheless, a clearly defined investment approach of definite separated tasks is 
followed, since on the one hand DCV is responsible for all financial and VC 
criteria of an investment, and on the other, the business units primarily focus on 
related operational and commercial issues. Yet, DCV keeps actively involved 
during the complete life cycle of a portfolio firm by monitoring and controlling 
the whole investment process in the role of moderator. Beyond the business unit 
involvement, the composition of the deciding steering committee showing 
operational managers of DaimlerChrysler allows a cross-unit alignment of the 
investments with the general corporate strategy of DaimlerChrysler. However, 
due to these two cross-unit links (business unit approval in the due diligence and 
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steering committee approval), DCV is quite limited in their decision-making 
autonomy.  
 
“Our procedural approach guarantees a cross unit strategic alignment of objectives. 
Nevertheless, interdependencies are minimized: the business units do not tell us 
what we have to do from a VC perspective, and DCV would not force the business 
unit to close any purchase commitments with an investment.” (Albrecht) 
 
The analysis of the involved actors within a business unit shows that the 
concurrence of operational people and senior management of a business unit is 
essential. On the one hand, operational people are responsible for the 
technological feedback of the due diligence and the operational integration of an 
investment technology in their strategic roadmap. On the other hand, the senior 
management level of a business unit at DaimlerChrysler is authorized to make 
decisions regarding potential co-operation contracts or the 
application/development of a product.  
 
Looking at the existent incentives structures of a business unit in the case of 
DCV, the case descriptions reveal that the main part of the collaboration is based 
on a voluntary engagement by the business units. However, it becomes obvious 
that the voluntary character and the absence of managerial authority by DCV 
towards the business units, entails long-lasting feedback loops by the business 
units showing a series of required counter-signatures on any documents that 
leave a business unit. This uncertain character is even more critical regarding the 
required technical due diligence in the pre-investment phase, since the unique 
strategic incentive, the window on technology, is still merely hypothetical and 
embryonic. Since the appliance of pressure would make the situation even more 
complicated, distributed personal networks within DaimlerChrysler are important 
for the investment manager. 
 
“Particularly regarding technical assessment it is difficult to get a response in an 
acceptable time. What would be an alternative? To apply enormous pressure which 
in return would put us in the doghouse? Certainly not. In this scenario, the goodwill 
basis goes back to the personal networks we have as investment managers. 
Regarding one concrete deal where I really had good personal contacts to the 
people in the business unit (…we already had some beers together) I had the due 
diligence back in the best time. Then its: ‘you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours’.”  
(Henzler) 
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In order to maintain these required networks within DaimlerChrysler, a 
fundamental element is the engagement of their investment managers mainly 
from the alumnus of the International Management Associate Program 
DaimlerChrysler (IMAP). However on an interpretative level, on the positive 
side this could mean that DCV mainly focuses on already existent networks and 
contacts in the group regarding their managers. On the negative side this could 
mean that DCV cannot offer the financial incentive systems common on the 
private equity market that are necessary to attract investment professionals. 
 
“If we hired people from the private-equity area used to half a million DM fixed 
salary, in principle that would have broken our complete compensation structures.” 
(Dr. Tümpen)  
 
However, the current efficiency oriented reorganization of the DCV structures 
and processes mirrors certain deficits. Focused competence centers on specific 
technology areas enable the establishment and structuring of a knowledge and 
contact database for DCV. However, the recourse to knowledge and networks of 
contacts in a structured way requires that the collection of data should be 
supplemented by general access, by well structured search possibilities, and 
finally by rating the internal contact quality. 
 
But even more important, the planned competence centers aim to strengthen the 
institutionalized link to the business unit by having investment managers 
responsible and focusing on a technology area. In order to guarantee an efficient 
transmission within the business units on an operational level, multipliers on the 
side of the business unit are defined. These multipliers represent for DCV the 
single-point of entry to a business unit and should be contacted at the interface 
between DCV and the business unit as a coordination hub to the operational 
people. These corridors of power within the corporation are responsible for the 
following inspection of CVC inquiries within a business unit. The following 
figure illustrates the purpose of the competence centers at DCV.  
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Figure 2-22: The purpose of the competence centers at DaimlerChrysler Venture  
BU 4
BU
 1
BU 2
BU 3
CVC
Unit
unit
CC 2 CC 3
CC 4CC 1
M1P M4P
M3PM2P
DCV Database
C 2 C 3
C 4 1
M1 M4
M3M2
DCV Database
Source: Author
CVC 
Unit
Key:  CC = Competence center
M   = Multiplier
BU = Business unit
Expert
Cycle
BU 1
BU 4
BU 2 BU 3
Operational 
People from BU
Senior Management
of BU
 
Finally, the case description DCV also shows that the process of involving a 
business unit in CVC activities seems to follow equivalent aspects of a marketing 
concept, known under the abbreviation “AIDA principle”101. To find the access 
to a business unit means in a first step to draw attention to CVC in general, and 
DCV specifically. Several mechanisms are applied at DCV to generate the first 
attention in a business unit, even before the actual involvement of a business unit 
in the deal generation: having a CEO with numerous contacts distributed in the 
corporation up to the top management of DaimlerChrysler; the presence of DCV 
in the intranet of the group; further, showing telecasts about DCV on the internal 
DaimlerChrysler-TV; distributing DCV booklets in the corporation. However, 
even more important for DCV in order to win attention is the ultimate technology 
of an investment. This technological innovation has to be classified by the 
highest quality and outclass the current product in a business unit. The interviews 
reveal that this challenge is strongly influenced by the internal embedding of a 
CVC unit: 
 
                                              
101 This abbreviation stands for Attention, Interest, Desire, Action, see www.gabler.de 
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“At BMW, the CVC unit is de-centrally located in corporate development. They 
really see CVC as a tool to get external developments in-house. DVC is centrally 
located on a corporate level, but we at DCV first have to get the link to the business 
unit. We have to get to the situation that the operational units thinks DVC is 
somebody who really can help us.”   
 
As soon as this attention is reached, the second issue of DCV becomes to get the 
interest of a business unit in a specific investment. Within the deal evaluation of 
the investment process, the investment manager tries to disclose potential 
benefits that could result from an investment first on a senior management level 
within the business unit. The planned competence centers can be interpreted as 
an institutional effort in this direction. As soon as a business unit is interested, the 
investment manager aims to generate the desire in a business unit to be involved 
by initiating the commercial agreement alongside the phase of deal structuring. 
The action of a business unit takes place in the concrete collaboration during the 
post-investment phase. However, the extent of collaboration depends on the 
predefinition of the operational corporate targets of a business unit. In order to 
enforce the engagement of a business unit, the executive corporate level might 
include subjective measures of divisional performance along with objective 
measures (e.g. any CVC milestones such as number of supported CVC 
investments, hours spent on CVC activities) in addition to the usual rate of return 
criteria.  
 
Finally, the analysis of the corporate culture shows a certain contentment on the 
part of DCV, since the interviewed investment managers illustrated that they do 
not encounter a dog-eat-dog mindset when they navigate within the corporation. 
Besides the efforts of the corporate executive management to support this 
positive mindset (e.g. newsletters, DaimlerChrysler TV, knowledge management 
systems, etc.), DCV itself also makes an effort in this direction: the establishment 
of the sub-unit business development, or the DCV- roadshows within the 
corporation, for example. This case shows that the longer DCV exists, the more 
intensive and better developed become the links to the operational units. 
However, these positive illustrations should not disguise the fact that besides the 
common goal of having a successful investment, every group follows their own 
goals first and foremost. This situation requires that the investment managers 
have to be aware of a hidden agenda when communicating their CVC goals in 
order not to provoke too much covetousness. 
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2.4 The Cases Of American CVC Programs 
 
It is the aim of the following three sections to describe in great detail intra-
organizational collaboration of three American CVC programs, Motorola 
Ventures (Section 2.4.1), GE Equity (Section 2.4.2), and Intel Capital (Section 
2.4.3).  
2.4.2 Motorola Ventures 
 
The objective of this case is to give a detailed description of Motorola Ventures 
performing corporate venture capital activities for Motorola. First, a brief general 
corporate profile will be presented, including the history, context, goals and 
focus of the program. Second, the case will focus on the different stages of the 
investment process, and finally within-case analysis will be carried out.1 
 
Corporate profile 
 
Motorola Ventures was formally founded in 1999 as the official CVC unit of 
Motorola. As of April 2002, the parent company, Motorola, had revenues of US$ 
30.04 billion, and a net income of US$ -3,937 billion (both in 2001). In 2001 
Motorola was America’s 26th biggest corporation with more than 147,000 
employees.2 The parent company is a global leader in providing integrated 
communications solutions and embedded electronic solutions.3 Motorola had 
already been making minority investments for 40 years. However, there has only 
been a centralized venture capital group within the corporation since 1999, called 
Motorola Ventures. Before Motorola Ventures was founded, a lot of the business 
units were taking the responsibility for making their own investments.4 However, 
                                              
1 This case study draws on transcribed interviews with Kelly S. Mark and Kurt Estes, and 
conversations with Franco Lodato. The appendix includes an overview of the affiliations and 
job titles of all interviewees. Furthermore, this case is based on annual reports, public 
speeches, press releases and analysts’ reports. 
2 See Handelsblatt survey, 02.04.2002: “The 100 biggest US companies in 2001”. 
3 For further details see http://www.Motorola.com/content/0,1037,1,00.html 
4 However, it has to be mentioned that today there is still the opportunity for the business units 
to make investments that originate from their P&L-sheet. 
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Motorola had two reasons for setting up a central CVC unit. First, as there are a 
lot of investments spanning several of Motorola’s business units, Motorola 
Venture’s purpose is to get the support of all possible BUs in Motorola, and not 
limit it to the BU that is actually doing the investment. Second, they wanted to 
ensure that investment support and contacts are more independent of strategic or 
personal changes within a business unit.  
 
The presiding statement of Motorola Ventures is to have a strong strategic 
investment model: to select investments that have a strategic fit with Motorola. A 
second goal is to get financial returns on the investments, strictly speaking an 
IRR5 above 50%. Thus, the overall purpose of Motorola is to “…grow 
shareholder value by driving acceleration from outside in. By being the ‘connect 
point’ of new technologies, new markets and new people, strategic value, 
profitable growth, and profitable revenue are obtained. The goal is to accelerate 
existing businesses, get talent and open new markets.”6  
 
All three locations of Motorola Ventures are close to the main businesses of the 
company7. With 13 closed deals in the first half of 2000 (8 deals in 2001), 
Motorola Ventures is one of the 25 most active corporate venture capitalists.8 
With an annual fund of $150 million, Motorola Ventures was also ranked in the 
upper half of the Corporate Venturing Allocations in 2000. With only three IPOs 
in 2000, they generated a value of US$ 221. This value took Motorola to the top 
three in the market ranking.9  
  
Looking at the preferred investment stages, 57% in early stage and 43 % in mid 
stage, mirrors Motorola Ventures’ focus on primarily early stage investments, 
overall start-up first stage and second stage.10 Motorola does not invest in seed, 
angel-financing or mezzanine investments. In 2000, the industry focus of 
                                              
5 IRR stands for ‘Internal Rate of Return’. 
6 See http://www.Motorola.com/content/0,1037,1,00.html. 
7 Offices are maintained in Chicago, Boston and San Francisco. 
8 The appendix includes a detailed list of the portfolio firms of Motorola Ventures. 
9 For detailed information see Corporate Venture Report, January 2001, Asset Alternatives. 
10 See official presentations of Motorola Ventures. 
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Motorola Ventures was broader than the core businesses of the parent company: 
embracing deals in biometrics11 and biotechnology.12 They focused on 14 areas 
of technology in 2000.13 
 
Investment process 
 
Deal Generation 
 
The first phase in the investment process is deal generation, which aims to 
generate a sufficient deal flow. The interesting question becomes, how does 
Motorola Ventures get the deal generation managed? By looking at the 
descriptions of the investment managers’ daily workload, I observed two 
methods: first, for the internal deal flow of the corporation, the technology 
specialists seem to be an important source. This could mean that potential deals 
which seem to be interesting for the business units arising out of their former 
collaboration with an external company, are transferred to Motorola Ventures. 
All interviewees indicated, that a BU favors internally generated deals over 
external deals that are transmitted from the CVC unit to the BU. Moreover, since 
this case shows that the internal deal flow becomes more popular and active as 
more people in Motorola get to know about Motorola Ventures, the importance 
of publishing invested deals within the group has been reported. Further, in order 
to increase internal deal flow, meetings with business units are institutionalized, 
either to maintain established relations or to build new relationships with the 
business unit. However, this has to be supplemented by the CVC manager 
personally convincing the business development person in the ‘periodical 
reviews’ to pass their strategy document on to the CVC unit. 
 
                                              
11 The company in this area was “Identix”, which delivers a biometric fingerprint authentication. 
12 The companies invested in biotechnology are “Phsiome Sciences”, delivering a simulation for 
biological processes; and “TissueInformatics”, which performs digitized analysis and delivery 
of tissue. 
13 These are: Content Delivery, Smart Messaging, Storage, Enterprise Services/Security, Voice 
Portal, Telematics, Wearable Technology, Distributed Computing/Architecture, Improved 
Human Interfaces, Wireless and Broadband Content, Biometrics, Next Generation Antenna 
Technology, Personal Area Networks, Biotechnology. 
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Regarding external deal flow, interestingly the case indicates an active and a 
passive method on the part of the CVC unit: passive, by daily screening 
incoming e-mails at Motorola Ventures regarding street deals. Further, besides 
the screening of investment bank reports, the active methods of the investment 
manager include the maintenance of numerous personal contacts. These contacts 
maintained by an external open communication could be directed either to 
external Venture Capitalists, investment professionals or to investment bankers. 
Finally, the studied case shows that both Motorola and the CVC unit are actively 
looking to maintain contacts to universities and students.  
 
Having selected some potentially strategic investments of the deal flow, the CVC 
manager contacts potentially interesting companies where the investment 
manager sees a strategic relationship to Motorola. The aim of this company 
contact is to get more detailed company and product information. When 
analyzing the information received, the investment manager always has to be 
briefed about a potential fit between these companies on the one hand and the 
different business units of Motorola on the other. This may be followed by an 
invitation to potential start-up companies to present their company.  
 
The central structure of Motorola Ventures is going back to the objective of deal 
generation. The interviews indicate that Motorola Ventures as a centrally 
organized CVC unit has a better overview of different BUs, that allows them to 
build a broader knowledge of BU activities across the whole corporation. This is 
important as Motorola tries to generate as many deals as possible within the 
company. The interviews with investment managers suggest a positive 
relationship between internal deal generation by a BU and access to the support 
of the BU in the later investment process. As regards the deals generated by a 
BU, the probability of a potential failure or of having investments that are out of 
the business unit’s focus of interest is definitely reduced, as they attempt to 
increase internal flow. Since there is no internal corporate publication such as a 
newsletter, the questions is how investment managers succeed in publishing CVC 
activities within Motorola. Astonishingly, I observed that Motorola Ventures 
does this in a fairly unorganized way. As there is no structured process, it seems 
to be strongly dependent on the personal contacts and working style of the 
individual investment manager: 
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“There is no structured way for us to get that. That’s more a matter of the 
investment professional saying, ‘this is what I got as investment, and these are the 
contacts I have: how do I get this information?’. We try to keep up with it as best 
as we can for Motorola. We are Motorola. We are no subsidiary.” (Estes) 
 
Deal Evaluation 
 
I will explain the stage of evaluating deals first by describing the process of first 
screening. All efforts in this step of the deal evaluation finish with the pitch 
presentation to the approval board. This is necessary for Motorola Ventures in 
order to start the detailed due diligence process. This is what I will subsequently 
discuss in this investment phase section.                         
 
In proceeding with the investment process, the first screening process mainly 
deals with the question: how strong is the strategic relationship and potential 
relevance of a start-up company to a business unit? The strategic dimension 
implies that the business unit should get access to technologies, talents, or 
possibilities that are either (1) not available in the business unit, or (2) would 
have to be developed internally in the business unit, or (3) are indispensable due 
to the fast development of the markets the business units are active in. Of special 
importance is that the investment should also positively affect the sales and 
orders of a business unit, which in return benefits Motorola’s economic situation. 
Since Motorola Ventures sees itself as a tool that tries to help the business unit in 
developing their strategy, the case of Motorola shows that the investment 
manager tries to find a fit between a potential investment and a business unit. 
However, in order to see a possible strategic fit between potential investments 
with one of Motorola’s business units, the corporate venture capital unit has to 
know and understand the strategy and direction of a business unit. In other 
words, the identification of interesting investments makes it necessary for the 
investment managers to at least have an idea about the main activities, needs or 
resulting opportunities of a business unit. The interviewees mentioned that by 
being informed about the weak spots of a business unit, Motorola Ventures tries 
to find out what kind of external technological input is required by a BU. 
Interestingly, the interviews show that information on a BU is mainly dependent 
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on open communication and personally established relationships between CVC 
manager and business unit. 
  
“Therefore, in order to understand the strategy and the needs of a business unit, we 
work closely together with them in order to fill holes in their strategy, and this is 
just a matter of establishing a relationship with the business unit...” 
… if  they’ll say, we’ve identified a hole out there, and they say, we want to fill 
this hole. What I will do is to select out of the possible companies the one that will 
fill this hole.” (Marc) 
 
Nevertheless, one more formal method was indicated in the interviews: Motorola 
Ventures tries to be involved in the strategy meetings of the business units. In 
spite of the fact that the CVC unit is not actively involved in formulating the 
future strategy of the different businesses within Motorola, this possibility allows 
the CVC unit to follow the strategy of a BU. This information is necessary in 
order to fill the strategic gaps by portfolio companies. 
 
However, in order to present an investment to the approval board, Motorola 
Ventures depends on the support of one of the business managers. Having 
reached an agreed consent with a business unit, the corporate venture capital 
manager is in charge of preparing a 4-page pitch which summarizes the strategic 
value of a deal. In this document Motorola Ventures includes indications of 
future support by and from a business unit regarding a potential investment.14 
The majority decision of the approval board, which includes four corporate 
senior managers, gives the go-ahead for the due diligence process. Interestingly, I 
observed in my interviews that a positive decision is obtained in about 50 % of 
the deals presented.  
 
The due diligence process embraces two main issues: the financial due diligence 
and the technical due diligence. In the financial due diligence, the CVC manager 
mainly refers to criteria which are normally used in the private equity industry, 
for instance, defensible intellectual property position, proven business model, 
customer availability, time to profit, or management personnel.  The analysis of 
                                              
14 Since this pitch is only made for about 1 % of the initially available deal flow, it reflects a 
strong pre-selection effort. 
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the business plans according to these criteria aims at the financial evaluation of 
the business models of the companies. Regarding the technical due diligence 
process, the investment manager plays the key role in initiating the involvement 
of business units in order to get their support for the technical due diligence. 
Therefore, business plans are passed over to the business units, and meetings are 
organized with business units that seem to be interested in the deals. At the same 
time, the transfer of business plans to operational units aims at increasing the 
notification of CVC activities at Motorola. As one individual put it: 
 
“What I try to do as the investment manager is to take the selected companies and 
rank them according to who has the best investment prospects. The business unit 
will rank these companies as to who the best product company is. Passing business 
plans to the business units helps us to get corporate venture capital more widely 
known within Motorola, which helps us further in getting more business plans sent 
from the business to us”. (Estes) 
 
The analysis of the interviews shows that a positive feedback from the business 
unit regarding the technical due diligence is the second “go, no-go” decision in 
the investment process of Motorola Ventures, which represents the link between 
Deal Evaluation and Deal Structuring. Therefore, enough potential strategic 
benefit has to be visible for the BU in order to get positive feedback.   
 
Examining the question of how the due diligence process is performed at 
Motorola Ventures shows a clear dichotomy. On the one hand, this means that 
the financial due diligence is very centralized at Motorola Ventures since a 
higher number of deal-flow in a central unit facilitates the maintenance of 
investment and venture capital know-how and expertise, which is very 
specialized. On the other hand, the technical due diligence is decentralized and 
represents the responsibility of a business unit. The reason for this came up in an 
interview: 
 
“The business unit knows and understands best the technology of these companies. 
…they will kick the tires on a company thoroughly to be able to say, ‘we think this 
is something good’.” (Marc) 
 
After presenting the process of deal evaluation, I will discuss the above-
mentioned problems that Motorola Ventures struggles with. I found in this case 
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that the high number of diversified business units results in two issues: first, the 
detection of the strategic relevance of an investment possibility to one of the 
BUs. The second difficulty relates to the extent to which CVC managers can 
learn from each other. As Motorola Ventures is organized in a way where each 
investment manager tries to cover a different area of technology from the 
diversified parent company, the possibility of learning from each other is fairly 
limited.  
  
Another main problem mentioned in the interviews is related to a trade-off in 
importance regarding different objectives of Motorola Ventures. On the one 
hand, the accomplishment of good financial results is important for the CVC unit 
since the financial results represent the basis for the compensation of the 
investment manager. On the other hand, the CVC unit cannot neglect the 
strategic dimension in order to get crucial involvement of a BU in the further 
investment process. The following statement shows that Motorola Ventures tries 
to select portfolio companies for which there is at least one business unit 
strategically interested:   
 
“You have to try to get them to pay attention to an investment, or even to get them 
thinking further than their current focus. …To identify the holes in their strategy 
and filling them helps tremendously in getting the involvement of the BU.” (Estes) 
 
However, a critical contradiction between the “strategic investment model” of 
Motorola Ventures and their actual investment approach seems to arise from the 
interviews. I observed that in “cases of doubt” when balancing strategic vs. 
financial goals, good financial investments outweigh strategic ones in the CVC 
manager’s decision as to which deals to continue with in the investment process. 
The compensation basis of a CVC manager and the inconvenience of measuring 
strategic results strongly influences the preponderance of financial deals. 
 
“We’re going to be a financial venture capitalist and we’re going to make strategic 
investments where we can, but you know what, if it falls out, then we better have a 
very good financial investment. Most of these things are pretty qualitative versus 
quantitative. There is no explicit tie to our rewards and measures on the strategic 
side, as yet. The reward comes down to the financial results, as it is easy to 
measure, strategic is not as easy to measure.  So…, if I’m rewarded financially I’m 
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looking to pursue this goal before looking at the strategic fit. I think it has to be 
done more in parallel, contributing to our statement and goal.” (Estes) 
 
Since Motorola Ventures has been operating for two years now, the question 
awaiting closer analysis is whether there are any effects on the observed 
problems due to the long existence of a CVC unit at Motorola. Interestingly, I 
observed that some of these problems seem to have become more moderate over 
time. The long experience of doing CVC investments in Motorola seems to 
facilitate and support the work of Motorola Ventures in different ways. 
Regarding the establishment of relationships and creation of open 
communication between the CVC unit and the BU, the early stages of operation 
at Motorola Ventures especially have been characterized as problematic. This 
was even more complicated, since the majority of the investment managers at 
Motorola Ventures were hired from outside the company. Therefore, they could 
not refer to existent networks and knowledge of the Motorola structure.  
 
“When this group was initially set up, people tended to be more outwardly focused 
than inwardly focused and didn’t have the wealth of experience of thirty years at 
Motorola.  Most people in this group have been with Motorola for a short period of 
time.”(Marc) 
 
However, now that Motorola Ventures has a longer history within the parent 
company, this problem becomes obsolete for three reasons. First, the higher level 
of interaction increases the number of established relationships between CVC 
unit and business unit. Second, the quality of the relationship between Motorola 
Ventures and the BU is influenced in a positive way. The case shows that the 
basis for the BU cooperation is developing more of a voluntary character. Third, 
as the positive impression and awareness of the CVC possibilities becomes more 
widely spread across the BU, it leads in return to an engagement that is driven by 
the interest of a business unit. This statement by an investment manager confirms 
the aspects mentioned: 
 
“We’re seeing much more interaction between our companies and our business 
units, even since we started the investments. In return, the fact that we have been in 
existence for a long time leads towards us extending our personal networks. In 
addition, it’s moving closer and closer to being voluntary.  But even more 
important is that now the business units like to work together with us, because they 
understand that we are a tool which helps them get what they need on a commercial 
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basis. So, I think our biggest success is the awareness in our business units that 
they can work with us closely on these equity investments to maximize what value 
they can get out of them.” (Marc) 
 
However, showing problems also requires analysis of the mechanisms Motorola 
Ventures applies in order to facilitate actively the collaboration between BU and 
CVC unit in the deal evaluation phase. This will be done in the following 
paragraphs. Regarding the question of how Motorola Ventures is trying to 
improve its relationship to the business units, the interviews delivered mainly one 
important mechanism: trying to maintain certain regularity and continuity in 
meetings, communication and information exchange between BU and CVC unit. 
Therefore, the investment managers try to get in contact with a business unit 
whenever they can, either by a conference call, or even more efficiently by direct 
personal contact between the investment manager and the technology experts, in 
the course of technology meetings, for example. 
  
“Therefore, you have to have a good and constant ‘person to person’ interaction 
with BUs. You can’t do it once and then walk away. You have to continually 
refresh that. That’s the biggest challenge we have. However, the technology 
meeting with the engineers is a key input for us.” (Estes) 
 
Following the chapter outline, I will now analyze the actors involved in 
evaluating deals. Looking at whom the investment managers mainly interact 
with, I observed that Motorola Ventures tries to cooperate and stay in close 
contact with the business development personnel of a business unit. With the aid 
of the middle management the CVC manager gets first contacts and access to the 
engineers working at the operational level of a BU. Having established the 
contact with the business development, the investment manager is further in 
charge of organizing the first round table meeting with all actors involved in an 
investment: the business unit, the CVC unit and the potential investment 
company. 
 
“…if I get a business plan in or if we’re working on a business plan in identifying a 
business unit, the first person I’m going to call is probably the business 
development person, unless you’re really involved with the process engineer. I’m 
not going to understand hundreds of engineers that may be out there. Now, if we 
bring in the company, I’ll coordinate the meeting, I’ll contact business 
development and they (hopefully) tell me who I have to invite to the meeting (or 
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they invite them directly). Then all will show up and evaluate the company and go 
through it. The engineers are involved in all steps of the process. They have to be, 
since they have some intent in their mind of what they are going to work on with a 
company.” (Marc) 
 
However, the interviews suggest that the integration process of the business unit 
is influenced in two different ways: first, the personal qualifications of an 
investment manager, and second, the industry area of an investment. Regarding 
the personal abilities of the investment manager, it must be said that different 
characteristics of investment managers have been reported as supportive in 
performing the deal evaluation: 
  
“...„ it’s a lot like being in sales, because you go there and you have to sell yourself 
to businesses  you are working with and get the BUs interest. Therefore, first you 
have to be able to sell yourself and your investment, and second, you have to be 
very determined in navigating through the big company“ (Marc) 
 
The second influencing issue refers to the investment manager’s task of figuring 
out the optimal mix on the spectrum with the polar cases “closeness” and 
“distance” between the investment area and the core business of an operational 
unit. On the one hand, the closer the potential investments are to the current 
business unit strategy, the easier it is for the investment manager to get a business 
unit interested enough to collaborate. On the other hand, the farther away these 
potential investments are located from the current activities, the more interesting 
it could be for the long-term strategy of Motorola. However, the longer this time 
span becomes, the more difficult it is to get the necessary attention of a business 
unit. 
 
Besides the investment area, the focus on the early, first and second stage 
investments helps Motorola to diminish the “big pool of deals”. Actually, three 
reasons have been mentioned for limiting Motorola Ventures’ potential 
investment stage. (1) They avoid investments in pre-IPO companies that are only 
interested in getting the Motorola brand as investor for their IPO roadshow. (2) 
Access to privileged rights in early-stage companies is easier for Motorola to 
obtain than in growth stage companies, since the investment amount represents a 
higher percentage of the whole company value. And finally, (3) it is easier to 
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develop an early-stage company in a direction that promises the highest strategic 
outcome for the investor.   
  
Deal Structuring 
 
Having finished the deal evaluation, in the deal structuring phase Motorola 
Ventures aims at negotiating and completing the shareholder and collaboration 
agreements. In detail, these agreements include legal documents (e.g. share-
holder rights), equity documents (e.g. investment conditions), and commercial 
documents (collaboration conditions). The investment agreement clarifies 
governance rights, which includes how many board seats the CVC unit gets in 
the portfolio company. At Motorola, the negotiation of this governance 
possibility in an investment is seen as the only responsibility of the CVC unit. 
Moreover, the interviews show that not only the task of negotiating them, but 
also the later filling of the board seats in investment is predominantly performed 
by Motorola Ventures. The existence of a central CVC unit allows Motorola to 
ensure a certain corporate standard and uniformity regarding the investment 
agreements in the deal structuring stage. 
 
As there are no direct financial incentives available at Motorola for the business 
unit, the interesting question is how the investment manager motivates the 
operational people for any collaboration. The interviews show that the 
investment manager has two possibilities to influence interest and positive 
feedback regarding an investment: first, the CVC manager has to give 
prominence to the potential resulting commercial benefit of an investment for a 
business unit. In order to get an idea of the pretended and pursued rights the BUs 
would like to achieve with a specific investment, the business unit is asked about 
their interest in formulating a commercial agreement. Second, accentuating the 
benefits of investing corporate money instead of using their business budget to 
realize strategic benefits was indicated at Motorola Ventures as a stimulus for the 
business unit to participate in CVC activities. The rationale is that as business 
units they do not have to balance the risk of losing money against potential 
advantages of an investment - it is seen as an “upside unlimited” possibility with 
no downside risks. 
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In the case studied, I observed that seeing Motorola Ventures as a tool also has 
an effect on how they organize the deal structuring: while the CVC unit is 
responsible for the equity relationship, the business unit takes care of the 
commercial relationship. According to this task sharing, while Motorola 
Ventures is in charge of finishing the equity and investment agreement, the 
business unit is responsible for the commercial and collaboration agreement.  
This division of responsibilities is reflected in the questions of concern in the 
CVC unit and the BUs: 
 
“We’ll do the equity terms, negotiate the equity agreement, but we also help with 
the commercial; but not get so involved as long as there’s a business person 
involved from the business unit. When you’re executing the investment, their 
business development person will be involved to help formulate the commercial 
relationship. In managing the equity relationship, we as Motorola Ventures ask 
ourselves, ‘are we able to get something financial out of the invested company for 
our corporate money’? At the same time, the business unit is concerned about the 
question: ‘What is our commercial benefit?’.” (Marc) 
   
Interestingly, there is no indication that Motorola Ventures struggles with 
lengthy corporate processes to get any required feedback from the organizational 
core.  This is even more astonishing considering the huge corporation of 
Motorola and the existent prejudices about slow and complicated decision 
making often connected with the bureaucracy of such companies.  
 
”We tend to move very fast, to get approval. I’ve never seen an approval within the 
investment process hold up the start-up. I guess I look across forty different 
investments and I’ve never really seen us be the ‘anchor dragging along’.“ (Estes) 
  
Looking for reasons for this astonishing statement, I found a relationship 
between the speed of getting feedback from a BU and the level in the command 
chain in a business unit that the CVC unit contacts. In order to get fast feedback 
from a BU in the deal structuring stage, it seems that the existence of contacts 
with higher levels in the command chain in a business unit is helpful for the 
investment manager. The realization of the expected support of a business unit in 
a reasonable time is pursued by a positive feedback from the senior management 
level in a BU.  
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Investment decision 
 
The sub-sections above presented the pre-investment phase of the investment 
process. Once these steps have been completed, the decision is: what leads to the 
post-investment phase? How is an investment decision reached? First, by 
discussing the existent policies at Motorola for carrying out corporate 
investments, I will show how Motorola Ventures is affected by that. In general, 
every single minority investment made in Motorola needs CEO approval. 
However, the CVC unit enjoys an exceptional position in the corporation: 
Motorola Ventures only required approval from the approval board to start the 
technical due diligence. After the positive feedback of a business unit regarding 
the technical due diligence, there is no further corporate decision necessary 
between deal structuring and final investment execution. Therefore, corporate 
top-management has no direct opportunity to control that the money provided for 
corporate venture capital in Motorola is invested in technology companies that 
are related to the industry of the parent company. The corporate money comes 
out of a fund, the volume of which is negotiated and decided annually. However, 
I observed that the fund volume available for the CVC unit is dependent upon the 
development of the CVC market and the success of Motorola Ventures. 
Therefore, as it differs each year, it is not seen as set for the long-term.15 
 
In the following, I explain the business unit’s involvement and influence 
regarding the investment decision. Looking at the interviews I found that the 
investment decision at Motorola is reached collaboratively between the CVC unit 
and the business units. Although the final investment decision is the 
responsibility of Motorola Ventures, I observed that they usually try to get strong 
commitment by an interested business unit after the technical due diligence. 
Interestingly, I found in the interviews that the business unit commitment is 
emphasized more than the decision of the approval board. This fact is mentioned 
in the interviews, as there will be no investment if there is positive consent by the 
approval board, but no full belief in the technology of a prospective company by 
a business unit. This is even more astonishing since the business unit’s support is 
not formally mandatory. However, since the commitment and realization of the 
                                              
15 In 2001 they were intending to invest all $50 million allocated. In 2000, Motorola Ventures 
invested $102-103 million. For 2002 they planned to invest another $100 million.   
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commercial agreement is not a mandatory prerequisite for an investment 
decision, Motorola Ventures has the flexibility to go on in the investment process 
if time pressure of the market circumstances requires a fast decision. 
 
In the final section of the investment decision, I will describe the methods 
Motorola Ventures uses to facilitate the required collaboration of the business 
unit. In order to overcome an uncertain or even non-specific commitment by a 
BU, Motorola Ventures tries to apply three kinds of mechanisms. First, by 
putting the commitment in written form, at least as an e-mail. Second, by 
completing the commercial agreement before the investment decision as far as 
possible. And finally, Motorola Ventures pursues the commitment of interest as 
high as possible in the hierarchy within a business unit. The following short 
quotations illustrate the corresponding situation: 
  
“… preferably, we try to get the commitment of a BU signed in a commercial 
agreement ‘we are going to do this for this company.’ Typically speaking, we try to 
put together commercial agreement and a strategic relationship before we make the 
investment. We want to get this certified as much as possible. I hate to do this for 
my companies later on, but it can be done, it is just much more difficult. And you 
know, the higher level the buy-ins, the better.” (Estes) 
 
 
Portfolio and support management 
 
To develop a better understanding of the post-investment phase in which support 
of the start-up company has to be guaranteed by an appropriate collaboration 
between business unit and CVC unit, this section attempts to present insights into 
main activities and variables of the support management phase at Motorola. 
Breaking down Motorola Ventures’ motto More than just money into its 
components reveals four main things that are mentioned in their mission: brand, 
distribution, technology, and expertise. With the objective of providing support 
for the start-up companies, the important task of Motorola Ventures is to find the 
most appropriate fit between a business unit and the portfolio company in order 
to create a win-win situation both for a Motorola department and for a start-up 
company. Thus, the CVC unit pursues an outside-in acceleration by opening a 
communication channel between these two actors. The deeper analysis of this 
post-investment phase shows that Motorola Ventures spend most of their 
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working time identifying BUs that respond to a certain support inquiry, and 
maintaining these relations within the corporation. Interestingly, the whole 
process of getting contact with a business unit appears to be mainly initiated by 
the investment manager. Since the central CVC unit of Motorola has an overview 
of all business units at Motorola, they aspire to maximize the support available 
over the whole spectrum of different business units by initiating a 
communication flow between business unit and portfolio firm. The following 
statement by an interviewee exemplifies this:  
  
“We kick the doors down and let the portfolio company walk through. But it’s 
really their responsibility to walk through. It’s very difficult in a large company 
like this to get in and find the different business units and identify the specific 
spaces a lot of times. Once you have that two-way communication flow going, 
your investments naturally begin to improve because you’re getting that feedback 
loop going, and you are getting their personal value in there”. (Marc) 
 
However, the capability to navigate within the big company is determined and 
influenced by the capabilities of the investment manager. Although the 
interviews show that each investment manager has different networks within 
Motorola, when navigating within the company in order to find the fit between 
BU and portfolio company they mainly rely on personal acquaintance of contact 
partners. Nonetheless, while these persons are case-specific, depending on the 
various technologies at Motorola, the investment managers prefer to rely on their 
favorites. 
   
”I have some of my favorites, Kelly has some of his favorites, Susan has her 
favorites. I have few people I use, but it really depends on technology. But there is 
not a certain person within a regular business unit field that covers all the 
business.” (Estes) 
 
The relationships and networks used between the investment managers and the 
BU are pretty much based on personal, informal relations which emerged from 
past investments. However, these informal relations are the entrance to the 
deeper roots of further contacts within Motorola. Since there are no formalized 
ways of exchanging information, it is crucial for the investment manager to 
ensure open communication between the business unit and the CVC unit. One 
interviewee put it like this: 
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“The information exchange is mainly based on informal relationships and on 
investments we made on behalf of the business units. It’s very informal. I don’t 
think there is any set structure. Actually, it’s word of mouth. A lot of times I’ll talk 
with someone and they will give me a name or two. I’ll call a business unit and talk 
to them for a little bit. It’s like a tree, a kind of a root system.” (Estes) 
  
Nevertheless, the actual kind and quality of support cooperation is strongly 
dependent on factors that are not directly manageable by Motorola Ventures. 
Specifically, the willingness and commitment of the BU and the quality of the 
relationship between business unit and portfolio firm can only be indirectly 
influenced by the CVC unit. However, there is a positive relationship between 
the degree of the previous involvement of individuals and the quality of the 
relationship. Moreover, the quality of the relationship defines how reliable an 
investment manager judges a contact partner to be. This statement by an 
investment manger mirrors this situation. 
 
“It depends on the business unit. Some we work a lot better with than others. Some 
get it really well and want a lot more of it, and some of them are still learning. 
Most of our business units definitely like to work with us and work pretty openly 
with members of our group. There are a lot of people that I’m in contact with who 
help me out or write me some information on the evaluation of a company. 
However, there are not a lot of people I can count on to work well with our 
companies. So, depending on the organization and the person, I’ve got good 
relations with a number of people.” (Marc) 
 
In order to realize the value added services mentioned in the statement of 
Motorola Ventures, the CVC managers attempt to involve a business unit in the 
support management directly as much as possible. This aims at establishing a 
close cooperation between business unit and portfolio company. The reward for a 
business unit for providing access to the support of the corporation is the receipt 
of product discounts, preferred license rights, or privileges in a company. To get 
a leverage effect for the portfolio company, Motorola tries to get the technology 
of a portfolio company implemented in the products of a business unit as far as 
possible. Although there are no direct financial incentives16 for a business unit to 
be active in CVC activities, all this effort is made in order to get any indirect 
financial reward for the business unit, either by an increase in sales, by additional 
                                              
16 Direct financial incentives could be profit sharing or equity participation. 
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development orders for the R&D people in a business unit, or by a decrease in 
their internal production costs. The financial returns from a Motorola employee 
bonus for a good overall trading result are more long-term oriented.  
 
What are the mechanisms Motorola Ventures refers to in order to facilitate the 
collaboration process? This question is even more interesting, since the above   
descriptions show that the product part is managed by the business unit. 
Furthermore, the incentive of providing a business unit with board seats in a 
company is not applied by Motorola Ventures. As long as there is no responsible 
business unit identified for an investment, the first contact partner for the PC 
remains the investment manager. However, the identification of a responsible 
business unit regarding the support for an investment depends on the reaching of 
a commercial agreement before the investment decision. As a pre-investment 
mechanism, the commercial agreement that has been approved by senior 
management of a business unit is seen as the perfect way to facilitate access to 
resources and to avoid problems at a later stage. One interviewee emphasized this 
as follows: 
 
“The commercial agreement is 100% the best way to provide access to some pretty 
significant resources. That is the preferred channel for Motorola Ventures. It is 
crucial that we can get a commercial agreement in place at exactly the same time 
that we make the investment, because that shows commitment by the business unit. 
As it is much easier to get the involvement of a business unit before an investment 
decision than it is afterwards, we define as much support as possible before doing 
an investment. If you don’t have that it is more difficult.” (Estes) 
 
For three reasons, the central structure of Motorola Ventures is seen further as a 
supportive mechanism for realizing management support. First, the set-up of both 
internal and external relationships is streamlined for efficiency reasons. It aims at 
uniformity regarding the maintenance of relationships. Second, Motorola 
Ventures assumes that there would be less information exchange between the 
business units if corporate venture capital investments were decentralized by the 
business units.17 A limited support potential for the start-up company would be 
the effect. And finally, by doing corporate venture capital in a centrally 
                                              
17 The interviewees mentioned that about 30% to 50% of the time it happens that a start-up 
company has significant relationships with more than one business.  
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organized way, Motorola Ventures aims at making the support of the portfolio 
company less dependent on personal and strategic changes in a BU. 
 
However, the analysis of the investment managers’ work at Motorola shows that 
identifying a potentially interested BU is only one side of the coin. Once a 
relationship is established, an additional part of its work is represented by the 
coordination and maintenance of these relationships. This task is networking 
within the company, holding numerous meetings, telephone conferences and 
further introduction of business unit people and entrepreneurs. Interestingly, the 
case at Motorola also shows that coordinating and maintaining the relationship in 
the post-investment phase is related to shifts in responsibility: the investment 
manager takes a step back and encourages the portfolio company to interact 
directly with the business unit as far as possible. The findings suggest that the 
investment managers are not interested in a further intermediary position. 
Nevertheless, the investment manager tries to keep up to date as to the 
development of the portfolio company. The reason could be characterized under 
the banner of problem prevention: if a portfolio company has to be presented to 
another business unit at Motorola, it is important that the investment manager is 
informed. One informant explained:  
 
“What I’ll do is to introduce the business to the start-up, and try to set up a meeting 
with the appropriate people, let them initiate the meeting.  I step back and let them 
work through the relationship. We will just kind of help to shepherd that and make 
sure, check in, see how the company is doing. We encourage them to work as 
closely as possible with the business units since I don’t have to be at every meeting 
or part of every phone call, but I do need to be informed about what’s going on. 
…., I always require my start-ups and the business units to keep me informed of all 
the contact they are having. I don’t want them to use me as a crutch”. (Marc)  
  
Furthermore, as soon as the relationship is established, the CVC managers move 
their contacts from the operational level, which was most efficient for the due 
diligence, to a higher level in the chain of command. While the commercial 
relationship will continue on the operational level of a business unit, the 
investment manager stays in contact with the senior management of the business 
unit for coordination purposes. The maintenance of contacts to the senior 
management level in a business unit serves as a kind of problem-solving 
mechanism. As one interviewee put it: 
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“I continue to work with the senior level management of those business units just 
to make sure that there are no problems or issues.  I let the company work with the 
mid-level managers to develop the commercial relationship. I will only touch base 
with some critical person, when the door is kicked open. Usually, the business 
development person will hand it off to the commercial group which will then 
decide what they might be doing with the company.” (Estes) 
 
The following paragraphs will provide in-depth descriptions of the hurdles that 
the CVC unit is confronted with regarding support management. One problem 
reported at Motorola is commercial agreements which are not formulated and 
finalized at the point of investment. The reason for this is expectedly due to the 
necessity of fast decisions and resource restrictions. Insufficiently or even worse, 
the direct consequence is no cooperation between the BU and the CVC unit. A 
further impediment to providing the best support for the start-up companies was 
reported candidly by the CVC manager himself. To put it in a nutshell, their very 
high workload with a lot of indirect administrative tasks sometimes impedes the 
best level of support that is actually required. 
 
Furthermore, the findings indicate that apart from the advantages of the central 
structure of the corporate venture capital unit at Motorola, it also has a negative 
impact: the refusal by personnel on the operational level in a business unit to 
accept any new technology that comes from outside the organizational borders of 
a business unit. This phenomenon is known as the ‘not invented here’ syndrome. 
Interest and motivation would be higher if investments were managed directly by 
business units. However, this phenomenon is also related to deeply personal 
characteristics: individual pride. Interestingly, the actual roots of the fact that 
business units are mainly driven by their proprietary daily business and therefore 
sometimes neglect their interest regarding CVC investments, are seen as strongly 
influenced by the performance measurement on somebody’s scorecard. For 
instance, a CVC manager at Motorola Ventures (Marc)acknowledged this:  
 
“Any investment you make, you are going to have the ‘not invented here’ 
syndrome. Motorola is a technology company. We have a lot of very talented 
engineers, a lot of people with, I don’t want to say big egos, but they are very 
proud of their work and rightfully so, in many cases. The other thing you have is, if 
I am in a business unit, and I make an investment on behalf of my business unit, 
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my motivation to work hard with that investment is greater than if corporate makes 
the investment.” 
“…what you are interested in comes down to the issue how you track somebody on 
his scorecard. People perform based on what they’re measured on, and the business 
units are (unfortunately) not measured on how they do their investments.” 
  
In order to overcome the problem of insufficient time commitment of a business 
unit in performing CVC activities, the CVC unit especially strives for 
investments that have a direct, near-term impact on the operational indicators of a 
business unit: how they produce a product and what profit margin they make. 
However, the best mechanism for Motorola goes back to the deal generation. If 
an investment is rooted and initiated from a business unit, it is followed by a very 
strong resource-commitment for those internal deals.  
 
In retrospect, the interviews reveal the necessity to review the internally 
developed relationships between Motorola Ventures and its business units. 
Regarding the future, those relationships that really promised and realized 
strategic synergies for the CVC program will be in the focus of collaboration. 
However, it is important to mention that despite there being no doubt about the 
positive effect of the support facilities that Motorola can provide for young 
companies to develop well, a certain independence on the part of a start-up was 
mentioned as a highly critical characteristic. Since an investment company 
cannot rely upon Motorola alone, additional business contacts (either clients or 
suppliers) are critical for guaranteeing a portfolio company’s good economical 
development.  
 
”They can’t be wholly dependent upon relationships with Motorola. They have to 
be able to stand on their own. If Motorola were to disappear, they should be able to 
survive and do well. If that’s not the case, I’m not going to make the investment.” 
(Estes) 
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Especially when the investment relationship between Motorola and its 
investments is coming to an end, this becomes even more important. This leads 
us to the last phase of an investment process: the exit management. 
 
Exit Management 
 
Subsequently, I will explain how Motorola manages the exit regarding its 
portfolio companies. Since the annual profit of Motorola Ventures is rolled out 
on the scorecard on corporate business strategy, independent of the kind of exit, 
the results achieved by the CVC unit go back entirely to the parent company. As 
the following figure shows, Motorola Ventures quite successfully performs exit 
management. Motorola Ventures is the third most successful CVC regarding the 
generated value of their exits.   
 
Figure 2-23: Value generated by corporations through IPOs18 
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However, the crucial question for this study is to what extent the exit strategy 
influences future collaboration with a business unit. Due to the developing 
market of Motorola’s industry, the CVC manager institutes the exit no later than 
                                              
18 Based on value of shares held by corporations minus original equity investment. Calculated 
using SEC filings and share price of company as of 12/15/00. Does not include stakes that 
corporations acquired through spin-offs or transfers of technology of assets. 
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after three years in order to realize the market valuation of a company’s 
technology. One of the major items in traditional venture capital is the definition 
of a precise exit option. However, the statements given in the interviews show 
that having a defined exit strategy is not taken into consideration as much at 
Motorola Ventures. In analyzing the reasons for a certain negligence of this final 
stage of the investment process, the interviews pinpoint the overall strategy of 
Motorola Ventures: focusing on a strategic investment model puts timing and 
mode aspects regarding maximal financial return second.  
  
“We perhaps aren’t looking at exit strategies as closely for the return as others 
because we are looking at strategy aspects first. Although I keep my eye on 
potential investment return, I certainly don’t manage that as closely as the other 
venture capitalists.  There was a company that would have been provided a very 
good return, since their product was very beneficial for Motorola, but I wouldn’t be 
trying to ram them into an exit which could actually hurt us.” 
 
However, there is a contradiction between the official objective of Motorola 
Ventures and the personal, inofficial preferences of the CVC managers regarding 
the purpose of a specific exit channel. While the CVC program seeks primarily 
strategic results for Motorola, the definition of a “good” exit at Motorola 
Ventures does not reflect this notion, since only financial attractiveness was 
mentioned. The short statement by an investment manager illustrates this: 
 
“…but honestly, regarding my preferred exit channel: whatever makes the most 
money. Therefore, any exit channel can be ‘good’ or ‘bad’ depending on the 
financial return on that exit, so I don’t have a preference.” 
 
However, the management of the exit strategy has to ensure that Motorola 
Ventures protects its achieved rights regarding a portfolio company, when their 
technology is integrated in a Motorola product. Since Motorola Ventures 
attempts to avoid complicated situations with a main competitor of Motorola, the 
possibility that certain competitors achieve the majority stake of an investment in 
case of an IPO has to be contractually excluded. Therefore, when formulating the 
investment agreement, the protection of Motorola’s intellectual property in case 
of an exit has to be considered. A conflicting situation with an investment could 
result if certain exit possibilities are limited. 
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Summarizing these in-depth case descriptions of Motorola Ventures, the 
following figure contains the statements of this interview by characterizing them 
into positively and negatively perceived influence factors during three simplified 
stages: investment process of (1) deal generation/first screening, (2) due 
diligence/investment decision, and (3) post-investment phase. 
 
Figure 2-24: Statements from the interviews at Motorola Ventures 
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Within-case analysis 
 
The case description of Motorola reveals two kinds of relationships: the formal 
collaboration, mainly based on the collaboration contracts, and the informal 
collaboration, which is mainly based on personal contacts and existing networks 
within the corporation. Interestingly, while the former is important as a basis, the 
personal relationships are crucial to make things happen fast and 
uncomplicatedly.  
 
Moreover, the case shows different stimulus in the collaboration in the 
investment process. Since no further approval by Motorola’s headquarters or by 
a business unit is required for the final investment decision after the consent of 
the approval board, Motorola Ventures applies a single stage investment process. 
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In a given frame regarding the investment amount, the CVC can manage an 
investment relatively autonomously. On the one hand, this could be interpreted 
as positive independence and flexibility for Motorola Ventures. On the other 
hand, how far this independent decision has an impact on the actual commitment 
of a business regarding CVC activities remains questionable. Generally speaking, 
the case description shows that in the pre-investment phase the CVC unit is the 
main driver and orchestrator, which makes the collaboration to the business units 
“come to life”. During this phase, the role of the CVC unit could be interpreted, 
metaphorically speaking, as a kind of match-maker. This combines activity in 
bringing the (external and internal) cooperation partners together. Therefore, the 
CVC has to be aware of the needs and goals of the different actors: the BU, 
which is mainly interested in a window on technology, the corporation with 
financial and strategic aims, and the start-up company that focuses on the 
promised support and services and does not want to lose too much autonomy. 
Against this background, the task for the CVC unit is to find a match which 
satisfies these different needs with the optimal results for each actor. 
 
The case description of the post-investment phase shows that once the match is 
made by an investment decision, the CVC unit takes a step back and stays in a 
passively involved position. As soon as the basis for a corporation is established 
when entering the post-investment phase, the business unit becomes more active 
in the focus of interest. By being a close partner in the financial area, the 
investment manager can only add some value to the (hopefully) working 
cooperation. Regarding the cooperation between the portfolio company and the 
business unit, they can only try to facilitate this relationship by avoiding 
problems or, if problems already exist, by solving them. Speaking metaphorically 
once more, the role of the CVC can be seen as being a relationship-facilitator, a 
kind of  “marriage maker”. 
 
2.4.2 General Electric Equity 
 
The objective of this case is to describe the CVC activities of General Electric 
Equity (GE Equity). First, a brief general corporate profile of GE Equity will be 
presented. Second, the case will focus on describing in depth the different stages 
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of the investment process. Finally, some summarizing within-case analysis will 
be carried out.19 
 
Corporate profile 
 
GE Equity is the corporate venture capital unit within General Electric (GE), the 
world’s biggest company by market capitalization. As of April 2002, the parent 
company of GE Equity had a market capitalization of US$ 480 billions, revenues 
of US$ 125.91 billions, and a net income of US$ 13.68 billions (both in 2002). 
With more than 313,000 employees in over 100 countries GE also represents one 
of the world’s largest employers.20  
 
Within the conglomerate of GE, GE Capital is one of the 12 major businesses of 
GE.21 GE Capital is the largest non-bank financial company in the world. With 
its embracing 24 businesses, GE Capital is a diversified banking institution, 
completely owned by GE. 22 
 
GE Capital contributed $ 5.2 billion net income to GE in 2001, and shows an 
average annual growth rate of 19% since 1983. One business within the 
‘Specialized Finance’ sector is GE Equity, a 100 % legally owned unit of GE 
                                              
19 This case study draws on transcribed interviews with Alex Sanchez-Mollinger and Lorenzo 
Rossi in London (both investment managers at GE Equity). The appendix includes an 
overview of the affiliations and job titles of all interviewees. Furthermore, this case is based 
on annual reports, public speeches, press releases and “Corporate Venturing “ reports. 
20 As per a Handelsblatt survey, 02.04.2002: “The 100 biggest US companies in 2001”. 
21 The other businesses of GE are: GE Transportation, NBC, GE Aircraft Engines, GE 
Appliances, GE Power Systems, GE Specialty Materials, GE Lighting, GE Medical Systems, 
GE Plastics, GE Industrial System Business, GE Information Services.   
22 The other businesses of GE Capital are: Within the consumer sector (that represents 30% of 
GE Capital net income): Card Services, Financial Assurance, Global Consumer Finance. 
Within the area Mid-market Financing (representing 13 % of the GE Capital net income): 
Commercial Equipment Finance, European Equipment Finance, Vendor Financial Services. 
Within Specialized Services there are Global Process Solutions, Capital Markets; within 
Equipment Management (15% of the GE Capital total net income) there are Modular Space, 
Penske Truck Leasing, Technology Services, GE SeaCo, Aviation Services, Americom, Rail 
Services, Fleet Services, Trailer Leasing; within Specialty Insurance (representing 15% of the 
net income of GE Capital) are Employers Reinsurance Corporation, Mortgage Insurance, 
Financial Insurance; within Specialized Finance (representing 27% of the net income of GE 
Capital) there are Structured Financed Group, Commercial Finance, Real Estate and GE 
Equity.  
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Capital. The approval of GE Equity’s strategy by the CEO of GE guarantees the 
involvement of GE’s top management team. The following figure illustrates the 
organizational embeddedness of GE Equity in the parent company. 
 
Figure 2-25: Structure of the organizational embedding of the CVC unit at GE 
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Although GE Equity was not formally incorporated until 1995, venture capital 
investments have been made since the beginning of the ’90s as part of the 
structured finance group. GE Equity was promoted by GE Capital in order to 
diversify assets under management. GE Equity started first by only making 
investments in funds. The exchange of people between GE Equity and diverse 
investment companies managing the funds enables them to maintain knowledge 
in private equity.   
 
“The main concern was to have an opportunity to invest in companies that don’t 
accord to the businesses of GE. We saw the high valuations in the market and were 
just eager and excited. That’s why the initiative came about”. (Rossi) 
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With offices in five continents23 and more than 200 investment professionals 
distributed in thirteen cities worldwide, GE Equity is a global private equity 
player.24 GE Equity invested $1.5 billion in over 200 companies, and managed a 
portfolio of $6 billion in the year 2001.25 The diverse portfolio brought up to 375 
companies worldwide26 and investments in 86 funds.27  
 
The portfolio of GE Equity is diversified regarding three aspects: geographical, 
by industry lines, and by investment stages. Three industry lines are mainly 
focused on: (1) Financial Services, Auto and Healthcare,28 (2) Technology, 
Media and Telecom,29 (3) Enterprise Services.30 Due to the widespread nature of 
GE businesses there is a broad range of possibilities for investments to ally with 
a relevant business unit of GE. GE Equity was characterized as a program that is 
far removed from the corporate leadership, since this venture unit is not part of 
the chairman’s office.31 GE shifted its investment focus from early stage to late 
stage investments, since growth equity financings and buy outs are preferred. The 
reasoning for this is quite simple: Very early, start-up companies require 
somebody to hold their hands, and check on them every day. GE as a very big 
organization honestly acknowledged deficits in providing that.   
 
GE Equity kept pace with GE’s global expansion, increasing their international 
investments by over 25 % in Europe32, Asia and Latin Ameriapprox.33 The 
                                              
23 North America, Asia, Australia, South America, and Europe since 1995 
24 GE Equity has two headquarters, one in Stanford, CA, USA, and one in London, Europe. 
25 See GE Annual Report 2001, p. 15. 
26 The appendix includes a detailed list of the portfolio firms of GE Equity. 65 investments are 
located in Europe. 
27 Examples of funds: Gilde, Cornline, JP Morgan Capital, Apax, TVM. 
28 This includes innovative technologies, enabling technologies, non-invasive diagnostics and 
telematics and vehicle technology. The biggest financial sector stake is $ 50 million in the 
transaction processor First Data Corp.  
29 This embraces fixed line and wireless application, internet and media related and B2B model. 
30 This means developed business, European focus, growth opportunity and MBO and LBO 
type. 
31 See Corporate Venturing Report, p. 19, October 2001 
32 There are three offices in Europe: London, Milan, and Frankfurt. In the European locations 
there are 24 investment professionals working. The value of the European portfolio is $ 650 
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internal organization of GE Equity reflects a matrix organization embracing 
geographical teams (e.g. Europe, USA) and industry teams. This structure allows 
GE Equity an internal communication flow along the geographical and industrial 
dimensions. Further, this matrix organization structure enables investment 
managers to become technology experts by repeated investments in one industry 
area. The internal reporting follows this structure: the European team of a certain 
industry reports to the corresponding technical team in the US. The organization 
structure of GE Equity in Europe is exemplified in Figure 2-26. 
 
Figure 2-26: The example of GE Equity Europe 
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The typical investment of GE Equity can be characterized as follows: GE Equity 
strives for minority positions in companies34 that show a solid management team 
and already existing products or services. Further, the companies have to display 
revenues of a minimum of US$ 5 million35. In deal size the range is fairly wide: 
                                                                                                                                    
million, of which $157 million were invested, $30 millions in direct investments, $20 
millions in follow-ons, and 12 exits were performed in 2001. 
33 See www.geequity.com 
34 This means investments of 5 to 49 percent ownership in a portfolio company. 
35 However, the interviews indicate that US$ 10 million and above is more typical. 
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between a minimum of $5 million and $50 million. The exit strategy at GE 
Equity is a trade sale or an IPO.  
 
The flexible investment approach of “GE Value Add” is based on three 
fundamental pillars: first, strategic investing, meaning that there is a value 
transfer between a GE business and a portfolio company. Second, financial 
investing represents investments for capital appreciation over 3 to 5 years. And 
third, fund investing in target industries or geographies to enhance deal flow. 
 
In the subsequent sub-chapter, each section represents one phase of the 
investment process. I will begin each phase by describing what GE does. Then I 
will explain the mechanisms and factors involved in how they do it. This is 
followed by a description of the actors involved (whether the tasks are performed 
by the CVC unit alone, by a business unit, or by both in collaboration). Each 
section will further contain an explanation of the reasons, purposes, and effects 
of the presented mechanisms. 
 
Investment process 
 
Deal Generation 
 
There are two ways in which GE Equity gets promising investment possibilities: 
either externally or internally.  Regarding the first possibility, the investment 
managers of GE Equity participate in industry conferences and maintain focused 
relationships with dedicated VCs and investment banks, since both are useful for 
GE Equity to stimulate the deal flow. Internally, GE Equity asks the businesses of 
GE for the transition of investment proposals to GE Equity which are of interest 
to them. Interestingly, in order to intensify the internal deal flow, GE Equity uses 
the opportunity to give the employees of the business units a personal monetary 
incentive if they present an interesting company to GE Equity. Although it is a 
relatively limited amount, it was mentioned as an essential incentive for 
operational employees.36 
  
                                              
36 It has to be mentioned that the actual amount remained undetermined in the interviews. 
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The general purpose of deal generation is to identify companies that match the 
notions of at least one GE business, in order to facilitate future collaboration with 
a GE business. In the pursuit of appearing as an attractive investor for potential 
companies, GE Equity uses its “Value Beyond Capital” approach, which 
promises to offer “more than just equity capital: an invaluable connection with 
the businesses, resources, expertise, and world-class brand of General Electrics 
Company”.  
 
Although there could be early involvement by a business unit regarding 
internally generated deals, GE Equity is the main point of contact between GE 
Capital and external investment opportunities. However, in finding companies 
that meet the criteria of the GE businesses, the investment managers refer to 
operational GE businesses in order to learn about the products and customers of 
an industry area. Regardless of this, GE Equity also looks for external deal flow 
that is not related in any way to a GE business.  
 
Finally, there is a kind of outsourcing of the deal origination to pursue a potential 
deal flow for GE Equity: investment in 86 private equity funds. On the one hand, 
these fund investments provide GE Equity with deals that represent opportunities 
for co-investment. On the other hand, since GE Equity is involved in the board of 
directors of some funds, these co-investments with funds are seen as an 
opportunity for GE Equity to expand their investment knowledge and expertise.  
 
At GE, the high diversification in different industry lines is seen an important 
opportunity to position themselves more independently from the development in 
a specific market segment. The relatively high diversification across industries - 
compared to GE’s competitors in the venture capital market - was reported as GE 
Equity’s competitive advantage in order to sustain financial returns in 
economically turbulent times of the CVC market. As an investment manager put 
it: 
 
“Intel, for example, recently invested in a lot of companies that are only technology 
focused. But they are not diversified and probably Cisco as well. If you look at 
GE’s portfolio, we are diversified across industries. So, when the market for exits 
goes down for a certain technology, you can sustain reasonable financial returns.” 
(Rossi) 
CASE STUDIES ABOUT THE INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION OF CVC                  134 
  
 
Deal Evaluation 
 
Subsequently, I will describe the deal evaluation of potential investments at GE 
Equity. Following the overall outline of this chapter, this includes an explanation 
of the first screening and due diligence processes. With regard to the first 
screening, GE Equity evaluates a company according to the criteria “exposure” 
and “ability to impact” as a kind of funnel to limit the number of potential 
investments. The objective of applying that criterion is to secure certain basic 
company value and to make it grow. The “ability to impact” criterion reflects the 
possibility to make a company grow with the aid of a strategic link to one of the 
GE services. Due to the strategic linkage GE Equity sees a chance to enhance a 
company’s ability to execute. Regarding the “Exposure” criterion, investments 
with a value of more than $ 10 m and exceeding a minimum level of strategic 
link are classified as “high preference”. These two criteria result in the following 
figure. 
 
Figure 2-27: Selection of targeted investees at GE Equity: A limited number of 
investees are selected for value-adding activities 
Ability to impact
Exposure
middle
preference
high
preference
US $ 10mm
Minimum strategic link
middle
preference
low
preference
Source: Author, based on interviews  
 
The identification of deals that are located in the “high preference” quadrant of 
the matrix requires important personal abilities on the part of the investment 
managers. In order to consider opportunities to work with the business unit 
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beyond an investment, the investment manager’s ability to “think after the black-
box” is a critical success factor for the CVC managers to make the collaboration 
with a business unit possible at all. 
 
Having identified a company when screening the deal flow, the investment 
manager contacts an appropriate business line of GE to ask the business unit 
employees about their technical opinion regarding a company. Interestingly, in 
the case of GE it is important to mention that this is not mandatory. However, 
contents and the rate of feedback strongly depend on the quality of the 
relationship between the CVC unit and the business unit contacted.  
 
The analysis of GE Equity’s deal evaluation reveals a wide gap between the 
official statement of supposed strategic investing and the actual primary focus: 
financially interesting investments. This obvious contradiction is illustrated and 
confirmed in the statements of all CVC managers interviewed: 
  
“We are mainly financially motivated, so there is no strategic angle here. Although 
we tend to do some strategic investments, the bottom line at the end of the year is 
our evaluation based on financial returns, not on strategic. …, while other CVCs 
are more hands on, the financial profit is clearly in our focus. Therefore, we are 
more oriented like a dedicated VC.” (Sanchez-Mollinger) 
 
The reasons for this approach are quite obvious. First, there is no formalized 
obligation that GE Equity is limited to do only strategically interesting 
investments. And second, since GE Equity has a big amount of cash-flow at its 
disposal, the investment managers aim to diversify their portfolios across asset 
classes in order to decrease the personal risk. This happens independently of any 
strategic aspects. Further, the strong emphasis on financial returns originates in 
the expectation of GE against CVC activities, namely to look for high financial 
returns. As a result, it is only of secondary importance for investment managers 
to strive for strategic goals when evaluating potential investments. The following 
statement illustrates this: 
 
“There is nothing that says every investment you do must be strategic. So think of 
us as asset managers investing across all asset classes. With the money that we 
invest in private equity, we want to get some strategic benefit of course. But first of 
all, we are evaluated on the return of the money. So if we invest in a company 
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strategically and we lose money, we are fired effectively. So, the main goal here is 
to make money, second goal is to make money from strategic companies. 
Therefore, we also invest in companies that are not strategic at all.” (Rossi) 
 
Now I will continue with an explanation of how GE Equity performs the due 
diligence process. Only as a strategic part of the pie does GE Equity typically try 
to leverage on the businesses of GE in order to get to know when they do the due 
diligence.37 However, regarding the strategically intended investments it must be 
said that GE Equity does not select companies that are close to the core 
businesses of GE. By this, the CVC unit wants to avoid GE Equity investing in a 
company at a good evaluation, and some time later one of their business units 
being interested in buying that company at a price that is not of financial interest 
to GE Equity. The definition of the term “close” at GE on the one hand includes 
the opportunity to refer to the knowledge of a business unit, and on the other, 
guarantees avoiding differing financial interests. This intention results in making 
complementary deals and avoiding investments in direct competition with one of 
GE’s core businesses. Finally, in order to avoid a situation later in the post-
investment phase where the provision of specific support possibilities at GE may 
depend only on a business unit, GE Equity mainly selects companies whose 
products can not only be distributed by GE. Therefore, the identification of 
companies that stand on their own two feet and show a certain independence 
from GE’s facilities was mentioned as a highly necessary prerequisite for a 
potential investment.  
 
While the focus on this type of autarkic company at GE Equity aims to avoid any 
conflicts either due to insufficient or abruptly aborted support by a business unit, 
the identification of primary financial investments mainly requires GE’s 
investment mangers to have an investment banking background. Interestingly, 
GE Equity interprets the former employment of an investment manager within 
the corporation as a two-edged sword. While former employment could 
accelerate the process of getting an overview of the corporation, at the same time 
it may detract from acting in favor of the general prosperity of GE without any 
business unit orientation. The majority of GE Equity employees have 
                                              
37 In a “snapshot”, GE’s investments can be roughly summarized as 50% with strategic link and 
50% completely financial investments. 
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characteristics similar to the “optimal” mix of financial deal-expert and existing 
internal networks within the corporation as former M&A employees.38 In 
addition, CVC managers have the possibility to rotate in other business units 
outside GE Equity for a certain time.  
 
Deal Structuring 
 
The objective of this phase at GE Equity is to finalize the business agreement 
with the start-up company. At GE Equity, independent of the origin of a deal 
(external or internal), the investment manager is responsible for negotiating the 
financial deal structure. Therefore, an investment manager’s investment skills 
have once more been highlighted as indispensable. However, the promotion of 
value added services indicated in GE’s slogan “value beyond capital” indirectly 
enables GE to gain a stronger negotiating power in terms of the equity stake GE 
Equity gets for a nominally specific amount of money. This is circumstantiated 
by the following statement by an investment manager:  
 
“Our approach ‘value beyond capital’ definitely supports us, since we are able to 
negotiate harder terms with the companies, i.e. to get more shares in the companies 
for your capital. But primarily, somebody who is working at GE Equity has to be a 
deal-expert. So, to do that you need financial background. If you look at the 
corporate venture capitalists, the successful ones are typically those who have 
people with investment banking background. Since we are evaluated to our return 
on investment, you need to be a deal-expert.” (Rossi) 
 
Regarding the deal structure, it must be said that GE Equity also offers GE’s 
business units the possibility of co-investment. The reasoning of providing 
business units with co-investment is quite obvious. It aims giving the business 
units an incentive to provide additional value-adding services. In this sense, for 
example, a transfer of commercial business transactions from a business unit to 
the portfolio company in return enhances the economic situation of an 
investment. That means that in the case of a co-investment with a business unit, 
their initial investment increases in value as well.  
 
                                              
38 In the interviews it was mentioned that around 70 % of the investment managers have worked 
for the M&A unit at GE. However, external employees are also hired. 
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Investment decision 
 
As GE embraces very diversified business activities distributed across its 12 
major business groups, it is important to know how GE Equity reaches the final 
decision to do a minority investment. Moreover, the existent prejudices in big 
corporations concerning long, protracted, and cumbersome decision processes 
make an in-depth understanding of these processes even more exciting. The 
following section aims at providing these insights. 
 
As soon as the investment manager decides to follow on a company in the 
investment process, he/she presents the potential deal to the corresponding 
geographical committee. This step is followed by the pitch-presentation for a 
potential investment candidate, which is presented to the investment committee 
by means of a regular video conference.39 Since the existent target criteria are the 
only restrictions for an investment manager regarding his/her personal decision 
about what to present to the investment committee, they are quite autonomous 
regarding any business unit cooperation.40 The investment committee represents 
only two members of senior management: the president of the corporation (CEO) 
and the chief investment officer (CIO), who is at the same time the head of risk-
management at GE. This investment committee makes the first formal “go” or 
“no-go” decisions in the single-stage investment process. Moreover, these two 
people seem to apply a certain labor division: while the president focuses more 
on the link between the business of an investment and potential businesses of 
GE, the risk manager focuses on all risk-related aspects of an investment. 
Interestingly, the decision making process is anything but a long, cumbersome 
process. Since the process is immediately finished by a clear “yes” or “no“ 
decision, there is usually no delay. The smooth transition to a clear decision is 
further granted by the approach that only support units like legal or risk-
management have the opportunity to veto if they have serious concerns regarding 
legal or risk questions. However, whether the investment committee accepts a 
veto or not is up to its own discretion. Having received a positive feedback from 
the investment committee regarding a potential investment, the investment 
                                              
39 At the time of the interviews the pitch presentation was always on Mondays. 
40 GE Equity focuses on certain industries and looks for companies with a turnover of between 
$5 and $100 million. 
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manager has the relative autonomy to invest money from GE Equity’s budget, 
authorized for three years by GE’s CEO. Only in cases where an investment 
exceeds the investment limit of US$15 million does the investment committee 
have to consult GE’s management board to get approval for an investment.   
 
In the context of the actors involved in this investment-making process, 
interestingly, there is no direct involvement regarding operational business units. 
Therefore, it remains the sole responsibility of the CVC manager to decide 
whether there is a substantial synergy with a business unit. How far the CVC 
manager is able to reach a reasonable decision, and how big the danger of a 
wrong decision is, remains under consideration. Although this circumstance 
could be followed by a weaker commitment regarding the support of a business 
unit, the reason for keeping out the business units is to avoid long and protracted 
investment processes due to differing goals between CVC unit and business unit.  
 
“In this phase there is no direct involvement of the BUs, because our main 
objective is financial return. So, our guys at GE Equity and investment committee 
as well look at it to see if it is a good financial investment first of all. In contrast, 
the business unit only would agree to an investment if they saw a strategic fit to 
their business.” (Sanchez-Mollinger) 
 
Although there is no mandatory involvement of a business unit, the investment 
managers are still free to contact the business unit regarding technical 
understanding of an investment. The crucial question that arises is: what are the 
mechanisms GE Equity uses to maintain the personal relationships necessary to 
contact the business units? This question becomes more important, as above 
explanations show that the business units are neither involved in the investment 
committee, nor represented in the pitch presentation of investment candidates. I 
observed two methods in my interviews: an institutionalized and an informal one. 
First, in the institutionalized method all sources of files and information are 
centrally stored in a database by GE Equity. As this database is stored in the 
Intranet of GE, it allows global access to everybody involved with GE’s CVC 
activities. This database was mentioned as an important opportunity to learn from 
past experience. The second and even more important institutionalized method 
represents participation of the CVC managers at the quarterly department 
meetings of the business unit as guest-speakers. This is used as a platform to 
exchange information either by personal discussion or by listening to 
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presentations and case studies, etc. Further, all sales people who maintain 
numerous contacts in the industry are present at this meeting. In the interviews 
this was mentioned as critical for keeping the business units informed about what 
is going on regarding CVC at GE. 
 
“And that helps, because all the persons can see us and we can tell them what we 
are looking for. It’s just to refresh in everybody’s mind what GE Equity is doing.” 
(Rossi) 
 
With respect to the informal dimension at GE Equity, the CVC managers stay in 
close informal communication exchange with the CEO’s of the business units. 
However, this communication was reported to follow certain “networking 
processes”, which are at first concentrated on a small number of involved 
business units. Only if the collaboration with one business unit proves successful 
contacting other potential business units was described as a “silver bullet”: 
 
“…, we identify the corresponding strategic business, and we try with one. The 
least you have the better it is to start because you are more concentrated and more 
focused. So one is better than five. It’s really only to make things simple in the 
beginning”. (Sanchez-Mollinger)  
 
Since there is no direct involvement of the business units in the investment 
decision of GE Equity the probability of investments in “wrong” technologies is 
increased.41 In order to avoid that, the global practice leader of an industry 
group42 acts as an adviser in the investment committee, since they keep and 
distribute global knowledge regarding a specific industry line. Nonetheless, since 
they don’t have any decision votes, they only can passively influence the 
decision of the investment committee.  
 
In the context of getting business units involved in strategic investments, GE 
Equity’s “best practice” represents co-investments with a business unit.43 Apart 
from the approval of the CVC unit, the board of the business unit has to approve 
this kind of syndicated deal as well. A formal contract (one-pager) between the 
                                              
41 “Wrong” technology is defined as an area that is not of interest to a business unit. 
42 This means the CEO of a certain industry line (e.g. financial services, or telecommunication). 
43 Since co-investments are only intra-firm accounted, GE Equity remains the sole investor vis-
à-vis the portfolio company. 
CASE STUDIES ABOUT THE INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION OF CVC                  141 
CVC unit and the corresponding business unit stipulates the co-investment.44 
However, interesting is its financial incentive: co-investment comprises the risk 
of financial loss for the business unit. Obviously, the effect of this kind of 
financial incentive is quite considerable, since the number of co-investments a 
CVC unit has with a business unit is respectable.45 However, the more an 
investment is located in the strategic area of a business unit, the higher is GE’s 
business unit’s interest to co-invest with the CVC unit.46  
 
Putting all this together reveals that the actual incentive of a business unit to 
collaborate with the CVC unit remains the strategic interest to learn from the 
investment companies, e.g. by “joint-projects”. Further, strategic possibilities that 
could arise from collaboration with an investment company in the post-
investment phase are the reason why there is not any charge for information of a 
business unit in the pre-investment phase. Therefore, the investment manager 
only addresses a business unit if he sees a real strategic angle for an investment. 
This approach aims to avoid potential problems in collaboration with an un-
cooperative business unit due to weak strategic incentives. In that case, GE 
Equity prefers to manage the investment at their sole financial interest.  
 
“The business units are not charging for anything, because they learn from that. 
Therefore, they are happy to come and see the company with me. It is in 
everybody’s interest to get involved. So, we only work together with a business 
unit, if there is some good strategic reason. We don’t try to highlight something 
strategic, where it is not really the case. In that case, we have to make a good 
financial investment. Then, we rather do it all by ourselves as financial investment, 
than working with a business unit that is not committed and convinced.” (Rossi) 
 
 
 
                                              
44 This document shows the ownership percentages (of both, GE Equity and the business unit), 
the splitting of the costs, and the management responsibility of the investment. 
45 GE reported that regarding the strategic investments (~180 investments) 50% of them 
represent co-investments (~ 90 investments) with business units. 
46 Examples mentioned in the interviews are businesses at GE as Card Services, with First Data 
Corporation, GEFA with AnnuityNet, GE Aircraft Engines with Enigma, etc. 
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Portfolio management and support 
 
After having invested in prospectus companies, the objective of GE Equity in the 
post-investment phase is to guarantee that they can realize their overwriting 
statement in an appropriate internal collaboration: “More than investors, … to 
become partners.”47 Since in the case of GE the start-up company has to ask a 
huge corporation, that is both geographically scattered and industrially highly 
diversified, the question of how GE Equity succeeds in getting the required 
support by the business units is even more important. 
 
Therefore, it is indispensable to get an idea about the possibilities that GE Equity 
promotes to their companies. The following figure summarizes the value added 
services offered by GE Equity to enhance the value of their equity investments 
(“GE Advantage”).  
 
Figure 2-28: The value add services offered at GE Equity 
Peer Links
Management
Expertise
Training
• Access to GE‘s more than 50 internal training courses
• Including Six Sigma, acquisition integration, executive development, process design
• Customized workshops and training programs
Sourcing
Discounts
Research & 
Development
• Networking with other portfolio companies
• Merging of companies in the same space; e.g. e-learning
• Industry focus and IP and ‘customer events’ bring peers together
• 50 % of investments are strategic, hence GE has embedded know-how of industry
• Investees may leverage industry knowledge of sister business management
• Operational managers can help investees develop product and company
• Benefiting from GE‘s purchase power
• Discounts when sourcing from office supplies to telecommunication equipment
• Access to GE‘s leasing companies 
• Access to GE‘s Corporate R&D facility in NY
• 4000 researchers in engineering, chemistry, material technology, software
• Development of quality tools and procedures (Six Sigma)
New customers
• GE may become a customer of the portfolio company
• GE’s distribution channels help to distribute the products
• Companies have the possibility to sell their services to GE’s own products
Co-Branded
Marketing
• Select portfolio companies can cost effectively capitalize on the GE affiliation 
• Cooperative advertising
• Joint-Marketing programs
Source:  Author, based on interviews and company presentations  
 
                                              
47 See interview of Joseph E. Parsons, President and Chief Executive Officer at GE Equity, 
printed in the Annual Report of GE 2000, p. 15 
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With respect to the general scope of potential support, GE Equity excludes any 
support for a portfolio company that could negatively impact the reputation and 
the stock evaluation of GE.48 A closer look reveals that in order to realize value 
added services, GE Equity often depends on the collaboration of its business 
units. While in the pre-investment phase the business units have been mainly 
excluded, they are supposed to take care of all commercial aspects arising along 
the support management in the post-investment phase, as one investment 
manager explained it quite metaphorically: 
 
“I as an investment manager just do the introduction to the business unit, and the 
business unit executes everything that is commercial. The ventures have to learn to 
dance with the business units and vice versa.” (Rossi) 
 
Due to the size and high diversification of GE, the investment manager is not 
capable to provide a complete overview about the potential support and value 
add possibilities to his investment companies. Therefore, he organizes a coming 
together event for all investment companies, where they have the possibility to 
exchange information and collaboration experience in GE. Having an idea about 
the possibilities, the investment company informs the corresponding investment 
manager about its support necessities. This external demand triggers the internal 
process within GE. In order to make support possible through collaborating 
business units, GE Equity has to persuade the operational units of the prospects 
of CVC investments. As the CVC unit sees itself at the interface between GE’s 
strategic businesses and the investment, the CVC managers try to bring the “right 
people” in contact in order to make sure the best closing gap. The objective of an 
investment manager becomes to establish a win-win situation for the CVC unit 
and the business unit. The case at GE shows that two criteria determine if the 
inquiry of a portfolio company will be successfully followed on within GE: (1) 
the investment manager has to know whom to call, and, (2) the investment 
manager has to control that his request will be treated and actively supported by a 
business unit.  
 
However, this short description of “success factors” regarding the internal 
process of the investment manager poses two crucial questions: first, how the 
                                              
48 In this sense, GE does not do any advertisement for a portfolio firm on the web-site of GE, 
they do not take the sponsorship for an investment, and they keep investments fairly secret. 
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investment manager knows the “right person” to call in a business unit. And 
second, how he controls that a business unit cares about a portfolio company. 
Since the term “right people” strongly depends on different aspects (e.g. 
technology of the portfolio-company, technology focus, their geographical 
location, or the kind of inquiry), the investment manager cannot rely on 
institutionalized paths of contact with a business unit or designated contact 
partners in the business units. The interviews reveal an astonishingly easy and 
unprofessional method: having a good telephone list helps enormously to get 
started. However, even more important are the personal contacts of an investment 
manager in GE, originating from his former projects and his location etc.  
Furthermore, the investment manager can contact the Value-Add Service Team, 
which is responsible to inform the investment manager about corresponding 
experts at GE in the context of a specific technical inquiry. Moreover, the CVC 
manager maintains his relationships by regular meetings with the CEO of a 
business, the head of business development, and the technology officer. Finally, 
since top management of GE Equity comes from a wide range of businesses 
within GE, the connection process is further facilitated.  
 
“… due to the former affiliation of the top management of GE Equity to other 
businesses within GE, they are good in connecting those businesses. If I can’t help 
myself they can press and make sure that something happens.”(Sanchez-Mollinger) 
 
To control the supposed support within GE means that the CVC manager cannot 
just once place a call to a business unit. Quite in contrast, he has to follow up the 
inquiry process, and provide organized platforms where people get the possibility 
to get together. It is crucial that the whole process is triggered and constantly 
overviewed by the investment manager. In order to overcome insufficient 
collaboration, the CVC manager sends a copy of the one-pager-agreement 
showing the co-investment of a business unit to the CEO. This was reported as a 
most efficient way to make a business unit to follow up a support-inquiry. 
 
However, the interviews showed that different objectives between CVC unit and 
business unit are the reason for insufficient engagement regarding CVC 
activities. While GE Equity is expected to do successfully financial investments, 
the business units are expected to deliver good operational results. Therefore, GE 
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Equity aims at increasing operational results of a business unit, as one 
interviewee put it:  
 
“… , because our businesses are incentivized first on financial returns of their 
operations themselves. As operational people have different goals than helping us 
as an ‘investment company’, reality sometimes looks worse than theory. So, it 
depends whether it leads to a better price than the so far used product.” (Rossi)   
 
The analysis of best practice mechanisms at GE for a collaborative support 
management shows that being financially motivated is seen as a main success-
factor of GE Equity to make sure that there are enough leverage effects on the 
corporate side. Interestingly, in following its financial objectives GE Equity sees 
itself in close competition with Intel Capital or Cisco.49 As one interviewee said: 
 
 “But fundamentally, GE, Intel, and Cisco, are in the type of category, where 
financial returns are the main objective. Then you got a leveraging obviously on 
the corporate side. Because, if you have financial returns motivating you, you make 
sure that everything else goes right. Yes, I think financial motivation is going 
through the text of the success of CVC.” (Rossi) 
  
Second, the interviews I had at GE Equity show that a long “internal track 
record” is important for the CVC unit. A supportive intra-firm culture takes time 
to develop. In other words, the positive attitude in the business units regarding 
CVC investments require a certain time of CVC activities at GE. Furthermore, 
since a permanent change between “enthusiasm” and “rejection” regarding CVC 
within GE would negatively influence the willingness of a business unit to 
collaborate, enough and lasting financial resources are provided by the parent 
company. At the same time, it guarantees a long lasting support for the portfolio 
companies.  
 
“GE has a lot of money in cash. So, that helps because you continue and the 
investing companies will be able to follow in the support of the parent, and not 
going in the ‘vicious circle’, that if your parent company has trouble now, you fail 
and get into the situation that you don’t have funds anymore.” (Rossi) 
 
                                              
49 Intel Capital is also included as case in this work, see chapter 2.4.3. 
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Third, since early stage companies require more business unit engagement for an 
effective “hand-on” support, GE Equity prefers to invest in late stage 
investments. Late stage investments are supposed not to depend merely on the 
leverage effects of GE Equity. In the past, GE Equity experienced that due to the 
early development stage, start up companies are often neither able to provide any 
clients to the businesses, nor to represent themselves companies that are 
internationally expanding. Therefore, late stage companies can add more value 
back to the businesses of GE, what implies a higher incentive for a business unit 
to collaborate with GE Equity. An investment manager pinpoints two reasons:  
 
“…first, as a very early start-up company you really need somebody with holding 
hands and checking you every day. GE as a big organization is not good in that. 
And second, when we introduce companies to our commercial businesses, they will 
ask us first, who is using that company. If we say, ‘the company is a start-up and 
your business unit will use it first, nobody gets comfortable. GE is a very safe, 
conservative organization. Therefore, we found that it is much better to invest in 
well established companies whose products are already used. So if we come to the 
business unit to ask them for help they feel safe, as they can use a certain 
technology as well.” (Sanchez-Mollinger) 
 
Generally in the interviews it came up that the dilemma between focusing on the 
business unit activities, which guarantees internal collaboration, and broad 
technical focus, which ensures less vulnerability to the development of one 
industry, has been overcome by focusing on diverse industries which are 
complementary to GE. One investment manager at GE put this as: 
 
“One reason for the fact that a lot of the CVC’s are failing is its focus on only one 
industry, e.g. Intel. A CVC should create a diversified portfolio, that allows you to 
grow over time, independently of the business cycles of a single industry.” (Rossi) 
 
Exit Management 
 
The following section concludes on the exit management of GE Equity and the 
consequences for the collaboration with a business unit. GE Equity appraises an 
investment exit at the stock exchange in the form of an IPO as more problematic 
than trade sales due to strong influence of the current IPO market and the related 
lock-up period. Although in the past many IPOs had been performed by GE 
Equity, the interviews show a certain preference for trade sales due to its easy 
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feasibility and returns. Besides this aspect of financial convenience, the focused 
question of this work is to what extent the type of exit channel affects a business 
unit to collaborate? In order to avoid any buying conflicts regarding the price of 
an investment, the interviews show that all investments are planned to sell them 
to external third parties without any preemption right for business units. 
 
Since the descriptions in the previous sections show that co-investments are done 
with business units, the final question that remains to be answered is how co-
investments with business units impact the exit of this investment. In order to 
avoid the situation that a business unit wants to get the capital gain of an 
investment at an earlier point of time than GE Equity plans to part with a 
portfolio company, a detailed documentation within the co-investment contracts 
is indispensable. It embraces the exact time of an exit, the managing exit team, 
and the splitting of the capital gain between the business unit and the CVC unit. 
Also the case of GE Equity concludes by summarizing the interview statements.  
 
Figure 2-29: The statements of the GE Equity interview 
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Within-case analysis 
 
The above description of how the corporate executive board is integrated in GE 
Equity brought up that GE Equity enjoys wide freedom and independence of the 
corporate board. The strategic alignment of the CVC activities with the 
corporation as a whole is guaranteed by a quarterly meeting with the president of 
GE, where he approves the strategy of the CVC unit.50 Within this frame, GE 
Equity is more or less free in their daily decisions.51 Further, even the necessity 
of having the approval of GE’s senior-management is facilitated by a pretty flat 
organizational structure of only two levels between the CVC managers and the 
top-management of GE. Moreover, this keeps the way of reporting to the top 
management easy. 
 
“We are very independent, we are effectively free, and we can do (to a certain 
level) what we want. For the rest of decisions we have to go to the board of GE 
Equity and then to the GE Board. However, there are only two steps to get the top 
of GE.”(Sanchez-Mollinger) 
 
The case description gives clear indication that there is really a fundamental 
difference between the purposes of GE Equity and the business units. While the 
business units typically aim at issues closely related to their operational business 
(e.g. to follow cost-cutting aspects), GE Equity strives for primarily financially 
successful investments, related with a freedom in which technologies areas to 
invest. Moreover, the case shows that the CVC unit does not have any direct 
mechanisms in order to force the business unit to cooperate with them. Quite in 
contrast, they explicitly avoid any mandatory approval by the business unit along 
the investment process. Nevertheless, GE Equity may get a qualitative 
collaboration of a business unit in the case that a business unit wants to 
collaborate voluntary due to their technical interest in an investment. Looking at 
possible implications for the investments of this voluntary business unit 
collaboration shows some positive and some negative effects. The positive 
implication is that although there is perhaps no or little direct involvement of a 
BU, the start-up companies get the corporate certification of GE as an investor in 
                                              
50 The same is done in the relationship between GE Capital and GE. 
51 Decisions exceeding the daily operations need to be approved by higher levels within GE. 
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the market, which affects positively the validation of the young companies.52 
Furthermore, since the business units are not directly involved, the portfolio 
companies retain greater independence in their decision making processes. 
However, the negative side of this voluntary involvement of a business unit is 
that there is no guarantee of support.  
 
Furthermore, the case description shows that the corporate culture of GE does not 
really encourage internal collaboration. A very strong “do-it-yourself” corporate 
culture was reported, provoking personal drive and individual action towards 
personal success. Additionally, the doubtlessly very American culture of “you 
succeed or you are out”, which is only based on financial indicators, does not 
show a direct motivation for collaboration. 
 
Regarding support management, the case shows that cooperation mainly rests on 
two pillars: first, the personal networking within the corporation, and second, the 
existence of a business unit’s financial incentives in the form of co-investment 
with GE Equity. Due to changing contact partners, ad-hoc meetings between 
specific technology experts and GE Equity are preferred to institutionalized 
forums or internal fairs. However, the way that GE Equity gets further contacts in 
GE shows a focus on the senior management level of the business units: either 
the CEO of the business, or the corresponding head of the business development 
team. These people show the commitment that a business unit uses resources 
(mainly man-power and time) in order to collaborate with GE Equity. 
 
In the context of support management, the internal charge of a corporate standard 
rate for a complete due diligence by a business unit, or the situation with long-
lasting projects with R&D employees shows that the limits of goodwill are 
quickly reached at GE.53 Interestingly, the interviews suggest that GE Equity’s 
long existence has a positive effect on the process of pushing an investment to 
the people of a business unit. A greater willingness on the part of the CEO of a 
                                              
52 This is confirmed in an interview with Marc Lassus, the CEO & President of Gemplus, which 
receives 26 million US$. In the interview (www.geequity.com/interviews/gem1.html), he 
mentioned: “GE Capital is a formidable partner with an excellent reputation. GE is a rich 
company, and we need rich shareholders to accompany us into the future.” 
53 “Long lasting” was defined in the interviews as projects spanning more than a week that help 
the company to jump into another industry segment, e.g. by modification of the software. 
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business unit originates in their experience from the positive effects of CVC 
investments that come back to their business unit: capital gains. Moreover, I 
found in this case that there is a relationship between the image GE Equity enjoys 
in the business units and the resulting commitment of a business unit to the 
investment process.  
 
“…it helps the CEO to push it forward, as they have already seen what the capital 
gains could be over time. In general, the business units follow us more and more, 
because they believe that GE Equity is good for the company.” (Rossi) 
 
Finally, the above discussion of different motives for written co-investments 
indicates that this approach is of advantage to all involved. First, GE Equity can 
use it as a mechanism to force a business to do what they initially promised.  
Second, since the business unit has a financial incentive to co-operate, it 
‘guarantees’ the investee access to GE service facilities. Finally, it facilitates the 
decision of the investment committee if the underwriting documents show a 
business unit’s strategic involvement.  
   
2.4.3 Intel Capital 
 
The objective of this case is to describe the intra-organizational collaboration 
between the business unit and the CVC unit throughout the investment process at 
Intel Capital. First, a brief general corporate profile of Intel and Intel Capital will 
be presented. Second, the case will focus on describing the investment process 
between the CVC unit and business units, and finally within-case analysis will be 
carried out.54 
 
Corporate profile 
 
As of April 2002, the parent company of Intel Capital has revenues of US$ 26.53 
billion, and a net income of US$ 1,291 billion (both in 2001). Intel, ranked 
                                              
54 This case study draws on transcribed interviews with Thorsten Krumm, Thomas Offner, and 
conversations with Sam Al-Shamma. The appendix includes an overview of the affiliations 
and job titles of all interviewees. Furthermore, this case is based on annual reports, public 
speeches, press releases and analysts’ reports. 
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among the 100 biggest US companies, has more than 83,000 employees.55 Intel 
had long been articulating the vision of how the industry could grow to attract 
new users and open up new uses for connected PCs. In the early 1990s, by 
officially forming the venture program Intel Capital, they began to back up that 
vision with financial commitments to innovative companies. The initiator of the 
program was the chairman of corporate new business development. Intel sees 
venture capital “as a tool to create buyers for products and ultimately to steal 
market share from rivals.”56 Intel realized it could benefit from nurturing start-
ups making complementary products: Demand for them could spur increased 
demand for Intel’s own microprocessor products.  
 
“At Intel, much of our future success depends upon the Internet economy. 
However, it is not enough for us to deliver the building blocks of the Internet. 
Through our strategic investments, we also help to improve the technology that 
gets users online, remove roadblocks to online access, and make Internet content 
compelling.” (Dr. Andrew S. Grove, Chairman, Intel Corp.) 
 
Intel Capital has 350 employees worldwide who are working on CVC 
investments for Intel. Currently, Intel Capital manages one of the largest 
corporate venture portfolios in the technology segment. As of December 29, 
2001, the capital under management of Intel Capital was US$8 billion, including 
over 600 companies worldwide.57 International investments accounted for 45% 
of Intel Capital’s portfolio in 2001, up from less than 5% in 1998, and it is 
planned that this figure will rise to fully half its deals in 2002. As Table 2-30 
shows, in both 2000 and 2001 Intel Capital was the most active corporate 
investor regarding the number of deals. Last year, Intel Capital invested $ 350 
million in 175 companies (Venture Capital Journal, 2002). 
 
 
 
 
                                              
55 Survey is based on market capitalization, see Handelsblatt, 02.04.2002: “The 100 biggest US 
companies in 2001.” 
56 See Red Herring, June 2000, p. 346 
57 The appendix includes a detailed list of the portfolio firms of Intel Capital. 
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Figure 2-30: Most active corporate investors in the first half of 2001 
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With an overall strategy to stimulate advances in computing, Intel Capital looks 
for investment possibilities and invests in promising companies according to the 
following profile: They make minority investments (typically < 20%) in mainly 
private companies. The investments are usually in early-stage companies (first- 
or second round financing) that get investments between $1 million to $10 
million. However, they also make acquisitions of 100%.58 As the heart of Intel is 
based on intellectual property (IP), the objective and motivation of making 
acquisitions is to secure the IP of a new technology. It is a matter of common 
knowledge at Intel that it is the exclusive right of Intel Capital to make these 
types of investments:  
 
“There are no service-level contracts at Intel. However, the business units know 
that whenever minority investments or acquisitions are in discussion, there is only 
one way within the corporation: Intel Capital.” (Krumm) 
 
                                              
58 In 2000, Intel made 28 acquisitions; see interview transcript with Thorsten Krumm.  
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The following ranking, published in Redherring59, shows that compared to their 
competitors Intel performs CVC investments quite successfully, at least 
concerning the financial terms ‘aftermarket increase’. 
 
Figure 2-31: Intel Capital is one of the top VC firms of 1999 based on the 
aftermarket increase in the dollar value of their portfolio IPOs60 
Rank Nam e
1999 
afterm arket 
increase (%)
1999 
afterm arket 
increase 
(bio. $)
No. of 
IPOs
VC under 
m anagem ent 
(m io. $)
Preferred 
inv estm ent 
per 
transaction 
(m io. $)
1 Lucent Technologies 2,636.6 71.8 3 n.a . n.a.
...
5 AT&T Ventures 1,170.2 60.5 9 350 1-5
...
9 Cisco Systems 869.6 35.0 5 n.a . 3-15
...
12
Morgan Stanley Dean W itter 
Venture Partners 776.0 27.9 7 8,000 2-20
...
20 Compaq Computer 621.9 28.7 6 8,300 n.a.
21
Morgan Stanley Dean W itter 
Capita l Partners 556.5 22.4 8 8,000 20-500
...
23 Intel Capital 503.6 52.3 23 8,000 n.a.
...
25 Goldman Sachs Merchant Bank 380.6 29.1 12 9,000 n.a.
Source: Author, following Redherring magazine, June 2000  
 
Intel Capital is a strategic investor and its decisions to invest in a company must 
satisfy a strategic goal: aiming to create and expand new markets for Intel's 
products. Initially, they invested in a range of content provider companies. 
However, they realized that they had to expand their scope beyond their 
operations and product lines. Today, Intel Capital invests in technology areas on 
the computing spectrum, in support of a total end-to-end computing solution. In 
this sense, they invest in ecosystem companies that are building the infrastructure 
to enable the Internet Economy. These ecosystem companies develop technology 
that is sold alongside Intel products. Investments to promote this are: 
Client/Server Platforms and Technologies (32%), Networking and 
Communication (15%), and Design and Manufacturing Technology (9%). Intel 
further invests in content and technologies that can enhance Internet experience 
and content for users (44%), such as broadband services and tools.61 While these 
ecosystem deals are meant to put Intel technology into more products, market 
                                              
59 See Redherring, June 2000, http://www.redherring.com/mag/issue80S/mag-vcfirms-80s.html 
60 The ranking is based on the aftermarket increase in the dollar value of their portfolio IPOs, 
from the date of the offering to the end of the year, as measured by Venture Economics. 
61 The figures represent the percentages of the total portfolio of Intel. 
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development deals aim to stimulate demand for Intel’s products. Not all of the 
venture group’s investments are ultimately aimed at boosting Intel’s top line. 
With what are known as “gap-fillers”, Intel Capital invests in companies that sell 
technology Intel needs in order to sell or produce its own products. However, 
there is one exception regarding the strategic relevance at Intel. In this sense, it is 
also possible that Intel Capital may invest in disruptive technologies that do not 
come under the area of any existent business unit right now at Intel. The aim is a 
very strategic one in the long-term: not to miss the access to “the decisive 
technology of the future” (according to the interviews). A company in that “eyes 
and ears” category, representing the very minority in Intel’s portfolio, might 
produce something useful in three to five years.  
 
“Regarding these deals we want to have an ear in a future segment: what is going 
on there? Then, Intel’s top management decides if it is strategically reasonable to 
establish a business unit in this area. (Krumm) 
 
Although financial returns are in fact secondary to strategic objectives, the 
financial potential is a second integral part of Intel’s selection criteria, which 
make investments more affordable. The explanation of an investment manager 
shows that the financial attractiveness of a deal seems to be closely connected 
with its strategic relevance: 
 
“To be a strategic deal for Intel means that a certain penetration in the market is 
possible. That is to say, if an investment is financially not attractive, it cannot be 
strategic for Intel, as we don’t have enough market penetration.” 
 
Putting all these aspects together, the ideal Intel investment is located in the 
intersection of two circles “Fits Intel’s strategies” and “Good Financial 
Investments”. This is illustrated by the following graph. 
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Figure 2-32: The “ideal” Intel investment   
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What does this mean for the predetermination of the overall strategy of Intel 
Capital? The strategy developed is focused according to the business units’ 
strategy, and is approved by the board of directors at Intel. This five-year plan 
mirrors the technologies that a business unit is lacking in order to follow their 
“road-map” strategy.  
 
Although, the last drop in CVC activities in the first half of 2001 seriously hit the 
“tech giant” in terms of financial returns due to changes in the value of its 
venture capital portfolio. The statement by Intel Capital’s president shows that 
these diminishing returns do not mean that Intel is refraining from investing in 
venture capital:62 “Intel is trying to keep up the pace of its venture investments”, 
says Leslie L. Vadasz, President of Intel Capital. Intel Capital made more 
venture investments last year than ever (Venture Capital Journal, 2002). Indeed, 
Intel Capital was the most active investor in the second quarter of 2002, 
participating in 22 new and follow-on investments.63   
 
Looking at organizational embedding within the corporation, Intel Capital is 
integrated as a 100 % legally owned unit of Intel, and does not represent a 
corporate entity in its own right, as the following figure shows. 
 
 
 
                                              
62 See Business Week, October 15, 2001, p. 85 
63 See www.privateequityonline.com, 07/01/2002 
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Figure 2-33: The organizational embedding of Intel Capital within Intel 
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As the structural embedding of Intel Capital within the corporation shows, the 
CVC unit is located directly under the executive board of Intel (Andrew S. 
Grove, Leslie L.Vadasz). Besides that, Leslie L.Vadasz, a founder of Intel, is the 
COO of Intel Capital. The interviewees at Intel confirmed that this high 
commitment Intel Capital enjoys by the executive board has a positive effect on 
the commitment of the BUs. 
 
“This structure gets us the commitment by the BUs, as they see that Intel Capital 
has a very high commitment by the board of Intel, and therefore is of highest 
priority regarding the whole corporate structure.” (Offner)  
 
The central embedding of Intel Capital within the corporation is operationalized 
by the fact that the corporation has the complete P&L responsibility of Intel 
Capital.64 Further, Intel Capital gets its financial resources directly from Intel’s 
balance sheet. Intel Capital is seen as a kind of service provider at Intel, in 
charge of looking for, representing, executing and managing investments for 
Intel. The following quotation by an investment manager illustrates this: 
 
“We investment managers are employees like anybody else at Intel. 
Fundamentally, we are nothing other than a cost center. Intel Capital is a strategic 
                                              
64 The balance of Intel is consolidated by Intel Capital’s P&L. 
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department, a kind of service provider without profit, working for the business 
units of the parent company.” (Krumm)   
 
The internal organizational structure of Intel Capital reflects two different 
dimensions: vertical in the US, and horizontal in Europe (and all the other 
countries). Vertical means that Intel Capital has employees who are located 
directly in the business units. By participating in the business units’ staff and 
strategy meetings they get in-depth insights into the strategic focus of a certain 
technology and make the link to Intel Capital. In contrast, in Europe (and all 
other countries apart from the U.S.) Intel Capital is structured horizontally. That 
means that an investment manager is responsible for a geographical area, 
including all technical areas. Regarding Europe, the horizontal structure was 
chosen in order to create a lean organization and to avoid overheads for Intel 
Capital. Figure 2-34 illustrates these differences.   
 
Figure 2-34: Intel Capital is organized in regions and technical experts 
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Investment process 
 
The corporate profile presented illustrates that Intel Capital invests in CVC with 
a strategic aim. In order to reach their strategic objectives, Intel Capital reported 
the necessity to connect business units with investment companies. As this study 
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aims at providing in-depth insights into how and why Intel Capital strives for 
collaboration with the business units, the following sections will explain the 
investment process at Intel Capital.  
 
Deal Generation 
 
With respect to the investment process, I will first explain how new investment 
opportunities are generated. Intel Capital has two deal sources: external and 
internal deals. In terms of the internal “deal pipeline”, Intel’s business units 
themselves represent an elementary factor. As the business units are actively 
operating in technology markets and therefore have contacts to a wide range of 
new, small companies, they are supposed to transfer deal possibilities to Intel 
Capital. Further, in order to know if a business unit sees any investment 
possibilities, Intel Capital tries to keep up-to-date with the activities of the 
business units. In the words of an investment manager the situation is perceived 
as follows:  
 
“… absolutely, it’s a purpose of Intel Capital to keep the business units 
permanently informed, as we also ask them to inform us about interesting 
investment possibilities they see in the market.” (Krumm) 
 
A mutual exchange of information between the CVC unit and the business unit is 
necessary. Therefore, the investment managers at Intel are invited to lectures or 
presentations by technical experts from a business unit in order to keep the CVC 
unit informed about the latest technical developments and attainments of an 
industry.65 With respect to the reverse direction, Intel Capital brochures are 
distributed directly from the top management of Intel Capital to the business 
units. Moreover, the investment managers maintain brisk and informal 
communication with the business units in order to stay in permanent information 
exchange. 66 Finally, very informal platforms like social events or company 
parties are a mechanism for establishing or extending relationships between 
employees. However, there is no institutionalized formal communication 
platform such as an internal Intel Capital fair. 
                                              
65 If this is not possible due to the geographical distribution, telephone conferences of virtually 
distributed presentations serve as surrogates. 
66 This could be done just by sending some e-mails, for example. 
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Besides the internal deal flow, Intel Capital actively attempts to find external 
investments that promise the required access to technologies necessary to fill the 
strategic holes in the value chain of a business unit.67 However, the strategic 
alignment of the external investment possibilities with the interests of a business 
unit requires the investment managers to understand the strategy and applied 
technologies of the individual business units. An institutionalized form of this is 
represented by the quarterly business update meetings between investment 
manager and business unit. Besides this, the vertical organization structure of 
Intel Capital in the USA enables them to profit from the in-depth insights of their 
US colleagues working in business unit locations for Intel Capital. 
 
Furthermore, incoming financing requests by street deals represent additional 
external deal flow. Finally, the maintenance of contacts and networks to 
dedicated venture capitalists or investment banks, for example, makes it possible 
for Intel Capital to co-invest alongside external VC firms. The positive effect for 
Intel Capital is that they don’t have to manage every investment closely, since 
the co-investors direct the ventures’ growth and monitor their performance. 
 
However, the strategic aim of Intel Capital and the corresponding alignment 
regarding new deals mean that the business units get back strategic market 
information and know-how. Apart from the difficulties in measuring the potential 
strategic results, the achievement of this strategic aim by the CVC unit is 
fundamental for the process of deal generation: it represents the only motivation 
for a business unit at Intel to contact the CVC unit regarding promising 
investment possibilities they see in their operational market. This self-enforcing 
investment circle, consisting of the strategic investment objectives of the CVC 
unit and the generation of internal deals, is shown in the following figure. 
 
 
 
                                              
67 Examples mentioned have been the lack of a product or the lack of a technical platform, etc. 
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Figure 2-35: The self-enforcing investment circle 
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Deal Evaluation 
 
Intel Capital applies a two-stage approval process in order to reach a decision 
regarding an investment possibility. This process will be explained below. Since 
the first screening is an analysis of the incoming business plans at Intel Capital 
by the investment manager, it acts as a funnel (according to the interviews). 
Since Intel Capital is forced to select companies that are of strategic relevance to 
a business unit in order to obtain this unit’s sponsorship, the purpose of deal 
screening is that the investment manager gets an idea of the strategic implications 
of a deal. 
 
Only if an investment manager came to the decision that there could be any 
strategic relevance regarding the concept of an investment for Intel does he/she 
contact the manager of a business unit. In intensive feedback discussions with a 
business the investment manager attempts to get confirmation of the strategic 
relevance of an investment. The investigation of the strategic relevance includes 
an analysis of a business idea’s significance, its “USP”, and the intellectual 
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property.68 The purpose is to get a business unit as a sponsor for an investment, 
which is indispensable for the deal concept meeting with the investment 
committee. This investment committee, including Intel Capital, legal department, 
treasury and the general manager69, makes the first official “go/no-go” decision 
in the investment process. While in the case of a negative decision an investment 
is not followed up, the positive decision means the transition to the next process.  
  
At the same time, the go-ahead by the investment board represents the start of the 
due diligence process at Intel Capital. As part of the due diligence process the 
other business units involved deliver their technical due diligence for a company, 
The legal department performs the legal due diligence, and financial evaluations 
are supported by the treasury department. All this effort is focused on the 
necessary details of an investment. However, besides the official financial 
investment criteria,70 no additional “must-have” criteria are applied in evaluating 
a company, such as minimum in revenues, sale, etc.   
 
The advanced process includes the solicitation of a business plan and meetings 
with the management team of the company. Further, the exchange of non-
disclosure agreements aims at securing incoming technologies at Intel regarding 
“do-it yourself” activities. Intel Capital is not about to risk their image in the VC 
market due to the illegal imitation of a technology in a business unit after 
completing the technical due diligence of a possible investment. An investment 
manager explained the situation as follows: 
 
“To speak plainly, observing the technology and then ‘doing-it yourself’ doesn’t 
work. You need the processes to avoid it. That means you need non-disclosure 
agreements for a portfolio company, and internally you have to make sure that no 
information goes outside”. (Krumm) 
 
Putting together the involvement of the business units in the technical due 
diligence process, the crucial question is, how does the investment manager find 
the decisive people from a business unit for the technical due diligence? And 
                                              
68 USP stands for ‘unique selling proposition’ of a company. 
69 The general manager represents the vice president of a business unit. 
70 Criteria mentioned are investments of US$2-10 million, or <20% of company stock. 
CASE STUDIES ABOUT THE INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION OF CVC                  162 
further, how does Intel Capital keep up-to-date with the activities of a business 
unit necessary for the first screening? The method applied at Intel Capital is 
astonishingly unspectacular. Investment managers use the available means of 
communication and internal directories at Intel. Apart from the company 
telephone list, e-mail directory and Intranet, the website of each business unit is a 
first guideline for the investment manager in getting information and contact 
partners from a business unit. Second, besides the supportive infrastructure, the 
matrix organization of Intel Capital, strictly speaking the vertical structure of the 
CVC unit in the U.S., was reported as supporting the daily business of the 
investment manager. The American investment managers open doors for the 
European colleagues71, since the US investment managers possess the required 
personal relationships in a business unit due to their focus on a certain 
technology.72 One investment manager working for Intel Capital in Munich 
reported this efficient possibility: 
  
“But first of all, if I need sector-specific technical help, I contact my colleague at 
Intel Capital in the USA. As only “he” is responsible for one specific business unit, 
he can give me ‘comparables’ and knows all competitors. Further, he helps me to 
involve the business unit: first, to get access to a business unit, and second, to help 
me understand the strategy of a business unit. They open doors for me that I cannot 
open from here. They know the people in the business units and have the personal 
relationship to them, since they have lunch together, they play golf or have a drink 
together.” (Offner) 
 
Regarding further mechanisms that facilitate deal evaluation, the interviews at 
Intel Capital reveal two personal characteristics of investment managers which 
are supportive. First, professional background with operational experience in 
sales, distribution, or business models help to evaluate incoming business plans. 
And second, the personal candor of an investment manager to maintain and foster 
existent contacts and networks to business units enables him/her to get fast 
feedback regarding a potential investment. This is even more important since  
                                              
71 In Europe, an investment manager is responsible for all technology areas arising from 
“his/her” specific region. Therefore, his/her in-depth knowledge about a certain technology is 
limited. 
72 This person is referred to as “focus-point” of Intel Capital.  
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informal contacts within Intel have been mentioned in the interviews as 
necessary for the later commitment and collaboration of business units: 
 
“With the relevant informal contacts we have, we try to establish new contacts. 
You look at the business plans and speak with one or two business units to get their 
first feedback. …, but at Intel, this is relatively informal. You as an employee are 
expected to care about your personal networks. Only with those do you also get the 
commitment and the cooperation from a business unit later.” (Krumm)  
 
Although the sponsorship by a business unit regarding the pre-selection of 
companies is required for the first concept meeting, the investment managers 
interviewed emphasized that they try to use the resources of a business unit as 
economically as possible. In order to unburden the employees of a business, they 
are supposed to become the “heroes of Intel” (interview) by capturing as much 
information as possible out of their own industry know-how in order to become 
experts themselves in a certain industry. The fact that no special information 
databases are available for Intel Capital complicates the duty of the investment 
managers. 
 
“We really should represent what we are often called, ‘Heroes of Intel’, in that we 
do not have to make a call to a business unit regarding each ‘bagatelle’, that 
prevents them from their operational work.” (Offner)    
 
From a general point of view, the process of getting feedback was reported to be 
very informal. All of the possibilities discussed above only assist the process of 
seeking advice within the corporation. There is no contractual basis for the search 
and inquiry process of a business unit available at Intel Capital. However, 
navigating in the corporation seems to be facilitated by the commitment of 
corporate top management regarding Intel Capital, as the words of an investment 
manager illustrate: 
 
“… basically, we have to ask our way through the corporation. However, as Intel 
Capital is suspended at a very high level at Intel, we don’t have problems finding 
the right business unit. And it is clear in the minds of the business unit, that Intel 
Capital represents an important part of the innovation activity, and the innovation 
level of Intel. This makes a positive collaboration happen.” (Offner) 
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Trying to find explanations for how Intel builds a supportive, positive 
environment for Intel Capital at the business units, the cultural analysis shows 
that the corporate culture of Intel is very active. It starts with the announcement 
of Intel’s overall corporate strategy, where Intel Capital represents a significant 
part of Intel’s prosperity. Moreover, it not only means the simple announcement 
of Intel’s strategy, but also that this strategy is visualized and communicated at 
Intel either on posters, pamphlets or badges. Even more important, the interviews 
reveal a relation between the compensation basis of the CVC managers and 
supportive corporate culture at Intel. In order to get the willingness of a business 
unit to collaborate, the investment managers at Intel Capital are not paid any 
carry of interest.73 Combining the aspects mentioned leads to the specific “Intel 
culture” that supports the positive image of Intel Capital in the business units.  
 
“This makes it happen that we all act together, and that there is the opinion at Intel 
that CVC is not something that only enriches the investment managers, but rather 
helps Intel as a corporation to progress. We are all employees of Intel, we all have 
the same goal in mind: to realize shareholder value for the corporation. It would be 
really very difficult to get the enthusiasm of a business unit if they know they are 
helping you to get richer. You get additional 20 % carry, and they only get their 
monthly salary. Therefore, we are compensated like anybody else here at Intel.” 
(Krumm)  
 
Deal Structuring 
 
All deal structuring aims to complete the whole documentation by the investment 
manager, which is required for second approval of the investments by the 
investment board. On the one hand, this documentation includes the finalization 
of the shareholder agreement (or term-sheet) that contains all equity details 
between Intel Capital and the investment. However, it must be mentioned that 
Intel Capital never occupies board seats in the portfolio company, at least 
observer rights. The reasons for this are first, liability issues, and second, 
conflicts of interest.74 Furthermore, co-investments with business units are 
excluded. On the other hand, it is the business agreement that covers the strategic 
                                              
73 The compensation structure at Intel includes a base salary, an executive bonus (basis for the 
achievement of goals), and stock options. That is exactly the same for Intel Capital. 
74 An example of a possible conflict of interest could arise if a reasonable decision from a 
strategic point of view denies a positive decision from an economic point of view.  
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part of an investment between the portfolio company and a business unit. These 
‘side letters’ contain the reasons, the objectives, and the resources the sponsoring 
business unit will provide in order to realize the value beyond equity. The 
purpose is on the one hand to make the expectations a business unit has regarding 
an investment obvious. On the other hand, it has the advantage for the portfolio 
company that they know Intel’s intention and the value add Intel is able to 
deliver; even before an investment is closed.  
 
“To point it out again: Intel only invests if we can define the strategic fit 100%; 
that means, what is my motivation?, what are my goals?, and which resources am I 
prepared to apply?” (Krumm)  
 
While the Legal department is responsible for the legal aspects and structure of 
the term sheets, the Treasury unit focuses on the financial evaluation of the 
business model in finalizing the shareholder agreement. The operational people 
(frequently it is an engineer and a marketing specialist) and the vice-president of 
a business unit aim at articulating the corresponding business agreement. Last but 
not least, the US investment managers of Intel Capital are once more helpful 
regarding thorough information about markets and technologies of a business 
unit. Since these additionally involved personal resources are seen as service 
providers for Intel Capital, there is no intra-group cost charging.  
 
“Besides the overall process, we as Intel Capital oversee the whole process where 
Legal and Treasury cooperate in finalizing the financial due diligence and the 
shareholder agreement. The strategic part, meaning the technical due diligence and 
the business agreement, is always residing in the business unit. Also my colleague 
in the USA helps us with the development of the business agreement.” (Krumm)  
 
As far as the personal characteristics and abilities of an investment manager are 
concerned, this process of internal outsourcing of tasks to other departments at 
Intel explains why being an investment expert is neglected as an important 
attribute of a CVC manager.  Nevertheless, a basic business understanding75 
seems to be required, since all employees at Intel Capital have an MBA. 
 
                                              
75 Examples of business skills mentioned in the interviews are: what is the business model? 
What are dependencies? Where are the bottlenecks? What is the market size? 
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“We don’t have to be investment experts who know we should set up special ‘deal 
vehicles’. The investment part becomes more and more a commodity, especially in 
Europe, where we see quite simple investment structures.” (Offner) 
       
Investment decision 
 
Once the whole documentation resulting out of the process of deal structuring is 
complete, the purpose of the second meeting of the investment board is to get the 
second go-ahead in the two-stage investment process. At the same time the 
positive outcome represents the final decision to invest in a company. Within this 
meeting the company is presented in detail by the investment manager in order to 
clarify any remaining unanswered questions. Interestingly, the final investment 
decision is not reached unanimously, but in a process of consent-finding. If one 
of the four people involved (either the representative of Intel Capital, Legal, 
Treasury, or the business unit) voted against a deal, no investment would be 
made in a company. If they cannot reach a decision within a time-span of three 
months, the investment process is canceled. After the investment sheet has been 
signed between the CVC unit and the portfolio firm, Intel Capital transfers the 
investment money, which originates from Intel’s balance sheet. Consequently, 
Intel is the owner of the shares in an investment. In general, the investment 
managers are in charge of coordinating the whole process of getting to a 
decision. What this embraces in detail is shown by the following quotation. 
 
“… the necessity is to get the ‘important’ people and the ‘right’ sponsor to the 
table. Further, you have to present the ‘right’ information to the CEO.” (Offner)      
 
With regard to the involvement of the business units in the investment decision, 
the clearly articulated sponsorship by a business unit in the business agreement is 
mandatory for gaining the investment approval by the investment committee. The 
main reasons for the existence of a sponsorship are both to signalize to the 
investment committee that the support by an Intel unit is guaranteed, but even 
more important, to accentuate the strategic relevance of an investment. The 
following two quotations illustrate the situation: 
 
“Absolutely every time we really need a ‘sponsor’ from a business unit. Without 
the support of a business unit, there is no strategic aspect of the investment 
apparent, and therefore a requirement of our investment strategy is missing. I think 
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the big difference at Intel is that we cannot invest if no business unit is involved 
and verifies the strategic relevance.” (Krumm) 
 
Putting this all together, what does it mean for the overall strategy of Intel 
Capital? Although Intel Capital emphasizes the business unit’s active 
involvement during the whole decision making process as a prerequisite for 
getting their cooperation later in the subsequent post-investment phase, it remains 
the investment manager who decides which deals are finally presented to the 
investment board. Moreover, Intel Capital admits to failing interesting 
investment possibilities in the past, since all decisions need to be approved twice 
by the top management of Intel. The following quotation confirms this: 
 
“Sometimes we are not able to participate in the closing, as we are not fast enough 
to get a decision through the corporation.” (Krumm) 
 
Portfolio and support management 
 
Intel Capital is committed to delivering “value beyond equity to support the 
long-term success of our portfolio companies”. Besides the resulting corporate 
certification and the facilities tied to Intel’s networks,76 Intel Capital strives to 
create synergy between the portfolio companies that arise due to their 
international distribution.77 In detail, Intel Capital’s “Alliance Program” extends 
to:78  
 
• Technological assistance: Companies may work with Intel labs on cutting-edge 
technology issues, driving the development of industry standard solutions.  
• Insight into future trends: Intel may share plans for the Intel architecture 
roadmap and perspectives on projected industry developments.  
• Strategic relationships with other sources of financing: Intel Capital works in 
a complementary relationship with the VC industry and other corporate investors.  
                                              
76 See statement by Padd Holohan, CEO of BaltimoreTechnologies, Ireland: “In working with 
Intel, we have had insight to the company’s plans for a common security architecture. Being 
on the inner circle has been an important source of strategic information.” 
77 See statement by Zou Qixiong, CEO of SuperData Technololgy Ltd,. China: “Intel helped us 
make contact with companies like Intuit, which resulted in important licensing arrangements 
for us. The fact that we were associated with Intel increases those companies’ confidence in 
SuperData.”   
78 Alliance Program located on the portfolio company member protected websitex 
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• Worldwide infrastructure: The Intel Capital team around the world is 
positioned to respond locally to promising new investment possibilities.  
• Visibility and corporate association: For many portfolio companies, the Intel 
investment may help to achieve higher visibility among customers and suppliers.  
 
Putting these program benefits together shows that Intel Capital targets and 
extends areas of Intel competency to bring value to the Intel Capital portfolio. In 
realizing their mission they strive to establish a win-win relationship between 
Intel and the portfolio firm.  
 
In this stage, one central element is the business agreements79, since they 
represent the formalized initiator of the information exchange between Intel 
corp., Intel Capital, and the portfolio firm. While Intel Capital’s portfolio 
management and marketing departments carry out the initial processing of 
inquiries by the portfolio companies to the corresponding business unit, the 
business units themselves are responsible for the internal transformation of the 
business agreements. Nevertheless, Intel Capital remain responsible for an 
investment during its complete life cycle and keeps in contact with the 
investments. In this sense, they focus on the financial indicators of an investment 
like development of cash flow, burn-rate, etc., and compare them with the fixed 
targets dates. Regarding the pursuit of increasing the value of the portfolio 
companies, the task which arises for the investment manager is to control 
whether there is enough support by exchanging information and know-how 
between investment and business units. An elementary facility in measuring up 
to this bridge function is the control reports that document the results. 
 
“We only control whether the exchange of know-how between the business unit 
and the CVC unit works if we agree and are satisfied with this information 
exchange. In this sense, the control reports are applied as guidelines for us.” 
(Offner) 
 
Even more important, the link to Intel’s executive board is guaranteed since the 
control reports are controlled by corporate top management in a quarterly 
meeting. Besides the description of the actual stage of an investment, the control 
report includes the realized collaboration between a business unit and an 
                                              
79 These ‘side-letters’ are attached to the business agreements. 
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investment. This approach forces the investment managers to ask the business 
units for the transmission of certain “collaboration indicators” around the 
business agreement in question.   
 
Since the above description showed that there are no formal requirements for a 
business unit to collaborate (e.g. the maintenance of board seats or co-
investments), the crucial question that arises is how Intel Capital succeeds in 
achieving active hands-on support. While in the post-investment phase the actors 
involved primarily in the pre-investment phase are mainly concentrated to a 
controlling function, the business units themselves are in the focus of activity. 
Intel Capital tends to address people who rank highly in a business unit, 
especially the director since this person has the authority to decide about the 
resources (personal and capital), and is able to articulate and clarify the strategic 
value of an investment to the technical experts of his/her business unit. 
Moreover, since the transfer of the strategic value to a business unit is based on a 
flow of information, the investment manager has to provide sufficient 
informative input. In the words of an investment manager, this situation is 
perceived as follows: 
 
“The collaboration is very informal, since on the bottom line the business units also 
benefit from an investment. And it is their own push to get support in an 
investment. In order to maintain the flow of information, we really need somebody 
in the team who sees the strategic value of an investment. Therefore, we stay in 
close information exchange with the corresponding general managers.” (Krumm) 
 
Intel Capital attempts to channel the contact partners for one investment 
company in order to avoid a start up company getting clobbered over the head by 
a multitude of Intel employees. To achieve this, Intel Capital limits the number 
of people involved on the part of a business unit to one single employee80, since a 
higher number of actors involved leads to no additional quality in the 
collaboration. However, Intel Capital also attempts to fall back to business unit 
resources in a very resource- and cost oriented way, as the critical bottleneck 
represents the limited time resources of a business unit to realize investment 
support. Since Intel Capital and the business unit represent two organizationally 
separate units at Intel operating autarkically in terms of cost-charging, the 
                                              
80 Only in exceptional cases are two or more persons involved. 
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necessity is aggravated. Moreover, as the business units do not participate in the 
financial returns of the equity investments,81 their only incentive for supporting 
CVC remains their strategic benefits. Unfortunately, the strategic incentive of 
having access to new technologies is often very long-term oriented and shows no 
direct effects on the operational results of a business unit. That Intel Capital feels 
a certain powerlessness against this problematic scenario is illustrated by an 
investment manager:   
 
“Certainly, the employees at the business units also only have 8, 10 or 12 hours a 
day, and have their “own” operational goals. And in this situation, we as Intel 
Capital want to make demands on their time. In economically turbulent times, the 
business units are thinking very short-term oriented. This makes it hard for us to 
get their consciousness for CVC. You don’t come into conflict with anybody, but 
you don’t get support. That is a real problem.” (Offner) 
 
Against this problematic scenario, the announcement of the desired collaboration 
of the business units requires sure instinct and sensitiveness on the part of the 
investment managers. Moreover, metaphorically speaking, ‘to foster and 
cultivate’ this interface was reported as essential in order to keep collaboration 
unproblematical. Precisely speaking, ‘fostering’ the interface between the CVC 
unit and the business units means clarifying and articulating the strategic benefit 
of the current expense of and effort spent on CVC engagement on the long-term 
technology roadmap of a business unit. This challenge puts the investment 
manager on the spot, and is referred to by an investment manager as follows: 
 
“Obviously, this shows a compromise that has to be dealt with with great care. In 
order not to fail to appear really critical, you constantly have to look after the 
sponsor. What we primarily do is to analyze and to communicate, since it is 
important to convince a business unit. However, you have to do your homework 
first in order to act the role credibly. You have to make sure that the business units 
do not think: ‘Intel Capital cannot articulate the value proposition so why should I 
listen, what is my benefit’.” (Krumm) 
 
With the challenging issue of an investment manager in mind, the question is 
what attempts Intel Capital make to meet the personal characteristics of their 
investment managers. First, in order to understand a company’s requirements, 
                                              
81 The same is true for the individual level of the employees. 
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operational experience in being an entrepreneur is beneficial for an investment 
manager. Second, since technical experts in very specific and focused market or 
product areas are required, Intel also hires investment managers outside of the 
company who are able to “separate the wheat from the chaff”. Third, alumna 
Intel hires employees who previously worked in an operational unit of Intel, in 
order to have investment managers with a broad network of contacts distributed 
within Intel. This category represents the majority of the employees at Intel 
Capital. Besides the (moreorless) existent network of contacts, a former Intel 
affiliation enables the investment manager to know the processes and the culture 
of Intel.82 Finally, since the investment manager has to communicate with 
persons with diverse characteristics located on different hierarchy levels, Intel 
Capital looks for investment managers who can add profound communication 
skills to the above-mentioned characteristics desired.83  
 
“Rather, the issue is to get the ‘right’ people and the products on board. We see 
ourselves absolutely as the driver of this integration process. And then you have to 
put everything forward to an investment; it’s a matrix task over different 
organizations. That demands a lot of communication.” (Offner) 
 
Putting it all together makes it obvious that Intel Capital believe that the strategic 
notion makes it unnecessary to further incentivize the business units in the post-
investment phase by any financial kick. The possibility of intra-group cost 
charging would even have a negative effect for Intel Capital, since they would 
drop in priority to the level of “any” client of a business unit. However, it also 
emerged that Intel Capital are not immune to potential conflicts that arise due to 
a business unit’s sudden strategic change, triggered either by internal changes or 
by the external market. The following quotation confirms this: 
 
“We don’t incentivize them on a cost-benefit level, but on the strategic objective. If 
we established a profit center, we would not be a service provider for Intel 
anymore, and we would become a client like everybody else.” 
“And a strategy change, that happens. Even Intel changes strategy. This results in 
an obsolete investment decision and a loss in motivation for the business unit. The 
consequence is that the priority of a portfolio company changes as well.“  (Krumm)  
                                              
82 Examples of this are: how are the people thinking? what is their responsibility in the firm? 
83 Precisely speaking, it is the senior management of Intel, the entrepreneurial management team 
of the portfolio firm, and the external financially oriented investor community. 
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Exit Management 
 
Looking for a successful exit, Intel Capital review market conditions for 
opportunities to sell all or part of their investments. Between Jan. 1 and Dec. 15, 
2000, Intel Capital generated paper gains of $ 27 million (net profit after tax) 
from nine companies.84 With respect to the corporate certification of having Intel 
as an investor, a strong influence on the IPO price was reported. With regard to a 
financial participation in profit and loss arising from an exit, the business units 
only participate indirectly in the financial returns as Intel shareholders. Due to 
the source of the invested equity, Intel Corp., there is no direct profit sharing. 
Interestingly, while the CVC unit loses its interest in an investment after exit, the 
involvement of a business unit sometimes even continues. This means that a 
business unit follows on joint-projects with an investment company which have 
already started and which look promising. However, an investment manager of 
Intel Capital did not report any preference for a certain type of exit: 
 
“I would say we are completely unemotional regarding IPO or trade sell. Selling is 
done as part of prudent management of a large portfolio even though strategic 
activities may continue with the company following a stock sale.” (Offner) 
 
Finally, Figure 2-36 summarizes the statements from this interview by 
characterizing them into positively and negatively perceived influence factors in 
three simplified stages: investment process of (1) deal generation /first screening, 
(2) due diligence/investment decision, (3) and post-investment phase. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
84 See Corporate Venturing Report, p. 20, October 2001 
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Figure 2-36: The statements from the interview at Intel Capital 
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Within-case analysis 
 
The case-description of this phase shows that Intel’s ‘value beyond capital’ 
approach implicates a necessary involvement and collaboration by the business 
units at Intel. The words of an investment manager show that even at Intel 
Capital the demand of business unit resources for longer periods (e.g. in the case 
of joint R&D activities or the optimization of portfolio firm products for Intel 
products) was reported to be afflicted with problems regarding the reported 
assignment of duties to the business units. 
 
“To be very honest, there are a lot of hurdles in providing value beyond capital.” 
(Al-Shamma) 
 
In order to overcome the collaboration hurdles described, Intel strives for the 
situation that the business units see CVC as an integrated strategic tool that 
enables them to get access to complementary solutions and technologies. The 
case description shows that at the beginning of the investment process, the CVC 
unit requires the collaboration of a business unit in order to obtain their 
sponsorship regarding an investment. Since in this early phase Intel Capital do 
not feel able to immediately realize a win-win situation, the investment managers 
have to use persuasive power by feeding the business units with future 
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expectations on a potential strategic value add. In the words of an investment 
manager this situation is perceived as follows: 
 
“…unfortunately, we don’t get a complete integration of the business unit in CVC 
activities, but more a kind of ‘virtual’ integration.” (Offner) 
 
Due to the awareness of necessary partnering regarding the “time to market” 
aspect existing in the high-tech area of Intel, the task of their investment 
managers is partly facilitated. However, the commitment of Intel’s senior 
management proved to be a crucial prerequisite. Top-management backing 
facilitates the awareness of the business units that they can use Intel Capital as a 
strategic tool in order to tie a partnership closer by a financial engagement. 
 
“…the business units have understood that with Intel Capital they are able to reach 
their own goals faster.” (Krumm) 
 
In the case description above a strategic issue also emerged. Since the CVC 
engagement is not directly taken into consideration in the performance 
measurement of a business unit, the investment managers run against rejection 
when they present a “disruptive technology” in a business unit, as these 
technologies challenge their persecuted strategy so far. The necessary conviction 
of a business unit about the potential value-added of a company for an 
investment manager to achieve the strategic roadmap remains uncertain. The 
resulting ‘not invented here’ syndrome originates at the senior management level 
in a business unit. As they follow their own R&D activities that consume huge 
amounts of budget, it is almost naïve to belief that they see external technologies 
with clear vision. Aggravating enough, emotional issues arise: the immediate 
termination of their own projects, the laying off of colleagues in the department, 
restructure of the organization of a unit, etc.  
 
During the case description of Intel it came up that there are three structural 
dimensions that influence the collaboration between the CVC unit and the 
business unit in a positive way: first, due to the central structure of Intel Capital 
within the corporation, the CVC activities have the long-term commitment of the 
highest top management at Intel, Leslie L. Vadasz. In addition, communication 
flow to top management is very direct, since Intel Capital is represented in the 
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management of Intel and Intel is represented on the board of directors at Intel 
Capital.  
 
Second, the absence of any carry of interest elements in the compensation 
structure of the CVC managers at Intel ensures that any competitive grudges are 
avoided at the business units. Finally, Intel’s corporate balance sheet as capital 
source allows a corporate wide alignment of CVC activities. 
 
In the case of Intel Capital it is worth mentioning that while the term “centrally 
structured” CVC unit only refers to the flow of money regarding the up-and-back 
decision making process, the business units aim at the flow of information. The 
case description shows that Intel Capital is seen as an integrated element of Intel 
Corporation. Further, this case shows that the closer the organizational location 
of the CVC unit to the parent company, the easier it is to achieve strategic 
alignment between CVC activities and business unit. 
  
“The further we develop away from Intel, the more we are disconnected from our 
parent due to less incentive in the business units to help an external CVC fund. 
This is accompanied by the fact that the investments are abandoned by Intel.” 
(Krumm) 
 
The analysis of processes can be subdivided into two different dimensions: 
formal and informal processes. With 12 years of experience and an impressive 
deal volume, Intel Capital has set-up continuous and formal procedures 
regarding its intra-firm processes. The following short quotation makes this 
obvious. 
 
“The entire corporation of Intel only consists of processes. As Intel produces a 
billion chips, we know that a certain business volume requires fixed processes. 
I think we have implemented our processes very well, as we are asked over and 
over by other CVCs ‘how is Intel doing CVC?’. And these processes are no 
different from one business unit to another.” (Krumm) 
 
In the context of informal processes, the U.S. investment managers of Intel 
Capital represent a central element in receiving knowledge about the strategic 
holes and needs of a business unit. Due to the location within the business units, 
the U.S. investment managers of Intel Capital are also helpful in getting the 
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business unit “on board” for the required support management. In the words of 
an investment manager, this communication interface is perceived as follows: 
 
“In order to exchange information when we have an investment proposal, we 
always contact a business unit this way. Our U.S. colleagues represent the link in 
the interface between the business unit and Intel Capital.” (Krumm) 
 
A main root for a fast and uncomplicated organization of information exchange 
is the corporate culture of Intel. The analysis of the corporate culture at Intel 
makes it obvious that much effort is made to maintain a distinctive American 
corporate culture that is characterized by a pronounced team spirit (e.g. 
distribution of Intel shirts, company stickers, etc.). The open corporate culture is 
lived in the Intel “constructive confrontation” philosophy.85 Further, since all 
employees work in cubicles instead of having their own offices, the possibility to 
approach each other is facilitated. Moreover, acting on the maxim thinking out of 
the box encourages employees to be open for new ideas. Andrew S. Grove, 
chairman of Intel, asks them to be open to “inflection points” (see interviews). 
By this he means new, revolutionary technologies that could represent a radical 
shift in the former technological strategy. Finally, Intel sponsors an internal job 
rotation of highly qualified employees within the corporation. The quotation of 
an investment manager summarizes Intel’s culture quite well: 
 
“It is embedded in our culture to be open for ideas and to be prepared to take high 
risks in the decision making process. Intel is highly motivated to support ‘good’ 
employees. On average, we rotate every 2 to 3 years.” (Krumm) 
  
Putting all this together, shows that a strong joint corporate culture makes it 
unnecessary for Intel Capital to strive for a higher contractual institutionalization 
of the collaboration with the business units (e.g. in the form of collaboration 
agreements). One essential difference lies in the business model of Intel Corp. 
Since Intel does not deliver products for consumers, Intel Capital takes a 
complementary position to the overall strategy. The commercialization of the e-
business solution leadership86 of Intel implies the beneficial reduction of a 
                                              
85 An interviewee explained as follows: “You are allowed to talk and discuss at any time, to 
everybody, independent of the level in the command chain.” 
86 See www.intel.com 
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business unit’s fear that the investment managers could deliver a technology that 
erases their operational core business. In fact, by helping the business units to 
find complementary technologies for a final business solution, the collaboration 
is based on more pleasant ground. In the words of an investment manager the 
situation is perceived as follows: 
 
“The complementary strategy of Intel Capital could be explained as follows: if you 
go to DaimlerChrysler you are interested in the end product ‘car’, you don’t want 
to buy a motor. The same is true for us: our clients are not interested in a processor, 
they want to know the solution benefits. We as Intel Capital are interested in 
leveraging a technology in order to maximize these ‘benefits’. (Krumm)  
 
Again, it is important to note that not all of Intel’s investments can be 
characterized as complementary investments. This is shown by the description of 
possible investments in very long-term oriented technologies or even “disruptive 
technologies”. Intel has to balance the benefits of promoting a competitive 
technology that uses Intel’s core products against the threat that the invested 
companies pose to other technologies than Intel’s. Managing these investments 
requires balancing financial discipline with strategic potential for the rest of the 
corporation. With respect to the illustrated culture of Intel, this investment style 
could be interpreted as a way to act on the maxim “openness to inflection points”. 
However, how Intel Capital gets the internal support for this species of deals 
remains under discussion, since an investment decision requires the sponsorship 
of a business unit.  
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Despite the fact that the presented CVCs operate differently along the investment 
process, the following section centers on analyzing both the discrepancies and 
the similarities concerning the collaboration with the business units along 
investment process. The preceded analysis of the applied investment processes 
by the CVC’s show that deal generation, deal structuring, exit management are 
only of inferior relevance regarding the collaboration of the actors in these 
phases. In order to facilitate the structure of this section, the investment process 
will be merged to three parts: (1) deal generation/first screening, (2) due 
diligence/investment-decision, and (3) post-investment phase. The section 
includes analyses of the CVC program’s applied structure, the related processes, 
the actors involved and the surrounding corporate culture. Furthermore, the 
following section extends the three cross-case/within-country analyses of CVC 
programs to an international level.  
2.5 Building a set of tentative hypotheses: Cross-case and cross-countrys 
analyses for enhanced external validity  
After having analyzed each respective case on its own using case description and 
within-case analysis, this final section of the case study chapter turns to the 
comparative analyses of the six case study firms. Initially, the three German CVC 
programs are compared with each other to determine within-country similarities 
and discrepancies concerning steps of the investment process. An analogous 
procedure is subsequently applied to the three American CVCs. Then the section 
turns to comparing the within-country results across the two countries. Again, the 
analytical focus will be on the detection of similarities or differences concerning 
structure, related processes, involved actors and corporate culture of the CVC 
program along the investment process. Finally, this section, and, actually, the 
entire case study chapter, culminates in the shaping of a set of tentative 
hypotheses. It is these tentative hypotheses that constitute the basis for an 
extensive unfolding of literature in the next chapter, leading to an extension of 
intra-organizational collaboration theory - the ultimate aim of this study. But for 
now, the section reverts to the case study firms.  
Cross case analysis is driven by the reality that people are notoriously poor 
processors of information (Eisenhardt, 1989). Therefore, investigators often 
come to premature and even false conclusions as a result of these information-
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processing biases. In order to avoid that, the cross-case section tries to look at the 
data in divergent ways. The idea behind cross case searching tactics is to force 
investigators to go beyond initial impressions, especially through the use of 
structured and diverse lenses on the data. These tactics improve the likelihood of 
accurate and reliable theory, that is, a theory with a close fit with the data 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Also, cross case searching tactics enhance the probability that 
the investigators will capture the novel findings that may exist in the data. 
 
I will start with the analysis of commonalities and distinctions regarding the 
general characteristics. Probably the most obvious distinction can be seen in the 
industry areas. Besides that the three companies operate in quite different 
industries, the companies also show sharp differences in the number of related 
operational departments.1 At the same time this leads to different scales regarding 
possible investment areas. While T-Venture and DVC are mainly limited to 
investments related to their relative narrow core industries, SVC enjoys a greater 
variety regarding the possible investment focus.2 Looking at the existence of the 
German cases makes clear that all three companies belong to the established 
CVC’s in Germany (SVC: 1999; DCV: 1997; T-Venture: 1997). Despite the 
similar ‘official’ foundation years, Siemens shows the longest experience in CVC 
activities since they already in 1984 started with Techno Venture Management. 
However, during this time, the German cases accumulated different numbers of 
investments. In this sense, SVC with its 70 investments doubtlessly is the most 
active CVC, followed by T-Venture’s 55 investments and DCV with 21 
investments. Further common characteristics can be seen looking at CVC 
locations. The pure differences in number of locations3 it is more interesting that 
each CVC has its head quarter in the same city as the parent company. Moreover, 
                                              
1 DaimlerChrysler: Automotive; Deutsche Telekom: TIMES markets; Siemens: Energy, 
Transport, Industry, Information & Communication, Medical, Lighting.  
2 As the case description shows, there are exceptions possible regarding deals that are out of the 
technological range of the parent company. 
3 Precisely speaking, T-Venture: Germany 4, USA 2; SVC: Germany 1, USA 2, Israel 1; DCV: 
Germany 1, USA 1. Also, worth to mention is that DCV is not represented at the American 
headquarter of Daimler Chrysler, Auburn Hills. 
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all three CVC are represented in the heart of the start-up scenery: Silicon Valley. 
This ranking sequence continues with regard to the number of employees.4   
All German companies pursue after a mix of financial and strategic objectives. 
However, while SVC primarily focuses on the objective enhancement of 
innovation5, DCV mainly aims at leveraging strategic assets6. Interestingly in 
case of doubt, both CVC’s prefer to have financially attractive investments. In 
contrast to that, for Deutsche Telekom the maximization of financial returns 
officially is the main element for any CVC activities.  
Pursuing these different CVC purposes, the German companies structured their 
CVC unit different. While the investment activities at DaimlerChrysler can be 
characterized as “centralized with integration in business units”, T-Venture can 
be subsumed more appropriately as “centralized CVC activities with less/no 
business unit involvement”. However, both CVC units have the exclusive 
sovereignty within the parent company to accomplish venture investments and do 
not struggle with uncoordinated parallel investments by a business unit. In 
contrast to that, Siemens maintain manifold CVC activities that distributed within 
the corporation.7 I define this CVC engagement as “decentralized with central 
coordination.”8 Despite of these sharp structural differences, in all three cases the 
CVC activities are performed (T-Venture, DCV) or at least coordinated (SVC) by 
a legally separate subsidiary of the parent company in the form of a limited 
liability company (GmbH). 
The corresponding superior corporate department of the CVC unit provides an 
interesting indication of the character of CVC activities. DCV is assigned to the 
M&A department of Daimler Chrysler that in return falls under Corporate 
                                              
4  In this sense, T-Venture accounts 55 employees, SVC 25 and DCV 13 employees. 
5  In this category falls utilization of external ideas, and window on technology.  
6 The utilization of technology, capacities, channels, customers and the long-term enhancement 
of core capabilities can be mentioned as examples. However, totally irrelevant for DCV is to 
Secure or enhance future demand for their core products. 
7 Deciding that its corporate divisions should focus on their core businesses, on October 1, 
2001, Siemens was moving to roll out all of its venture capital programs and pool it as 
Siemens Venture Capital in order to be able to act with “one voice” in the market and 
guarantee consistent investment selection standards.  
8 The most prominent activities are the one of Mustang Ventures and Siemens Business Services. 
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Development. Since Deutsche Telekom aspires to financial objectives and 
Siemens to strategic aims, it is even more interesting that T-Venture is 
organisationally attached to Production and Technology and SVC is integrated in 
Corporate Finance. Independent of this inconsistency invest all CVC units 
corporate money.  
Speaking about structural aspects combines the internal aspect how the CVC unit 
itself is organisationally structured. While SVC shows the most sophisticated 
approach with its matrix organisation in three business areas and four cross-
sectional functions, DCV and T-Venture show no internally fragmented sub-
divisions. In addition, while T-Venture pursues a partition of the investment team 
in investment directors responsible for a number of investment managers, SVC 
and DCV has no further segmentation in this sense. However, none of all seem to 
be completely satisfied with its current structure, since all of them already started 
reorganisation efforts. While DCV plans to implement internal competence 
centers, SVC merges its corporate-wide venture activities into one central unit. 
And also T-Venture tries to align its venture activities closer to the pillars of 
Deutsche Telekom by contacting defined hubs within the pillar as first contact 
partner, who delegates the further processes within the pillar. 
The following paragraphs turn to the influence factors of the investment process. 
This procedure, starting with the deal generation/first screening, is congruent 
with the above structure regarding the American Cases. Here too, the most 
obvious difference appears in the institutionalized approval gates along the 
investment process. In this sense, while Siemens follows a two-stage process, 
neither T-Venture nor DaimlerChrysler need two approvals for an investment 
decision. Since they call together their investment-/steering committee only once, 
both companies show a single-stage process.  
The first important similarity is the illustrated attitude regarding internal deals. 
Due to higher business unit incentives and partly existing contacts, the German 
CVCs prefer internal deal possibilities alongside the deal generation. Another 
important similarity regarding deal generation/first screening is the fact that 
there is no active involvement of a business unit regarding the German CVCs, 
since only the investment manager or the whole CVC unit (e.g. at SVC) reaches a 
decision. However, the deeper purpose of this sorting out-approach in all cases is 
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the unanimous consciousness to save business unit resources regarding deals that 
fall out of interest either for financial or strategic reasons. But, in doing the first 
screening, the development stages of prospective incoming deals are considered 
regarding its implications on the incentive of a business to collaborate, as well as 
on support possibilities. In doing so, all three companies focus on seed/early 
stage companies, since there is the prevailing opinion that the willingness of a 
business unit originates in more influence possibilities in forming a start-up 
company after the interests of a business unit. 
Although all German CVCs attempt to consider the aspect “closeness to a 
business” when attaching incoming deals to an operational department, 
nonetheless, there are sharp differences regarding investment managers’ efforts 
to get an idea about relevant - and interesting deals for a business unit. 
Doubtlessly, T-Venture and SVC are the more active examples in this sense. 
While T-Venture and SVC participate at New Business Development meetings 
where strategic search fields are defined, rely the investment managers at DCV 
only on their personal experience with past deals when categorizing incoming 
deals in “potential rejection” or “similarly accepted” by a business unit.    
Another difference appears regarding the mechanisms in order to locate the 
relevant persons in a business unit. Besides the existing contacts of the 
investment professionals, the venture units at Siemens and the defined hubs at T-
Venture represent central elements. Since at DCV there are no contact partners 
defined, the investment managers have to limit themselves to organisational 
auxiliary (e.g. organigram) and the personal business unit contacts. However, the 
reorganisation of DaimlerChrysler in competence centers and the set-up of a 
database pretend to define contact partners in a business unit for DCV.  
Turning to the analysis regarding the due diligence/investment decision, the case 
descriptions of the German cases show that the involvement of the business units 
get a more active character when doing the due diligence. There is consensus that 
employees on a very operational level most appropriate regarding the required 
technological feedback. However, while the positive feedback by a business is 
welcome at all German cases, the positive due diligence-feedback is mandatory 
only for DCV and T-Venture. Since SVC is well aware that this hides the danger 
to invest in competitive companies of a business unit, they never have invested in 
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the case of a negative feedback so far. Finally, only DCV asks for a second, 
external evaluation in order to maintain certain objectivity regarding internal 
generated deals due its perspicuous enthusiasm.  
However, apart from the character of the due diligence evaluation by the business 
unit, in the case of SVC and DCV investments are made only in complementary 
or niche markets. No investments are done in substitutive/competitive deals 
regarding current business unit activities since competitive deals do not allow 
any nurturing- and technical support possibilities. In exceptional cases, the 
business units of Deutsche Telekom are supposed to flexibly refocus their current 
strategy due the investments of T-Venture that represent a real threat of business 
unit technology. 
Another important difference appears regarding the involvement of the business 
unit in the investment decision. Apart from the differences in the mere number of 
involved persons in the investment/steering committee9, the composition of the 
committee shows that only at T-Venture a direct business unit involvement is 
guaranteed. Neither at SVC nor at DCV there is any direct vote possibility for the 
operational units.10 Nonetheless, try both companies to have at least an indirect 
cross sectional link by representatives of corporate departments like e.g. 
corporate technology or corporate R&D. It has to be mentioned, that DCV was 
the only company with a flexible composition of the actual steering committee, 
depending on booming industry topics.11  
Before concluding this analysis of due diligence/investment decision, an 
interesting similarity represents the link to the post-investment phase. In none of 
the German cases, a finalized commercial- or collaboration agreement, 
specifying the support for a start-up, is mandatory for an investment decision. 
However, the advantageous flexibility and speed have to be balanced against the 
                                              
9 In the case of T-Venture (three members) and SVC (two members in the case of the steering 
committee) the number of involved persons is relatively small compared to the steering 
committee of DCV with seven representatives. 
10 This statement remains true both regarding the Siemens Venture board and the Corporate 
Steering Committee. 
11 E-business and Information Technology are examples of the mid 90’s, mentioned in the 
interviews. 
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uncertainty regarding a business unit support. With respect to the investment 
decision-making, there is to say that SVC is the only company that enjoys the 
corporate guarantee of having feedback within two days by the corporate 
steering committee. 
The above detailed case description made it obvious that different methods are 
applied in order to facilitate the co-operation between the CVC unit and the 
business unit alongside the post-investment phase. In this sense, while all 
companies agree that the quality of personal networks and the personal chemistry 
of the involved persons are decisive for the effectiveness of the collaboration, 
there are clearly marked differences in the made endeavours. Looking at the 
institutionalised communication platforms, SVC (Siemens Venture Days) as well 
as T-Venture (T-open) actively stimulate a cross-sectional exchange between the 
CVC unit and the business unit. In contrast to that, DCV shows no comparable 
institutionalised activities. Although existing contacts of the investment manager 
and his knowledge of the corporation have been mentioned as critical, there are 
astonishing differences regarding the origin of the investment manager. The team 
of DCV mainly consists of affiliates of the corporate training program 
(International career partnership program). SVC also hires 2/3 internally out of 
Siemens. The opposite is true for T-Venture: 60% of the investment manager 
formerly maintained external positions out of Deutsche Telekom.  
The case descriptions of the relevant actors and contact partners along the 
support-management reveal that in the case of DCV and T-Venture the 
investment manager remains the realizing and deciding person, while the 
business unit only act on an informative- and consulting level. As soon as the 
collaboration agreement is finalized at SVC, the investment managers maintain 
control functions regarding the active business unit involvement. These 
approaches have consequences on the number of overseen investments per 
investment manager. While SVC ranges on the upper extremity with five deals 
per manager, DCV represents the lower extremity with only three investments 
per manager. Somewhere in the middle is T-Venture with four investments per 
investment manager. 
Another interesting difference appears regarding the approach of contacting a 
business unit along the post-investment phase. One the one hand-side, T-Venture 
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as well as SVC coordinate their post-investment activities by preferring senior 
management contact in a business for guaranteeing their following support. Quite 
in contrast, DCV prefers a “bottom-up process”, since it is expected to be more 
efficient and faster compared to the “top-down process”.    
The collaboration between the business unit and the CVC unit is further related 
with the incentive systems of the business units to engage in CVC. This is even 
more interesting since all CVCs invest provided corporate money which is not of 
ultimately interest of a business unit.12 Astonishingly, the German CVC’s do 
consistently not provide any direct financial incentives for a business unit. 
Therefore, only strategic aspects like window on technology or a win-win 
situation remain from an incentive point of view. Moreover, no company 
considers the engagement of a business unit with respect to CVC activities, since 
performance evaluation of a business unit is only based on operational results. 
The analysis of incentive system is closely related with the possibility of co-
investments with an operational department. This approach is followed in the 
case of T-Venture and SVC, whereby the Siemens case shows very limited 
interest of the business unit due to different time-horizons between typical 
business unit- and CVC activities. However, it has to be mentioned that in the 
course of the reorganisation efforts at SVC and T-Venture try to implement a 
financial incentive for the business unit also.13 DCV refrains completely from 
similar possibilities. The same cluster appears regarding the occupation of board 
seats by a business unit. While DCV completely neglects this approach, SVC (in 
case of co-investments with business units) and T-Venture are positive against 
this possibility. However, all companies refrain from intra-group cost charging.14 
Moreover, the illustrated corporate culture surrounding the German CVC 
programs shows incisive differences. Besides the fact that all CVCs struggle with 
                                              
12  In the case of T-Venture there are slight differences since they invest money of different 
funds. However, the source of capital remains corporate finance. 
13 Since 10/2001, SVC centrally manages the CVC activities of business unit money. T-Venture 
tries to emphasize its fund-in-fund investment and maintains an affiliate fund model. 
14 It has to be mentioned that SVC does it exceptionally in the case of legal- and tax-
departments, and T-Venture regarding long-term projects the technical expert circles of 
Telekom. 
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a not invented here-syndrome, DCV seems to be negatively affected by the 
corporate culture of a “very traditionally managed engineering company” (see 
interview). This situation is aggravated by the differences between product life 
cycles of cars (~7 years) and CVC investments (~2years). Similar findings came 
up in the case description of Siemens. In contrast, T-Venture benefits from the 
dynamic and innovative TIMES market, which moderates the not invented here-
syndrome on the side of the business units. Therefore, it may come as a surprise 
that T-Venture is the only company, where CEOs of the parent company control 
synergy reports, formalizing the strategic “win-win” situation between the 
business unit and the investments. 
Finally, in order to conclude the cross-case analysis of the German CVCs, sharp 
differences in the number of exits have to be mentioned, with T-Venture on the 
upper extremity (eight exits until 2001) and Siemens and DCV (one resp. no exit 
until 2001) on the bottom. While all companies do IPO’s, DCV and T-Venture 
highlight trade sales, since it represents an interesting possibility for their 
operational units to become invested in start-up companies. 
  
The following paragraphs turn to an analogous discussion of the collaboration 
between the CVC unit and the business unit regarding the American CVCs. 
Firstly, I will explain the most obvious differences. The illustrated cases show 
strong distinctions regarding their time of existence. While Intel (founded in 
1990) and GE Equity (founded in 1995) represent established CVC’s, Motorola 
as a central CVC unit (founded in 1999) is the younger actor.15 This fact results 
in the number of investments each CVC has done: while GE Equity and Intel 
Capital (375 resp. 350 investments) represent the more active investors, 
Motorola has to limit itself to 31 companies. A similar sequence follows 
regarding the number of established offices. Intel Capital with 22 offices and GE 
Equity with 10 representations are represented worldwide, while the 3 offices of 
Motorola Ventures seem to be unobtrusive. The same can be maintained 
regarding the employed investment professionals: both Intel and GE have app. 
150 employees, the corresponding number of Motorola is noticeably smaller. It 
may not surprise that these differences have effects on the awareness of CVC 
                                              
15 However, it has to be mentioned that Motorola does minority investments since 1992.  
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activities within the group. The longer e.g. Intel Capital is in operation, the easier 
it is to justify CVC activities within the corporation and to get the necessary 
enthusiasm within the business units.   
An important difference that influences any CVC activities within a corporation 
is the objective that each corporation tries to realize with CVC investments. 
While all companies follow a mix of financial and strategic objectives, there are 
astonishing differences in attaching value to the single sub-objectives. In this 
sense, GE Equity first of all looks for solid financial investments, and 
supplements this by strategic objectives, but only if its possible. Despite of 
knowing to loose perhaps a collaborative attitude by the business units, Motorola 
Ventures operates similarly since they prefer primarily financial investments in 
dubious cases. On the other side, Intel prefers strategic investments, since “the 
focus on strategic benefits leads to smart investment decisions” (L. Vadasz). 
Interestingly, Intel Capital was the only company of the three US cases, where 
the CVC strategy is developed in collaboration with the business units along their 
strategic route-map. 
Consequently, the discrepancies in the motives can also be found in the applied 
structure of the CVC program within the corporation. Although all three 
American CVCs pursue their CVC engagement in a centrally embedded unit 
within the corporation, discrepancies appear concerning the legal affiliation in 
the parent company. While in the case of Intel Capital it is a 100% department of 
the corporation, and not a legally independent company, Motorola goes a slightly 
different way with its CVC unit which falls under Corporate Headquarter. In 
contrast to that, GE Equity is a 100 % legal subsidiary of GE Capital, that in turn 
is a subsidiary of GE Corp.    
Speaking about structural aspects of a CVC unit also includes the dimension of 
the internal structure of the CVC unit. While GE Equity and Motorola Ventures 
follow a two-dimensional matrix organization, Intel goes a slightly different way. 
While in Europe they follow the ‘horizontal’ organization structure in geographic 
areas, in the U.S. they rely on a ‘vertical’ organization structure along technology 
areas. Moreover, Intel Capital in the USA is the only case where one investment 
manager is located and working directly within each business unit.  
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It may come as no surprise that the discrepancies in the followed structure leads 
to differences in the support of the business units during the investment process. 
Therefore, the differences and similarities between the three US-cases will be 
analyzed in the following paragraphs. Apart from the existing “approval gates”, 
this analysis will also give a clarification of the influence factors on each of the 
investment stages.  
In general, the most obvious difference in the three American is the analyzed 
structure of the investment process.  While Intel Capital’s and GE Equity’s 
approach can be characterized as a two-stage investment process, Motorola 
Ventures investment process is based on a one-stage approach, since they only 
need one official approval from the approval board in order to proceed along 
their process.16 However, the analysis of the “approval gates” reveals strong 
distinctions in the level of the business units-involvement. While Motorola and 
Intel Capital need a support or a sponsor in a business unit regarding potential 
deals, GE Equity represents the lowest level with no direct, mandatory 
involvement of the GE businesses to reach an investment decision. On the other 
side, Intel Capital requires a sponsorship of a business unit for the first concept 
deal meeting of the investment board, and later on, a positive technical 
evaluation for the final meeting of the investment board. Since Motorola 
Ventures only exceptionally refers to a business unit in doing the due diligence, 
they are located in the middle of this spectrum. Although a formal business unit 
support regarding an investment is not mandatory before presenting a potential 
deal to the approval board, they won’t invest if they do not have an interested 
business unit.  
Nevertheless, all companies show similar patterns regarding the post-investment 
involvement of a business unit. In all three cases, the corresponding businesses of 
the corporation move from a mainly informative/consulting support along the 
pre-investment phase to a more realizing/deciding quality of involvement in the 
post-investment phase. Most obviously, Motorola Ventures and Intel Capital ‘go 
one step back’ (see interview) as soon as the collaboration between the start-up 
and the business unit is initialized.  
                                              
16 In this thesis, a two-stage investment process is defined by two independent approvals of a 
convoked investment/steering committee (independent of the composition). 
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If we turn to the analysis of the influence factors on deal generation/first 
screening, one sharp difference can be determined. Regarding the source of deal 
flow, it emerged along the case description that only for Intel Capital as well as 
for Motorola Ventures the corporate business units represent the preferred mode 
of deal flow. The investments that come directly from or with the help of a 
business unit seem to promise a better collaboration in the following investment 
process. However, there are sharp differences regarding the influence factors on 
this investment phase. While Motorola Ventures emphasize their central structure 
within Motorola as a facilitator to have a corporate-wide overview regarding 
investment possibilities, Intel Capital rather applies to procedural mechanisms 
like participation at the business units’ updates meetings. In contrast to that, GE 
Equity primarily relies on contacts to investment banks and dedicated VCs. 
Moreover, GE Equity was the only company that applies monetary incentives on 
an individual level in order to increase the internal deal-flow.  
In following their investment objectives distinctive discrepancies in the targeted 
investment models are obvious. An important difference influencing the interest 
as well as the support-possibilities by a business unit is the investment stage. 
While both, Motorola Ventures and Intel Capital, are focused on early stage 
investments, GE Equity primarily strives for late stage investments and buy-outs.  
On the one hand side, Motorola as well as Intel evaluate their collaboration- and 
influence possibilities higher in still very young companies.17 In contrast to that, 
GE Equity prefers late stage investments, representing more interesting 
cooperation partners for their business units. 
There are further marked similarities regarding the targeted investment areas. 
The targeted investment areas in all three U.S. cases represent industries that are 
“close” to the core businesses of the corporation.18 However, the crucial question 
is: are the investment areas complementary or competitive in presence of the core 
businesses of the parent company? In the sense that Intel pursues in delivering 
business solutions, they invest mostly in complementary technologies that are 
                                              
17 In the meanwhile, represents a given stock amount in a young company a higher percentage 
of the whole company value. 
18 While Intel Capital invests in microprocessors/internet-, GE Equity is especially active in 
financial and e-commerce innovations. Motorola is interested in the wireless market.  
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expected to enhance their business applications for PCs. The same is true for GE 
Equity, since they only invest in business areas that are not competitive to GE 
businesses. Since Motorola’s investments need to align to the business unit, thus 
complementary investments are also their preference. 
The analysis of the formal incentive structures shows another distinction. While 
Intel Capital and Motorola Ventures do not apply any intra group cost charging, 
GE Equity is charged a corporate rate by the involved businesses for 
accomplishing CVC activities.  
The above illustration of applied mechanisms for localizing and detecting the 
corresponding technical experts shows that in general it is an astonishingly 
unstructured process that can be characterized best by “asking through one’s 
way”. However, differences regarding the applied technical infrastructure 
emerge. While GE Equity attaches high importance to their existing information 
database, Intel Capital rather refers to corporate organization-charts, the home 
page of a business unit, or, last but not least especially in Europe, the U.S. 
investment managers of Intel Capital. In contrast to that, Motorola Ventures 
‘only’ relies on the contacts of their colleagues along specific technology areas. 
However, emphasis on upper echelons in the hierarchy level when contacting 
business unit is best-practice in all U.S. cases (e.g. general manager of a business 
unit (Intel Capital), global expert leaders (GE Equity).  
In the final paragraphs of the across-case analysis of the American CVC, 
similarities and differences regarding the post-investment phase will be analyzed. 
Significant discrepancies appear regarding the effects of the central structure of a 
CVC program. On the one hand, Motorola Ventures and GE Equity emphasize 
the preponderating advantages of corporate-wide support possibilities, the 
independence of any business unit changes, and finally the conformity regarding 
corporate investment style. On the other hand side, Intel Capital primarily 
reported insufficient support or not invented here syndrome supported by a 
central CVC unit. However, Intel’s top-management commitment for CVC 
seems to moderate the negative effects regarding the business unit collaboration.   
The above illustrations show the consistent opinion that the personal 
characteristics of CVC managers are critical such as broad personal contacts 
within and outside of the corporation. Astonishingly, there are significant 
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differences in the modes that are used in order to get the best appropriate 
investment professionals regarding a feasible and qualitative intra-firm 
collaboration. While Motorola mainly hires CVC managers outside Motorola 
Inc., Intel attaches importance to former business unit affiliates with operational 
experience in Intel’s technology and broad networks of existent contacts at Intel. 
Since GE Equity strongly beliefs that a financial background is necessary for 
successful CVC activities, the main part of their managers is hired out of GE’s 
M&A department comprising sophisticated financial skills and existing contacts. 
Further, none of the American CVC’s had developed compensation models for 
coming up systematically with the personal incentives of their CVC managers. 
All of the companies “only” provide a corporate usual base salary, without the 
payment of carried interest common in private equity.19  
A central aspect along the post-investment phase is the existing incentive 
structure for a business regarding CVC engagement. Interestingly, on the one 
hand, both Motorola Ventures as well as Intel Capital turn down the possibility 
of co-investments with one of the involved business units. There is unanimity 
that “thinking in shares” and doing operational businesses are two scenarios that 
do not fit together. On the other hand side, GE Equity even favors the “trick” to 
co-invest with a business unit as the most efficient mode to get an efficient 
collaboration of the business units.20  
Therefore, what are the remaining possibilities that are used in the American 
cases to incentivize the operational business units? Motorola Ventures invests in 
companies that allow an increase in sale revenues by implementing the acquired 
technology in the Motorola product. Completing the “strategic holes” in the 
value chain represent the incentive to collaborate for the business units of Intel. 
Investments in complementary products stimulate the eco-system of the business 
units.21 In contrast to that, GE Equity merely points out the potential window on 
technology of its strategic oriented investments. Unisonous, all CVC units 
                                              
19 Only Motorola provides a 1 % bonus supplement to the base salary. 
20 However, it remains a corporate-internal co-investment (a kind of “visual internal transfer 
posting”), so that GE Equity externally remains the sole investor. 
21 Ecosystem means the suppliers, customers, and developers. Complementarity means, having a 
product makes a person want another. 
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evaluate the existent incentives as insufficient for an effective business unit 
engagement. Since the only trigger of the business units remains their operational 
results, it is even more astonishing that in no company the CVC engagement of a 
business unit is considered in their balance-score card.  A final matter of interest 
along the post-investment phase is the difference regarding the possibility of 
having board seats in the portfolio company. While Intel Capital neglects board 
seats in a portfolio company, Motorola as well as GE Equity have executives 
sitting in the boards of the investment companies, pursuing for better control and 
stimulation of the business unit’s collaboration. 
Analyzing the persons addressed by the CVC managers to transmit the inquiry of 
a start-up to a business unit shows that in the post-investment phase all CVC 
firms focus on persons who rank higher in the business units’ command chain. 
All CVCs agree that a higher ranked contact partner more efficiently coordinates 
and controls the collaboration of a business unit during the post investment-
phase. However, while the investment managers at Motorola Ventures attempt to 
keep personal contacts to the senior management of a business unit, Intel Capital 
and GE Equity institutionalized special teams in order to help the CVC manager 
pass support-requests of an investment through the corporation.22  
Another important difference exists regarding the institutionalized documents the 
CVC unit refers to along the provision of “value-added services” for a start-up 
company. In this sense, while GE Equity only stresses the necessity to fix the exit 
details (concerning the kind and the time of the pursued exit), Motorola and Intel 
Capital refer to commercial agreements and side letters that include all incurred 
support liabilities. However, even between Motorola and Intel a significant 
difference exists. While a finished commercial agreement at Motorola is not 
formally mandatory for the actual investment closing, at Intel Capital the side 
letters go together with the investment agreement. Interestingly, Intel Capital is 
the only company that also controls the collaboration results in their control 
reports.  
                                              
22 The ‘portfolio management team’ in the case of Intel, or the ‘value-add service team’ in the 
case of GE Equity. 
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Moreover, there are significant differences regarding the corporate cultures. 
While Motorola and Intel can be characterized as companies that are open for 
any novelties, GE presents it as a very safe-oriented company. The consequence 
is quite obvious: For Motorola and Intel it is easier to find business units’ 
engagement for “risky” CVC activities than it is in the case of GE. However, all 
American CVCs see a long, positive track record as favorable for a supportive 
corporate culture. The longer they are in operation, the better they succeed in 
finding the business units’ collaboration. 
If you look at the applied mechanisms in order to avoid upcoming problems in 
the support management, different approaches emerged. Both Motorola Ventures 
as well as GE Equity only select companies that “stand on their own feet” in 
order to position themselves more independently from any renege regarding a 
support facility of a business unit. Since the characteristic of “economically 
independent” companies is hard to realize due to the preferred early stage 
investments of Intel Capital, they attempt to use the business units as 
economically as possible. Approaching the critical bottleneck of limited business 
unit resources requires a deliberate approach and sensitiveness by their 
investment manager, overall regarding investments that are outside of the current 
business unit interest (competitive or ‘disruptive’ technologies). 
Last but in no case least, interesting differences appear regarding the pursued 
favored exit-channel. While Motorola Ventures takes the most independent 
position regarding any exit preferences (“Any exit can be good or bad; it all 
depends on the current market”), GE Equity and Intel Capital are more focused 
regarding this aspect. While GE Equity prefers trade sales or buy-out, Intel 
Capital aims to generate liquid funds, either by an IPO or a trade sale on cash. 
As the cases have now been compared to the country contexts, the remainder of 
the analysis concentrates on a cross-country comparison. This analytical step is 
important because one purpose of this study is to find out whether the specific 
collaboration mechanisms lead to international patterns. Therefore, it is essential 
to examine whether the similarities regarding the collaboration patterns that have 
been determined in the cross-case within-country analysis also apply for a cross-
country comparison. The rationale for such a comparison is that if similarities 
can be found in both country samples there is a higher level of probability – 
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though no certainty - that these collaboration patterns are not merely the result of 
one specific country environment but of general validity.  
The most obvious differences between the US and the German CVCs appear 
regarding the length of existence of the companies. The cases selected for this 
study confirm the supposition that the US are the more mature CVC players. 
Looking at the corresponding foundation dates shows that while American 
companies already started their CVC activities in the beginning of the 90s, the 
German actors entered the field only at the end of the 90s. Besides the higher 
technical experience with this type of investments, all US CVCs highlighted the 
length of existence as an important mechanism that facilitates the collaboration 
with a business unit, since the business units get own experience which potential 
advantages CVC activities could have. Furthermore, it can be seen in the higher 
number of investments in their portfolio, as well as a higher amount of 
committed capital under management by their parent company.  
The above analysis shows that the pursued objectives represent a critical element 
when structuring a CVC program. Although all CVC units refer to the 
cooperation of corporate departments, not all CVCs in this thesis follow a 
combination of strategic and financial goals. The exceptions are GE Equity on 
the American- and T-Venture on the German side. This stands in hard contrast to 
earlier research that recommends for CVC programs a combination of both 
financial and strategic goals (Gompers and Lerner, 1998; European Commission, 
2000). However, if the both objectives are followed, the strategic objectives 
preponderate. But, there is a difference when speaking about strategic objectives. 
While Motorola and Intel emphasize the growth in sales (leverage of strategic 
assets), SVC and DCV put more emphasis on the issues window on technology, 
intra-preneurship, and utilization of external ideas to stimulate core R&D. These 
objectives can be summarized under the category of objectives “enhancement of 
innovation”. However, in dubious cases regarding the strategic potential, the vast 
majority of companies (except Intel Capital) favour investments that show a 
fundamental financial base and that promise financial returns. Figure 2-37, which 
summarizes the differences/similarities regarding the objectives of the analysed 
cases, shows that the differences in the pursed objectives between the German 
and the American CVCs are not significant.  
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Figure 2-37: Differences and similarities regarding the objectives of the analysed 
cases 
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In line with the objectives, while all financially motivated CVCs follow their 
investments activities in a centralized unit with no integration of business units, 
(e.g. GE Equity, T-Venture), mainly strategic investors show centralized CVC 
activities with integrated business units (e.g. Intel, Motorola, DaimlerChrysler). 
This pattern is held up in the case of the German and American companies. 
However, there is the exception of Siemens. Siemens is the only company in this 
study that coordinates decentrally authorized CVC activities with a centrally 
embedded CVC unit. These analyzed patterns support the assumption that the 
structure of a CVC program follows its objectives.  
 
However, while in the case of the American CVCs the centralized units represent 
corporate divisions that are either organized under corporate top-management 
headquarter (Intel Capital and Motorola Ventures) or a corporate subsidiary (GE 
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Equity), all German CVCs are legally separated in the form of a limited liability 
company.23 This is associated with certain independence and autonomy regarding 
legal rights and management duties. Besides accounting policies24, the legally 
separate form doubtlessly strengthens the impression that CVC is something 
outside the core activities. Moreover, while Intel Capital, Motorola Ventures and 
GE Equity are organisationally tied directly to corporate top-management, the 
German subsidiaries are attached to corporate divisions (DCV: M&A; SVC: 
Corporate Finance; T-Venture: Production and Technology). Although this is not 
related with differences in the commitment of the corporate headquarter, it may 
influence the collaboration of a business unit. 
When speaking about structure, another important dimension is the internal 
structure of the CVC unit. All American CVC units follow an internal matrix 
structure along the two dimensions technology and geographic area. However, 
the cross-country analysis shows that no German CVC has implemented this 
segmentation in geographic and technologic areas, rather follow a hierarchy 
organisation of investment directors and investment managers. However, the fact 
that all German companies are currently in the phase of internal structural 
reorganisation shows that they recognized room for improvement.  
The fact that the involvement and collaboration of a business unit takes place 
along the investment process makes it indispensable that the cross-country 
analysis regarding similarities and differences also extends to the investment 
process. From a general point of view the existing approval gates show striking 
differences between the two countries. While the majority of the American CVCs 
follow a two-stage investment process (as GE Equity and Intel Capital), where 
two approvals of an investment committee are necessary, T-Venture and 
DaimlerChrysler Venture only once have to refer to a central investment 
committee in order to invest in a start-up company.  
In order to be in line with the above structure, in the following paragraphs I will 
analyse similar and different patterns in the stage of the deal generation/first 
                                              
23 However, all German LLC companies are 100% owned subsidiaries of the parent company. 
24 While the American CVC units directly invest from the corporate balance sheet (concerning 
the cash-balance), in the case of the German subsidiary companies, the actual financial result 
of the GmbH is consolidated only at the end of the year. 
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screening of the investment process on a cross-country level. A striking 
similarity comes up regarding the sources of deal flow. While, all six companies 
show internal as well as external deals, there is the unanimous opinion in all 
companies that the internal deals represent a better basis for an efficient 
collaboration process with the business unit later in the investment process. The 
reasons are that contacts already exist, that a business unit knows the technology 
in detail, or simply due to a certain pride of a business unit, since these deals 
represent their “baby”. Moreover concerning deal generation, both GE Equity as 
well as SVC and T-Venture indirectly invest in parallel funds in order to increase 
the deal flow and to gain deeper knowledge about VC investing.    
The analysis of the phase of deal generation/first screening is closely related to 
the topic of the preferred investment stage, as there are critical repercussions 
between the development stage of an investment and the possibilities to support, 
to collaborate, and to control a portfolio company. In general, it has to be 
mentioned that there are striking differences between the ‘publicly accessible’ 
data of Venture Economics and the information I got in my interviews. The data I 
collected in Venture Economics are summarized in the appendix of this study. 
However, in the following I will refer to the information I got in my interviews.  
An interesting similarity between the American and German CVCs is that, apart 
from GE Equity, meanwhile all corporations preferably follow early stage and 
first growth round companies, since these companies represent better control and 
collaboration possibilities for the CVC itself as well as for the business unit. On 
the one hand side, the invested amount represent a higher percentage in these 
relative young companies, on the other hand side, early stage companies are 
easier to direct (actively or passively) in the favorable sense of a business unit. In 
contrast to that, late stage investment show already more application and selling 
possibilities for a business unit.  
Moreover, in the context of deal generation/first screening, it is even more 
interesting to see that in all American cases the first involvement of a business 
unit is initiated, while all German CVC still refrain from involving a business 
unit. This striking difference appears since, on the one hand the American CVCs 
need a positive sign/note of a business unit in order to proceed in the investment 
process, be it - as in the case of Intel - by having a sponsor of a business unit, or 
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by a more informal business unit support as in the case of Motorola. This is done 
to ensure that only strategically relevant companies are further traced. However, 
being well aware of the danger of strategic miss-investments, on the opposite of 
that, all German CVC refrain from any involvement of a business unit, since the 
CVC unit first wants to verify the financial indicators as a pre-condition for any 
further evaluation of a company. That approach is based on a confirmedness to 
use business unit resources only in cases where there is a legitimate interest of a 
CVC unit.    
Following the outlined structure, the cross-country analysis turns to the phase of 
due diligence/investment decision of the investment process. However, while all 
six companies show an involvement of a business unit in accomplishing the due 
diligence, the scattered pattern regarding the character of that involvement is 
maintained in the cross-country analysis. While only in the case of SVC, DCV 
and Intel Capital it is seen as mandatory that the due diligence is performed by 
the business unit, at T-Venture, Motorola Ventures and GE Equity, the business 
unit only sporadically participates in the due diligence, when a operational unit is 
explicitly asked by the investment managers to perform it. However, independent 
of whether the business unit's feedback on technical matters is mandatory to 
represent a deal at the corresponding investment committee, the vast majority of 
companies would not invest if there would be any informal negative comments 
on the technology of a company. The exception represents GE Equity. 
The emerged pattern of the within country analysis, that the strategic investors 
focus on complementary- and niche markets, proves true in the cross-country 
analysis. In this sense, SVC and DCV as the German representatives, and Intel 
and Motorola as American CVCs mainly invest in companies that do not 
represent direct competitors or have substitutive technologies of a business unit. 
In contrast to that, both mainly financial investors, GE Equity and T-Venture, 
also invest in companies that could represent a threat to the current technology of 
a business unit. Figure 2-38 categorizes investment approaches along the affected 
dimensions “communication intensity” vs. “goal congruence” 
 
Figure 2-38: Investment approaches along the affected dimensions 
“communication intensity” vs. “goal congruence” 
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However, following a specific investment model represents a tightrope walk for a 
company. With respect to the business unit collaboration, there is a dilemma 
regarding investments in companies that follow a similar technology of a 
business unit. While these deals promise a broad common understanding and an 
overlap in the technical language between an investment and a business unit, 
similar technologies represent a the same time a high threat for a business unit. 
Better and more efficient technology could mean that a business unit is asked to 
re-focus and change their technological strategy, or even to stop the current 
business activities.  
Regarding the ways how the CVC unit gets in contact with the business unit of 
interest, it emerged along the cross-country analysis that knowing the corporation 
and having personal networks are indispensable for an efficient intrafirm 
navigation of the CVC managers. Therefore, the vast majority of the CVC units 
hire their investment managers out of corporate sources, meaning employees who 
have been working before in other business areas of the parent company. The 
exceptions represent Motorola Ventures and T-Venture, since these companies 
emphasize the financial know-how of the externally hired resources. But, 
regarding the mechanisms used in order to find the corresponding contact 
partners, there are also striking differences. Apart from the meetings between the 
investment manager and the technological experts, interestingly enough, the 
“newer” German actors additionally have institutionalised communication 
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platforms within the corporation in order to stimulate and expand the 
communication regarding CVC activities. In the American companies there is 
nothing like the German varieties of e.g. Siemens Venture Days or the T-Open. 
Moreover, the German CVCs doubtlessly show stronger institutionalised efforts 
in order to streamline the finding and communication process. In this sense, it is 
worth mentioning the efforts of T-Venture (defined hubs), SVC (venture units), 
and DVC (experts cycles/competence centers).  
The cross-country analysis leads to the final investment decision. However, 
striking differences reveal looking at the composition of the investment 
committee that represents the last approval gate in the investment process. While 
in the American investment committees no cross-sectional perspective is 
maintained due to only corporate top-management representatives in the 
deciding-board, the German CVCs try to involve the business units either 
directly in the investment committee (T-Venture) or at least indirectly via 
representatives of corporate technology departments (e.g. DCV and SVC). 
Interestingly, while all American strategic investors attempt to finalize a 
document  (e.g. side letters, commercial agreements) that defines the later 
support before the final investment decision, no German CVC shows effort in 
this sense; they feel confident that this would hamper and delay a fast investment 
decision.  
The above within case analysis of the German and the American investment 
processes made it obvious that there are also striking differences regarding the 
level of involvement (in the sense: informative / consulting / approval / deciding / 
realizing) from a cross-country perspective. On the side of the American cases, it 
is worth mentioning that while the business units get involved on a realizing and 
deciding level, the investment managers retreat themselves as main actors along 
the post-investment phase. In contrast to that, the German investment managers 
remain involved on a deciding level along the whole investment process, while 
the business unit remain on an informative- and consulting level. This 
circumstance is directly reflected by the number of investments that one 
investment manager has to care about. In the American cases, these numbers are 
higher than in the German cases (e.g. GE with five and Motorola with even 
seven investments per manager; in contrast to DCV with three, and T-Venture 
with four investments). These differences in the trend of maintained involvement 
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level (realizing /deciding) regarding the CVC unit and the business unit are 
summarized in figure 2-39. 
 
Figure 2-39: Differences in the trend of maintained involvement level regarding 
the CVC unit and the business unit 
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Another interesting similarity in the post-investment stage relates to hierarchy 
levels of the contacted persons within a business unit. The vast majority 
investment managers, regardless of their country origin, prefer and focus on 
persons at the business units who maintain to higher positions in the corporate 
command chain. They seem to be more appropriate to control the collaboration 
process and to provide the required resources. The only company of this study 
that violates this pattern is DCV, since their preferred “bottom up-process” would 
be more effective for a faster support. However, despite of the cross-country 
pattern, the American CVCs have the advantage that they can rely on special 
institutionalised teams that support the transformation of the value added during 
the post investment phase. In this sense, while the investment manager of e.g. 
Intel Capital can refer to the Portfolio Management Team and GE Equity to the 
Value Added Service Team, nothing similar has been reported on the side of the 
German CVCs.     
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Finally, in order to conclude the analysis of the post-investment phase, the 
similarities and differences regarding the incentive systems have to be analysed 
from a cross-country perspective. When speaking about the investment managers' 
incentives, it has to be mentioned that the common US pattern of no “carry of 
interest” payment is not maintained in all the German cases. Especially SVC and 
T-Venture (at least with its carried variations) are the outliers. Figure 2-40 
summarizes the findings.  
 
Figure 2-40: The findings of compensations schemes and its rationales 
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Turning to financial incentives on the side of the business units apart from 
strategic incentives, leads to the possibility of co-investments with a business 
unit. There is striking similarity that mainly financially motivated investors 
provide co-investment to their business units; in the sense, GE Equity as the 
American example and T-Venture with its fund in fund investments as the 
German example have to be mentioned. All of the mainly strategic investors, 
independent of their country origin, do not show this possibility. Regarding the 
feasibility of taking board seats, there are less similarities apparent along the 
cases. While Motorola Ventures and GE Equity absolutely see this possibility, 
Intel Capital completely refrains from it. The same scattered picture exists 
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regarding the German cases. While T-Venture and SVC reported the possibility of 
board seats, DCV keeps out of that. However, with the exception of GE Equity, 
there is the unanimous opinion across the countries that cost-charging would not 
represent any value added regarding the collaboration with a business units. 
Quite on the contrary: it would only complicate the actual collaboration basis to a 
business unit. 
Regarding the applied mechanisms in the collaboration process with a business 
unit one additional difference between German and American companies has to 
be reported. All American CVCs emphasize the necessity to invest only in 
companies that “stand on their own feet economically” and do not completely 
depend on the support and facilities of the corresponding investor. In doing this, 
CVC unit positions itself more independently of the future support of a business 
unit. This could be the reason why all American CVCs explicitly denied seed 
investments. Interestingly enough, no German CVC mentioned this approach. 
Moreover, it is worth mentioning that Intel Capital is the only American and T-
Venture the only German actor that reported any control regarding the preceded 
collaboration. Intel’s control reports and the synergy reports in the case of T-
Venture represent fundamental elements with regard to that approach.  
Finally, in order to conclude the cross-country analysis along the investment 
process, potential patterns in the preferred exits strategies have to be mentioned. 
In general, regarding the number of already performed exits on a cross-country 
level, the German CVCs doubtlessly represent the less experienced companies. 
However, besides the fact that the financial investors, i.e. GE Equity and T-
Ventures, acclaim the possibility of trade sales, no obvious pattern emerged. 
Moreover, the explicitly mentioned importance of generating cash by pursuing 
an exit (either by an IPO, or a trade sale on cash) was not mentioned in any 
German case. 
Summarizing the findings of the analysis of the investment process, it can be 
recorded that the involvement of business unit follows the objectives of a CVC 
program. In detail, while in the case of financial objectives the lowest level of 
business unit involvement can be realized, the strategic objectives show a higher 
level of involvement. Figure 2-41 summarizes the findings. 
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Figure 2-41: Involvement of BU in the investment process follows objectives 
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Moreover, while the strategic motivated CVC-companies recourse more 
intensive on internal resources than financial motivated CVCs, they also involve 
their business units at an earlier point of time along the investment process. More 
intensive means that business units are involved on a deciding-, approval-, and 
realizing-level in contrast to informative- and consulting-input. In this sense, GE 
Equity and T-Venture involve their business units later than all mainly strategic 
motivated CVC’s. Figure 2-42 illustrates that.
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Figure 2-42: Investment process shows significant differences regarding the 
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Having analysed the similarities and discrepancies in the investment process 
from a cross-country perspective leads to the surrounding corporate cultures. 
While more or less all companies mentioned the positive influence of their long 
experience, since the publicity of the favourable CVC activities on the side of the 
business unit is critical, further discrepancies emerged. On the one hand side, it is 
almost needless to say that all American companies can be characterised as very 
open, curious about and thrilled by any technical novelties. Doubtlessly, this 
facilitates any CVC activities within the internal corporate structures. On the 
other hand side, the well-known not-invented here syndrome is enhanced by the 
German corporate culture as they can be characterized as very traditionally 
managed and hierarchically organised corporations which stretches the cultural 
gap between the culture of a CVC unit that is similar to start-up and the 
underlying parent company.  
Based on the six contextual case descriptions this section now closes 
summarizing the findings of this study’s analyses, i.e. in-depth within and cross-
cases analyses as well as across the two countries. The summary is presented by 
formulating preliminary key findings that lead to a set of tentative hypotheses. 
They are tentative because they still have to be confronted with the literature for 
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further refinement and because the theory extension, built on the tentative 
hypotheses, will eventually have to be the subject of large-sample quantitative 
testing.  
The above discussion has demonstrated that many collaboration problems and 
the mechanisms to overcome them are similar, if not outright identical, for CVCs 
in the United States and in Germany. Although the international dimension of 
American and German CVC has been applied both for the selection and the 
analysis of the cases, in the cross-country analysis no significant differences in 
the collaboration between the CVC unit and the business unit emerged. 
Independent of that, the analysis allows me to draw six preliminary conclusions. 
First, in order to reach efficient collaboration the structural embedding of the 
CVC unit has bridge the gap between independence of operational processes and 
the feasibility to refer to business unit resources. Second, the concrete 
involvement of the business units in the investment process strengthens their 
interest in CVC. The earlier this takes place in the investment process, the higher 
is their interest to collaborate. The character of this involvement has to change 
from an initially consulting/informative level to a realizing/deciding level. Third, 
the investment focus, strictly speaking, the stage and the competition area of the 
investment, has significant influence on the collaboration process of the business 
unit. Fourth, the applied coordination mechanisms follow mainly informal 
mechanisms. Therefore, the better the internal networks of the CVC personal are, 
the easier is the coordination of CVC. Fifthly, the motivation of the CVC 
managers and the business units has to be considered in appropriate incentive 
systems. Although an aligned CVC compensation is best for a smooth 
collaboration, it hides the danger that CVC mangers are attracted by the 
compensation of dedicated VC. Therefore, hybrid incentive systems have to be 
installed. And finally, while top management commitment facilitates the 
provision of resources, it does not directly support the daily collaboration 
between the CVC unit and the business unit. 
Hypothesis related to the characteristics of the CVC unit 
Tentative hypothesis # 1a:  
The more the CVC objectives incorporate strategic objectives, the more willing 
are business units to collaborate with the CVC unit. 
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Tentative hypothesis # 1b: 
The more strategically focused a CVC program is, assuming everything else 
being equally, the less is the temptation of the CVC unit to favour financial 
investments (or: the higher is the probability that the CVC unit prefers strategic 
investments). 
Tentative hypothesis # 2: 
The more strategically motivated a CVC unit is, the more involved are the 
business units in the investment process.  
Tentative hypothesis # 3: 
The more the CVC unit is structurally positioned within the corporation as a 
core activity (i.e. by its legal form), the higher the willingness of a business unit 
to collaborate. 
Tentative hypothesis # 4a: 
There is an interaction between the investment stage of a CVC unit and the 
willingness of the business unit to collaborate, such as late stage investment lead 
to more collaboration willingness in business unit, that prefer application or 
selling possibilities, while early stage investments lead to more collaboration 
willingness in business units that look for R&D possibilities and spill-over 
effects.  
Tentative hypothesis # 4b: 
The earlier the investment stage of a CVC unit is, the more are the provided 
possibilities for a business unit to control/influence an investment that is 
favorable for the business unit.  
Tentative hypothesis # 4c: 
The later the investment stage of a CVC unit is, the less are the provided 
possibilities for a business unit to control/influence an investment that is 
favorable for the business unit. 
Tentative hypothesis # 5: 
The more a CVC unit invests in companies that have been internally generated 
by a business unit, the higher is the willingness of a business unit to collaborate 
due to a limited “not-invented here syndrome”. 
Tentative hypothesis # 6a: 
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The higher the exposure of a CVC unit is to invest in substitutive technologies, 
the less the willingness of a business unit to collaborate. 
Tentative hypothesis # 6b: 
The more a CVC program pursues after financial objectives, the higher the 
higher the exposure to invest in substitutive technologies.  
Tentative hypothesis # 6c: 
The more a CVC program invests in substitutive technologies, the higher the 
capability of the CVC unit to collaborate. 
Tentative hypothesis # 6d: 
Both the relationship between substitutive investments and the capability as well 
as the relationship between substitutive investments and the willingness of a 
business unit to collaborate are mediated by the technological communication 
overlap between investments and business unit.  
Tentative hypothesis # 7a: 
The more CVC mangers previously maintained positions in other business units 
of the corporation, the more efficient he is in finding the right contact partner of 
a business unit.  
Tentative hypothesis # 7b: 
The relationship between the previous maintenance of other business unit 
positions and the CVC managers’ efficiency in finding the contact partner is 
mediated by the number of existent internal contacts he has in a corporation.  
Tentative hypothesis # 7c: 
The relationship between the previous maintenance of other business unit 
positions and the CVC managers’ efficiency in finding the contact partner is 
mediated by the quality of internal contacts he has in a corporation. 
Tentative hypothesis # 8a: 
The more there is distributional justice of compensation between the CVC unit 
and other business units, the higher the willingness of business units to 
collaborate. 
Tentative hypothesis # 8b:  
The more strategic aspects are considered in their performance measurement of 
the CVC unit, the stronger is their strategic focus. 
Tentative hypothesis # 8c: 
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The more strategically motivated a CVC company is, the more similar is its 
compensation system to the “corporate” compensation (base salary and bonus 
based on corporate performance). 
Tentative hypothesis # 8d: 
The relationship between the distributional justice of compensation and the 
business units’ willingness to collaborate is moderated by the CVC manager’s 
effort to gain collaboration, such that the distributional justice of compensation 
has less impact on the collaboration between the CVC unit and the business unit. 
Tentative hypothesis # 9a:  
The longer a CVC program exists in a corporation, the higher the willingness of 
a business unit to collaborate. 
Tentative hypothesis # 9b:  
The relationship between the length of a CVC program and the willingness of a 
business unit is mediated by a higher number of contacts the CVC unit has to 
operational units. At the same time the relationship between the length of a CVC 
program and the willingness to collaborate is positively mediated by trust. 
Tentative hypothesis # 9c:  
The relationship between the length of existence of a CVC program and the 
willingness to collaborate is mediated by a higher number of internally 
generated deals by business units. 
 
Hypothesis related to the governance mechanisms of the CVC-BU relationship 
Tentative hypothesis # 10a: 
The higher the overall communication that takes place between the CVC unit and 
all the business units, the higher the efficiency of the CVC mangers in finding an 
appropriate business unit. 
Tentative hypothesis # 10b: 
The higher the overall communication that takes place between the CVC unit and 
the business units, the higher the number of contacts between the CVC unit and 
the business unit. 
Tentative hypothesis # 11a: 
The more collaboration- and support agreements already exist at the investment 
decision, the higher is the capability of the CVC in the later collaboration.  
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Tentative hypothesis # 11b: 
The earlier the collaboration- and support agreements are finalized along the 
investment process, the easier it is for the CVC unit to achieve.  
Tentative hypothesis # 12a: 
The more supportive infrastructure (databases, service-teams, competence 
centers) for the CVC unit exist, the higher is the CVC units’ capability to 
collaborate focused on a informative/consulting level regarding post-investment 
deals.  
Tentative hypothesis # 12b: 
The more supportive infrastructure (databases, service-teams, competence 
centers) for the CVC unit exist, the higher is the CVC units’ capability to 
collaborate focused on an realizing/deciding level regarding pre-investment 
deals. 
 
Hypothesis related to knowledge sharing 
Tentative hypothesis # 13: 
The higher the number qualitative relationships between the CVC and the 
business unit, the greater the level of knowledge exchange between the CVC unit 
and the business unit.  
Tentative hypothesis # 14: 
The greater the amount of knowledge exchange between the CVC unit and the 
business unit the higher is their willingness to collaborate. 
Tentative hypothesis # 15: 
The relationship between the exposure to substitutive technologies and the 
willingness of a business unit to collaborate is moderated by the quality of 
contacts, such that the exposure to substitutive technologies have less impact on 
the willingness of a business unit to collaborate.   
Tentative hypothesis # 16a: 
The better the quality of the existing relationships between the CVC unit and the 
business unit, the less important are contractual control (i.e. control- or synergy 
reports) or agreements for the collaboration between the CVC unit and the 
business unit.   
Tentative hypothesis # 16b: 
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The relationship between the quality of the existing relationship and the 
importance of formal governance mechanisms is mediated by trust; although it 
makes formal control mechanisms less important, in no way it becomes 
dispensable. 
Tentative hypothesis # 16c: 
There is a curvilinear relationship between the overall collaboration efficiency of 
a CVC unit and the number of interacting persons in the CVC network. 
 
Hypothesis related to the characteristics of the business unit 
Tentative hypothesis # 17: 
The more the structural imperatives of the business unit allows a cross sectional 
perspective along the investment process, the higher is the willingness of a 
business unit to collaborate.  
Tentative hypothesis # 18: 
There is a curvilinear relationship between the time of business unit involvement 
and the willingness of a business unit to collaborate, such as a very early 
business unit involvement avoids investments in strategically irrelevant deals and 
leads to a higher number of internal generated deals. However, the earlier a 
business unit is involved, the higher the number of transferred investment 
proposals that are finally not invested.    
Tentative hypothesis # 19a: 
The more BU- involvement arrives at a realization/decision level, the higher is 
the capability of a BU to collaborate with the CVC unit. 
Tentative hypothesis # 19b: 
The earlier the BU-involvement arrives at a realization/decision level, the higher 
is the capability of a BU to collaborate with the CVC unit. 
Tentative hypothesis # 19c: 
The more the BU-involvement arrives at a realization/decision level, the more 
consulting/informative gets the involvement of the investment managers. 
Tentative hypothesis # 19d: 
The more the CVC-involvement arrives at a consulting/information level, the 
higher is the capability of a CVC unit to oversee a higher number of post-
investment deals. 
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Tentative hypothesis # 19e: 
The more the CVC-involvement arrives at a consulting/information level, the 
higher is the capability of a CVC unit to focus its resources/effort on the pre-
investment activities, where overall financial abilities are asked. 
Tentative hypothesis # 20a: 
The more an investment comes to the post-investment phase, the more are BU-
people contacted who are at a higher hierarchy level (i.e. senior management of 
a business unit). 
Tentative hypothesis # 20b: 
The more the contacted persons represent senior management, the higher is the 
capability of a BU to authorize and approve the required BU-resources, or to 
control the BU –involvement, or to solve occurring problems in the post-
investment phase.  
Tentative hypothesis # 21a:  
The more incentives for a business unit exist regarding CVC activities, the higher 
is their willingness to collaborate with the business unit.  
Tentative hypothesis # 21b: 
The more financial gains of CVC investments go back to a business unit, the 
higher is their incentive to collaborate with the CVC unit. 
Tentative hypothesis # 21c: 
The more for a business unit usefully strategic gains of CVC investments go back 
to a business unit, the higher is their incentive to collaborate with the CVC unit. 
Tentative hypothesis # 21d: 
The more a business unit is involved in the advisory boards of an investment, the 
higher is their incentive to collaborate with the CVC unit. 
Tentative hypothesis # 21e: 
The more (intra-company accounted) co-investments exist between a business 
unit and a CVC unit the higher is their incentive to collaborate with the CVC 
unit. 
Tentative hypothesis # 21f: 
The relationship between the existent incentives and the willingness to 
collaborate is moderated by the quality of network-contacts, such that existent 
incentives have less impact on the willingness of a business unit to collaborate. 
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Tentative hypothesis # 21g: 
The relationship between the financial incentives for a business unit and the 
higher willingness is moderated by the aspect of organizational learning that is 
apparent for the business units in CVC activities, such that the incentives have 
less impact on the willingness to collaborate. 
 
Hypothesis that are related to the characteristics of the corporation 
Tentative hypothesis # 22a:  
The more the corporate culture is open for technical novelties, the higher is the 
willingness of a business unit to collaborate with the CVC unit.  
Tentative hypothesis # 22b: 
The relationship between the open corporate culture and the willingness of a 
business unit to collaborate is mediated by the “not invented here-syndrome”. 
Tentative hypothesis # 23: 
The more top-management commitment of the corporation for CVC activities 
exists, the higher the willingness to collaborate. 
 
This set of tentative hypothesis is the result of exploratory case-based research. 
At this point, the hypotheses are still at a stage of being interrelated, i.e., they are 
not free of overlap, and they are certainly not mutually exclusive. Therefore, they 
do not yet lend themselves to large-sample empirical testing. They are in need of 
further refinement. This refinement takes place in the following chapter which 
sets out by unfolding the relevant literature and thus aims at developing an 
extension of internationalization theory. 
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3 Theoretical perspectives: toward an integrated theory of 
intra-organizational collaboration between CVC unit and 
business units 
This chapter aims at refining the findings of the case study chapter. It does not 
constitute a break from the previous chapter, it rather represents a continuation of 
the process of case-based research. As pointed out in the discussion of the 
methodological foundations of this study (section 2.1), case descriptions and 
analyses should ideally be ‘theory-free’, allowing the researcher to capture the 
richness of the cases without bias. Only after tentative hypotheses have been 
drawn from the cases the literature should be unfolded (Eisenhardt, 1989). It is an 
essential component of case-based hypotheses formation and theory extension 
that the tentative hypotheses be juxtaposed with conflicting and similar 
theoretical findings. Thus, the tentative hypotheses can be challenged, 
corroborated and, eventually, refined in such a way that together they serve as an 
extension to theory - i.e., in this study, an integrated theory of intra- 
organizational collaboration. 
Although there is very little earlier research on the relationship between CVC 
unit and business unit, it can be reasonably assumed that this relationship is 
critical for explaining how value is added to portfolio companies and to the 
corporation as a whole. Therefore, first the corporate venturing literature is 
reviewed in chapter 3.1 with a focus on successful and failed corporate venturing 
activities due to reasons that are related to the internal relationships surrounding 
corporate venturing activities. This is done in order to build a solid basis for the 
juxtaposition of the further theory with the tentative hypotheses.  
In the following sections 3.2 to 3.4, the pertaining theoretical frameworks are 
reviewed. For each theory, the development and key concepts are summarized, 
and the theories are confronted with the case findings of this study. The first set 
of theory, resource-related theory, looks at the creation of value through the 
selection, creation and combination of tangible and intangible resources. 
Therefore, section 3.2 confronts the resource-based view and the knowledge-
based view (including organizational learning theory) of organizations with the 
case findings. Due to the breadth of this literature, this section will focus on 
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several of the most prominent theoretical approaches. Since the case description 
showed that not all required resources are given within one unit and that the 
efficient creation of value requires joint activities between different 
organizational units, section 3.3 turns to a discussion of exchange-related 
theories. This includes the social capital theory and the network theory pertaining 
to the role of lateral communication and cooperation between operational 
divisions. The collaboration across the organization involves that the 
relationships need to be governed. Section 3.4 presents some thoughts on how 
different governance mechanisms and modes will affect the outcome of resource 
exchange in intra-organizational relationships. Agency theory and social 
exchange theory offer support for the refinement of the tentative hypotheses.  
Each theory section will be structured as follows. It begins with a short 
description of the development and reasons for the origination of the theory. This 
is followed by a definition of the theories as found in the literature. It includes 
definitions of the main components of the theory, including the main dependent 
and independent variables. Next, the main empirical applications and findings of 
each theory are presented. The actual confrontation of each theory with the case 
study results will not include a discussion of all tentative hypotheses. Rather, the 
tentative hypotheses and examples from the case section will be discussed only 
when they are relevant to a given theoretical framework. Next, the extant 
criticism of a theory will be more specifically confronted with the case findings. 
Finally, each theory concludes with illustrations of the theory’s advantages and 
shortcomings with regard to this study. 
Table 3-1 gives a summary of the theories that are used in this study. More 
specifically, it shows how each theory conceptualizes the “firm”, how the notion 
of intraorganizational relationships is approached, and what the proposed main 
motives are for firms in terms of how to manage intra-organizational 
relationships. Finally, it shows how the theory is applicable to this study. 
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Figure 3-1: Summary of the theories that are used in the study 
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 Source: Author 
3.1 Confronting extant corporate venturing literature with the case findings 
Previous researchers have examined several factors that are important for success 
in corporate venturing programs. However, as illustrated in chapter 2.2.2, 
corporate venture capital represents one type of venturing activity. Therefore it is 
reasonable to examine the literature about successful and failed corporate 
venturing programs with a focus on the internal relationship between the CVC 
unit and the parent’s business units. This also aims at justifying the selection of 
theories that are chosen for this study. 
As a sub-form of corporate venturing, CVC programs must create the conditions 
that support interdependent, collaborative work taking place between the CVC 
unit and the business unit. The major difference between individual and 
corporate venture is the proximity of the corporate venture to its parent 
organization. Exactly this proximity of CVC to its parent company offers both 
advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side, strategic linkages to the 
firm’s capabilities and resources are found to enhance the likelihood of new 
products success (Nord and Tuchker, 1987). The proximity offers access to 
resources, which might be difficult to imitate or substitute by outside ventures. 
Legitimacy provided by the parent’s brand, opportunities for synergy 
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exploitation, and financial backup are examples of such benefits. On the negative 
side, institutional conflicts between CVC activities and mainstream operations, 
including strategic conflicts, administrative conflicts, cultural clashes, and reward 
issues are explained foremost by institutional theory.  
The literature overview about corporate venturing is organized in three sections 
along the major characteristics of the relationship between the parent and the 
corporate venture. The first section (3.1.1) looks at literature that focuses on 
institutional pressure originating from the relationship to the parent company. 
This discussion includes strategic, administrative, culture, and reward issues. 
Literature that looks at complementary resource acquisition and knowledge 
relatedness is analyzed in section 3.1.2 within this chapter. Finally, the overview 
of corporate venturing programs concentrates on social networks (3.1.3), since 
recently especially the outcomes of social networks in innovative settings have 
especially been in the focus. As a summary of the chapter, it will be presented if 
and how the factors might influence each other. The existent lack of findings 
must be discussed with regard to their relevancy for this study.  
3.1.1 Institutional pressure 
By the time managers reach the top management level, they have developed a 
highly reliable frame of reference to evaluate business strategies and have 
resourced allocation proposals pertaining to the main lines of business of the 
corporation. By the same token, their substantive knowledge of new technologies 
and markets is limited, and their ability to manage a venture with fundamentally 
different needs from mainstream units may be limited (Burgelman, 1985). 
Subsequently, conflicts arising at three different levels are discussed: conflicts 
arising between the venture unit and mainstream operations, at corporate level, 
and on middle manager level. 
Conflicts between new ventures and mainstream operations are seen to include 
strategic conflicts, administrative conflicts, culture clashes, and finally 
performance measurement and reward issues. Researchers have pointed out that a 
mismatch of structures, systems, and processes often characterizes the 
relationship between the venture unit and the rest of the corporation. Sykes and 
Block (1989) point out that corporate venturing is often managed similarly to 
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mainstream activities despite their differing requirements. For example, they 
show that decision processes of corporate venturing programs in the investment 
process are often not streamlined in order to avoid becoming lengthy and 
protracted. However, they miss in giving details how these hurdles could be 
overcome in order to have efficient and fast decisions along the approval 
processes for an investment. Another difficulty in the relationship between 
venture and corporation is represented by the inconsistent time frames. While 
operating divisions are under constant pressure for returns on investment, 
corporate ventures often require significant time spans before becoming 
profitable (Biggaddike 1979). Kanter (1985) argues that due to the inherent 
uncertainty, knowledge intensity, competition with alternative courses of action, 
and the boundary-crossing nature of new venture divisions, venture units need 
visionary leadership, ‘patient’ money, planning flexibility, team continuity, and 
inter-functional cooperation. Kanter et al. (1990) find that a tension exists 
between corporate strategy and corporate venturing. To achieve synergies it is 
argued that there would be a need for active management of the interface 
between the corporation and the venturing unit. However, although Kanter et al. 
refers to the relationship between the CVC unit and the business unit, she does 
not provide further insights into how to manage the interface between the two 
parties. 
In a large firm studied by Burgelman (1985), strategic conflicts, including 
domain and synergy issues, seemed to emerge whenever the new business 
activities had the potential to overlap with the business of the division. In the 
case that CVC activities would also attract discontinuous and disruptive 
innovations, a defined integration of the business units regarding CVC activities 
was even more important since enormous resistance on the side of the 
mainstream activities can be the result (Bower and Christensen, 1995, Mason and 
Rohner, 2002). These findings are similar to what I found. The domain and 
synergy issues emerged in the interviews with the business managers when they 
evaluated an investment of a CVC unit as a threat to their current technology. 
This includes the discussion of building up internally “disruptive technologies” 
vs. “sustaining technologies.” However, I argue that this hurdle can be limited: 
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the more a CVC unit invests in complementary1 investments, and the more 
investment managers neglect investments that embody a substitutive technology 
(tentative hypothesis # 6c). Although Burgelman (1985) does not consider the 
relationship between potential technological overlap and resulting knowledge 
exchange2 and learning possibilities, I argue that technological overlap increases 
the capability of a business unit to collaborate since it provides a common 
language necessary for organizational learning (tentative hypothesis # 6c). 
Backholm (1999) found that the administrative processes of the corporation 
facilitate the functioning of the complex workflows in the operating system but 
hinder the functioning of the new venture division. Similarly, Mason and Rohner 
(2002) found in their study that the most cited barriers in innovation processes 
are conflicts between departments in terms of their differences in thinking and 
the lack of structural fit in organizational terms. Hill (1994) emphasized the role 
of corporate management of the firm to adopt the appropriate internal 
organizational arrangements in order to produce superior performance through 
diversified activities within the firm. These organizational problems emphasize 
the need for CVC programs to cooperate and share a common language with 
other organizational units, and emphasize that a successful launch of new 
technologies by a corporation may require a new organizational structure. But 
these findings lack in giving further insights how the organizational structure 
could look. I found that the more a CVC unit is organizationally embedded as a 
core activity within the parent’s structure, the higher might be the willingness of 
a business unit to collaborate (tentative hypothesis # 3).  
At the corporate level, Burgelman (1985) observed that rules and regulations, as 
well as reward systems led to frictions. While the corporate structural context 
may require extensive approval processes, the venture unit requires fast and 
streamlined decisions. Administrative conflicts also include the unwillingness of 
                                              
1 I define complementary investments by using two indicators. (1) complementarity of resources 
and capabilities, and (2), complementarity of products and resources. Both indicators refer to 
a business unit’s operational business. This operationalization covers both the 
complementarities in resources and capabilities in product and service offerings (Amit and 
Zott, 2000). 
2 In this work, knowledge acquisition was operationalized using three indicators. The measures 
cover knowledge acquisition regarding (1) market trends, (2) competition, and (3) technology. 
These items were adopted from Yli-Renko et al. (2001).  
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other departments to share resources with the venture unit or the unwillingness of 
the venture unit to use the policies and systems of the established organization. 
Moreover at the corporate level, cultural clashes are possible because of the more 
chaotic and start-up nature in comparison to the more stable units of the 
organization. Problems in terms of performance measurement and reward issues 
may arise, because it is often misleading to measure the performance of CVC 
activities in the same way the performance of an established business is measured 
(Burgelman and Sales, 1986; Kanter, 1985, 1988, 1989; Sykes and Block, 1989).  
Regarding the top-management level, Miller, et al. (1991) found that while top 
management involvement can help to ease some problems of corporate ventures, 
its influence may not be positive in all cases. Too much top-management 
involvement is expected to lead to lengthy decision processes. This is somewhat 
different to what I found. The case descriptions show evidence that a required 
approval of corporate top-management does not lead to lengthy decision 
processes. But even more important for this study is that if corporate top-
management shows commitment for CVC activities by their concrete 
involvement, the willingness of business unit is higher to collaborate (tentative 
hypothesis # 23).  
Hornsby et al. (1993) argued that five organizational characteristics support 
intrapreneurial activity. These organizational factors include management 
support, autonomy/work direction, rewards/reinforcement systems, time 
availability, and organizational boundaries. While this study gives no further 
details about the single characteristics, there is research about what level of 
autonomy should exist in the corporate venturing units, and how that level of 
autonomy may be achieved. Siegel et al. (1988) find that ventures with more 
autonomy are more successful, since they are able to reach fast decisions. 
Unfortunately, they do not consider how more autonomy affects the 
collaboration of related operational units.  While Hitt et al. (2000) concludes very 
generally that for a firm to fully realize value from hierarchical governance the 
correct organizational structure and control systems must be in place, he lacks in 
giving further insights in how these organizational structure and control systems 
should be designed. In contrast, this study argues that the more a CVC unit is 
structurally positioned within a corporation, the higher is the willingness of a 
business unit to collaborate (tentative hypothesis # 3). 
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Burgelman (1983) argues that middle managers have the ability to start 
autonomous strategic initiatives by conceptualizing strategies for new business 
areas and providing resources for such activities. However, Backholm (1999) 
found that managers of the middle management level in mainstream units feel 
uncomfortable, if the venture unit is evaluated with fundamentally different 
criteria. He found that the lack of legitimacy inside the organization results from 
the same reason why the venture exists: promoting divergence. With regard to 
this study there is to say that Burgelman’s finding (1983) supports the findings of 
this work. In the case description it emerged that the more the investment process 
arrives at the post-investment phase, the more the senior-management of a 
business unit gets in focal point, due to their ability both to authorize required 
business unit resources, as well as to solve occurring problems in the post-
investment phase (tentative hypothesis # 20a and # 20b).   
To summarize, institutional pressure emerges at the corporate level, on middle 
manager level, and between the venture unit and mainstream organizations. The 
arising issue of interest will be how institutional pressure could be limited by 
following the recommendations given in the upcoming theory. 
3.1.2 Complementary resource acquisition and knowledge relatedness for 
resource combination 
After having discussed institutional pressure pertaining to corporations, the 
considerations and ideas of this section focus on the availability of resources, and 
the nature of the resource-exchange between units. Different scholars have 
argued that there is a significant potential for exploiting complementarities 
within the firm (see for example, Laamen, 1998; Dougherty and Hardy, 1996; 
Rothwell, 1989). However, exploiting economies of scope involves the sharing 
of resources between two or more businesses (Hill 1994). While studies analyze 
different corporate level areas of complementarities, they all neglect specific 
needs of the single business units (for example, marketing, management 
bureaucracy, attracting finance, financing growth, or coping with patents). 
Mason and Rohner (2002) find that the relationship between the parent 
organization and the new corporate venture is characterized by three key 
activities: resource availability, collaboration to solve problems and to connect 
innovations with existing businesses, as well as fusing innovation with meaning 
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in a corporate strategic context. Further, they find that keeping the venture 
program connected to the parent firm’s strategy, and integrated with R&D, M&A 
and Corporate Development as essential when creating a viable structure for 
business R&D through CVC. 
Resource acquisition constitutes a major theme in entrepreneurship (Starr and 
MacMillan, 1990). It is argued that in distinction to external ventures, corporate 
ventures have access to competencies of the corporation, which can give ventures 
a competitive advantage (for example, Barney, 1991; Mc Grath et al., 1994). 
Internal corporate ventures can often weave together pieces of technology and 
knowledge, which exist in separate parts of the organization and which would 
otherwise remain unused (Burgelman, 1993). While I acknowledge the 
possibility of piecing together technology and knowledge, Burgelman gives no 
further insights into how we get access to these resources, and how to overcome 
the resistance of business units to share required resources. 
In addition to Hill (1994), this study finds that divergence leads also to 
significant potential for exploiting complementarities between the corporate 
venturing unit and the parent firm. However, there is an interaction between the 
focused investment stage of a CVC unit and the willingness of a business unit to 
collaborate, such as late stage investments lead to more willingness to collaborate 
in business units, that prefer application of selling possibilities, while early stage 
investments lead to more collaboration willingness in business units that look for 
R&D possibilities and spill-over effects (tentative hypothesis # 4a).  
Resource combinations and operational routines are relatively idiosyncratic, the 
new combinations of resources may help firms develop enduring differences in 
resource profiles and consequently a sustainable competitive advantage. So a 
substantive and desirable outcome of close parent-venture relations is the 
generation of valuable new resource combinations, specific to firm, which it 
alone may exploit. 
With this concluding remark on the above discussion of the ‘resource acquisition 
and combination’, it is now warranted to tie together the findings of this section. 
The section has shown that there is significant potential for exploiting 
complementarities for resource combination and acquisition represented in  
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venturing activities. However, all mentioned studies fail in giving further insights 
in how we get access to theses resources and we create incentives for business 
units to share them by considering resource and knowledge related theoretical 
issues. 
3.1.3 Social network  
Kanter (1985) argues that the best innovations are often interdisciplinary or 
interfunctional in origin. However I found that the venture manager has usually a 
limited formal access to sources of power, influence, or authority. Therefore, it 
seems that the creation of informal social network might be a way to obtain 
resources. Svendsen (1998) suggests that the venture staff has to have the ability 
to build and utilize informal networks to be able to gain access to the parent 
organization’s competencies. Legitimacy is one of the key regulators in resource 
accumulation in firms. A key strategy that firms use is to use the human and 
social capital as the basis for establishing the firm’s legitimacy and for building 
exchange relationships (Coleman, 1990; Ostgaard and Birley, 1994). One 
mechanism discussed in the literature for resource acquisition is to co-opt 
resources that are currently being underutilized  (Pfeffer and Salanick, 1978; 
Burt, 1980, 1983). However, while this is argued to be the most flexible and 
easiest way to gain access to underutilized resources, it came up in my interviews 
that the resources, which the CVC unit requires, are everything else than 
underutilized. Quit in contrast, one critical bottleneck of a successful 
collaboration is the scarce resources of the business units, which are 
indispensable in order to maintain the ongoing process (zu Knyphausen-Aufseß, 
1995).  
It appears that two-way relatedness in terms of potential for mutual economic 
gains is a necessary condition to build a stable network structure (Larson, 1992). 
However, I found that some of the problems associated with corporate venturing 
activities may result from mainstream units not recognizing any significant 
potential gains for them. Most of the studies on corporate venturing have 
neglected the need for mutual gains (overall for participating units) and focused 
on potential economic gains for the overall firm. 
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Many scholars have found that critical to discontinuous innovation, 
entrepreneurial activity, and new venture success is often a high degree of 
internal partnering (for example, Mason and Rohner, 2002; Yli-Renko et al., 
1999; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998). Benefits from internal cooperation include 
acquiring knowledge about markets and technology, as well as to gain visibility 
and legitimacy. I further argue that cooperation may aid in monitoring the 
environment and access to technologies, which could provide entrance into new 
markets. Any entrance in a market, if the innovation is not completely 
appropriable, or is easily imitable or substitutable, is likely to require access to 
complementary assets in order to retain profit potential. Teece (1996) argues that 
the parent firm is likely to own some of the required complementary assets, 
thereby increasing the appropriability of the innovation.  
Rice et al. (1998) found that informal networking was critical in all cases they 
observed. Network contacts include R&D, M&A, Corporate Development, and 
different operational business units (Mason and Rohner, 2002). They helped to 
give early validation to the value of the technology and provided access to scarce 
resources. Indeed, this is somewhat similar to what I found. The better the 
informal contacts and relationships are that a CVC manager maintains to 
business units, the easier is the access to business unit’s support and resources. 
But this study attempts to extend these findings by asking for the why and how 
of the mentioned relations. 
However, the effects of formal and informal networks may not be solely positive. 
Yli-Renko et al. (1999) found in their study a negative relationship between the 
external relationship quality (in terms of social capital) with customers and 
learning as a result of over-embeddedness. Therefore, a question that has to be 
further analyzed in this study is: Does concentrated network ties lead to a 
reduced ability to alter venture strategies, thus reducing the ability to follow 
opportunities, and harness internal and external innovation in changing market 
conditions?  
Floyd and Woolridge (1999) argue that the position of the managers in social 
networks influences their ability to influence the corporate venturing process. 
Unfortunately, they do not give applicable devices of where and how the CVC 
managers should be optimally positioned within their networks in the firm. This 
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study pursues in closing this gap by giving detailed information where the CVC 
unit should be structurally located within the parent corporation. 
Moreover, the relationship between the parent company and the CVC unit seems 
to have various effects on the resulting resource exchange and on the value 
creation by “enhancing innovation”. While Quinn (1985) found that too close 
cooperation in the early definition phase can result in lower innovativeness, 
Sykes and Block (1989) argue that close cooperation in the growth phase helps in 
the resource acquisition. In the integration phase close cooperation can help to 
overcome the reject reaction (Kanter, 1988). The confrontation of this changing 
effect of close cooperation is not fully supported by the findings of this work. I 
found that a close cooperation between the CVC unit and the business unit is 
thoroughly positive along the entire investment process. While a close 
cooperation in the pre-investment phase positively stimulates the generation of 
internal deal possibilities, close cooperation in the post-investment phase is 
positively related with a fruitful achievement of the post-investment support 
management.          
To summarize, the overview of corporate venturing literature focused on three 
major characteristics of the relationship between the parent and the corporate 
venture: institutional pressure, complementary resource acquisition/knowledge 
relatedness, and social network. While, studies exploring the antecedents to 
venture-parent relationship attributes are rare (e.g. Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998), there 
is no study that focuses on the relationship between the CVC unit and the 
involved business units. The collaboration between CVC units and business units 
within the context of CVC activities requires organizational arrangements that 
enhance cooperation between these two separate units. This collaboration may in 
turn increase the value added by the CVC to its investments. The literature 
review highlights the need to remove obstacles and provide incentives in order to 
coordinate more effectively the collaboration activities of these economically 
“independent” business units, which is critical in order to transfer and share 
skills, resources, and corporate facilities. 
The major hurdles of collaborative relationships seem to be related to the 
availability of resources, the nature of the resource-exchange between units, and 
the efficiency of governance mechanisms of such exchange. The literature to be 
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enfolded for the confrontation with the preliminary hypotheses will therefore 
comprise these three aspects. The following chapters aim at constructing an 
integrated theory of intra-organizational collaboration. One of the crucial 
question will be: What can we learn from the case studies and prior research that 
pointed to the design of the organizational structure of corporate venturing 
programs which promotes intensive cooperation between the CVC unit and the 
business unit? 
3.2 Confronting resource related theories of relationships with the case 
findings 
One of the objectives of this study is to explain how the corporation could be set-
up best regarding an access to corporate resources and concerning an exchange 
of resources between the CVC unit and the business unit. The access and 
exchange of resources is even more important since corporations are supposed to 
maintain a wide range of resources, but at the same time they need to know 
where the resources are located within the firm. Further, if properly set–up, the 
access to and exchange of resources could serve as an incentive for the business 
unit to collaborate with the CVC unit. Thus, the first set of theory looks at the 
creation of value through the selection, creation and combination of tangible and 
intangible resources. Therefore, in section 3.2.1 the resource-based theory of the 
firm is discussed. Chapter 3.2.2 confronts aspects of the knowledge-based theory 
and the organizational learning theory of organizations, since both theoretical 
streams are closely related.   
3.2.1  Resource-based Theory of the Firm  
First, I will begin with a short description of the development and reasons for the 
origination of the resource-based view. Also, important definitions of this theory 
for this study’s purpose are presented. In general, access to resources is one 
important reason to enter into collaboration. One of the key perspectives of this 
analysis still represents the resource-based theory of the firm. This theory, which 
goes back to the seminal work of Penrose (1959), conceptualizes the firm as a 
collection of productive resources and views firm growth as a process of using 
these resources to exploit the firm’s “productive opportunity” and of increasing 
the firms’ resource base. Penrose defined productive opportunity as “the 
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collection of all possible productive possibilities entrepreneurs can identify and 
are willing and able to pursue” (1959:31). Because productive opportunities are 
unlimited, the firm’s growth is only limited by the existing resource base and the 
competence of management to exploit the resource base. 
Penrose’s ideas did not receive much attention before Wernerfelt (1984) 
introduced the term “resource-based” in his characterization of firms as 
collections of resources rather than sets of product-market positions. He defined 
resources more broadly as anything which could be thought of as a strength or 
weakness of a given firm. This approach includes those tangible and intangible 
assets which are tied semipermanently to the firm. Examples of resources are 
brand-names, in-house knowledge of technology, employment of skilled 
personal, trade contracts, efficient procedures, capital, etc. Notable to this 
definition is that it includes weakness, while many other researchers (for 
example, Lado et al. 1992; Barney, 1991) focused on only those elements, which 
are potentially rent yielding. The inclusion of weakness supposes that the access 
to resources may also be related to disadvantages or costs for the firm. At the 
same time, Rumelt (1984:557-558) suggested that “a competitive advantage is 
determined by the firm’s unique resources that are handled by the management”. 
Broader in scope than Penrose (1959) or Wernerfelt (1984) defined Barney 
(1991) resources as all assets, capabilities, competencies, organizational 
processes, firms attributes, information, knowledge, and skills controlled by a 
firm that enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve its 
efficiency and effectiveness. According to this framework, resources are not 
productive on their own. There is a distinction between resources and 
knowledge. While resources can be considered as tangible and intangible assets 
possessed by the firm or accessed through relationships (Wernerfelt, 1984), 
knowledge is an ingredient that helps to get higher value from the resources 
(Penrose, 1959). While Hofer and Schendel (1978) concretizise resources into 
financial, physical, technological, reputational, and organizational resources, 
Grant (1991) just expands its definition to personal-related resources.   
In the present study, the term resource will be used in line with Barney’s (1991) 
definition to encompass all tangible and intangible assets, including capabilities, 
competencies, and organizational processes that are strategically relevant in the 
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relationship between the CVC unit and the business unit. According to Barney 
(1991) and zu Knyphausen-Aufseß (1995), resources must be valuable, rare, 
imperfectly imitable, and without strategically equivalent substitutes, in order to 
sustain long-term competitive advantage.  
After having introduced the resource-based view, the main variables and their 
relationship are now represented. Because of environmental uncertainty, the 
firm-specific resources and capabilities are considered as a more sustainable 
basis for competitive advantage than product-market positioning (Grant, 1991). 
In his conceptual paper, Barney (1991) presents the two key axioms of the 
resource based view: (1) resources are distributed heterogeneously across firms, 
and (2) these productive resources cannot be transferred from one place to 
another without costs (i.e. resources are “sticky”; for example Priem and Butler, 
2001). Thus, the essence of the firm’s strategy lies in the ways that existing 
resources are used and in the means to acquire or internally develop additional 
resources (Wernerfelt, 1984).  
What are the main empirical applications and findings of the resource based 
view? Although some of the earlier research papers on the resource-based view 
have focused largely on the internal resources of the firm, in more recent research 
the resource-based view has been applied to the analysis of inter-organizational 
relationships of firms (Hamel, et al., 1989; Hitt et al. 2000) and in the new 
venture process (for example Bruno and Tyebjee, 1982). 
In the resource-based view, the fundamental argument for alliance formation is 
that firms try to create and appropriate value in inter-firm relationships by 
leveraging superior resources they possess with complementary resources (Stein, 
1997). In this aspect, the resource-based view highlights the role of resource 
complementarities influencing the alliance formation and performance (Das and 
Teng, 2000; Hitt et al., 2000; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Hellmann, 
2001). Das and Teng (2000) recognized resource complementarities as one of the 
key drivers of alliance formation and performance. While there is the relatively 
large and rapidly growing literature applying the resource-based view to strategic 
alliances formation and to alliance performance (e.g. De Meyer, 1999; Chung et  
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al., 2000), there is little empirical research applying that perspective to corporate 
venture capital (e.g. Maula and Murray, 2000).  
Next, a confrontation of the extant criticism of the resource-based view is 
represented.3 The resource-based view has received criticism for its 
conceptualization of resources. This conceptualization led researchers to evaluate 
the theory as a static theory (Teece et al., 1997), neglecting product markets 
(Priem and Butler, 2001), and having limited prescriptions for managers due to 
path-dependent and unique resources (Conner, 1991). The resource-based view 
has also been criticized for being excessively focused on internal resources with 
the unit of analysis being a single firm and neglecting the environmental context 
in which a firm operates (Dyer and Singh, 1998). This criticism has led to the 
development of the “relational view” extension to the resource-based view 
focusing on the sources of competitive advantage residing not solely from firm-
level resources but from difficult-to-imitate capabilities embedded in dyads or 
networks of firms (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998).   
To what extent are these interorganizational findings transferable to the internal 
relationship between the CVC unit and the business unit? Acknowledging the 
criticism towards the resource-based view, I argue that the resource and 
capability development is important for the collaboration between the CVC unit 
and the business unit. Given the focus on the internal collaboration between the 
CVC unit and the business unit, on the one side, this study refers to resource 
acquisition as the access by a business unit to resources like sale-orders or 
production-orders of the portfolio firm possible by the CVC investment. On the 
other side, it also pertains to the CVC unit’s access to resources a business unit 
holds. The direct application of the presence of various kinds of resources to the 
context of this study is that while the financial resources are administered by the 
CVC unit, the technical and human resources are mainly held by business units. 
In terms of the nature of the resources, the case description illustrates, that the 
main resources that are exchanged between the CVC unit and the business unit 
represent intangible resources rather than tangible resources. Access to non-
material resources is related to operational complementarities in the product 
                                              
3 A much broader overview of the recent ‘resource-based’ critique is provided by zu 
Knyphausen-Aufseß (1995, chaps. 1.2, 1.3, and 2.2; 1993). 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION  
 
230
markets between the business unit and the portfolio firms. Based on the resource-
based theory, the confrontation with the case findings of this study shows support 
for tentative hypotheses # 1a and 1b: strategically oriented corporate venture 
capital programs are more likely to induce a transfer and combination of 
resources between the CVC unit and the business unit aimed at developing new 
value creating products or activities. The strategic position compared to 
financially oriented CVCs therefore positively influences the capability and 
willingness of the business unit to collaborate. The key notion in the resource-
based view of the firm is that a firm’s competitive advantage is based on its 
resources. But unfortunately, this theory’s key notion does not provide further 
insights into how the CVC units knows where the resources reside in a 
corporation and how to find access to them. Tentative hypotheses # 10a, # 13, 
and # 21c attempt to meet this challenge.  
The mentioned criticisms concerning “static theory” and “path-dependency” 
seem to represent a double-edged sword. On the one side, “path-dependency” of 
a business unit conceals technical resources in a certain area which may be 
important to evaluate a specific technology. On the other side, path-dependency 
reduces the willingness of a business unit to exchange their resources. While the 
resource-based view regards the potential resources as existent and static, the 
CVC unit pursues in its intra-firm collaboration an increase of the corporation’s 
resource exchange, not only linking the CVC unit and business unit resources 
with one another, but also by bringing in new resources through the portfolio 
firms. This positive aspect of CVC activities of bringing in different kinds of new 
resources to a business unit (for example, product development, increase in sales 
order, access to resources of the portfolio firms) should be strengthened and 
highlighted both by the CVC managers as well by the corporate top-management 
as advantageous (tentative hypotheses # 1a, # 13, # 23), since a successful 
resource-exchange requires a collaborative attitude of the business units against 
CVC. 
Moreover, the aspect of “path-dependency” is transferable to the business units. 
It limits the “horizon” of possible resources and technologies a business unit is 
interested in. Following this theory, the strategy of the CVC unit to increase the 
collaboration willingness of the business unit should focus on expanding the 
resource pool possibly resulting from complementary investments. These 
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investments support the ‘eco-system’4 of a business unit by stimulating an 
exchange process of resources between the business unit and the CVC unit or by 
mediating ditto between the business unit and the investments (tentative 
hypotheses # 14, # 21a, # 21c). Thus, business units might enter relationships in 
the expectation of creating superior value through the combination of 
complementary resource capabilities (Zajac and Olsen, 1993). The 
complementarities can be related in resources and capabilities, products and 
services, or some other dimension. The key determinant of complementarity is 
whether the success of one player is positively related to the success of the other 
player (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996).  
In the previous literature, several authors have developed typologies of 
complementarities in order to explain the motivation of entering in a cooperation 
with a partner (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Stein, 1997). 
According to Dyer and Singh (1998), there are four potential sources of 
competitive advantage: relation-specific assets, knowledge-sharing routines, 
complementary resources and capabilities, and effective governance. Regarding 
the context of CVC, especially the synergy argument between the portfolio firms 
of a CVC unit and the business unit is discussed. Rotwell (1983) argues that 
while small firms have advantages in innovative activities, large firms have 
resource-based advantages. Amit and Zott (2001) found that, “complementarities 
are present whenever having a bundle of goods together provides more value 
than the total value of having each of the goods separately.” Direct competition is 
minimized when both parties can signal value-adding, complementary resources 
that are not direct substitutes for one another. At the same time, the incentives for 
interaction for the purpose of value creation are maximized.  
Confronting this theoretical recommendation with my work supports my 
findings. The cases showed, indeed, that the higher the “evaluated return” of a 
business unit of an exchange with complementary investments is, the higher is 
their willingness to collaborate. Transferring these theoretical findings into an  
                                              
4 The eco-system of a business unit includes all aspects of demand and supply: e.g. suppliers, 
buyers, and deliverers.  
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applicable guide-line for the CVC unit means: in order to strengthen the business 
units’ collaboration, a CVC unit should not invest in direct substitutive 
technologies of a business unit, because this could represent a threat for the 
business unit’s technologies and economic success (tentative hypotheses # 6a, # 
6c). 
However, the decision to collaborate in order to seek access to complementary 
resources is not straight forward: two actors only collaborate in order to get 
access to resources that they do not have themselves, “when the hazards of the 
cooperation can be held to a tolerable level” (Powell et al., 1996). For a 
collaborative, trusting relationship to develop, the collaborating parties need to 
be convinced of the ability, benevolence, and integrity of each other. When trust 
is present, the collaborating firms are more likely to engage in frequent and open 
interaction. Unfortunately, the resource-based view does not explicitly consider 
the aspect of trust. This issue will be further analyzed in the forthcoming chapters 
about social capital (section 3.3.1) and agency theory (section 3.4.1) that are the 
base for the analysis of the resource exchange and governance mechanisms of 
relationships. 
In summary, the resource-based view describes what kind of resources the 
business units are interested in. While in inter-organizational constellations there 
is the necessity to exchange resources, in the intra-organizational exchange of 
this work it is initially not clear what finally will be exchanged. Regarding the 
business units the interviews showed that their exchange only comes true if the 
CVC brings the business unit together with appropriate start-up companies, 
which represent potential for any resource-exchange. There are two reasons why 
it is difficult to apply the resource-based theory to this study: first, the 
exchanging parties are “forced” to collaborate although the beneficial outcome is 
uncertain. Second, the relationship between the CVC unit and the business unit is 
only a mediating relationship between the business unit and the start-up 
company. The resource-based view in this study fails to give insights into the 
prerequisite of any resource exchange, as e.g. trust. Further, if a CVC unit would 
strictly follow the resource based-view they might have to limit their investments 
to only complementary deals, since complementary deals are supposed to offer 
the broadest basis for any resource exchange. At the same time however, 
focusing on complementary investments results means not necessarily the 
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optimal level of technical communication overlap between the CVC unit and the 
business unit. Investments that are very similar (or almost substitutive) are out of 
the horizon of the resource-based view (tentative hypothesis # 6c). But what are 
the effects and implications of similar deals on the willingness and the ability of 
a business unit to collaborate? Since this discussion is strongly related to 
knowledge exchange and organizational learning it will lead us the knowledge-
based view of the firm which is in the heart of the following section. 
3.2.2 Knowledge-based Theory of the Firm and Organizational Learning 
The knowledge-based view of the firm developed from the resource-based view, 
and is often considered as an extension of the resource-based view. There is 
general agreement in the literature that Nelson and Winter’s (1982) evolutionary 
theory, Prahalad and Hamel’s (1990) work on core competencies, as well as zu 
Knyphausen-Aufseß’ (1995) organizational capabilities, and Teece et al. (1997) 
dynamic capabilities framework all representing streams within the knowledge-
based view.5  
Prior research in the field of the knowledge-based view considers knowledge as 
the strategically most significant resource of the firm (Grant, 1996). Its 
proponents argue that heterogeneous knowledge bases and capabilities among 
firms are the main determinants of sustained competitive advantage and superior 
corporate performance (Decarolis and Deeds, 1999; Kogut and Zander, 1993). 
Therefore, knowledge is often conceptually distinguished from information by 
defining knowledge as processed information. For example Huber (1991:89) 
notes that information refers to “data that give meaning by ambiguity, 
equivocality, or uncertainty”, while knowledge refers to “more complex products 
of learning, such as interpretations of information, beliefs about cause-effect 
relationships.” However, although the later definition will be used in this study, 
the terms “information” and “knowledge” are far from unambiguous, and 
therefore are often used interchangeably (Huber, 1991).  
                                              
5 Zu Knyphausen-Aufseß (1995) provides a very broad discussion about “what are 
organizational capabilities” in chapter 2.2.2. Eisenhardt and Martins (2000) further developed 
the concept of dynamic capabilities. 
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Many researchers have proposed analyzing the knowledge along various 
dimensions. The most commonly used dimension is codifiability, or the 
distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge (Arrow, 1994; Nonaka, 1994; 
Nelson and Winter, 1982). Other dimensions include observability, complexity, 
and whether knowledge is independent or embedded in a system (Winter, 1987). 
Table 3-2 summarizes some dimensions characterizing knowledge.  
Table 3-2: Dimensions of knowledge characteristics 
Wright, 1996Can the knowledge be easily 
understood?
Not understandable -
understandable
Autio, 1995Is the knowledge specific to a 
narrow domain?
Specific - generic
Hedlund & Zander, 1993Is the knowledge maintained in 
the form of a list?
List-like structure –
architectonic structure
Winter, 1987Is the knowledge dependent on 
other related knowledge? 
An element of a system-
independent
Winter, 1987How much and what kind of 
information is required to 
characterize the item of 
knowledge?
Complex-Simple
Winter, 1987Can you learn the knowledge by 
observation
Not observable in use-
observable in use
Winter, 1987Is the knowledge articulated in 
symbols?
Not articulated-articulated
Winter, 1987; Grant, 1996Can the knowledge be taught?Not teachable-teachable
Arrow, 1994; Nonaka, 1994; 
Nelson and Winter, 1982 
Can you express the knowledge 
with symbols?
Tacit-explicit
Proposed byExplanationDimension
 
The distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge has been the basis for the 
emergence of the knowledge-based view of the firm (Kogut and Zander, 1992), 
and is critical for explaining the imitability of knowledge, the transferability and 
mechanisms for the transfer of knowledge across individuals (Grant, 1996). Tacit 
knowledge is linked to the individual, and is very difficult to articulate. While 
tacit knowledge identifies “knowing how”, explicit knowledge covers “knowing 
about” (Grant, 1996). The knowledge-based view argues that because tacit 
knowledge is difficult to imitate and relatively immobile, its transfer between 
people is slow, costly and uncertain (Kogut and Zander, 1992). For instance, 
Inkpen and Dinur (1998) report that amount of knowledge transfer is negatively 
related to the tacitness of knowledge. Similarly, Simonin (1999) found that 
tacitness, complexity of knowledge, and cultural and organizational distance 
(mediated by knowledge ambiguity) were negatively related to knowledge 
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transfer. However, tacit knowledge can constitute the basis of sustained 
competitive advantage (Grant, 1996; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Kogut and 
Zander, 1993).  
Researchers generally agree that an organization’s knowledge resides in its 
individuals, structural routines, as well as culture (Argote, 1999; Starbuck, 1992; 
Nelson and Winter, 1982). The knowledge-based view of the firm depicts firms 
as repositories of knowledge and competencies that are key resources of firm 
(Kogut and Zander, 1996; Spender, 1996). According to this view, the 
“organizational advantage” (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996) of firms over markets 
arises from their superior capability in creating, accumulating and transferring 
knowledge (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Knowledge creation and innovation 
result from new combinations of knowledge and other resources (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Kogut and Zander, 1992). The accumulation of knowledge 
constitutes a driving force in the development and growth of firms (Penrose, 
1959; Spender and Grant, 1996), because knowledge acquisition opens new 
“productive opportunities” (Penrose, 1959) for the firm and enhances the firm’s 
ability to exploit these opportunities. Knowledge transfer might happen through 
organizational learning which has often been viewed as the process through 
which existing intellectual capital is combined, exchanged and applied through 
the assimilation of new knowledge into the existing knowledge base (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Teece and Pisano, 1994; Autio et al., 2000).  
Although organizational learning begins with individual learning, it is the 
outcome of complex, team-based activities (Grant, 1996). In other words, 
learning on an organizational level does not only depend on individuals’ abilities 
to learn, but also on the integration of skills and know-how among individuals. 
This is consistent with Simon’s (1991:125) observation that: “although all 
learning takes place inside human individual human heads; an organization 
learns in two ways: either by the learning of its members, or by ingesting new 
members who have knowledge the organization didn’t previously have.” New 
individual knowledge is transformed into organizational knowledge only when it 
is shared and is assimilated into organizational routines, documents and practices 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Similarly, Steensma (1996) has argued that 
learning takes place when information is exchanged across the inter- and 
intraorganizational boundaries of a firm.  
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Although in organization and management research organizational learning has 
been characterized in a variety of ways (see for example, Cyert and March, 1963; 
Levitt and March, 1988; Rosenberg, 1982; Crossan et al., 1999), and a variety of 
definitions of organizational learning have been proposed, a common notion in 
various definitions involves the two modes of learning, that is, exploitation and 
exploration (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Levinthal and March, 1993). 
Exploitation involves the refinement and incremental improvement of existing 
knowledge, skills and processes, whereas exploration involves the research for 
new knowledge skills and processes. In other words, organizational learning is a 
dynamic process in which the parties continuously update their knowledge base 
and potentially exploit the newly gained knowledge.  
The concept of absorptive capacity has been shown to be among the most 
important factors influencing organizational learning (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990; George et al. 2001, Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Van den Bosch et al., 1999). 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) first defined absorptive capacity as the firm’s ability 
to (1) recognize the value of new external information, (2) to assimilate it, and 
(3) to apply knowledge to commercial ends. In contrast to the focus on how to 
acquire knowledge inside the firm, interorganizational relationships, alliances, 
and networks have often been mentioned as means to acquire knowledge outside 
the firm (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Steensma, 1996). 
In this study, I follow Huber (1991:89) who showed that organizations not only 
hold specialized knowledge, but also that an “organization learns if any of its 
units acquires knowledge which it recognizes as potentially useful to the 
organizational units”, and that “an entity learns if, through its processing of 
information, the range of its potentials is changed.” For this study this definition 
is of special utility, since it shows a relationship between the acquisition of 
knowledge by learning and the recognition of its usefulness for a business unit.    
To what extent is this theoretical discussion around the knowledge-based view 
applicable in order to support the developed tentative hypotheses of this work? 
Huber’s (1991) definition of organizational learning is consistent with this study. 
This work shows that the more useful knowledge is transferred to and acquired 
by the business unit, the more they might respect the usefulness of CVC 
investments. However, the cases show that many of the valuable innovation and 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION  
 
237
learning seem to emerge only in the post-investment phase by the actual 
collaboration between the business unit and the start-up company or by the 
implementation of the new technological knowledge in the produced products. 
But, this increases the BUs’ willingness to collaborate (tentative hypothesis # 
14). Further, there is consistency regarding the view of individual knowledge 
repositories. Knowledge was reported to be inherent in individual employees of 
the business units as well as in single investment managers. Regarding the 
business units, the know-how of single technical experts is necessary to get 
access to the required information. The same is true regarding the CVC unit, 
since the structure of the interviewed CVC teams showed a division in certain 
technical areas.  
Furthermore, within the knowledge-based literature, it has been pointed out that 
building resources and capabilities suffers from time compression diseconomies 
(Dierickx and Cool, 1989). This notion goes back to a major hurdle mentioned 
along all interviews that the CVC units have to overcome. Since the business 
units are very focused on their operational activities, they fail in getting free 
resources that can specifically take care about the necessities of the CVC unit. 
Unfortunately, this time restriction results in paying little attention to the 
possibilities emerging out of CVC activities. Therefore, I argue that the more 
commitment corporate top management shows for CVC, the more the business 
unit will try to provide resources in order to participate in CVC activities in an 
expected manner (tentative hypothesis # 23). But this commitment has to include 
corporate top-management placing additional resources (in the form of time and 
employees) at the disposal for business units especially concerning CVC 
engagement. Further, the cases showed the same is true regarding a corporate 
culture that is open for technical novelties which is also dominantly stimulated 
by corporate top management (tentative hypotheses # 22a, # 22b).6 Especially 
Intel Capital is an appropriate case example, which may be characterized by an 
open corporate culture, supportive for technical innovations. 
                                              
6 This issue of the relationship between technological evolution and industry structure has had 
considerable implications for the establishment of competitive advantages. A broad overview 
of the role of technology and innovation for strategic management theory is provided by zu 
Knyphausen-Aufseß (1995, chap. 2.5). 
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As mentioned above, for learning to occur in a corporation, the actors have to be 
actively involved. The collaboration asks for an explicit involvement of the 
operational units throughout the different stages of the investment process. In this 
sense, business units should not only participate in the evaluation of investment 
opportunities but also in the support of the portfolio firm (tentative hypothesis # 
17). This is even more important since the involvement of the business units in 
the investment process represents a way of exploring a new technological field 
and to learn the rules of an industry (Keil and Laamanen, 1995; Roberts and 
Berry, 1985). At the same time, an early involvement increases also the 
exploitation of the business unit’s knowledge (tentative hypotheses # 19a, # 19b). 
The advantage for the CVC unit is that market and technological knowledge 
already exists in the business units when doing the due diligence, and does not 
have to be built from scratch by the CVC unit. At the same, the CVC unit should 
be aware that an early involvement of the business units in the investment 
process also entails a higher number of transferred deals to business units, which 
are finally not invested (tentative hypothesis # 18). 
But, the remaining question is: what is the business units’ incentive to be 
involved in the investment process? Organizational learning as a kind of 
knowledge exchange can also be analyzed from an incentive-related perspective. 
Indeed, numerous studies have identified learning and knowledge acquisition as 
important motivations for entering inter-organizational relationships (Badaracco, 
1991; Häkansson, 1990; Hamel et al., 1989; Kogut, 1988; Keil and Laamanen, 
1995; Keil, 2000). The more and the earlier the business units have been 
structurally involved in the investment process, the higher was the incentive of a 
business unit to collaborate. This suggests that the relationship between the time 
of involvement in the investment process and the willingness to collaborate is 
mediated by the learning effect obtained by the business unit. Therefore the 
knowledge-based view supports tentative hypothesis # 14. However I found, that 
organizational learning asks for an appropriate quality of business unit 
involvement. Therefore, business units should not only be involved just on an 
‘informative or consulting level’; quite in contrast the business units should be 
involved on a ‘deciding- and realizing level’, since this kind of involvement 
maximizes their learning motive (tentative hypotheses # 19a, # 19b, # 21d). In 
return, while organizational learning increases their willingness to collaborate, it 
decreases the necessity of financial incentives (tentative hypothesis # 21 g). 
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Therefore, this finding goes somewhat beyond the findings of McNally (1997) or 
Winters and Murfin (1988) who reported the learning motive also for corporate 
venture capital.  
Confronting the various definitions of the organizational learning theory with the 
corresponding knowledge of the business units shows that the theoretical 
differentiation of Cohen and Levinthal (1990) in exploitation and exploration is 
consistent with my findings. While the exploitation of knowledge dominantly 
takes place in the pre-investment phase by requesting business units’ knowledge 
feedback, the exploration of knowledge is more related to the post-investment 
phase. The case description showed that an involvement of a business unit in the 
pre-investment phase mainly aims in exploiting existing business units’ know-
how for the due diligence process; an involvement in the post-investment phase 
pursues more a collaboration of a business unit with the portfolio firms in order 
to explore new knowledge. Exploring new knowledge through frequent contacts 
of the business units to portfolio firms means ‘learning about new markets’, 
‘learning about new technologies’, and ‘learning about new disruptive 
technologies’. These learning areas have been analyzed as especially important in 
high velocity environments,7 since real time information is necessary to monitor 
the rapid evolution of new markets and spot new technological trends early, as 
there is little time to react to arising trends (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997; 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990). Through the collaboration between the 
CVC unit and the business units, the business units can learn about the strategic, 
market, and technological potential of the portfolio firms’ technologies (tentative 
hypothesis # 21c).  
According to the theory, when selecting investments, the CVC unit has to be 
alerted to bring sufficient new know-how to a business unit, in order to make 
knowledge valuable. In this sense, CVC activities can serve as a form of ‘market 
intelligence’ that supports the strategy process of a business unit. The ‘market 
intelligence’ is not limited to emerging business areas, rather it can also function 
to monitor developments that affect the current businesses of the corporation.  
                                              
7 Examples of high velocity environments are e.g. the information- and communication sectors 
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Therefore, in this work the aspect of exploration is represented by the objective 
‘enhancement of innovation’, and the aspect of exploitation is typified by the 
investment goal ‘leverage of strategic assets.’ However, the cases showed an 
interaction between investment stage and the two aspects of exploitation and 
exploration, such as late stage investments lead to more collaboration in business 
units that prefer ‘leverage of strategic assets’,8 while early stage investments 
leading to more collaboration willingness in business units that look for 
‘enhancement of innovation’9 (tentative hypothesis # 4a). 
The theoretical suggestion that the exploitation and the exploration of knowledge 
represent the same strong incentive to increase the collaboration willingness of a 
business unit is not supported by my findings. Quit in contrast, interesting 
differences in getting the willingness of a business unit to collaborate were found 
dependent on the type of targeted ‘market intelligence’. While the findings 
suggest that the investment objective ‘enhancement of innovation’ represent a 
bigger hurdle in finding the business units’ collaboration, the investment goal 
‘leverage of strategic assets’ facilitates the access to a business unit. The 
potential increase in sales or a security for future demand represents a more 
direct incentive for the business unit to collaborate (tentative hypothesis # 21b) 
than to learn something about new technologies in the market. Only the 
exploitative ‘leverage of strategic assets’ represents a possibility to generate 
immediate cash for the business unit. Since the possibility for immediate cash 
generation is quite limited regarding the explorative ‘enhancement of 
innovation,’ it results in lower willingness of the business unit to collaborate. The 
investment goal ‘enhancement of innovation’ was found to feed signals about 
changes in the core business of business units, and therefore decreases the 
willingness of a business unit to collaborate (tentative hypotheses # 21a, # 21c). 
While the aspect of ‘enhancement of innovation’ is applicable to the cases T-
Venture and Siemens Venture Capital, the aspect of ‘leverage of strategic assets’ 
was more important for Intel Capital, Motorola Ventures, GE Equity and 
DaimlerChrysler Venture.  
                                              
8 Examples are application or selling possibilities. 
9 Examples are R&D possibilities and technological spill-over effects. 
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Moreover, this study shows that learning of ‘disruptive technologies’ (see for 
example, Bower and Christensen, 1995; Christensen, 1997) encounters major 
hurdles regarding the willingness to collaborate. The cases show, that especially 
if a CVC unit invests in very substitutive technologies the issue arises, whether 
CVC investments could even represent a threat for the current business unit 
activities. However, this strategic direction has to be decided by corporate top-
management, in order to show their commitment for these ‘disruptive’ 
investments against business units (tentative hypotheses #1a, #6a and # 23). Only 
if a corporation decided to stay out of this problematic scenario of aiming in 
bringing ‘disruptive technologies’ to the corporation, the business units should be 
intensively involved in CVC activities. Besides an involvement in the first 
screening of deals, this should involve the process of reconciliation of business 
units’ ‘strategic holes’ and the investment areas of the CVC unit (tentative 
hypotheses # 17, # 19 a, # 19b).  
However, any kind of learning, either explorative or exploitative, supposes that 
there is a flow of knowledge between the CVC unit and the business unit. But the 
critical question is what determines the amount of generated and exchanged 
knowledge in the relationship between a CVC unit and the business unit? 
Organizational theory suggests that the generation of new knowledge is 
maximized under the following conditions (for example Autio et al., 2000). 
Again, in order to make the subsequent paragraphs more readable, I will directly 
confront the suggested conditions with my case findings.   
(1) In domains close to the domain of existing knowledge. Cohen and Levinthal 
(1990) posited that the more similar prior knowledge is to new knowledge, 
the easier the absorption of the new knowledge due to technological 
communication overlap. The underlying rationale is the increased 
“absorptive capacity” of the “recipient” which the learning of tacit and 
embedded knowledge requires (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). The knowledge-
based theory’s suggestion to invest in domains that are close to the domain 
of existing knowledge is somewhat additional to the findings of the 
resource-base theory. While in the case of portfolio firms that represent a 
complementary technology, the willingness of a business unit to collaborate 
was found to be high, interestingly the willingness decreases the more 
substitutive the targeted investments are (tentative hypothesis # 6d). The 
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higher level of substitution increases the possibility that an investment may 
represent a threat for the current business activities of a business unit, since 
a business unit is forced to change its own routines and procedures 
(tentative hypothesis # 6a).  
(2) In conditions under which there are existing routines. Organizational 
learning is supposed to be reinforced in all the activities of a firm and, over 
time, becomes increasingly calcified in organizational practices (Barkema 
and Vermeulen, 1998; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). However, the case 
descriptions show that the work of CVC managers in connecting 
themselves with a business unit takes place not in a manner of routine. In 
other words, existing routines are not supportive in getting the willingness 
of the business units to collaborate in order to generate new knowledge, 
rather the connection happens through personal networking driven by 
individuals. Therefore, this aspect suggested by the organizational learning 
theory is somewhat different to my findings that the more informal 
relationships and social networks exist between the CVC unit and the 
business unit (tentative hypothesis # 13), which in return decreases formal 
routines of governance mode (tentative hypotheses # 16a, # 16b), the higher 
is the willingness of a business unit to exchange knowledge. Further, the 
recommendation of this theory to make implicit know-how through existing 
routines explicit is only rarely followed by the analyzed cases. In this sense, 
only a small number of CVC are currently in the process of establishing any 
tools (e.g. in the form of a common CVC database) that allow the access to 
jointly learned processes and insights based on prior investments. 
(3) The adoption of new knowledge involves not merely the learning of new, 
but the unlearning of the old knowledge (Bettis and Prahalad, 1995; 
Nonaka, 1994; Hedberg, 1981). Acquiring new experiential knowledge 
involves new ways of thinking which face strong inertial forces to continue 
in old patterns. This circumstance points to one of the major hurdles which 
a CVC manager has to overcome. The illustration of the perceived “not 
invented here syndrome”10 in the case description shows, that this 
                                              
10 DaimlerChrysler is an appropriate case example to illustrate the “not invented here 
syndrome.” 
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‘unlearning-process’ of existent knowledge, embodied in a certain 
production technology, seems to produce problems. Especially for 
externally generated deals the “not invented here syndrome” was found to 
be even stronger (tentative hypothesis # 5). It could be related with the 
difficulty of overcoming individual, social pride and egoism that may be 
related with the abandon of the current technology. Further, the rejection 
could be rooted in a fear of a change of existent production ways or even 
the end of a whole business unit. However, the unlearning process is 
facilitated if there is sufficient commitment of the top-management for 
CVC activities (tentative hypothesis # 23). Further, the more the culture of 
a corporation reflects openness and curiosity for new technologies and 
technical know-how, the higher the willingness of a business unit to unlearn 
existent procedures (tentative hypothesis # 22a, # 22b). Unfortunately, the 
CVC managers themselves seem to be very limited in their ability to 
influence the openness that exists between the business unit and the CVC 
unit; this task falls back on the corporate top-management. 
(4) In conditions where organizational assimilation and subsequent retrieval of 
the knowledge occurs in an intense and repetitive manner (for example 
Grant, 1996). This theoretical suggestion supports different findings of this 
work. More in detail, the more there is social interaction11 between a CVC 
unit and business unit, the higher is the business units’ willingness to 
collaborate with the CVC unit (or the start-up company) in order to 
assimilate new knowledge (tentative hypotheses # 10a and # 10b). 
Moreover, the aspect of intense and repetitive manner is also consistent 
with tentative hypotheses # 9a and # 9b, in that the longer a CVC unit 
operates within an organization, the higher their effectiveness in 
collaborating with the business units is. Another advantage of an open 
corporate culture is its increased likelihood for repetitive and intense 
communication, and therefore the organizational assimilation and 
subsequent retrieval of knowledge (tentative hypothesis 22a). 
                                              
11 In this work I use three indicators of social interaction. ‘Frequency of interaction’, was 
adopted from Sapienza and Gupta (1994). ‘Closeness of the relationship’ and ‘Knowledge of 
investor’s people on personal level’, were adopted from Yli-Renko et al. (2001).  
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Summarizing the theoretical discussion shows that inside and outside sources of 
knowledge are critical to organizational learning, to the development of a firm’s 
competencies, and the innovation process (von Hippel, 1988). Further, we learnt 
under what conditions the generation of knowledge is maximized. But even more 
important is the question, how does the theory help us to understand how these 
different “knowledge-repositories” within a corporation are connected? In order 
to avoid a “search-transfer problem” of intraorganizational knowledge, social 
interaction is a key driver of organizational learning according to empirical 
research (Nahpiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Yli-Renko et 
al. 2001). Through a high level of interaction, knowledge and ideas are shared, 
and common meanings are developed. Brown and Duguid (1991) stress the role 
of “communities of practice” in providing common structure and meaning for the 
transfer of knowledge and experience. Confronting this theoretical discussion 
with my findings shows that this is capable in explaining the tentative hypothesis 
# 10b. Further, the higher the overall social communication between a CVC unit 
and the business unit was, the more knowledge was exchanged between both, 
resulting in a better intraorganizational collaboration (tentative hypothesis # 13).  
While empirical studies showed that intraorganizational relationships are viewed 
as essential for learning processes (for example, Spender, 1992; Doz and Shuen, 
1995), the remaining question becomes what types of learning take place in 
relationships? According to Doz and Shuen (1995), intraorganizational relation-
ships are fundamental for five types of learning: (1) environmental, (2) task, (3) 
process, (4) skill, and (5) goal learning. To what extent are these findings 
applicable to this study? 
Indeed, the collaboration between the CVC unit and the business unit reflects all 
five learning types. In terms of environmental learning this study shows that the 
business units often have problems in understanding and adapting the 
environmental circumstances of the CVC investments and the start-up area 
concerning their way of thinking. Especially, overall in the very beginning of the 
existence of a CVC program this was reported as being problematic. However, 
the longer the CVC unit was in place (tentative hypotheses # 9a and # 9b), and 
the more the CVC managers have formerly worked in other business units of the 
company (tentative hypothesis # 7a), the easier was the process of bringing these 
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“different environments” (see Intel interview) of business unit-style and CVC/start-
up style together.  
Also, task and process learning are transferable to this study. A reasonable belief, 
why the CVC unit sometimes has to wait an unacceptable time for business unit 
feedback, could be that the business units do not really understand the process of 
CVC investing as something that requires fast decisions by the CVC managers. The 
interviews show that the more a CVC unit followed a well-structured investment 
process, including structural imperative tasks a business unit has to deliver, the 
easier was the collaboration since it supports that the business unit learns about their 
tasks and the investment process (tentative hypothesis # 17).  
In contrast to that, the aspect of skill learning is only very limited applicable to this 
study, since the collaboration of the CVC unit and the business unit does not aim at 
learning the technical skills of each other. Quite in contrast, the interviews show a 
clear separation in financial-aspects, representing the skill area and responsibility of 
the CVC manager, and in product-aspects, which is the skill domain and 
responsibility of the business unit.  
However, especially the learning type of each other's goal characterizes best the 
kind of learning the CVC unit and the business unit undergo in their collaboration 
process. The case descriptions provided evidence that the business unit not lacks 
understanding the overall CVC objectives. At the same time the collaboration 
process requires that the CVC managers need to consider and understand that the 
primary goal of a business unit is not related to any CVC activities. I found that the 
more the CVC managers show organizational experience through their previous 
work in other operational units of the corporation, the better they were able to 
‘smooth’ the collaboration process. The more the CVC managers maintained other 
positions in the corporations, the more knowledge has been accumulated about the 
corporation’s decision-makers, processes, and existent goals within the business 
units. This underpins the important role of the investment manager in increasing the 
willingness of a business unit to collaborate (tentative hypotheses # 7b and # 7c). 
Further, the process of goal-learning is facilitated the more the CVC unit follows 
strategic goals that provide the business units with strategic relevant information for 
current operational areas (tentative hypothesis # 1a). 
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However, Doz and Shuen’s (1995) findings implicitly assume that the new 
knowledge, the “window on technology”, is transferred to and diffused in the 
business units. There are only few studies that explicitly provide hints about the 
mechanisms and processes through which learning takes place. The diffusion of 
knowledge within organizations has been explored as a critical element that 
defines the level of learning (Levitt and March, 1988). Since the business units’ 
knowledge required by the CVC unit differs with each investment and due to the 
fact that the required knowledge is also very specific to a certain employee, the 
conversion of tacit into explicit knowledge mentioned by Nonaka (1994) by 
simply codifying it in a database is not applicable to this study. This difficulty 
may explain why GE Equity was the only company that actively refers to a 
“CVC database” that includes all information about past investments. 
Nevertheless, the more supportive infrastructure (e.g. in the form of a database) 
exists, the higher is the CVC unit’s capability to collaborate along the investment 
process (tentative hypotheses # 12a, # 12b). 
But, even more important for this study is the reference in the theory concerning 
factors that influence the transfer of knowledge. Although much of the literature 
has examined this aspect in the context of interorganizational boundaries, they 
are also applicable to the intraorganizational perspective of this study. One major 
hurdle in knowledge transfer is the “stickiness of knowledge”, which is rooted in 
the subsequently presented characteristics of the transfer situation (Szulanski, 
1995):  
(1) The knowledge source is reluctant to share crucial knowledge for fear of 
losing ownership, a position of privilege, or of not being adequately 
rewarded for sharing hard-won success.  
(2) The source of knowledge is not perceived as trustworthy or knowledgeable 
(Arrow, 1971). 
(3) The lack of motivation of a recipient to accept knowledge from an external 
source and to engage in activities to utilize the knowledge. 
(4) The lack of prior related knowledge to exploit outside sources of 
technology. The stock of prior related knowledge determines the 
“absorptive capacity” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  
(5) The lack of “retentive capacity”, that is the maintenance of new knowledge 
by extending its full use (Glaser et al., 1983).  
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(6) A ‘barren’ organizational context due to formal structure and systems, 
sources of coordination and expertise and behavior framing attributes of the 
organizational context. 
(7) Finally, an arduous relationship between the source and the recipient of the 
information.  
To what extent are these results applicable to the explanation of the findings of 
this thesis? Since the case descriptions showed that the majority of required 
knowledge by a CVC unit along the investment process extends from the 
business units (i.e. information about internal deal possibilities, results about the 
due diligence, etc.), I refer to the business units as the source of information and 
the CVC unit as the recipient. The first mentioned characteristic of the transfer 
situation, the (1) fear of losing ownership or position of privilege on the side of 
the business unit, explains why business units are often not willing to transfer the 
knowledge in the expected way. The business unit fears that the knowledge about 
a new technology could threaten the existence of their current operations. 
Furthermore, this theoretical insight illuminates why a higher exposure of a CVC 
unit to invest in substitutive technologies is related with less willingness of a 
business unit to collaborate (tentative hypotheses # 6a).  
(2) In order to make a valid statement regarding the aspect of trust, first we need 
to clarify what trust means. Morgan and Hunt (1994) conceptualized trust as 
existing when one party has confidence in an exchange partner’s reliability and 
integrity. This definition of trust is consistent with the findings of this study, in 
the sense that the more the CVC unit and the business units mutually trust each 
other, the more likely an exchange of specific know-how between the CVC unit 
(including the portfolio firms) and the business units is (hypotheses # 16a). Trust 
is an important issue both when the CVC unit transfers the business plans to the 
business units for doing a technical due diligence, as well as when the business 
units transfers “their” technical know-how to the CVC unit. However, since the 
corporations do not have any “non-disclosure agreements” for the knowledge 
exchange between the business unit and the CVC, it is not reasonable to believe 
that lack of trust characterizes the relationship between the business unit and the 
CVC unit. At the same time it is important to mention that although formal 
control mechanisms become less important by trust, in no way it becomes 
dispensable (tentative hypothesis # 16b).  
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(3) The lack of motivation by a business unit for CVC activities seems to 
represent one of the biggest problems a CVC program has to overcome, since 
often the business units are not compensated appropriately for their effort related 
to a knowledge transfer. One reason for the limited motivation seems to be 
related to limited incentive systems (tentative hypothesis # 21a). These weak 
incentives have to be overcome by the transfer of more incentives to a business 
unit: either by providing the business unit with more strategically relevant 
information (tentative hypothesis # 21c), by financial returns that go to the 
business unit (tentative hypothesis # 21b), or by an intensified involvement of 
business units in the advisory boards of portfolio firms (tentative hypothesis # 
21d). 
(4) The characteristic of prior related knowledge of the theory is partly consistent 
with the view of my model. While the theories’ assumption is applicable 
regarding complementary deals, it is not transferable regarding substitutive 
investments (tentative hypothesis # 6d). While complementary deals are 
eventually situated in industry areas distant from the organizations’ core, 
substitutive deals are supposed to range in areas very close to the core activities 
of the corporation, followed by an increased capability of the business units to 
collaborate (tentative hypothesis # 6d).  
(5) Interestingly, in the context of lack of retentive capacity the case studies draw 
a different picture. Quite in contrast, the interviews showed that the CVC unit is 
able quite well to use the information they received from the business units in 
order to proceed the investment process. 
(6) In turn, the component of a barren organizational context is consistent with 
the view of this study. In addition, I argue that the more the CVC unit is 
structurally positioned as a core activity of a corporation with low levels of 
hierarchy and authority, the higher the willingness of the business units to 
transfer knowledge (hypothesis # 3).  
(7) The final consistency with the results of this work emerges regarding an 
arduous relationship that might hinder the knowledge transfer. Again, the better 
the personal relationships between the investment managers and the business unit 
people are, the higher the amount of knowledge exchange (tentative hypothesis # 
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13), and hence, the higher the collaboration willingness of a business unit is 
(tentative hypothesis  # 14). 
Taken together, these and other studies of knowledge transfer (Simonin, 1997; 
Capron, 1999) indicated that knowledge transfer is affected by knowledge 
characteristics and by the relationship between the business unit (sender) and the 
CVC unit (recipient). Especially in the intraorganizational context, the tacitness 
(Inkpen and Dinur, 1998), complexity, and ambiguity of knowledge (Simonin, 
1999) reduce knowledge transfer between the CVC unit and the business unit. 
However, transferring knowledge is in no way an efficient approach in 
integrating knowledge. Therefore, the issue of knowledge integration will be 
analyzed subsequently. 
The theory that views the firm’s primary task as integrating the specialized 
knowledge of the multiple individuals suggests that even with goal congruence, 
achieving effective coordination can be problematic (Hill, 1994). However, there 
is a strong need to coordinate the cooperation of otherwise independent divisions 
so that sills and knowledge can be transferred and shared (Hill, 1994). Bringing 
the assumption of goal congruence together with my study’s findings shows that 
there is a strong relationship between CVC units’ and business units’ goal 
congruence in strategically oriented investments and the willingness of the 
business unit to collaborate. Therefore, this component of the knowledge-based 
view is consistent with tentative hypothesis # 1a. However, similarity in goals is 
a necessity but not a sufficient condition for a successful coordination of the 
CVC unit and the business unit. To what extent are theoretical implications 
helpful concerning knowledge integration? Grant (1996) points to four 
coordination mechanisms for integrating specialized knowledge:  
(1) Rules and directives: These ‘impersonal’ approaches to coordination 
involve ‘plans, schedules, forecasts, rules, policies and procedures, and 
standardized information system’ (Van de Ven et al., 1976). As recognized 
by Demetz (1991:164) direction is a “low cost method of communication 
between specialists and the large number of persons who are specialists in 
other fields.” Such rules and directives are seen to provide a means by 
which tacit knowledge can be converted into readily comprehensible 
explicit knowledge (Grant, 1996). 
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(2) Sequencing: In the literature ‘sequencing’ is seen as probably the simplest 
means by which individuals can integrate their specialist knowledge while 
minimizing communication and continuous coordination is to organize 
activities in a time-patterned sequence, such that each specialist’s input 
occurs independently (Nonaka, 1994; Thompson, 1967).   
(3) Routines: While these ‘relatively complex pattern of behavior’ (Winter, 
1986:181) can be interpreted as simple sequences, their interesting feature 
is seen as their ability to support complex patterns of interaction between 
individuals in the absence of rules, directives, or even significant verbal 
communication (Grant, 1991). 
(4) Group problem solving and decision making: While all of the above 
mentioned mechanisms seek efficiency of knowledge integration through 
avoiding costs of communication, some tasks require more personal and 
communication-intensive forms of integration (Galbraith, 1973; Grant, 
1991). Reliance upon high-interaction, non-standardized coordination 
mechanisms increases with task complexity (Perrow, 1967) and task 
uncertainty (Galbraith, 1973; Van de Ven et al., 1976).  
Generally, the knowledge-based view recognizes high costs of consensus 
decisions given the difficulties of communicating tacit knowledge. Hence, 
efficiency in organizations tends to be associated with maximizing the use of 
rules, routines and other integration mechanisms that economize on 
communication and knowledge-transfer. Problem solving and decision-making 
by teams is reserved to unusual, complex and important tasks (Grant, 1996). 
Having these insights about knowledge integration, the crucial question is: to 
what extent is this consistent or contradictory to the results of this study? 
Undoubtedly, the arising tasks in the collaboration between the CVC unit and the 
business unit can be characterized as ‘unusual, complex and important tasks’ 
(Grant, 1996). Interestingly, the findings of this theory correspond only partly to 
what I found. Regarding the collaboration process between the CVC unit and the 
business unit, rules and directives are only applicable to the extent that the 
involvement of a business unit follows defined structural imperatives along the 
investment process (tentative hypothesis # 17). These knowledge integration 
mechanisms are more relevant for the investment standards of the CVC unit and 
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 its reporting instructions to corporate top-management. Putting aside the 
‘collaboration agreements’ and ‘control reports’ that are partly used, the 
relationship between the CVC unit and the business unit is predominately 
managed by informal governance mechanisms, such as trust or personal 
relationships (tentative hypotheses # 16a, # 16b). 
Similarly, sequencing does not represent a helpful possibility in organizing the 
relationship of interest in this work. Since, already by definition it minimizes any 
communication between two actors, it would be directly opposed to increasing 
the recognized low level of communication between the CVC unit and the 
business unit (tentative hypothesis # 10a). 
Somewhat more appropriate in explaining the collaboration between the CVC 
unit and the business unit are routines, since they support complex pattern of 
interaction between the involved actors. Regular meetings, internal fairs, or 
routines in the investment process that take place between the CVC unit and the 
business unit are often apparent in the case descriptions. These mechanisms are 
found to be useful concerning the knowledge integration between the CVC unit 
and the business unit (tentative hypothesis # 10b). 
Almost absent in this work is group decision making, since the business units are 
generally not part of the investment committee, executing and responsible for the 
final investment decision. However, I found that a more frequent involvement of 
business units on a decision-making level leverages the integration of knowledge 
and the willingness of business unit to collaborate (tentative hypotheses  # 19a, # 
19b).  
Overall, these theoretical suggestions appear to represent important ways to 
overcome the challenges of knowledge integration created by the existence of 
different knowledge and different modes of knowing. In this sense, the 
mentioned mechanisms have enormous power to improve and impede knowledge 
integration (Pettigrew et al., 2001). Since all mentioned mechanisms for 
knowledge integration are necessitated by the differentiation of individuals’ 
stocks of knowledge, all depend upon a common way to express knowledge for 
their operation. The importance of a common knowledge is that it permits  
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individuals to share and integrate aspects of knowledge which are not common 
between them (Grant, 1996).  
In the knowledge-based theory, different types of common knowledge fulfill 
different roles in knowledge integration. First, a common language is 
fundamental to integration mechanisms that rely on verbal communication 
between individuals. Second, all forms of symbolic communication, and 
familiarity with the same databases enhance the efficiency and intensity of 
communication-based knowledge integration. Third, the level of sophistication 
that communication-based modes of knowledge integration achieve depends 
upon the extent of commonality in their specialized knowledge. Fourth, tacit 
knowledge can be communicated through the establishment of shared 
understandings, like common cognition schema, metaphor and analogy between 
individuals (Spender, 1989; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). Finally, shared 
understanding facilitates coordinated activity, but effective knowledge 
integration requires each individual being aware of everyone else’s knowledge 
domains (Thompson, 1967).  
Summarizing the purpose of knowledge integration, the organizational learning 
literature claims the higher the level and sophistication of common knowledge 
among the involved actors, the higher is the level of knowledge integration by 
more efficient communication. In the case that a CVC unit focuses on similar or 
even substitutive technologies regarding the current business unit activities, the 
theoretical requirement of a common language base is given (tentative 
hypotheses # 6c, # 6d). Regarding other forms of symbolic communication, the 
suggested use of common databases is congruent with the findings of this work. 
The more supportive infrastructure exist that the business unit and the CVC unit 
refer to (e.g. common deal-flow database), the more efficient is the collaboration 
(tentative hypotheses  # 12a, # 12b). However, in the context of the commonality 
of specialized knowledge, this work draws a different picture. Instead of striving 
for a basic commonality of specialized knowledge of the business unit and the 
CVC unit, quite in contrast, the actors aim at evading this necessity by the 
definition of technically separated responsibilities along the investment process 
(tentative hypotheses # 19a-19e). Moreover, the shared understanding among the 
business units of CVC activities as a useful “tool” for the corporation’s economic 
success is positively related with the willingness of a business unit to transfer 
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knowledge (tentative hypotheses # 22b, # 22b). The maintenance and diffusion 
of shared understandings falls back to the top-management and their commitment 
showed for CVC activities (tentative hypothesis # 23). However, the 
communication-based modes of knowledge transfer are more helpful than just a 
supportive corporate culture in bringing the business units’ knowledge to the 
CVC unit and vice versa. A higher number of common interaction platforms 
between the investment managers and the business units, e.g. team-based 
meetings, allow to be aware of everyone else’s knowledge domain (tentative 
hypotheses # 10a, # 10b). In order to give an overview on the numerous concepts 
discussed related to the knowledge-based theory, the following table 3-3 
summarizes the mentioned dimensions, discussed variables and parameters, as 
well as its authors.    
Table 3-3: Dimensions, variables and authors of discussed knowledge concepts 
• Rules and directives
• Sequencing
• Routines
• Group solving, decision making
• Source of knowledge is reluctant
• Source of knowledge is not trustworthy
• Lack of motivation
• Lack of prior related knowledge
• Lack of retentive capacity
• Barren organizational context
• Arduous relationship between source and recipient
• Environmental
• Task 
• Process
• Skill
• Goal
• Close to the domain of existing knowledge
• Existing routines
• Unlearning of old knowledge
• Intensive, repetitive manner
• Recognize the value of information
• To assimilate the information
• To apply knowledge to commercial ends
• Exploitation
• Exploration
Discussed Parameters and Variables
• Grant (1996)
• Demetz (1991)
• Van de Ven (1976)
Mechanisms to integrate 
knowledge
• Szulanski (1995)
• Arrow (1971)
• Cohen and Levinthal (1990)
• Glaser, Abelson and Garrison (1983)
Characteristics of the 
transfer situation
• Doz and Shuen (1995)Types of learning
• Autio, Sapienza and  Almeida (2000)
• Cohen and Levinthal (1990)
• Nonaka (1994), Grant (1996)
Factors that maximize the 
generation of knowledge
• Chohen and Levinthal (1990)
• Lane and Lubatkin (1998)
„Absorptive capacity“
• Cohen an Levinthal (1990)
• Levinthal and March (1993) 
Modes of learning
Proposed byDimension
 
Before concluding this section, shortcomings of the knowledge-based view are 
discussed in order to be in line with the above mentioned chapter outline. One 
substantial deficit is that this theory gives no recommendations on how the actual 
learning process between the CVC unit and the business unit should take place. 
Further, it is difficult to measure any learning processes in a business unit, 
although this would be necessary for a better understanding of the incentives of a 
business unit. Moreover, while the knowledge-based view conceptualizes  
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knowledge as a resource that can be acquired, transferred, or integrated in order 
to achieve sustained competitive advantage (Eisenhardt and Santos, 2000), the 
cases showed that the business units often fail to understand that their special 
knowledge represents a major source of useful information for the CVC unit. 
Further, another assumption of the theory is that a business unit is aware of the 
positive effects of transferring knowledge in order to learn. Unfortunately, since 
the CVC needs information from operational places that are distributed along 
very diversified activities and often possessed by “egoistic” individuals, the 
realization of the supposed competitive advantage hide more barriers to 
overcome than assumed by the theory. Thus, corporate top management has to 
focus on removing obstacles of the collaboration between the CVC unit and the 
business unit, and providing appropriate incentives.  
A further drawback is, that even the scholars of the knowledge-based view seem 
to be divided in two main streams. One stream argues that relationships in terms 
of learning are always beneficial for the business units. Cohen and Levinthal 
(1990) argued that firms get locked out of certain types of knowledge if they do 
not acquire it early on. However, in developing their “competency traps”, they 
are limited to the pursuit of a narrow set of opportunities suited to existing 
competencies. This aspect is consistent to the analysis of the business units’ 
attitude towards CVC. Indeed, the business units are very focused on their 
“competency traps”, which are given by their operational daily business. 
However, favoring “competency traps” may impede a successful collaboration 
between the business unit and the CVC unit. Business units often rejected the 
learning of new business strategies since it was found to be something that could 
threaten the current strategy of the business unit. Moreover, business units seem 
to be afraid of a loss of “their” proprietary knowledge by a transfer to the CVC 
unit, or later in the post-investment, by an exchange with a portfolio firm. 
Therefore, Cohen and Levinthals’ (1990) suggestion supports tentative 
hypothesis # 6a, independently of the higher business units’ capability to 
collaborate due to similar technologies (tentative hypothesis # 6c). Interpreting 
the loss of proprietary knowledge as a “negative” strategic incentive for a 
business unit to collaborate, these theoretical insights further support tentative 
hypothesis # 21c. Therefore, my findings follow another stream of learning 
theory that showed “path dependency” represents a constraining effect of the  
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firm’s knowledge base (for example Kogut and Zander, 1996).  The interviews 
showed since the business units are very “path dependent”, the collaboration 
effort of the CVC unit sometimes fails or even is rejected. Insofar, the CVC 
either could go the easy way by focusing on investments very close to the 
“competency traps” of the business units, or could invest in very competitive 
technologies away business units’ path in order to learn new technologies that are 
important for the survival of the corporation as a whole in the long term.  
Resulting from the discussion above, the analyzed relationship between on the 
one hand similarity and complementarity of investments and on the other hand 
willingness and ability to collaborate, is summarized figure 3-4. The right hand 
side of this figure shows that while knowledge similarity steadily increases the 
ability of a business unit to collaborate, the willingness of a business unit shows 
the form of a parabola. While too less similarity impedes a common language in 
order to exchange knowledge, too much similarity does not allow that a business 
unit learns new knowledge. On the left hand side, the best collaboration 
willingness represent investments that incorporate medium similarity to existing 
business unit technologies. The pay-off for business units is maximized when the 
deals show a high complementary technology. 
Figure 3-4: Relationship between on the one hand similarity/complementarity of 
investments and on the other hand willingness/ability to collaborate 
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In summary, knowledge-based view has offered explanations for some patterns 
observed in the case study chapter. Explanatory power concerns the 
recommendations about complementary and similar investments. While the 
consideration of the aspects complementarity and similarity concerning the 
selected portfolio firms were shown to be mainly useful in forecasting the 
resulting capability of a business unit to collaborate, it partly neglects the 
willingness of business unit to collaborate. It has been shown that it is less the 
involvement of business units in the investment process per se, rather the 
effective choice of a CVC unit when selecting investment companies in the pre-
investment phase. However, in order to achieve an efficient selection of 
companies, the business units already should be involved in the investment 
process when deals are screened and selected. This is even more critical since the 
most important learning seems to take place directly between the portfolio firms 
and the business unit in the post-investment phase. In a sense, while the CVC 
unit has to realize the most appropriate “connection” between the business unit 
and the portfolio companies, the CVC unit is not directly involved regarding the 
learning and knowledge exchange that takes place between the portfolio firms 
and the business unit. In the actual process of learning, the CVC unit only 
represents a “moderator” between the two actors: the business unit and the 
portfolio firms.  
Concluding, it has been shown along the discussion of the resource-based theory 
and the knowledge-based theory that it is less important for a CVC unit to know 
“what” and “how”, than it is to know “who” they have to bring together. Due to 
the fact that the required knowledge is maintained by individuals in the context 
of CVC activities, the interesting question for the CVC companies becomes how 
to link and connect the CVC managers with the business unit. As many scholars 
have argued, networks of intraorganizational linkages are effective for 
exchanging resources by intraorganizational collaboration (e.g. Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal, 1998; Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 1991; Hansen, 1999; Powell, 1990). In 
the search for explanations that appear more appropriate, the subsequent section 
confronts exchange related theories with the case findings. This discussion will 
include some aspects about social capital theory (chapter 3.3.1) and network 
theory (chapter 3.3.2), since these theories are important for exchange 
relationships. 
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3.3 Confronting exchange-related theories about relationships with the 
case findings 
Since not all required resources are given within one business unit and the 
efficient creation of value requires joint action between different organizational 
parts within a firm, exchange-related theories about relationships need to be 
analyzed. Here, social capital- and network theory give insights into relationships 
for the effective exchange. The field of exchange related-theories is extremely 
heterogeneous. It is characterized by methodological and conceptual diversity 
that, on the one hand, adds to the richness and breadth of the field, yet on the 
other hand, indicates the absence of a common theoretical base. 
3.3.1 Social Capital Theory 
The development of the social capital framework builds on ideas introduced by 
social exchange theorists (for example, Homans, 1961; Blau, 1964; Jacobs, 1965; 
Putnam, 1995), who emphasized the social relationships between actors engaging 
in transactions, and drew on Granovetter’s (1985) work on the “social 
embeddedness of economic action.” Later, Coleman (1988:98) introduced and 
developed the social capital framework in modern sociology, and defined social 
capital as “a variety of different entities, which consists of some aspect of social 
structures, and facilitates certain actions of actors within the structure… social 
capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its 
absence would not be possible.” More recently the concept has been applied in 
organizational studies, where it has been used in connection with the social 
context of organizations and inter- and intraorganizational relationships (for 
example, Burt, 1992; Leana and Van Buren, 1999; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; 
Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998). In order to differentiate social capital from human 
capital, simplistically, social capital can be characterized as “who you know”, 
while human capital represents “what you know.” The importance of social 
capital in the context of this work was illustrated in the case description, since it 
is important for a CVC manager to bring the decisive persons together to one 
table. 
What reflects social capital? The central proposition in the social capital 
literature is that networks of relationships constitute or lead to resources that can 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION  
 
258
be used for the good of the individual or the collective. The concept of social 
capital reflects the idea that knowledge is embedded in a social context, and that 
knowledge is created through ongoing relationships among entities. Social 
capital theory suggests that networks of strong, personal relationships may lead 
to the development of trust, cooperation, and collective action (Burt, 1992). The 
pattern of the relationships are the basis for social capital. Bourdieu and 
Wacquant (1992:119) developed a definition of social capital as “the sum of 
resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or group by virtue of 
possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of 
mutual acquaintance and recognition.” This definition focuses on benefits that 
can be achieved by participating in social networks and on deliberate 
construction of social relationships for the purpose of achieving these benefits. In 
the work of Bourdieu (1985) and Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), the social 
relationships that allow individuals or groups to claim access to resources are 
distinguished from the amount and quality of these resources. The distinction 
between the physical resources and social capital that provide access to those 
resources is important for understanding social capital (Galunic and Moran, 
2000; Portes, 1998).  
The relationships themselves providing access to the physical resources can be 
considered as a higher-order resource (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998) for the 
individual or organization, hence the label social capital. Nahapiet and Ghoshal 
(1998) argued that social capital may lead to knowledge creation through the 
combination and exchange of knowledge, skills and capabilities between entities. 
These authors defined social capital as “the sum of the actual and potential 
resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of 
relationships possessed by an individual or social unit” (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 
1998: 243). As social capital is embedded within relationships of individuals, 
resources become available through contacts among individuals. Two main ideas 
have been provided regarding the beneficial effect of social capital (Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998). First, social capital may enhance the efficiency of an exchange 
or decrease the exchange cost because less monitoring is needed in trustful 
relationships. Second, social capital may stimulate the learning and creation of 
new ideas through the enhanced level of cooperation between exchange partners. 
In a similar vein, Leana and Van Buren (1999) define “organizational social 
capital” as a resource reflecting the character of social relations within the 
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organization, and distinguish between the two elements, i.e. associability and 
trust. First, associability is defined as the willingness and ability of individuals in 
an organization to subordinate individual goals and associated actions to 
collective goals and actions. Second, trust consists of dyadic/generalized12 trust 
and fragile and resilient13 trust. Resulting from this overview about existent 
definitions of social capital in the literature, this study considers social capital as 
a mediating factor that facilitate the availability of resources and knowledge 
transfer. 
After having defined the term social capital, subsequently I will represent the 
main variables of social capital. Social capital is a multidimensional concept 
(Granovetter, 1985; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Tsai and Ghoshal 1998; Yli-
Renko et al. 2001). Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) defined three interrelated 
dimensions of social capital: the structural, the relational, and the cognitive 
dimension. The relational dimension of social capital describes personal 
relationships that develop among people through a history of exchanges 
(Granovetter, 1992). This dimension focuses on the particular relations 
individuals have and the impact of these relations on their behavior. The main 
components of the relational dimension are trust14 (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 
1993), norms, obligations, and identification (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1990; 
Granovetter, 1985). The structural dimension of social capital refers to the 
overall pattern of connections between individuals (Burt, 1992). This dimension 
reflects the presence of strong social ties between individuals (Scott, 1991), the 
network configuration and appropriate organization in describing the pattern of 
linkages. The cognitive dimension of social capital refers to the presence of 
shared representations, interpretations, and systems of meaning among parties 
                                              
12 While fragile (also referred to as instrumental or transacting) trust is based on perceptions of 
the immediate likelihood of rewards, is resilient (also referred to as relational, deep, 
knowledge-or identification) trust based on stronger and more numerous links between 
organizations and its members. 
13 While dyadic trusts represents trust between two parties which have direct knowledge of each 
other, is generalized trust based on norms and behaviors that are generalized to others in a the 
social unit as a whole. 
14 Trust was found to be a central governance mechanism in the social relationships between 
organizations (i.e. Uzzi, 1997; Larson, 1992). In this context, trust can be defined as “the 
confidence in another’s goodwill” (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992). For an extensive review on 
trust, see Rousseau et al. (1998). 
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(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). It is argued that each of these dimensions 
influence resource exchange and development through various mechanisms, such 
as giving parties access for combining and exchanging resources, the anticipation 
of value through resource combination and exchange, the motivation to combine 
or exchange knowledge, or the capability to combine resources. 
In empirical research, social capital has been applied in various levels of analysis 
including the relationships of individuals (Galunic and Moran, 2000; Higgins and 
Gulati, 2001), teams (Hansen et al., 1999; Reagans and Zuckermann, 2001), 
projects (Hansen, 1999), organizational units (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998; Tsai, 
2000, 2001), firms (Stuart et al. 1999; Stuart, 2000), single dyadic relationships 
(Mohr and Spekman, 1994; Yli-Renko et al. 2001), networks (Uzzi, 1997; 
Walker et al. 1997), and firm-market interfaces (Baker, 1990). Focusing on the 
relational qualities, Yli-Renko et al. (2001) found that social capital enhances 
knowledge acquisition by improving access to external sources of knowledge, by 
increasing the willingness and ability of exchange partner to identify, exchange, 
and assimilate knowledge, and by improving the breadth and efficiency of 
knowledge transfer. Recent research has acknowledged that social capital also 
represents costs, and that the value of social capital is contingent on whether the 
benefits exceed the costs15 (Leana and Van Buren, 1999, Hansen et al. 1999; 
Higgins and Gulati, 2001). 
But there is very little research that has explicitly explained the link between 
organizational learning and social capital in the context of intraorganizational 
relationships. Whereas Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) focused on the role of 
social capital between organizations, in this study social capital is examined in an 
intraorganizational context. However, since social capital also has been applied 
to various intraorganizational levels of analysis (for example, Tsai and Ghoshal, 
1998; Tsai, 2000, 2001), it can be assumed that the social capital framework is 
applicable for the intraorganizational context of CVC in this work as well. To 
what extent are the theoretical findings congruent with the results of this study? 
For answering this question, subsequently I will confront the suggestions of 
                                              
15 While benefits include commitment justification, work flexibility, collective organization, 
intellectual capital, costs could be maintenance costs, foregone innovation, institutionalized 
power (Leana and Van Buren, 1999). 
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Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) and of Tsai and Ghoshal (1998) in a summarized 
way with the findings of this work. The main findings of these authors about 
relationships are summarized in figure 3-5: 
Figure 3-5: Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s (1998) main findings in relationships 
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In the search for further explanations for this study, subsequently I compare the 
main relationships of the social capital theory along this sequence: (1) structural 
dimension, (2) cognitive dimension and (3) relational dimension. However, 
regarding the (1) structural dimension, the confrontation of Nahapiet and 
Ghoshals’ findings (1998) with the preliminary hypotheses of this work lead to a 
different picture. Besides acknowledging, that trust on the side of the business 
units positively influences their ‘motivation’, my study suggests that also the 
structural dimension of the CVC unit has impact on the business units’ 
‘motivation’ to collaborate and exchange resources. I observed that the more a 
CVC unit is structurally positioned as a core activity of the corporation, the 
higher the willingness of the business units to collaborate is (tentative hypothesis 
# 3). Also, the less the legal structure of a CVC unit (e.g. in the form of a 
‘Limited Liability Company’, LLC.) induces the image of the CVC unit as 
Corporate top-
management 
commitment 
- Involvement in  the 
  investment process  
- Kind of relationship 
- Length of  existence 
Analysed relations by Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) 
Additionally analysed relationships in this study   
Source: Author, based on Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998 
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somewhat separated from other business units, the higher the ‘motivation’ of the 
operational people to collaborate is and the easier is the ‘access’ to them is. 
Moreover, the higher the joint vision of CVC activities within a company as 
something important for the success of the overall corporation is, the higher is 
the motivation of a business unit to collaborate. The development of this 
common vision between a CVC unit and a business unit was found to be directly 
induced by a very strong focus in investments strategically related to the business 
unit activities (tentative hypothesis # 1a), and by the length of existence of the 
CVC program (tentative hypotheses # 9a, # 9b, # 9c). Indirectly, a common 
vision (cognitive level) was strongly supported by the commitment of the 
corporate top-management (tentative hypothesis # 23). The confrontation of 
social capital theory with this study shows that the theory fails in providing a 
deeper explanation of the relationship between the ‘anticipation of value’ 
possible through the business units’ collaboration and their ‘motivation’ to 
collaborate. In addition, this work shows that the higher the ‘anticipated value’ of 
a resource exchange by new technology insights is for a business unit, the higher 
is its ‘motivation’ to collaborate (tentative hypotheses # 14, # 21c). 
These issues aside, the theory’s finding that the (2) cognitive dimension, mainly 
the shared codes and language, influences positively the ‘capability to exchange’ 
resources is consistent with the findings of this work. Indeed, the more the CVC 
unit and the business unit are able to refer to a common (technological) language, 
the higher is the business units’ ‘capability’ to collaborate. The case description 
illustrated that the more a CVC unit invested in technologies that are close to a 
business unit activity, in the sense of similarity of a technology, the more 
common language developed between the CVC unit and the business unit 
(tentative hypothesis # 6d). Unfortunately, social capital theory fails in 
explaining the observed relationship between ‘shared language’ and the ‘access 
to parties’ to exchange resources. The cases demonstrate that the more a CVC 
unit focuses in their investment selection on companies using a similar (or even 
the same) technology as a business unit, the easier it is for the CVC unit to get 
‘access’ in a business unit, when acting as a moderator between the portfolio firm 
and the business unit (tentative hypothesis # 6e). In this sense, the more a 
portfolio company and the business units are able to apply a common language, 
the easier it is for a business unit to ‘anticipate the potential value’ that a 
portfolio firm could offer to the business unit. Therefore, when a CVC unit 
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determines their focused investment area, this aspect should be considered 
(tentative hypothesis # 6a). 
Regarding the (3) relational dimension of social capital, another similarity of the 
arguments of social capital theorists and the emerged results of this work has to 
be mentioned. This work also found a positive relationship between the aspect of 
trust and the ‘motivation’ (tentative hypothesis # 16a). The more a business unit 
employee has personal trust in a CVC manager, the easier it is for the CVC 
manager to get ‘access’ to the surrounding business unit of this employee. 
Moreover, in cases of trust, the attempt of a CVC manager to explain the 
‘anticipated potential value’ of an investment to a business unit tends to be more 
fruitful. However, one shortcoming of this relational dimension has to be 
mentioned. Following the existent interpretations in the theory about trust as an 
informal governance mechanism, Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) do not consider 
any interdependencies between informal and formal governance mechanisms. In 
this way, I found that the more trust exists between the CVC unit and the 
business units that, the less important are formal governance mechanisms, as for 
example collaboration and support agreements. But, it is important to mention 
that in the case of trust these formal mechanisms become in no way unnecessary; 
quite in contrast, they are still important to facilitate the collaboration. Moreover, 
while the case description shows that trust in the pre-investment phase is more 
important, formal governance mechanisms (e.g. collaboration agreements, 
control reports) are applied more in the post-investment phase (tentative 
hypothesis # 16b). 
The illustrations above showed the relationships between the three dimensions of 
social capital, and mentioned factors that influence the combination and 
exchange of resources. However, in this study I also found that at the same time 
there are important relationships among the dimensions of social capital. These 
aspects will be in the focus of the subsequent paragraph. In an intraorganizational 
setting Tsai and Ghoshal (1998) found a very strong relationship between their 
measures of shared vision (cognitive dimension) and trust (manifestation of its 
relational dimension). Moreover, the social interaction ties (structural dimension) 
positively influence trust. Somewhat different are the findings of this work. The 
case description shows that the relationship between the structural dimension and 
the relational dimension seems to be stronger than the relationship between the 
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cognitive dimension and the relational dimension proposed by Tsai and Ghoshal 
(1998). In this sense, the involvement of the business units in CVC activities 
based on structural imperatives along the investment process (e.g. mandatory 
business unit approval after due diligence process, existence of “sponsoring 
business unit”, etc.) seems to have stronger effects on the relational dimension 
than the relationship between the aspects ‘shared vision’ and ‘trust’ (tentative 
hypothesis # 17). Even more interestingly, this study shows that trust on the side 
of the business unit seems to develop by a concrete involvement in the 
investment process, coupled by positive CVC experiences, e.g. in the form of 
technological insights or an increase in sales or profit. But the confrontation of 
the theoretical views of Tsai and Ghoshal (1998) with the ones of this work 
shows an additional finding. The analysis of the collaboration process between 
the business unit and the CVC unit demonstrated reasonable belief that there is a 
relationship between the structural dimension and the cognitive dimension as 
well. Concretely speaking, the more a CVC unit is structurally embedded in a 
corporation close to the business units’ core activities, the more enhanced is the 
development of the shared visions between the CVC unit and the business units. 
Moreover, the more structural imperatives of a business unit along the 
investment process are required, the easier the development of shared visions, 
codes and languages is (tentative hypotheses # 19a, # 19b).  
In accordance with the outlined structure before finishing a chapter, subsequently 
a description of criticisms that social capital enfaced in the literature will be 
presented. The discussion will include a confrontation of the criticism with this 
study. The concept of social capital has been criticized for being merely a new 
label for processes that have been previously studied under different 
terminology. As Portes (1998:21) noted, “… social capital is just a means of 
presenting somewhat in a more appealing conceptual garb”. Portes (1998) also 
criticized the use of social capital as a collective label for a number of different 
and even contradictory processes. Consequently, Bourdieu’s (1985) distinction 
between social capital itself and the resources acquired through it should be 
clearly maintained (Portes, 1998). Leana and Van Buren (1999) pointed to the 
conflict of social capital’s focus on strong ties, while other studies emphasize 
weak ties in gaining access to resources (for example Granovetter, 1973). 
Consequently, in their framework they distinguish dyadic trust (typical for strong 
ties) and generalized trust (typical for weak ties). Further criticism includes the 
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ignorance of costs, time consumption, and potential negative consequences of 
social capital (for example Leana and Van Buren, 1999).  
This work supports the arguments of Leana and Van Buren (1999) in various 
ways. Indeed, I also found different kinds of ties between the CVC unit and the 
business unit. While the ties between the CVC manager and business units 
employees who already have been involved in CVC activities can be 
characterized as strong ties showing dyadic trust, the ties that CVC manager links 
to employees who are not yet involved yet are doubtlessly weak. Trust in the 
relationship between the CVC unit and the business units originate from an 
overall positive and productive reputation of the CVC unit among business unit 
employees. This image is rooted in the opinion of the business units referring to 
CVC as a useful “tool” that is important for the overall success of the corporation 
(tentative hypothesis # 3). Qualitative relationships incorporating dyadic trust 
between the CVC unit and the business units facilitate the collaboration between 
both actors (tentative hypotheses # 16a, # 16b). But dyadic trust is strongly time 
intensive. Concretely speaking, strong ties were developed by common 
interaction between the CVC managers and individuals of the business unit. 
Frequent meetings between the business units and the CVC unit increase the 
overall interaction between the both actors (tentative hypothesis # 10b). The 
longer a CVC unit exists in a corporation and the more a corporation tries to 
bring the CVC unit in contact with other operational departments, the higher the 
likelihood that qualitative relationships with dyadic trust will develop. Therefore 
tentative hypotheses # 9a and # 9b deliver additional insights to social capital 
theory. Nevertheless, this proposed distinction of trust is helpful to understand 
one facet of trust, which has not been considered so far in the developed 
framework of this study. In doing so, generalized trust is appropriate for 
understanding the factors that support the generation of internal deals by the 
business unit, whereas dyadic trust explains the basis of the direct collaboration 
between the CVC mangers and business unit employees, e.g. in asking for doing 
a due diligence or a post-investment service. 
In summary, the social capital theory has offered important explanations for this 
work. However, it failed in explaining additional patterns emerging from the 
cases. Social capital theory does not provide insights into how the CVC unit  
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achieves qualitative network relationships and shared languages through an 
appropriate network organization. The question of how trust can be enhanced 
between the CVC unit and business units still remains open. Moreover, the social 
capital theory failed in considering any effects between the ‘access’, 
‘anticipation’, ‘motivation’, and the ‘capability’ to exchange resources.  
Resulting, the question awaiting deeper analysis is: what drives the creation of 
social capital between the business unit and the CVC unit? Hite and Hesterly  
(2001) are among the few who have considered the economic motives driving the 
creation of social capital within companies through inter-firm networking. They 
demonstrated that the development from ‘identity-based networks’ of managers’ 
old contacts towards ‘calculative networks’ is driven by economic motives to 
acquire resources needed to expand the firm. However, these cursory findings are 
not sufficient in providing an explanation of the creation of intra-firm social 
capital for this work; especially the creation of social capital between two 
independent units in a firm. In contrast, the more numerous and better the 
informal networks of contacts are, the less important are “calculative networks”. 
But, at the same time, these findings pinpoint to a potential solution to overcome 
the shortcomings of social capital theory; this is the used terminology of 
“networks”.  
Indeed, the structure of a multiunit organization can be easily conceptualized as a 
network arrangement consisting of a set of relational ties linking together 
dispersed organizational units (e.g. Miles and Snow, 1986; Nohria and Eccles, 
1992; Nohria and Ghoshal, 1997). As already Huber (1991) has suggested, by 
linking different units together, a network arrangement provides a flexible 
learning structure that complements old hierarchical structures. Since a learning 
organization that is rich in social capital is characterized by motivated units 
which are intimately connected to one another, it is even more important to get 
insights in the dynamics of network linkages (Tsai, 2001). Therefore, chapter 
3.3.2 is devoted to the network theory.  
3.3.2 Network Theory 
The previous overview of corporate venturing (section 3.1) showed that formal 
and informal networks are essential in the context of parent-CVC unit 
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relationship for the success of CVC activities. In the chapter about access to 
resources (chapter 3.2) and the previous section about social capital (section 3.3.1), 
it was concluded that networks can be used to acquire resources, to learn and to 
gain legitimacy (see for example, Ostgaard and Birley, 1994; Liebeskind et al., 
1996). Moreover, knowledge-based theory showed that intraorganizational 
network linkages are a critical pre-requisite for organizational learning to take 
place.  Therefore, the question becomes what can we learn from the network theory 
in order optimize the intraorganizational collaboration processes? 
In the search for a useful definition of networks, Nohria (1992) maintained that all 
organizations are important in respect of their network designs and need to be 
addressed and analyzed as such. Following Lauman et al. (1978), networked 
designs consist of the interactions or relationships among interdependent 
contributors (or groups of contributors) who cooperate to achieve a purpose. A 
network can be viewed as consisting of nodes or positions (occupied by individuals 
or groups) and links or ties (manifested by interactions among the positions). 
According to the number, intensity, and type of interactions among members, 
networks may be tight or loose (Thorelli, 1986). Not all pairs of nodes are directly 
linked; and some are joined by multiple relationships (Tichy and Fombrun, 1979), 
and nodes and links change over time. Networked designs differ from other team 
structures in their lack of clear boundaries between the network and the rest of the 
organization. In contrast to other team structures, networks are not self-contained 
and membership is fluid and diffuse. Members cannot reliably identify the other 
members of the network and may be aware only of the participants with whom 
they have direct links. Work teams or project teams may comprise nodes of a 
network, but the network extends beyond team boundaries.  
Having these rudimentary definitions in mind, network analysis represents useful 
implications for the intra-organizational collaboration focus of this work between 
the CVC unit and the business units.16 Since the CVC unit and the business units 
have to perform complex network tasks and must adjust rapidly to changing 
market conditions, customer needs, and corporate needs, the relationship between 
                                              
16 The relationship to the external start-up companies is not in the focus of this work and is only 
touched upon if is seems to have significant influence or impacts on the intra-organizational 
relationships. 
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the CVC unit and the business unit can be conceptualized as a social network. 
Whereas social network research has provided many insights how structural and 
relational characteristics affect the outcome of a network (e.g. Burt, 1992; 
Walker et al. 1997), this work attempts to apply the network concepts that are 
most appropriate for different constellations throughout the investment process.     
In the search for deeper explanations of how to arrange and configure the 
network between the CVC unit and the business units the subsequent paragraphs 
attempts to provide theoretical insights into how the CVC unit can find the 
corporate resources and how to couple these resources through network links. 
While for the aspect of how to find network resources it can be reverted to the 
literature about crossing intra-firm organizational boundaries (e.g. Picot et al., 
1996), Tsai’s (2000) discussion of intraorganizational linkage formation is 
helpful for the analysis of the connecting process. These linkages are important, 
as the integration of pieces of the knowledge from different units constitutes the 
crucial organizational coordination need (Van de Ven et al., 1976; Hedlund, 
1994).  
The network concept is not confined to the intraorganizational sphere. However, 
looking closer at the characteristics of the intraorganizational context of this 
work delivers the proof of authority to use network theory in this study. Usually, 
the main distinction between inter-firm networks and intra-firm networks is the 
absence of a hierarchical structure in interorganizational contexts (Liebeskind et 
al., 1996). Given the focus of this work, this distinction is not given in the 
intraorganizational relationship between the CVC unit and business units: the 
CVC unit has no hierarchic authority over the business unit to enforce their 
collaboration. The underlying structure of the resource flow between 
nonhierarchical clusters of legally separate units can be characterized as a 
heterarchy (Alter and Hage, 1993; Miles and Snow, 1986).  Moreover, two 
interorganizational relationships (namely business unit to start up company and 
CVC unit to start-up companies) that surround the intraorganizational 
relationships between the CVC unit and the business units substantially affect the 
collaboration under focus of this work. 
Of particular interest for this work are the sociologically oriented network 
theorists who apply social network theory in order to treat the characteristics of  
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network ties (such as centrality, structural equivalence, and network structures) 
in social relationships.17 In this pursue, network theory offers a framework to 
analyze the pattern of linkages between the nodes from a structural- and a 
relational dimension (Burt, 1982; Granovetter, 1973, 1985; Powell, 1990). The 
stream of network scholars who agrees that economic patterns of interaction is 
embedded in a structural network of social relationships, focus on ‘network ties’, 
‘network configuration’, and ‘appropriable organization’ (e.g. Burt, 1992; 
Fukuyama, 1994). Researchers that focus on the relational dimension have 
emphasized either dependence or trust as the elements that facilitate a firm to 
obtain information from its partners, whereby the strength of a tie provide a basis 
of trust (e.g. Cook, 1977; Granovetter, 1992; Gulati, 1995).  
Following this group of researchers, economic institutions are socially 
constructed (Berger and Luckmann, 1966) and fundamentally influenced by the 
history and structures of personal relations and networks of such relations (Ben-
Porath, 1980). In order to reach collaborative network linkages, network theory 
distinguishes between formal, hierarchical structures (including centralization, 
formalization and specialization) on the one hand (Mintzberg, 1983), and 
informal structures (including trust in lateral relationships) on the other hand 
(Powell, 1990).  
In focusing on structural components of networks, network theory characterizes a 
network configuration by three properties: (1) density, (2) connectivity and (3) 
hierarchical position. In applying these characteristics of network ties, network 
theory maintains that the extent an actor benefits from its network depends on the 
degree to which network actors are linked to each other (e.g. strong/direct vs. 
weak/indirect), the number of direct and indirect ties a partner maintains within a 
network, and by the location of an actor (central vs. decentral). But, in the social 
network literature, there is a debate over the form of network structures that is 
optimal (Walker et al., 1997). Main part of these controversial findings goes back 
to the abovementioned distinction between the structural and the relational 
                                              
17 Besides sociologically oriented scholars that look at characteristics of ties there is also a group 
of authors who conceptualize networks as a new type of organizational coordination 
mechanisms, e.g. as a successor of the M-form organization (e.g. Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990, 
1995), or the N-form organization (e.g. Hedlund, 1994) for globalising firms (Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 1989).  
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE INTRA-ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION  
 
270
dimension. Moreover, even within the ‘structural school’ there are alternative 
structural approaches discussed. According to one view, densely embedded 
networks with many connections are facilitative, and social network structures 
are seen as advantageous to the extent that networks are “closed” (Coleman, 
1988). Specifically, network closure encourages the development and 
enforcement of shared norms (Coleman, 1988). These norms increase the 
predictability of behavior, reduce self-seeking opportunism, and encourage 
cooperation (Walker et al., 1997). 
According to an alternative view, however, social structural advantages derive 
from the brokerage opportunities created by an “open” network structure of 
autonomy (Burt, 1992). Burt introduced this idea with the theory of ‘structural 
holes’, which maintains that centrally located actors can build relationships with 
multiple disconnected clusters and use these connections to obtain information 
and control advantages over others (Burt, 1992). A structural hole indicates that 
the people on either side of the hole have access to different flows of 
information. Networks rich in structural holes imply access to mutually 
unconnected partners and, consequently, to many distinct information flows. 
Thus, maximizing ‘structural holes’ or minimizing redundancy between partners 
is an important aspect of constructing an efficient, information-rich network 
(Burt, 1992). In contrast to Burt’s network structure of autonomy which 
emphasizes benefits to the focal actor based on access to “…more rewarding 
opportunities” (Burt, 1992:13), Coleman’s notion of network closure provides 
access to information due to shared and enforced norms. While Brass and 
Burkhardt (1992) follow Burt’s point of view in investigating the link between 
centrality in social networks and power within organizations, a second group of 
authors argue that the position in a network as such does not play the main role. 
Rather the social relationships and the network as a whole should be considered 
(Bourdieu, 1985; Coleman, 1988).   
Burt (1992) suggests that these information benefits resulting from the network 
ties occur in three forms: access, timing, and referrals. While ‘access’ refers to 
receiving a valuable piece of information and know-how, ‘timing’ refers to the 
ability of personal contacts to provide information sooner than it becomes 
available to people without such contacts. ‘Referrals’ are those processes 
providing information on available opportunities to people or actors in the 
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network. Given that tacit knowledge and ambiguous knowledge have been 
shown to be more difficult to transfer over organizational boundaries, a stream of 
research has shown that strong ties and collaboration are positively related to the 
transfer of knowledge (Mowery et al., 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992). By 
conceptualizing equity joint ventures as strong ties, Mowery et al. (1996) found 
that strong ties were more likely to be used to transfer complex capabilities and 
knowledge than weak ties (i.e. contract-based alliances). 
Now, as we know the basic variables and the main streams of the network theory, 
the question becomes what are the advantages of networks over other 
organizational forms? Since the resources and knowledge required by the CVC 
unit is scattered along the firm, an intrafirm linkage represents an important 
channel of communication and information within the firm. The role of a 
network as an information channel and facilitator of knowledge exchange can be 
significant, since the network can (1) serve as an information-gathering device 
(Freeman, 1991), and (2) as an information-processing and screening device 
(Leonard-Barton, 1984). Several authors have tried to explain the variance in 
economic performance through the analysis of social networks (Burt, 1992; Uzzi, 
1996, Walker et al., 1997). In a few studies exploring network structure from the 
perspective of innovation generation (Shan et al., 1994; Podolny and Stuart, 
1995), it was found that the number of formed relationships is positively related 
to its innovation output. Liebeskind et al. (1996) support this work since they 
argue that social networks increase learning and flexibility in organizations. 
Knowing about the positive effects of network links, what is said in the literature 
about how the CVC unit could form new linkages to business units? This is even 
more important since the existent literature analyzed some difficulties when such 
linkages are created. Difficulties include (1) path-dependency of social relations 
in the sense that prior linkages determine the formation of future linkages (e.g. 
Gulati, 1995; Walker et al., 1997), and (2) the lack of information about the 
competencies and reliabilities of potential partners (Gulati, 1995). Focusing on 
the rate of new linkages created, Tsai’s work (2000) represents the only empirical 
work in the literature that analyzes how organizational units create new interunit 
linkages for resource exchanges. Results show that while the network centrality 
and trustworthiness of an organizational unit’s positively affects the formation of 
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intraorganizational linkages, strategic relatedness between two units positively 
moderates each of the relationships above.   
In applying the network theory in order to analyze the “search-transfer problem” 
of knowledge, Hansen (1999) applied two dimensions: weak vs. strong18 ties and 
tacit vs. explicit19 knowledge. He found that neither weak nor strong 
relationships between operating units lead to efficient sharing of knowledge 
among them. Weak or strong ties have their respective strengths and weakness in 
facilitating search for and transfer of useful knowledge. Findings show that weak 
ties allow search benefits for useful knowledge but impede the transfer of 
complex knowledge. Another finding of this study is, that having weak ties 
speeds up projects when knowledge is not complex but slows them down when 
the knowledge to be transferred is complex. In order to give an overview on the 
numerous concepts discussed related to the network theory, the following table 
summarizes the mentioned dimensions.   
Table 3-6: Dimensions, variables and authors of discussed network concept 
• Tsai (2000)• Centrality (positive influence)
• Trust (positive influence)
• Strategic relatedness (positive moderation)
Factors influencing the 
formation of 
network linkages
• Hansen (1999)• Weak vs. strong ties
• Tacit vs. explicit knowledge
Search-transfer problem
• Gulati (1995)
• Walker et al. (1997)
• Path-dependency of social relations
• Lack of information about the competencies and    
reliabilities
Difficulties concerning 
the formation 
of network linkages
• Information-gathering device
• Information-processing and screening device
• Surplus in economic performance
• Innovation generation
• Density: strong vs. weak
• Connectivity: direct vs. indirect
• Hierarchical position: central vs. decentral 
• Dependence
• Trust
• Network ties
• Network configuration
• Appropriable organization
• Centrality
• Structural equivalence
• Network structure
Discussed Parameters and Variables
• Freeman (1991)
• Leonard-Barton (1984)
• Burt (1992), Uzzi (1996)
• Podolny and Stuart (1995)
Advantages 
of network linkages
• Walker et al. (1997)
• Coleman (1988)
• Burt (1992) 
Network structure
• Cook (1977)
• Granovetter (1992)
Relational dimension of 
pattern of linkages
• Burt (1992)
• Fukuyama (1994) 
Structural dimension of 
pattern of linkages
• Berger and Luckmann, 1966
• Ben-Porath (1980)
Sociologically oriented 
network characteristics
Discussed byDimension of 
networks
 
                                              
18 Huber (1991) measures 'weak' ties as the average of the frequency and closeness scores.  
19 Huber (1991) operationalizes the degree to which knowledge was 'tacit or non-codified' with a 
three item scale that measured the extent to which the knowledge transferred from the source 
division to the receiving project team was not fully documented. 
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To what extent does network theory help to explain the results of this work? I first 
will confront the single aspects of network structure - density, connectivity and 
position - with what I found. Indeed, the cases showed that the personal networks 
of CVC managers positively influence their ‘access’ to business unit people. I 
found that due to the diversity of information a CVC manager needs concerning 
the investments, a higher number of network ties to multiple technical experts in 
various business units is more efficient in order to get the business units’ 
collaboration, since it increases the amount of transferred knowledge and therefore 
the willingness of a business unit to collaborate (tentative hypotheses # 13 and # 
14). Therefore, the findings of Jacob’s (1965) and Granovetter’s (1973) studies are 
consistent to explain the collaboration process between the CVC unit and the 
business unit. For these authors, “hop and skip” links and “loose ties” in 
information diffusion are more important because the creation of intellectual 
capital results from bringing together knowledge from disparate sources and 
disciplines. Since this study shows that the more a CVC manager maintains 
personal contacts and network ties, the higher is his ‘access’ to business unit 
people (tentative hypothesis # 13), this work stands in contrast to Burt (1992) who 
prefers few ties. Moreover, while I found that numerous and weak ties are useful in 
‘screening’ potential business units, few and strong ties become more important 
when the CVC manager has to rely on getting information back from the business 
unit. Therefore, the further an investment manager proceeds in the investment 
process, the more strong and few network ties facilitate the collaboration, while 
numerous and weak ties become less important.  
Insofar, the aspect of qualitative relationships supports Hansen’s study (1999) who 
found that weak ties facilitate the search for knowledge, but impede the transfer of 
critical insights (tentative hypothesis # 13). However, completely transferring 
Hansen’s (1999) theoretical insights to the context of my work would mean that 
the best scenario would represent weak ties and codified knowledge, since this 
promises search benefits and (only) few transfer problems (compared to non-
codified knowledge). While I acknowledge Hansen’s findings that weak and 
numerous ties for the CVC unit to their business units mean advantages in 
screening potentially interesting business units, the cases showed that one cannot 
assume that the knowledge required by the CVC unit is codified and independent 
as suggested by Hansen. Following Hansen’s (1999) framework, I argue that  
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CVC units are in better circumstances if they rely on strong ties since this 
scenario "moderates" knowledge-transfer problems (compared to "severe" 
knowledge transfer problems of weak ties). This work shows that strong and few 
ties have a stronger effect on the willingness of the business units to collaborate 
and transfer the business unit knowledge (tentative hypothesis # 14). 
To what extent corresponds the theoretical discussion pertaining to network 
centrality to the observations of this study? In fact, centrally positioned CVC 
units seem to have less problems in finding a corresponding relevant business 
unit that could be interesting for a portfolio firm. Examples for central CVC units 
would be Motorola Ventures, Intel Capital or DaimlerChrysler Venture. 
Doubtlessly, central CVC units have to undertake greater effort in finding the 
nurturing and technical support of a business unit in the post investment phase. 
At the same time, a central CVC unit increases the perception of a business unit 
to CVC as somewhat outside of a business units’ core. But the advantage of a 
central CVC unit is that CVC activities of a corporation are more independent 
from personal or organizational changes in business units. Further, central CVC 
units have also a better corporate wide overview regarding best-suited business 
units for the support of a portfolio firm. This confrontation within my findings is 
consistent with the arguments of the group of network authors (e.g. Walker et al., 
1997) who favor central network positions (tentative hypothesis # 3).  
However, in the context of an intraorganizational environment, two aspects have 
to be taken into consideration. On the one side, top-management commitment for 
CVC activities can make things happen, since it can represent a signal to 
business units that CVC activities are something important for the corporation’s 
wealth. Further, top-management is able to step between the business units and 
the CVC unit when collaboration becomes critical. The more CVC in a 
corporation enjoys top-management commitment, the higher is the willingness of 
a business unit to collaborate (tentative hypothesis # 23). But, on the other side, 
since a firm aims towards top-management not having to ‘step in’ too often, the 
top-management should rather pursue creating structures that really promote 
business units wanting collaboration with the CVC unit. Therefore, the more a 
CVC unit is structurally embedded within a corporation as a core-activity, the 
higher is the willingness of a business unit to collaborate (tentative hypothesis # 
3).    
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Resulting from the discussion about strong/weak ties and numerous/few ties, the 
analyzed relationships and resulting scenarios for the investment process are 
summarized in figure 3-7: 
Figure 3-7: Relationships and resulting scenarios for the investment process 
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In summary, there is no general solution about number and strength of ties 
throughout the entire investment process, since it was shown more important for 
a CVC unit to have ‘sleeping’ ties that can be flexible and fast built if required. 
Therefore, the CVC unit should try to maintain latently its network in a kind of 
‘sleeping’ mode, while having certain company directories (in the form of 
telephone and e-mail directories, organigrame, etc.) ready for the ‘wake-up 
process’ of its network ties. For having a corporate-wide overview when 
selecting potential business units throughout the pre-investment phase, a central 
network position is very important in order to maintain numerous and weak ties. 
In the post-investment phase when strong and few ties are required for a close 
collaboration a central network position is of less importance. As soon as 
potential business units are localized, it emerged in the interview that it is more 
efficient first to reduce the number of ties and then to “invest” in the weak ties, 
pursuing for strong ties.     
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But the so far discussed configuration of a network represents only one side of 
the medal that embodies the collaboration between two network actors. A 
network configuration also has to be governed efficiently. Therefore, I now will 
demonstrate what is said in the literature about network governance: what does 
the term network governance involve? For Jones et al. (1997:55) network 
governance involves “a select, persistent, and structured set of autonomous 
network players engaged in creating products or services based on implicit and 
open-ended contracts to coordinate and safeguard exchanges.” The interesting 
aspect of Jones’ definition is that these contracts are socially, not legally, 
binding. For Jones et al. (1997) the phrase “implicit and open-ended contracts” 
refers to means of adapting, coordinating, and safeguarding exchanges that are 
not derived from authority structures and from legal contracts. In the literature 
concerning network theory it is widely accepted that in order to enhance 
cooperation in shared tasks, the network form of governance relies more heavily 
on social coordination and control than on authority or legal recourse.  
However, in order to know if the CVC context of this work meets the conditions 
of interactions in a network, we have to look at these factors more in more detail. 
What can be found in the literature concerning the structural embeddedness of 
network governance? For Jones et al. (1997) four conditions characterize 
network exchange: (1) demand uncertainty, (2) customized exchanges of human 
asset specifity, (3) complex tasks under time pressure, and (4) frequent exchanges 
among parties comprising the network. These conditions deserve a closer study. 
(1) Under conditions of external demand uncertainty, that come from customers, 
competitors or financial markets (Miles and Snow, 1986), firms internally 
disaggregate into autonomous units (Miles and Coleman, 1997). Moreover, 
demand uncertainty also is generated by rapid changes in knowledge of 
technology, which results in short life cycles and makes the rapid 
dissemination of information critical (Robertson and Langlois, 1995). 
(2) Customization of services is common among actors in a network. This 
customization involves human asset specifity (e.g. culture, skills, routines, and 
teamwork) acquired through “learning-by-doing”, because it is derived from 
participant’s knowledge and skills (see Williamson, 1985). Network 
governance is supposed to balance the competing demands of uncertainty 
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(asking for disaggregation) and human asset specifity (requiring coordination 
and integration) (Hill, 1994).  
(3) Task complexity refers to the number of different specialized inputs needed 
to complete a service. Task complexity creates behavioral interdependence 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and heightens the need for coordinating activities. 
Network governance facilitates integrating multiple autonomous, diversely 
skilled parties under intense time pressures to create complex services.  
(4) Frequency concerns how often specific parties exchange with one another. In 
contrast to Williamson (1985)20, network scholars (e.g. Jones et al., 1997) 
argue that frequent exchanges enable networks between actors as an 
alternative governance form. Frequency is supposed to transform the 
orientations that parties have toward an exchange and the amount of informal 
control. In addition, the frequency of dyadic exchanges allows informal 
control through the structural embeddedness21 (Granovetter, 1992).  
Before we can look if network governance mechanisms are applicable to the 
context of this work we have to clarify if the suggested factors characterizing a 
network exchange are applicable to the relationship between the CVC unit and 
the business unit. Regarding the point (1) demand uncertainty it doubtlessly can 
be answered with ‘yes’. The high-technologies industries, to which the parent 
companies of the analyzed CVC units pertain, are certainly areas where new 
products and technologies leap frog prior products and technologies, leaving 
participants to catch up. Therefore, the more a CVC unit focuses on strategically 
oriented investment that are able to reduce this uncertainty pertaining to business 
units, the higher is the willingness of business units to collaborate (tentative 
hypothesis # 1a). Moreover, the case descriptions show that (2) the customization 
of human asset specifities (in terms of skills, culture, and routines) is transferable 
to the collaboration process between the CVC unit and the business unit. 
However, this customization depends strongly on the length of existence of a  
                                              
20 Williamson suggested because specialized governance structures are costly, to use them with 
recurring exchanges. 
21 The term embeddedness explains how dyadic relations and the overall structure of relations 
influences economic action and outcomes (Granovetter, 1992).  
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CVC unit, such as the longer the CVC activities exist in a corporation, the more 
progressed is this customization. Since the case descriptions show the mutual 
development of a CVC-culture and communication skills between the CVC unit 
and the business unit, customization increases the willingness of a business unit 
to collaborate (hypothesis # 9a). Further, the (3) condition task complexity 
coupled with high time pressure is without doubt applicable to the focus of this 
work. CVC managers and business units experts maintain very different 
specialized skills that have to result very quickly in statements and investment 
evaluations. Task complexity may justify why collaboration agreements facilitate 
the collaboration process between the CVC unit and the business unit (tentative 
hypotheses 11a, # 11b). Regarding the last condition (4) frequency two factors 
have to be mentioned in the context of this study. The first determinant is given 
by the technical specifity of the business units, since it came up in the case 
descriptions, that there are significant differences in the frequency of interactions 
between business units, depending on their industry area and their demand 
(tentative hypothesis 10a). Second, the overall frequency of exchange between 
the CVC unit and the business unit is widely dependent on the length of 
existence of the CVC program (tentative hypothesis # 9a). In summary, all four 
theoretical conditions that ask for a network governance mode are complied 
transferred to the exchange between the CVC unit and the business unit. 
Since the confrontation above showed that there is reasonable belief that the 
network exchange conditions are present in the context of this work, 
subsequently an analysis of how these conditions shape and influence social 
mechanisms in network governance will follow. The theoretical discussion 
showed that the network governance carries with it special problems to 
coordinating exchanges and relying on autonomous units operating in a setting of 
demand uncertainty with high interdependence, owing to customized, complex 
tasks. Network scholars see structural embeddedness22 as critical to 
understanding of how social mechanisms coordinate and safeguard exchanges in 
                                              
22 Structural embeddedness represents the network’s overall structure and social control, which 
is seen as ability to shape the behavior of actors. Structural embeddedness is defined as a 
function of how many participants interact and how likely participants are to talk about these 
interactions (Granovetter, 1985, 1992). While relational embeddedness has quite direct 
effects on individual action, structural embeddedness has less direct effects on economic 
actions. 
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networks (Granovetter, 1985, 1992). Thus structural embeddedness allows 
parties to use implicit, and open-ended contracts for complex exchanges, and it 
enables social mechanisms, such as the subsequently discussed (1) restricted 
access, (2) macroculture23, (3) collective sanctions24, and (4) reputation25 to 
coordinate and safeguard exchanges (Jones et al., 1997). In network governance 
literature, these social mechanisms are argued to facilitate the coordination and 
safeguarding exchanges. Further, these network governance modes are argued to 
overcome the network problems, rather than authority, bureaucratic rules, 
standardization, or legal resources. 
How and why social mechanisms positively influence coordination and 
safeguard exchanges in networks will be highlighted now. (1) On the one hand, 
restricted access to resources minimizes variance in parties’ expectations, skills, 
and goals (Eccles, 1981; Faulckner and Anderson, 1987). Further, 
communication protocols are developing and routines from continued routines 
are established (Bryman et al., 1987). On the other hand, the required mutual 
monitoring is decreased, and the increased parties’ interaction enhances 
commitment (Granovetter, 1992).  
 
(2) Common values, norms, and beliefs shared across parties through an intense 
and frequent mode of interaction (Abrahamson and Fombrun, 1992) enhances 
coordination among autonomous parties in three ways: first, by creating 
convergence of expectation through socialization (Williamson, 1991). Second, 
the theory argues that it allows the establishment of a common, idiosyncratic 
language to convey complex information (Williamson, 1975). Finally, by 
specifying broad understood rules of behavior (Camerer and Vepsalainen, 1988). 
(3) In network governance one’s reputation is hurt when one recommends 
someone whose performance does not meet expected results. It is argued that a 
                                              
23 Macroculture means the development of common values, norms, and beliefs across parties. 
24 These collective sanctions involve group members punishing other members who violated 
group norms, values, or goals, and “range from gossip and rumors to ostracism and sabotage” 
(Jones et al., 1997) 
25 Reputation means the information about parties’ behavior. It involves an estimation of one’s 
character, skills, reliability is important under exchange conditions of uncertainty and 
customization (Kollock, 1994). 
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collective sanction punishes those who do not adequately screen or punish poor 
performers (Becker, 1982). Consequently, collective sanctions safeguard 
exchanges by increasing costs of misfeasance, while decreasing costs of 
monitoring the other. At the same time, it is argued that it provides incentives to 
sort and monitor partners (Jones et al., 1997).   
(4) Finally, reputation safeguards exchanges because it relays the detection of 
and serves to deter deceptive behavior, which enhances cooperation (Parkhe, 
1993). Network governance theorists mention that reputation for mutual 
adjustment is critical for deciding who gets to repeat exchanges (Faulckner et al., 
1987). Literature about network governance found, that the more these social 
mechanisms are used the thriving for overseeing complex, customized tasks in 
changing markets are enhanced (i.e. Jones et. al., 1997). 
 
Figure 3-8 provides an overview on how interaction of exchange conditions leads 
to social mechanisms in network governance, and how these social mechanisms 
influence adapting, coordination, or safeguarding exchanges. 
Figure 3-8: How interactions of exchange conditions leads to social mechanisms 
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To what extent and why is this critical in the CVC context? This question will be 
answered by analyzing subsequently all four social mechanisms in the context of 
this work. 
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Ad (1): The benefits of restricted access to resources within a network are 
consistent with this study due to several reasons. Indeed, it has been 
demonstrated in the case descriptions that business units who already “entered” 
the ‘CVC network’26 within a corporation, minimize their variance regarding the 
CVC units expectations, skills and goals. If the business unit and the CVC unit 
already worked together, they developed ways and routines to communicate. 
However, not supported in this study is the theory’s suggestion that at the same 
time the necessity of mutual monitoring is eliminated. Even with business units 
with whom a CVC unit already worked, the collaboration process has been 
smoother to manage if there were collaboration agreements between the CVC 
unit and the business unit. While these agreements ‘enforce’ a business unit to 
deliver support, it also articulates what a business unit (and the start-up company) 
can expect from the collaboration. Therefore, tentative hypotheses # 11a, # 11b, 
and 16b that the numerous and early support agreement supports the 
collaboration, is not sufficiently explained by network theory. Moreover, the 
cases show that the positive side of this restrictedness has its limits. There is a 
converted U-shape relationship between the level of restricted access to the 
CVC-network and the overall efficiency of collaboration for a CVC unit. The 
right side of figure 3-9 shows that while too little restriction and a high number 
of interacting persons in the network complicates the development of qualitative 
personal contacts between investment managers and business unit employees, too 
much restrictedness limits the process of finding an appropriate business unit for 
the CVC manager. If a business unit has very little contacts with CVC managers, 
the “not-invented here syndrome” in business units is passively supported, that 
impedes external innovation and decreases the willingness of a business unit to 
collaborate (tentative hypothesis # 22b). 
Ad (2): While acknowledging the positive effects of establishing a common 
language and rules of behavior (macroculture) on the coordination and safeguard 
exchanges, network theory does not consider that it takes a certain time to 
establish shared understanding and routines. CVC units must deliver incentives 
back to business units in order to maintain their long-term interest. Further, 
                                              
26 By CVC-network I mean the developed contacts between CVC managers and business units 
employees who already worked on a CVC-project. 
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network theory does not consider that the macroculture is influenced in two ways: 
first, norms and common values develop easier if the CVC manager has formerly 
maintained other positions in a network (tentative hypothesis # 7a). Second, the 
cases showed that common values and norms are more easily developed, if the 
CVC unit is structurally and geographically located close to business units 
(tentative hypothesis # 3). 
Ad (3): Regarding collective sanctions, the findings of this study show a slightly 
different picture compared to what the network theory claims. The case description 
shows that in case of disappointing feedbacks from a business unit (i.e. 
unacceptable long or of bad quality), the CVC manager performs “individual 
sanctions” by eliminating these business unit employees from their future contacts 
with respect to CVC activities. Further, the more the investment managers can 
assure on their qualitative relationships, the less important get contractual 
governance modes (i.e. control- or synergy reports). The CVC managers build trust 
following their previous experience they made with certain business unit people 
(tentative hypothesis # 16b). However, it is difficult to figure out if a 
“disappointing” feedback is the result from misunderstandings, from opportunism 
or just form a high-work load of a business unit regarding their current operational 
activities. Moreover, how can an information feedback of a business unit be 
evaluated, since CVC investments themselves are characterized by high economic 
uncertainties?  
Ad (4): Due to the positive reputation of a business unit, which is based on a 
former collaborative attitude for CVC investments, investment managers prefer to 
get back for future investments to business units they already worked with. 
However, this may induce that an investment manager limits the range of potential 
business units and operational employees to a small number. This may eliminate 
the consideration of ‘new’ business units even if they would be very appropriate 
from a technical point of view. This approach would be harmful for the full 
potential of a CVC program, both for the strategic “window-on technology”, as 
well as for the portfolio firms. This aspect of network governance mechanism 
stands in contrast to tentative hypothesis # 16c, which suggests that a higher 
number of contacts a CVC manager has facilitates the collaboration with business 
units. Figure 3-9 summarizes the main results of this theoretical discussion 
regarding restricted access and limitation on positive reputation.  
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Figure 3-9: Results out of the theoretical discussion regarding restricted access 
and limitation on partner with a positive reputation 
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Out of this background, the central management competence for corporate top-
management consists of the balancing of the tension conditions that exist in the 
networking process between the partners (Sydow and van Well, 1999): (1) trust 
vs. control, (2) autonomy vs. dependency, (3) formality vs. informality. Therefore, 
to what extent is the relational dimension27 of the network theory – namely (1) 
trust vs. control – applicable to this study? Following the theory, potential 
benefits of creating intraorganizational strategic linkages can be achieved only if 
trust exists among organizational units. In the context of CVC investing, a high 
degree of trust is particularly important as it can achieve global integration in the 
network structure in which the business unit is linked to the CVC unit. I argue 
that a CVC unit’s reputation for trustworthiness is mainly determined by CVC 
unit’s integrity and reliability in interunit exchange. I found that especially the 
more established players within the cases (e.g. Intel Capital, T-Venture, or 
Siemens Venture Capital) supported my assumption. The CVC companies which 
                                              
27 Granovetter (1992) defines relational embeddedness as the degree to which exchange parties 
consider one another’s goal and the exchange behaviors like trust, codifying and information 
sharing.   
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have a long time of existence, mentioned in the interviews that by the length of 
existence, the positive reputation of the CVC unit gets dispersed throughout the 
corporation. Reputation in return triggers trust by business units on CVC 
investments, which fundamentally facilitates the daily collaboration (tentative 
hypothesis # 9b). Existing mutual trust is an essential factor that will positively 
influence the engagement of a business unit to transmit internally generated deals 
to the CVC unit. Since the interviewed persons unisonously mentioned that the 
main part of exchange between a CVC unit and a business unit happens on a very 
informal basis, trust is even more important for the willingness of a business unit 
to collaborate (tentative hypothesis # 16b). Finally, trust also relates to the topic 
of “non-disclosure” (see Intel interview) in the sense that all information 
exchanged between the CVC unit and the business unit is treated highly 
confidential. The main results out of the discussion about trust as a governance 
mode are summarized in figure 3-10. 
Figure 3-10: Main results out of the discussion of trust as a governance mode 
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With respect to the (2) aspect of autonomy vs. dependency, I argue that the more 
a CVC is dependent on feedback of the business unit, the higher is the 
willingness of business unit to collaborate (tentative hypotheses # 19a, # 19b). 
However, while a high dependency also increases the strategic alignment of a 
CVC program with the business units’ strategy (tentative hypothesis # 1a), it 
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decreases the flexibility for fast decisions of a CVC unit. Regarding the balancing of (3) 
informality vs. formality, a clear tendency towards informality emerged along the 
interviews. The collaboration process is mainly based on informal contacts of 
investment managers and “voluntary” services of business units. Figure 3-11 shows that 
trust, dependency on business units, and informality in the collaboration even increase 
throughout the investment process. Fortunately, this high level of informality seems to 
have a self-enforcing influence on the willingness of a business unit to collaborate 
(tentative hypotheses # 13a, # 16a, and # 16b). Despite the predominance of informality, 
it has to be mentioned that although the tasks of selecting network partners and the 
regulation of the collaboration with business units belongs to the CVC unit, the 
allocation of resources as well as the evaluation of the results mainly belongs to the top-
management in CVC programs. However, regarding the daily collaboration between the 
business units and the CVC unit less top-management influence was revealed in the 
interviews. While the top-management is only called in the case of severe collaboration 
conflicts, the more the investment managers contact middle-management of a business 
unit, the more operational people have a “backing” for collaboration from the senior 
management, and the higher is the willingness of a business unit employee to 
collaborate (tentative hypothesis # 20a, # 20b). 
Figure 3-11: The pattern of tendency along the investment process and the 
resulting willingness of a business unit to collaborate 
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But, putting all these implications of the network theory together, the crucial 
question becomes: which organizational network mode seems to be from a 
theoretical point of view most appropriate for organizing the collaboration 
between the CVC unit and the business unit? Since CVC activities are located in 
a tension-area of autonomy and dependency, the context of CVC investing calls 
for a network mode of organizing that  
• encounters the tendency of headquarter to intervene excessively, 
• decreases time and effort devoted to influencing activities, 
• decreases poor decision making resulting from the distortion of information. 
The search for an appropriate network form for organizing the collaboration 
between the CVC unit and the business units leads to the empirical research 
about decentralized network structures in multiunit companies which are 
supposed to overcome theses problems (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1993; Hedlund, 
1994; Tsai, 2002). In the analytic search, Hedlund’s (1994) heterarchical ‘N-
form’ represents a useful approach. In order to be able to analyze differences and 
similarities between Hedlund’s theoretical concept and the findings of this work, 
the main findings concerning the ‘N-form’ are subsequently presented.28 
The concept of the ‘N-form’ was expounded by Hedlund (1994) as the possible 
successor of the multidivisional form (‘M-form’), since the knowledge transfer 
among the independent, autonomous units to the M-form is supposed to be too 
difficult. Since the fundamental goal of the N-form is to combine the knowledge 
of the different units across the organization, it is of special importance for this 
study. The concept of the N-form suggests the multiplication of knowledge-
based synergies by recombining individuals in cross-functional teams, where 
people represent the key element. The new role of the middle management is to 
pull together the dispersed know-how from different units, since they are ‘on the 
pulse’ of the specialized activities and are often extremely competent. As the  
                                              
28 Since it would go beyond the focus of this study to provide a detailed comparison of network 
modes, I just will restrict to focusing on the N-form. For a detailed discussion of the different 
network modes including ‘M-form’ (Ghoshal et al., 1989), the ‘spherical network’ (Miles and 
Snow, 1992), the ‘management network organization’ (Charan, 1991), see Achtenhagen, 
2001. 
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underlying organizational structure, Hedlund (1994) suggests the concept of 
heterarchy. Thus, the focus of coordination in this concept is vertical coordination, 
based on cross-unit dialogue, temporary teams, and middle-level initiative. The 
role of the top management is one of monitoring and allocating resources, to 
provide direction and consistency to the knowledge development activities and to 
build the infrastructure for interpersonal and technical communication. Therefore, 
top management needs a clear vision of the company goals in the long term. 
Further, the importance of inter-functional and inter-unit linkages and relations 
among personnel at lower level of the organization, as the main coordination need 
is the integration of ‘pieces of knowledge’ from different units.  
In order to get an idea about the transferability of the ‘N-form’ to the context of 
this work, the main aspects and characteristics of Hedlund’s work will be 
confronted with this study. Comparing the goal of the ‘N-form’ - combining 
resources of different units - with the fundamental idea of the internal collaboration 
between the CVC unit and the business unit basically shows a congruent picture. 
However, this overall organizational goal has to represent any direct incentive for 
the business unit to collaborate: the more this “internal exploitation” follows 
strategic aims of a business unit, the more the business units are willing to 
‘integrate their pieces of resources’ (tentative hypotheses # 1a, # 21a). 
Nevertheless, the strategic incentives have to be complemented by financial 
incentives for a business unit to maintain their willingness to collaborate in the 
long-term (tentative hypothesis 21b). Especially in the early stages of the 
investment process, when the CVC manager and the operational staff of a business 
unit need to enumerate their goals and further proceedings, extensive face-to-face 
communication is required (tentative hypothesis # 10 b).  
Hedlund’s suggested underlying structure of heterarchy corresponds with the 
findings of this study. The case descriptions show that CVC units do not maintain 
hierarchical authority over the business units. However, while network theory 
suggests flattening the hierarchy, there is only little consideration about how to 
flatten lateral barriers of communication and team working. This study goes 
beyond that: the case description shows that the more the organizational structure 
shows the CVC unit as being a part of the organization’s core, the more are the 
business units willing to collaborate with the CVC unit (tentative hypothesis # 3).  
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However, while Hedlund assumes that the linkages among units exist in an 
intensive and dense way, the analysis of linkages between the CVC unit and the 
business unit shows a different picture. Especially, the creation of these linkages 
represent a main hurdle the CVC managers have to overcome in trying to get the 
business units’ collaboration. The creation of linkages is complicate due to two 
reasons. First, CVC activities are often perceived in a business unit as something 
that is strategically not related to the business units core operations. And second, 
the business units’ incentive to collaborate is limited since they don’t depend 
directly on CVC investments. Due to that complicated background, only the 
experience of the CVC managers in other business units and the length of the 
CVC program make intensive linkages happen. At the same time, it increases the 
willingness of a business unit to collaborate (tentative hypotheses # 7a, # 7b, # 
7c, # 9a, # 9b). With respect to the linkages among units in an intraorganizational 
setting, a centrally located CVC unit in the firm’s network is more likely to have 
privileged access to critical resources because of its local advantage. Moreover, 
network centrality supports the visibility of a CVC unit within a corporation and 
is positively related to the creation of new linkages.  
The role of the top management as a catalysts and integrator of units has 
doubtlessly its importance. However, I found that the corporate top-management 
commitment only passively provokes the integration of the CVC unit and the 
business unit (tentative hypothesis # 23). The investment manager represents the 
main initiator of the collaboration process: his personal contacts and networks to 
employees in business units are essential in order to activate the collaboration. 
Moreover, while Hedlund emphasizes top-management as the ‘architect of 
structures’, including information systems and databases, this work shows less 
importance of this auxiliary means. Although I acknowledge that the information 
technology can alleviate considerably the collaboration, it is only a necessary but 
in no way sufficient condition. Information technology neither reduces the need 
for face-to-face interaction nor eliminates personal contacts. However, if the 
involved actors of a CVC program revert for auxiliary reasons to any information 
systems I found that it should be designed as a shared global database, which is 
accessable for the CVC unit and (!) the business units. Internationally amendable 
databases enable connections to be made between the CVC and the business 
units on a global level, that originate form different functions and multiple 
disciplinary backgrounds. Both the limitation to a specific country as well as to 
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the CVC unit is not supportive for a mutual collaboration. Since the central 
element of network-oriented collaboration remains the personal “networking” 
between the CVC managers and the business units, corporate top management 
has to remove obstacles and provide incencentives concerning the development 
of social, personal and technical networks, which in return mediate in a positive 
way the willingness of a business unit to collaborate. 
Straightforward, Hedlund’s findings concerning main dependencies and 
coordination needs will be confronted with the case studies. While in the context 
of this study the aspect of ‘technological dependence’ (see Hedlund, 1994) seems 
to be less critical, the ‘dependence on the transfer of personal knowledge’ 
explains quite appropriately the main coordination needs the CVC manager has 
to take care of. However as mentioned along the discussion about knowledge-
based theory (chapter 3.2.2), the kind of required knowledge and the investment 
focus (stage and area) influences the level of the technological and resource 
dependency (tentative hypotheses # 4a, # 4b, # 4c).  
Finally, the confrontation of Hedlund’s main mechanism to manage coordination 
gives additional insights. While this study prioritizes a high overall social 
interaction between the CVC unit and the business unit in order to enhance 
coordination and collaboration (tentative hypotheses # 10a, # 10b), or previous 
employments of CVC mangers (tentative hypotheses # 7a, # 7b), Hedlund 
compatibly emphasized “job rotation” and “cross-functional projects”. Indeed, 
these possibilities represent useful mechanisms for a CVC program in order to 
enhance collaboration. With respect to “job rotation” the approaches of 
DaimlerChrysler Venture and Intel Capital are in a similar vein. 
DaimlerChrysler Venture mainly hires affiliates of its international trainee 
program, who rotated through trough different units within the corporation. Intel 
Capital’s approach goes even further. Especially in the U.S., Intel Capital has 
constantly located investment manager within business units. While 
DaimlerChrysler’s approach underpins the hypotheses # 7a, # 7b and # 7c that 
the previous employments of CVC managers increases the willingness to 
collaborate, Intel Capital’s approach pursues in maximizing the overall 
communication between the CVC unit and the business unit (tentative 
hypotheses # 10a, # 10b). Table 3-12 summarizes the main findings of this 
discussion. 
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Table 3-12: Transferability of key characteristics of the N-form to CVC 
programs 
 Transferability of key characteristics of  
the N-form to CVC programs 
Characteristics Parameter
-
Certain aspects are  
transferable 
? technological dependence between 
it? resource dependence (personal knowledge)
? knowledge-transfer among units
? Main dependencies/
coordination needs
Theory presents  
additional insights 
? cross-functional project teams
? recruitment
? job rotation
? communication
? Main mechanisms to   
manage coordination
? ? valuable assets? empowerment to enhance entrepreneurial  
behavior
? Role of employees
This study gives  
addit i onal insights 
? catalyst, protector
? architects of structure
? integrator of units through overall 
i i
? Role of top management
linkages are not 
per - se intensive 
? intensive
? cross-unit projects
? Linkages among units
? ? specialized, ? Role of business units
This study gives  
addit i onal insights 
? diverse, multiple power 
? flat structure
? heterarchy
? Structure/configuration
? ? Exploitation of intra-firm advantages by combining existing knowledge nodes
? Economies of depth
? Goals 
Transferable to  
CVC programs 
Source: Author, based on Hedlund (1994)
 
In summarizing this section, the strengths and weaknesses of the network theory 
have to beanalyzed. On the positive side, it has to be mentioned that the 
recognition of information sharing as a function of characteristics of network 
structure is doubtlessly useful in the context of CVC. Especially Hedlund’s  
(1994) N-form structure helped in explaining the impacts of size and centrality 
on the realization of resource sharing. Therefore, it goes one step further than the 
discussed resource-related theories that merely determined sources of 
competitive advantage. On the negative side, the general emphasis on multi-party 
relationships and their density and centrality limits the explanatory power 
regarding the dyadic relationship between CVC managers and business unit 
managers (Gulati, 1998). A further restriction of network theory in the context of 
CVC is its applicability to the transformation processes and the measurement of 
network performance regarding the created value add of CVC (Gulati et al., 
2000). The issue of allocating costs and revenues associated with the shared 
resources among cooperating units is complicated because of the significant 
measurement problems involved in assessing relative contribution (Hill, 1994). 
Also negatively weights the neglect of other determinants of collaboration such 
as formal governance mechanisms (Amit and Zott, 2001).
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After having designed a network structure between the CVC unit and business 
units, managing the network involves more: appropriate governance 
mechanisms, having knowledge sharing routines, and making appropriate 
relationship-specific investments. Without any governance mechanisms and 
integration purposes, networks may not be managed efficiently or even remain 
fragmented. Therefore, in chapter 3-4 an analysis of theories follows that focus 
on the governance of relationships.  
3.4 Confronting theories about governance mechanisms and integration 
modes with the case findings 
The review of corporate venturing literature (chapter 3.1) showed that realizing 
the value for the corporation and for portfolio companies often goes astray 
because of missing governance and integration mechanisms between divisions 
within the corporation to achieve lateral communication (Lerner, 2001; Hill, 
1994). However, for a firm to fully realize value form hierarchical governance, 
the correct control and governance systems must be in place (Hill, 1994). A 
dilemma emerged along the discussed reasons of failed corporate venture 
activities. On the one side, it has been shown that business units and the CVC 
unit within corporations are differentiated from each other in terms of subsystem, 
goal orientation, member’s time orientation and member’s interpersonal 
orientation. On the other side, the focused unit of analysis of this study shows a 
high level of interdependence since the results of the CVC unit depends to a great 
extent on the integrated and collaborating business units. Integration in this work 
is defined as the process of achieving unity of effort among the CVC unit and 
business units in the accomplishment of collaboration and lateral communication. 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) found that within each organization the degree of 
differentiation of behavior and orientation between the various subsystems is 
inversely related to the degree of obtained integration between these subsystems. 
Galbraith (1977) found that successful organizations had adopted integrating 
mechanisms in proportion to the amount of differentiated subtasks. However, the 
differentiation in segmented subtasks leads to specific interdependency structures 
and therefore to different governance and integration mechanisms. There is the  
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basic assumption that the coordination in a sub-unit is smoother than between 
different sub-units (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967).  
Many of the integration theorists claim that the achievement of integration is the 
task of top management (e.g. Child, 1984; Galbraith, 1977). Following Hill 
(1994), it can be argued that hierarchical governance gives top management the 
authority structure required to address contracting problems, haggling, and free 
riding. Although coordination is undoubtedly an important part of the top 
manager’s job, there is considerable evidence that many organizational systems 
develop governance and integrative devices in addition to the conventional 
hierarchy. Litterer (1973) for example suggested three means of achieving 
integration: through the hierarchy, through administrative or control mechanisms, 
and through voluntary activities.  
In summary, the purpose of this introductory subsection pertaining to                  
integration in diversified companies was to underpin the importance that the 
relationship between the CVC unit and the business units need to be governed. 
The lateral aspects of organizational functioning are becoming more important to 
organizational success in the highly, interdependent CVC-setting. Lateral 
structures and integrating roles and governance modes have to be designed to 
ensure the fast creation of value and the exchange of resources which are 
important for the success of a CVC unit, the value added to a start-up company 
and the value added of a business unit. I base my theory confrontation on 
concepts developed in the agency theory (chapter 3.4.1) to understand the 
dynamics in the relationship between the CVC unit and the business units 
regarding an efficient governance of the relationship. Social exchange theory 
(chapter 3.4.2) provides insights into how different governance mechanisms will 
affect the outcome of resource exchange. 
3.4.1 Agency Theory 
The discussion about resource-related theories indicated business units may 
benefit from the access to complementary resources of the portfolio firms. 
Besides this, corporations may also directly benefit from the IPO success of their 
portfolio companies via attractive financial returns. Therefore, it is important to 
know how the level of social interaction between the start-up company and the 
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corporation can be positively influenced. The chapters about social capital and 
network theory showed that social interaction facilitates the exchange of 
information and the identification of opportunities for cooperation  (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1990; Dyer and Singh, 1998). However, social interaction and 
cooperation depend in return on the transferred rewards to the involved actors - 
the CVC manager and the business unit. Since it is argued that the financial gain 
is a good incentive for cooperation (Cable and Shane, 1997), two questions arise: 
first, to what extent participate the CVC managers by their personal 
compensation on the financial gain; and second, how the operational business 
units participate financially on the success of the investments?  
Usually incentive problems are discussed in the agency theory from a 
principal/agent perspective. Although the origins of the agency theory date back 
to Adam Smith, who already in 1776 described how managers of companies 
owned by others cannot be expected to manage the business as well as if it was 
owned by themselves, the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976:308) is the one 
most often cited. They defined the agency relationship as “a contract under which 
one or more persons (the principal) engage another person (the agent) to perform 
some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making 
authority to the agent.” They continue, “if both parties to the relationship are 
utility maximizers, there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always 
act in the best interest of the principal.” Agency theory thus focuses on both 
principals and agents who are assumed to be self-interested, rational, and risk-
averse (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Agency theory has developed two research streams, commonly referred to as 
positivist agency theory and principal-agent theory (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Researchers in the positivist branch of agency theory view the firm as a nexus of 
contracts among various production factors. Although the positivist agency 
theory provides substantial insights into the nature and origin of agency problems 
and the types of organizational structures and contracts that have been designed 
to cope with such problems, it stops short of providing insights into the selection 
of the optimal contract for overcoming specific agency costs. Representative 
works of positivist agency theory are Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) development 
of a theory for the firm’s capital structure as a response to agency costs, Fama’s 
(1980) analysis of the efficiency of the separation of security ownership and 
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control in corporations, as well as Fama and Jensen’s (1983) analysis of how the 
decision-making process within firms relates to different types of organizational 
structures and processes and their ability to reduce agency problems. 
Based on the assumption of the principal-agent theory, the goals of the agent may 
not perfectly align with those of the principal. This stream of agency theory 
focuses on how to structure the contractual relation between the principal and the 
agent to provide appropriate incentives for the agent to make choices which will 
maximize the principal’s welfare (Eisenhardt, 1989). The main distinction among 
these types of contracts is the proportion of fixed payments versus residual 
uncertain payments to the principal or the agent. In the case of complete 
information, when the principal can monitor the actions of the agent, the optimal 
contract will reward the agent with fixed payments that are based on behavior. 
This will curb opportunistic behavior by the agent and allows the principal to 
assume the residual risk. However, when information is incomplete, the agent 
can no longer be rewarded based on actions, as this will raise the potential for 
opportunistic behavior. Instead, the principal will compensate the agent based on 
outcomes rather than actions, which represents a sub-optimal arrangement if the 
agent is risk averse (Fama, 1980). Therefore, theory assumes that the principle 
cannot be motivated to act cooperatively without extrinsic incentives. 
Furthermore, differences in risk preferences of the principal and the agent lead to 
different preferred actions of the principal and the agent. Goal incongruence, 
information asymmetry, and the problem of risk bearing constitute agency risk 
and give rise to three types of agency problems: 1) adverse selection, 2) moral 
hazard, and 3) hold-up (e.g. Barney and Ouchi, 1986). Before I relate the abstract 
concepts to this work, first I will describe each type of opportunistic behavior.    
The concept of adverse selection comprises problems that derive from 
asymmetric information before the two parties actually enter a relationship. 
Agents act opportunistically by misinterpreting their own background, 
motivations or capabilities. In principal-agent models that embody adverse 
selection, the agent is typically portrayed to be of unknown “quality” and 
capability of performing according to the expectations. The concept of adverse 
selection is described in detail as the “lemons problems” in Akerlof (1970). 
Adverse selection can be interpreted as “pre-contractual opportunism” that 
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exploits asymmetries in information about future performance (Barney and 
Ouchi, 1986). 
Moral hazard arises in an exchange relationship when one party cannot directly 
observe the other’s actions, and where efforts to monitor these actions are both 
costly and subject to error (e.g. Arrow, 1962). Moral hazard sets the stage for 
opportunistic behavior, such as shirking or purposefully not performing as agreed 
by one of the partners, once a relationship has been established. The agent might 
have an own hidden agenda that he would pursue after the principal has 
delegated the decision-making authority. Moral hazard can be interpreted as 
“post-contractual” opportunism that exploits asymmetries in information about 
current performance (Barney and Ouchi, 1986). To reduce moral hazard, 
principals often devise costly monitoring mechanisms. Holmström (1979) proves 
that any additional information about the agent’s actions, no matter how 
imperfect, can be used to improve the welfare of both the principal and the agent. 
Hold-up problems associated with post-contractual renegotiation of the 
agreement can arise from two factors: 1) one of the partners has invested in 
relationship-specific assets, and 2) contracts are incomplete. Relationship specific 
assets are investments of money, time, or other valuable resources in physical or 
human capital asset that have greater value in the current relationship than they 
would in any other relationship. Such sunk investments allow the transaction 
partner to renegotiate a contract for more favorable terms once the assets have 
been committed. Problems associated with incomplete contracts arise from the 
limited capacity of the partners to anticipate and identify all possible future 
outcomes. This will result in contracts that do not specify all contingencies, 
leaving open the possibility that performance of the actual terms of the contract 
would present unrealized benefits at the time of realization of the outcomes. 
Agency problems create agency costs, which are defined by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) as (1) the monitoring expenses by the principal, (2) the bonding 
expenditures by the agent, and (3) the residual loss.  The monitoring costs mean 
that principals can use formal controls and monitoring to reduce the agency risks 
in the relationships, and establish incentives for the agent to induce performance 
that is in the principal’s best interests. Agents, in turn, need to incur bonding 
costs to ensure that they are not harming the principal. The residual loss refers to 
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the reduction of welfare of the principal by the divergence in the agent’s 
decisions and the decisions that would have maximized the welfare of the 
principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
After having presented the basic concepts of agency theory, the crucial question 
is: to what extent are the different types of agency risk transferable to the context 
of CVC? Indeed, CVC investments under the focus of the internal relationship 
between the CVC unit and the business unit are characterized by problems of 1) 
high uncertainty concerning the collaboration between the CVC unit and the 
business unit, 2) adverse selection, 3) moral hazard, and 4) hold-up. The 
subsequent paragraphs will demonstrate the reasoning. 
CVC investments are characterized by high uncertainty. While acknowledging 
Sahlman’s finding (1990) that a large proportion of CVC investments fail due to 
entrepreneurial29 and market-determined30 risk, I found that in addition to these 
risks CVC units have to manage the ‘corporate internal uncertainty.’ ‘Corporate 
internal uncertainty’ means the possibility that a business unit refuses the 
collaboration regarding a portfolio firm, or that a business unit does not manage 
the collaboration with the start-up company in the expected way. However, I 
argue that the better the relationship between the CVC unit and the business unit 
is, the smaller is the uncertainty that a business unit behaves very 
uncooperatively against a CVC unit concerning a knowledge transfer (tentative 
hypothesis # 13). At the same time it decreases the necessity of contractual 
governance mechanisms (i.e. control or synergy reports) (tentative hypothesis # 
16a). Nevertheless, the critical mediating factor that emerged in this study, which 
is trust, is not considered by agency theory (tentative hypothesis # 16b). Further, 
I found that the CVC units by focusing on strategic investments may reduce the 
uncertainty that the business unit rejects any collaboration (tentative hypothesis # 
2). Since strategic CVC investments offer a “window on technology”, increase in 
sales, or the “enhancement of innovation” for a business units, strategic 
investments may be interpreted as risk reduction mechanisms. The same is true 
                                              
29 Entrepreneurial risks include such factors as difficulties in the technological development, 
inadequate management teams, and financial problems caused by excessive cash-burn rates. 
30 Market-determined risks include such factors as the emergence of competitors, technological 
shifts, or economic downturns.  
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for the interaction between the investment stage and the willingness of the 
business unit to collaborate. The CVC unit should be aware that late stage 
investments decrease collaboration uncertainty regarding business units that 
prefer application of selling possibilities, whereas early stage investments induce 
less uncertainty in business units that look for R&D possibilities and spill-over 
effects. Therefore, tentative hypothesis # 4a is only partly explained by the 
agency theory. 
Adverse selection problems in the relationship between the business unit and the 
CVC unit arise from the fact that a business unit has better information about the 
technical quality of potential investments than the CVC unit. Especially, 
regarding internally generated deals by business units, the CVC unit needs to 
expend significant resources on identifying the ‘true’ technical value of an 
investment, since business units are found to be very uncritical regarding their 
‘babies’. At the same time, the mainly financially motivated CVC unit may have 
informative advantages regarding the financial up-side of a portfolio firm, and 
may try to persuade a business unit to collaborate, even if there is not any 
strategic fit with the corporation. I argue that the focus on a very strategic CVC 
program may be a potential solution for this situation of mutual dependency 
(tentative hypothesis # 2). Then corporate top-management only needs to focus 
on informal relationship building mechanisms in order to guarantee a trustful 
exchange of information. One way is to increase the overall communication 
between the CVC unit and the business unit, since it reduces the information 
asymmetry, which in return reduces adverse selection (tentative hypotheses # 10a 
and # 10b). In the case of strategically oriented CVC programs, the corporation 
does not need to implement additional incentives (i.e. financial bonus) for the 
CVC unit, since strategic deals, assuming everything else being equal, are more 
easily to manage for the CVC unit than financial investments. The reasons are: 
the business unit’s approval is easier to get for them; in the case of financially 
unsuccessful investments, the CVC unit at least has strategic benefits to 
emphasize against corporate top-management; the capability of the business units 
to collaborate is higher.  
Moral hazard in the relationship between the CVC unit and the business units 
arise since the CVC unit cannot directly observe the business units’ action 
regarding the support of the portfolio firms. Also, the business units are not able 
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to evaluate if a chosen investment by a CVC unit represented the most 
appropriate strategic deal out of the incoming deal-flow. In the case descriptions, 
it emerged that CVC unit and business units not always pursue aligned goals. In 
the absence of proper incentive structures, the CVC unit will mainly focus on 
maximizing financial returns, while the business unit will purposefully not 
collaborate as expected and shirk once an investment has been made. In this 
dilemma, one solution may represent collaboration agreements. I found, that the 
more collaboration and support agreements already exist when an investment 
decision is made, the more efficient is the collaboration between the CVC unit 
and the business unit. Both the CVC unit as well as the business unit know how 
they are expected to perform, and what they can expect as return for their input 
(tentative hypothesis # 11a). The earlier collaboration agreements are finalized 
along the investment process, the easier they are to achieve for a CVC unit 
(tentative hypothesis # 11b). Therefore, close monitoring in the form of support 
agreements can be interpreted as a mechanism for reducing inherent risk in the 
post-investment phase. Moreover, the more a business unit is involved in the 
advisory boards of an investment, the more transparent the actual support of a 
business unit is for the CVC unit (tentative hypothesis 21d).  
The same is true for the financial deal-structure (e.g. in the form of intra-
company accounted co-investments) that exists between a business unit and a 
CVC unit (tentative hypothesis # 21e), in order to motivate a business unit to 
collaborate. Therefore, agency costs could originate from the business unit, if 
they may not offer the promised support or withhold confidential information to 
the CVC unit (and the start-up company). However, I argue that in the case of a 
co-investment with a business unit, the business unit’s incentives are strongly 
aligned with the success of a CVC investment. Since it is in the business units’ 
best financial interest to provide value-added services and “nurture” the portfolio 
firm (tentative hypothesis # 21e), the potential for moral hazard by the business 
unit is relatively low. As the business unit’s involvement increases the chance of 
the investment’s success, the business unit has financial incentives to behave and 
act collaboratively against CVC investments. Moreover in the context of intra-
organizational collaboration, a compensation based on the effort expended 
(which would be most effectively in the absence of information asymmetries and 
external uncertainty) is not appropriate, since it would induce moral hazard on 
the side of the business units. Therefore, the compensation resulting for a 
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business unit should be tied directly to the value creation for CVC investments. 
The more the compensation is tied to the achievement of ‘milestones’ agreed in 
the collaboration agreement, the higher is the incentive of a business unit to 
collaborate towards the achievement of ‘milestones’ in the support agreement 
(tentative hypotheses # 11a and # 21a). At the same time, moral hazard issues 
become less critical. However due to the high market uncertainty, a downside of 
this type of compensation is that business units who are not planning 
purposefully to shrink regarding CVC efforts, may not be rewarded in proportion 
to their effort spent. 
Hold-up problems in the context of this work are based on the assumption of 
bounded rationality regarding decision making processes. By this I mean, that on 
the one hand, the business units may be very short-term oriented regarding their 
attitude against CVC investments. On the other hand, the cases show reasonable 
belief that the CVC managers chooses investments, which maximize the 
evaluation basis for their compensation, since investment managers are merely 
compensated on financial returns of the portfolio firms. In addition, the business 
units have unique technical knowledge that is critical for the CVC unit. However, 
the business units cannot be contractually bounded to collaborate, since human 
capital is “inalienable”. Since the CVC unit has no direct authority on the 
business unit and the business unit can abandon the collaboration with a CVC 
unit at any time, the business unit retains bargaining power in subsequent 
investment processes. This represents a hold-up situation that arises as soon as 
the CVC unit depends on the input of a business unit along the investment 
process (e.g. in the form of an approval). Therefore, agency theories’ assumption 
of hold up helps to explain my tentative hypotheses # 21 a, # 21 b, and # 21c, 
that the more incentives exist for a business unit (either in the form of strategic or 
financial returns), the more rationally the business unit will collaborate with the 
CVC unit.  
However, the discussion of agency theory showed that collaboration agreements 
cannot fully eliminate hold-up positions. Another possibility regarding co-
investments is to make co-investments depending on the CVC managers’ 
previous experience with a business unit regarding their collaborative attitude 
during past investments. From a principal-agent perspective, this kind of ‘staged’  
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co-investments can be interpreted as a means to curb hold-up problems, such as 
the continuation of failing collaboration projects between the CVC unit and the 
business unit. The more this kind of ‘staging’ is applied, the higher the incentive 
of a business unit is to effectively collaborate in order to qualify oneself for co-
investments in CVC deals (tentative hypothesis # 21e). Thus, this ‘staging’-
approach corresponds to gradual embodiment of the inalienable human capital of 
the business unit in the financial capital of the business unit. Unfortunately, it has 
to be mentioned that on the side of business units the interest for these type of 
high-risk and long-term oriented investment is limited.   
Following the chapter outline after having presented the main variables and basic 
arguments, now I will discuss empirical applications of the agency theory. In the 
context of venture capital, agency theory has been used in relatively much 
analysis of principal-agent problems. This happened either by considering the 
entrepreneur as an agent working for the principal venture capitalist (i.e. 
Sapienza and Gupta, 1994; Gompers, 1995; Lerner, 1995) or by considering the 
venture capitalist as an agent providing value-added benefits for entrepreneurs, 
the principals (Cable and Shane, 1997; Fiet, 1991; Smith 1998). Especially, the 
work of Gupta and Sapienza (1992) is of special interest for this work since they 
found that the frequency of interaction between the principal (venture capitalist) 
and the agent (portfolio firm) depends on the goal congruence, the stage of 
development of the agent, and the degree to which technical innovation the agent 
was pursuing. In a later study, Sapienza and Gupta (1994) found that higher task 
programmability and outcome measurability reduce information asymmetry. The 
same is true for the length of the past relationship between the principal and the 
agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). Further, the uncertainty of outcomes and the 
willingness of the parties to accept risk will together have an influence on the 
agency relationship (Sapienza and Gupta, 1994). 
Kann (2001) opened the agency theory to the context of corporate venture capital 
and analyzed the relation between the CVC unit and the portfolio company. By 
modeling the CVC unit as the principle and the portfolio company as an agent 
and found that the shaping of the incentive and control systems can help to 
impose a risk on the agent and thus handle the adverse selection problem, the 
moral hazard problem, and the hold-up problem. Finally, the analysis of 
alternative organizational and institutional arrangements, especially regarding the 
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role of property rights, is another field where agency theory has been empirically 
applied. It concerns itself with. For example, Hart (1991) shows in his model that 
an agent should take some ownership of an asset if the agent makes relationship-
specific investments, as well as if the agent is a crucial trading partner.  
The confrontation of the agency theory’s critics with this study asks for a deeper 
look at the criticism this theory received. One of the main criticisms concerns the 
strict assumptions of self-interest, risk-aversity, and rationality, which have been 
mentioned as an “undersocialized” characterization (Granovetter, 1985). Critics 
of agency theory have argued that agency theory’s ability to explain the 
formation and development processes of relationships is limited, as there is a lack 
of control and monitoring devices in the relationships, goals are often jointly 
determined by parties, and the roles of principal and agent blur and shift (Larson, 
1992; Uzzi, 1997). 
The criticism of Uzzi (1997) that the roles of principal and agent blur and shift 
represents the link for this study. Since I consider potential agency problems in 
the relationship of the CVC unit and the business unit, the focus in this work is 
rather on the following question: when is it reasonable to believe that business 
units think that cooperation is necessary or helpful for them? Is there reasonable 
belief that the relationship is characterized by the problem of information 
asymmetry? In this study, agency theory is applied to the relationship of interest 
in a changing constellation. First, agency theory will be applied to the pre-
investment phase since the analyzed cases showed that the CVC units depend on 
information-feedback (e.g. regarding approvals for the technical due diligence 
etc). Therefore, the CVC unit represents the principle, who is not able to verify 
the business unit’s information. Since the business unit possesses and controls 
the resources that the CVC unit depends on along the pre-investment phase (i.e. 
deep industry and technical know-how, access to corporate facilities) the 
business unit represents the principal in the agency view. Second, in the post-
investment phase, the position of the principal and the agent depends on who 
becomes the main actor along the investment process. Figure 3-13 shows that in 
case (a), when the business unit represents the realizing and deciding actor 
regarding the investment process, the business unit represents the agent, on 
whom the CVC unit (principal) depends; in this case the CVC unit depends on 
information and a collaborative attitude of business units concerning the ongoing 
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cooperation with the portfolio firms. In case (b), where the CVC unit remains the 
first contact partner for the portfolio company, there are good reasons to believe 
that the CVC unit mainly pursues high financial returns or fast exits, which 
represent objectives that are not necessarily congruent with the one of a business 
unit. In this case, the business unit represents the principal who depends on 
information of the agent - the CVC unit -, like strategic “window on technology”. 
Figure 3-13 illustrates the discussed changing principal-agent constellations 
along the investment process.  
Figure 3-13: Changing principal-agent constellation along the investment process    
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Especially the case where the CVC unit represents the dependent principal, 
implies the question: how does the CVC unit get the business unit to act on 
behalf of the CVC unit interests?  The case findings show that opportunism is a 
main challenge that has be overcome in order to render CVC activities 
successfully: to create a context where the relevant actors develop confidence 
and are led to a performance that benefits the whole company. Main part of the 
conflicting opportunism is based on incongruent goals between the CVC unit and 
the operational driven business units. Assuming this conflicting constellation, to 
what extent are the existing control and collaboration agreements consistent with 
the theory? Regarding the pre-investment process, where the CVC unit represents 
the principal and the business unit the agent, the theory supposes, that the CVC 
unit should refer to control and monitoring devices and establish incentives that 
induce that the business units engagement is best for the CVC unit.  
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However, the findings of this study do not provide evidence regarding any 
applied control and monitoring devices in the pre-investment phase. Quite in 
contrast, the better the relationships between the CVC unit and the business unit, 
the less important are monitoring devices (tentative hypothesis # 16a). Moreover, 
the higher the developed trust between the two actors is, the lesser the necessity 
is to apply to formal governance mechanisms (tentative hypothesis # 16b). 
Looking at the post investment-phase, the agency theory predicts that the 
existence of collaboration agreements depends on whether the CVC unit or the 
business unit represents the principals. Regarding the post-investment phase, my 
study is congruent with the assumptions of agency theory. In fact, the existence 
of collaboration agreements between the CVC unit and the business unit depends 
on the principal-agent constellation. In case (a) where the CVC unit “goes one 
step back” in the post-investment phase, the CVC unit strongly aims in finalizing 
collaboration- and support agreement with the business units in order to 
guarantee and monitor the collaboration process of the business unit. In case (b) 
where the CVC unit remains the realizing- and deciding actor in the investment 
process, the case descriptions did not show any contractual monitoring of the 
business unit by the CVC. Taking this additional theoretical insight, my tentative 
hypotheses # 11a and # 11b have to be modified by considering this difference in 
the post-investment phase.  
What can be said regarding the provided incentive systems in the relationship 
between the CVC unit and the business unit? In the case that the business unit 
represents the realizing/deciding actor, the theory suggests that any additional 
incentive for the business unit should be implemented. In this constellation where 
the CVC unit is the principal, who depends on the collaborative attitude of a 
business unit, the case description show no incentives for a business unit at all. 
Independent of the principal-agent constellation, the cases show evidence that the 
more financial returns of CVC activities get in the “pockets” of the business 
units, the higher their incentive to collaborate is. Therefore, tentative hypothesis 
# 21b stands in contrast to agency theory. Furthermore, the implication of Hart’s 
study (1991) for this work would be that complementary portfolio firms should 
be owned by the CVC unit and by (!) the business units together. In other words, 
the theory suggests co-investments between the CVC unit and the business unit 
in order to overcome agency problems. Confronting the suggestion of co- 
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investments with the present study supports my tentative hypothesis # 21e, that 
the more co-investments exist between a business unit and a CVC unit, the 
higher is the incentive of a business unit to collaborate with the CVC unit. 
To what extent is agency theory applicable to the relationship between corporate 
top-management and the CVC unit? This is even more important, since this 
relationship has significant influence on the relationship between the CVC unit 
and the business unit. In applying the assumptions of the agency theory, 
corporate top management can be seen as the principle and the CVC unit as the 
agent. This constellation imposes the question of how top management gets the 
CVC unit to act on behalf of the corporation’s overall strategy. Following the 
agency theory, top-management is supposed to control directly the CVC unit. 
This is consistent with my findings. In all cases, the CVC unit reports directly to 
the top-management of the corporation. However, I found significant differences 
in the “bottom-up”-reporting. While for example Siemens Venture Capital, and 
DaimlerChrysler Venture limit themselves to informal verbal reporting, Intel 
Capital has to take position along the defined road maps of the business units. 
But, no additional incentives are applied to align the investment decisions of the 
CVC unit with the overall strategy of the corporation. While this lack of 
additional incentives could limit the motivation of the CVC unit to choose the 
most appropriate investments from a strategic point of view, both for the parent 
company as well as for business units, I argue that the greater distributional 
justice of compensation between the CVC unit and other business units is, the 
higher is the willingness of a business unit to collaborate (tentative hypothesis # 
8). It can be assumed that a separation of the CVC managers’ compensation from 
the corporate compensation system undermines the team character which is 
characteristical for multidivisional companies (Hill, 1994). Therefore, my study 
is somewhat complementary with Sykes’ finding (1992), who argued that a 
venture compensation plan should be constructed so that there is congruence 
between the individual, the venture and the corporate goals. The plan needs to be 
flexible and stress team awards rather than individual awards. Two basic 
principles exist for Sykes (1992): equity as reflection of the performance, and 
equality regarding the distribution of rewards. However, I found that the more 
strategic aspects are considered in the performance measurement of the CVC 
mangers, the stronger is their pursue for strategically aligned portfolio firms. At 
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the same time this increases the willingness of a business unit to collaborate 
(tentative hypothesis # 8b). 
However, the case description shows that the incentive systems of both the 
business unit as well the CVC managers show blatant needs for modification. 
The confrontation of this study with the components of agency theory shows that 
both the business units and the CVC managers in fact react and behave in a very 
rational and selfish way. The findings show that in doubtful cases, the CVC 
managers favor solid financial investments against strategic investments, since 
their personal compensation system is only based on achieved financial results. 
On the other side, the business unit neglects CVC activities, since their 
performance evaluation is only based on operational results. This confrontation 
shows that the incentive systems of both the business unit as well the CVC 
managers show blatant needs for modification. One explanatory reason for these 
inappropriate incentive systems could be the almost insuperable task of 
measuring the invested effort regarding strategic returns. Moreover, the 
theoretical assumption of risk-averse and rational behavior of actors is supported 
by case findings. The findings show that the business units indeed react very risk 
averse, since they do not prefer to spend their “own” budget for CVC –co-
investments, because these investments are long-term oriented and characterized 
by high uncertainty about the economic success. 
But, what can we learn of the extant literature regarding the basis for any bonus 
determination of actors involved in CVC activities. Already Salter (1973) 
identified the size of bonus relative to base salary as one of the key dimensions in 
the design of incentive systems for division general managers. As Salter (1973) 
suggested, the incentive bonus for a division general manager doesn’t need to be 
a function of the focal division’s performance. According to empirical research 
in this area, the greater the extent of resource sharing between units in an 
organization, the greater is the need to tie the unit manager’s bonus to the 
performance of the larger cluster of units (Hill, 1994; Gupta and Govindarajan, 
1986). The logic behind this finding is that the unit managers’ motivation to 
engage in inter-unit cooperation and to take a cluster wide perspective in decision 
making and actions is likely to be greater when their incentives are tied to the 
performance of the cluster of units as a whole.  
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Therefore, the recommendation for corporate top-management of Gompers and 
Lerner (1999) to add a risk component to the remuneration of the CVC managers, 
as independent VC companies usually do in the form of a carried interest, stands in 
contrast to the stressed team character that is important for intra-organizational 
collaboration. However, the case description of this thesis congruently with Block 
and Ornati (1987) circumstantiate that the more VC activities are handled “in-
house” by internal corporate venture capital units, the less they follow this 
recommendation. Quite in contrast, I hypothesize that the more distributional 
justice of compensation between the CVC unit and the business unit there is, the 
higher is the willingness of a business unit to collaborate (tentative hypothesis # 
8a). But, distributional justice would impede any financial carried interest for the 
CVC managers. While the Tower Perrin study (2000), confirms this results for 
German CVC activities, the William M. Mercer report (2001) comes to similar 
results regarding nine big CVC programs in the US. Therefore, the suggestion of 
my study disagrees to Edelson’s work (2001) who prognoses that especially 
successful CVC managers will wander to independent VC companies and therefore 
CVC activities have no future (Hardymon et. al, 1983).  
While Gompers and Lerner (1999) merely argue that the lack of additional 
financial incentives of CVC managers affects in a negative way the relationship 
between the CVC unit and the operational units of a company, my findings go 
beyond that. I argue that it is more important that the CVC managers get a bonus 
which is based on strategic aspects, since this type of incentive strengthens the 
strategic focus of a CVC program and guarantees enough strategic fit to the core 
business of a company (tentative hypothesis # 8b). The incentive problem of the 
business unit in order to engage favorable on behalf of the CVC interests may be 
solved by the top-management through a shift from considering merely operational 
results to evaluation approaches which also take into account CVC engagements of 
a business unit (tentative hypothesis # 21a). That there is crucial need for 
modification is shown in the case descriptions, since unfortunately no company 
considers CVC activities in the balanced score-card of business units. 
It seems that the agency theory is not thoroughly appropriate in explaining the 
governance mechanisms between the CVC unit and the business units. One 
shortcoming of this theory is that the hierarchical setting consisting of principal and 
agent is only hardly applicable in the context of this study. The hierarchical level 
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of the CVC unit and the business unit within a corporation does not show any 
superior or inferior hierarchical position of one actor. Neither the CVC unit, nor 
the business unit has the authority to force the other actor to action. This study 
shows that the CVC unit often interacts as an “intermediary” between the 
business unit and the start-up company, who pursues in realizing a “win-win-
situation” for these two actors. Quite in contrast to agency theory’s assumption, I 
found that the willingness of the business unit to collaborate is higher the less 
their relationship to the CVC unit is characterized by hierarchical qualities. This 
could happen either in the form of a flat organizational structure (tentative 
hypothesis # 3), or by qualitatively personal relationships between CVC 
managers and business unit people (tentative hypotheses # 13, # 16a, # 16b). 
Another shortcoming that emerged in this study is that agency theory holds no 
explanatory power for the formation and development process of the analyzed 
intraorganizational relationship between the CVC unit and the business unit. As 
the case description shows, the alignment of the CVC strategy with the business 
units’ strategy is facilitated if the CVC unit and the business units jointly 
determine the objectives and goals of a CVC program. While this procedure may 
limit the investment possibilities of a CVC unit regarding “disruptive 
technologies,” I argue that jointly determined objectives are crucial to attain the 
willingness of a business unit to collaborate (tentative hypothesis # 1a).  
Even worse, agency theory is not really suited to examine closely the incentive 
problems that strengthen the cooperation between CVC unit and other business 
units of the company. Although some companies of this thesis have at least some 
approaches that pretend giving any additional financial incentives for the CVC 
managers (e.g. T-Venture, Siemens Venture Capital, Motorola Ventures), it 
clearly emerged along the case description that a lot of the cooperation between 
the CVC unit and the business unit is merely based on “good-will” collaboration, 
following the motto, “I help you since I know you also once helped me.” At the 
same time, following closely the recommendations of agency theory hides the 
risk of replacing the intrinsic motivation for cooperation between the CVC unit 
and the business unit by focusing on extrinsic incentives. 
A final shortcoming of agency theory is that it does not consider the topic of 
organizational- and corporate socialization. This is even worse since the literature 
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tells us that intra-firm socialization has direct influence on the incentive of 
business unit to collaborate with others (Edstrom and Galbraith, 1977). Van 
Maanen and Schein (1979:73) defined organizational socialization as the process 
by which “an individual is taught what behaviors and perspectives are customary 
and desirable within the work setting.” Ouchi (1975) applies this approach to 
context of intra-group collaboration and argued that socialization of managers 
can be a powerful mechanism for building identification with and commitment of 
the organization as a whole. Some key processes through which socialization 
occurs are job rotation across units and management development programs 
involving participants from several units (Edstrom and Galbraith, 1977).  
Corporate socialization, which is interpretable as an informal governance mode, 
is linked to the tentative hypotheses concerning the characteristics of the 
corporation. Based on the indications given in the literature I argue that corporate 
socialization of department managers is a reasonable process through which the 
CVC unit’s and the business units’ values and norms become closely aligned 
with those of the parent corporation. However, corporate socialization needs to 
be actively supported by a high level of communication between the CVC unit 
and the business units which increases willingness to collaborate, mediated by a 
higher number of contacts (tentative hypothesis # 10). Furthermore, corporate 
socialization is a feasible way to develop an open corporate culture which is 
characterized by curiosity for technological newness, necessary for the business 
unit’s willingness to collaborate with the CVC unit (tentative hypothesis # 22a). 
In summary, agency theory described the effects of high uncertainty of CVC 
investments on the governance modes of the relationship between the CVC unit 
and the business unit. While acknowledging Sahlman’s finding (1990) that a 
large proportion of the investments fail due to entrepreneurial risk and market 
determined risk, the discussion showed that CVC units have to manage the 
corporate internal uncertainty that a business unit refuses the collaboration 
regarding CVC investments. A result of the theory confrontation is that outcome 
control is more feasible than behavioral control, since the principal is unable to 
control the behavior of the agent. This could happen in the form of control- or 
synergy reports. This theoretical result is congruent with tentative hypothesis # 
11a: the more collaboration and support-agreements exist, the higher is the 
capability of the CVC unit to manage the collaboration with the business unit. 
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Since the aspect of outcome uncertainty and –measurability is also true for the 
evaluation of strategically aligned investments decisions by the investment 
managers, my findings are in a similar vein as Eisenhardt (1985), Ouchi (1979), or 
Ouchi and Maguire (1975). All these researchers have argued that as outcomes 
become more difficult to observe or become less reliable as an indicator to the 
manager’s “true” performance, then behavioral control should be the preferred 
approach.  
This goes back to the role of corporate top-management. Their skill is to negotiate 
mutually beneficial returns for all contributing participants. The performance 
management and the reward systems must support cooperative and self-managing 
behavior on the part of organization members: the more financial and strategic 
incentives exist for a business unit, the more they are willing to collaborate with 
the CVC unit (tentative hypotheses # 21a, # 21b, # 21c). In this sense, the 
implemented incentive systems should fulfill the function of getting the attention, 
interest and desire of a business unit in order to enhance business unit’s action. 
Moreover, appropriate incentive systems leads to the fact that business unit 
managers and investment mangers see themselves as completing rather than 
competing with each other, which in return increases the flexibility and 
innovativeness of corporations achieved through their CVC programs. In order to 
overcome principal agent problems, corporate socialization has been shown as a 
viable way to develop a sense of community among the network participants 
(tentative hypotheses # 22a, # 23). Corporate top management is supportive 
regarding the creation of a corporate culture that transcends intraorganizational 
ownership and borders between the CVC unit and operational units.  
In concluding this chapter, one questions remains open: to what extent and how is 
any form of control influenced by the social relationships between the business unit 
and the CVC unit? Therefore, chapter 3.4.2 looks at social exchange theory. 
3.4.2 Social Exchange Theory 
Up to this point, the discussed theoretical perspectives have their origin in 
economics or management. The perspective of this chapter is derived from 
sociology. However, previous chapters already pinpointed that economic action 
between CVC units and business unit takes place in a network of social 
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relationships. The case descriptions also show that (overall) business unit 
employees are at least partially motivated by non-economic goals such as 
approval, status or power. Social exchange theory tends to emphasize the idea of 
personal obligation and gratitude rather than to focus on specific extrinsic 
benefits. This chapter is even more empowered, since presented the resource-
related theories in this work (chapter 3.2), which highlighted the dependence on 
relationships, are build on social exchange theory. In order to understand social 
exchange theory, I first will present the basic ideas and variables of this theory. 
Social exchange theory is based on the notion that people review and weigh their 
relationships in terms of costs and rewards. While costs are those elements in the 
relationship that have negative value to a person (e.g. stress, time, energy, 
attention), rewards have positive value to a person (e.g. fun, loyalty, attention). 
The formula that is used in order to “calculate” the overall value of a relationship 
subtracts the costs involved from the rewards provided. This calculation leads to 
positive relationships, in the case that rewards exceed costs, and leads to negative 
relationships if costs exceed rewards. According to social exchange theory, the 
“value” of a relationship predicts its outcome: while negative relationships will 
likely be terminated, positive relationships are continued.  
The centrally discussed concepts of social exchange theory are dependence and 
power. Dependence as the source of an actors’ power over others, has been a 
central theme in the study of power over the past decades. Since the publications 
of Emerson’s (1962) seminal paper on power dependence relations and Blau’s 
(1964) related discussion of tactics for balancing dependence relations, it has 
become commonplace to assert that power is less an attribute of an actor than of 
a relationship between actors. Emerson defined dependence of actor A in 
interpersonal relationships as (1) directly proportional to A’s motivational 
investment in goals mediated by actor B, and (2) inversely proportional to the 
availability of those goals to A. According to Emerson (1962), dependence in 
social relationships is the reverse of power. Even more important for this work is 
Thompson’s study (1967), which transfers Emerson’s definition of interpersonal 
dependence to the organization’s internal borders. The patterns of dependence on 
necessary resources, such as materials, know-how, or even capital, produce 
intraorganizational power, which influences organizational behavior (Aldrich and 
Pfeffer, 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
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Which theoretical insights of social exchange theory can be transferred to this 
study in order to motivate a business unit to collaborate with the CVC unit? The 
relationship between dependence and power is only partially applicable in the 
context of this work. While social exchange theory characterized the situation of 
an actor either as dependent or powerful, the situation between a CVC manager 
and a business unit manager is in contrast characterized by a highly mutual 
interdependency. Speaking concretely, on the one hand the CVC unit strongly 
depends on the business units’ collaboration. On the other hand, the CVC unit is 
in a powerful situation concerning the selection of investments and the allocation 
of capital.  
Transferring Emerson’s (1962) proposition in relation to the (1) motivational 
investment in goals and (2) availability of goals to the context of this work, 
means that a CVC unit is more dependent on a business unit, the more approval 
gates are implemented along the investment process. In other words, a CVC unit 
is less dependent on a business unit, the more independent from a business unit it 
can come to an investment decision. However, the dependency of a business unit 
is influenceable by a CVC unit and corporate top-management when designing 
the approval gates of business units along the investment process. Well aware of 
running in a situation of high dependency, I argue that the more a business unit is 
structurally involved along the investment process, the higher is their willingness 
to collaborate with the CVC unit (tentative hypothesis # 17). In return, the higher 
the willingness of a business unit is, the less critical becomes the dependency of 
the CVC unit. Concretely speaking, I found a curvilinear relationship between 
the time of business unit involvement and their motivation to collaborate, such as 
a very early business unit involvement avoids investments in strategically 
irrelevant deals and leads to a higher number of internal generated deals. 
However, the earlier a business unit is involved, the higher the number of 
transferred investment proposals that are finally not invested (tentative 
hypothesis # 18). While the collaboration of a business unit is attained by a 
realizing-level of involvement (tentative hypothesis # 19a), I found that the 
earlier this happened along the investment process, the higher is the capability of 
a business unit to collaborate (tentative hypothesis # 19b). The upside for a CVC 
unit of high business unit-dependency is that the CVC unit can focus their 
resources on screening the market for interesting investments, and on financial 
issues 
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(tentative hypothesis # 19d). Further, the more business units are involved on a 
realizing level, the higher the capability of an investmentmanager manager is to 
observe a higher number of investments on a consulting/informative level 
(tentative hypothesis # 19c). In managing an increased dependency on a business 
unit, I found that long-term oriented collaboration projects between CVC units 
and business units may be more effectively assessed by contacting senior 
management of business units. They are supposed to have the overview of the 
current and upcoming workload of business units, which is critical for the 
achievability of expected objectives (tentative hypotheses # 20a, # 20b).  
After having presented the main ideas of social exchange theory, the question 
becomes: what are the basic assumptions of social exchange theory? First, I will 
present three assumptions (1a-1c) about the involved human nature. Secondly, 
three assumptions about (2a-2c) the nature of relationships follow.  
(1a) Humans seek rewards and avoid punishment: Social exchange theory’s 
notion is that people’s behavior are motivated by some internal drive mechanism. 
(1b) Humans are rational beings: The calculation of rewards and costs is used to 
guide exchange behaviors. The exchange patterns are based on the assumption 
that people are driven to achieve goals in their interactions with others. 
(1c) The standards that humans use to evaluate costs and rewards vary over time 
and from person to person: The emphasis of the theory is on the role of diversity 
in relationships: a reward by one person may be seen as a cost by another. 
(2a) Relationships are interdependent: A human compares potential choices 
against the outcomes. The outcome is not completely in the hands of one 
individual as exchange partner co-create the nature and outcome of relationships.  
(2b) Relational life is a process. Time and change are essential components in 
relational life. Especially past experiences in relationships are used to guide 
judgments and expectations about rewards and costs, which in return influence 
future interactions and exchanges.  
(2c) Dyads develop through stages of increasing commitment and reward. One 
of the key idea is that actors engage in transactions in honor of the social 
exchange relationship itself, extending into the experienced past and the 
anticipated future. 
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In order to formulate valid statements about the applicability of social exchange 
theory, I will confront the assumptions of the theory with this study. The 
assumption of reward seeking in social exchange theory is somewhat different 
with my findings. I acknowledge “internal drive mechanisms” of social exchange 
theory related to short-term projects, which most efficiently happen on a good-
will basis (e.g. help in first screening). However, I argue that intrafirm CVC 
activities are only partially based on internally driven motivation. I found that as 
soon as business units are asked to collaborate with the CVC unit to a greater 
extent (either through numerous projects or through long-term oriented 
cooperation with start-up companies), additional incentive systems have to be 
implemented by corporate top-management in order to maintain the business 
units’ willingness to collaborate in the long-term (tentative hypothesis # 21a). 
Besides strategic incentives (tentative hypothesis # 22c), I found that especially 
the long-term willingness only is perpetuated by additional financial incentives 
that go back to a business unit (tentative hypothesis # 21b). Especially the 
predicted advanced relationships, characterized by the development of mutually 
beneficial goals between CVC units and business units, are only attained if 
business units are sufficiently financially rewarded. But at the same time, I found 
that additional incentives without “internal drive” are useless, since they have no 
“fundament”. Figure 3-14 summarizes the findings.  
Figure 3-14: Who needs to trigger what in order to maximize collaboration along 
the investment process 
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Source: Author, based on the interviews  
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With respect to the assumed rationality of business unit’s human being, social 
exchange theory gives no insight how to overcome the problem of rational 
behavior. While I acknowledge that business behave very rationally, the cases 
showed that the business units’ rationality go back to their evaluation basis. 
Since corporate top-management only considers operational results in the 
balanced score-card of a business unit, business units are mainly focused on their 
operational results and neglect CVC activities. Therefore, corporate top-
management should consider the engagement of business unit regarding CVC 
activities in the business units’ balanced score-card. Moreover, the CVC unit 
may strengthen the strategic focus of their CVC program in order to overcome 
the barriers of rationality in business units (tentative hypothesis # 3). Even more 
efficient, CVC managers should consider the interaction between the investment 
stage of a CVC unit and the motivation of the business units to collaborate 
(tentative hypothesis # 4a). In order to get an idea about the needs and interests 
of a business unit, which are extensively discussed by zu Knyphausen-Aufseß 
(1995), a feasible way is an increase of the overall communication between the 
CVC unit and the business unit (tentative hypothesis # 10a, # 10b). This 
increases the capability of firms to consider the needs and interests of involved 
actors, summarized as “responsiveness” by zu Knyphausen-Aufseß (1995). 
 
The assumptions of social exchange theory about the standards that humans use 
to evaluate costs and rewards represents another main hurdle which a CVC 
manager has to overcome. Applying the influencing dimension of time in 
evaluating costs and rewards to the context of this work means that CVC 
managers have to choose investments that may be of interest for a business unit 
in a specific time period. The “golden” way would be to select internally 
generated deals by business units, since it can be assumed that these deals 
maximize the current interest of business unit (tentative hypothesis # 5). 
Furthermore, the dimension of individual subjectivity in social exchange theory 
explains why CVC managers prefer to collaborate with business unit employees 
to whom they maintain personal contacts (tentative hypothesis # 14). Regarding, 
these “familiar” contact persons, the aspect of personal variation of social 
exchange partners is limited.  
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Forthcoming, I will confront the second group of assumptions of social exchange 
theory, which focus on the nature of relations. The mentioned interdependency of 
relationships is only partly found in the analyzed cases. While the cases show 
that CVC units are well aware that only by a co-creative collaboration the output 
of CVC programs could be maximized, business units are not always aware of 
their importance. This goes back to the core-assumptions of this work that this 
collaboration is necessary to achieve the supposed value added of CVC. In 
addition, the assumption of potential choices of an actor when choosing the 
exchange partner is only in a limited sense true for this work. CVC units often 
depend on a specific technological knowledge which is only existent in one 
business units of the parent company. 
To what extent is the theories’ assumption that relational life between two actors 
is a process supported by this work? Indeed, social exchange theory supports my 
hypothesis that the longer a CVC program exists within a corporation, the better 
the collaboration between involved actors works (tentative hypothesis # 9a). 
Even more important, the assumption about past experiences of actors explains 
why the past employment of CVC managers within the corporation is crucial to 
guide its judgments and expectations about rewards and costs. Therefore, 
tentative hypotheses # 7a, # 7b, # 7c, which mention the positive relationship 
between the previous employment CVC managers in other business unit 
positions and the collaboration effectiveness, are compatible with social 
exchange theory.  
The last assumption of social exchange theory that dyads develop through 
personal commitment and rewards of individuals gives additional support for 
this work. However, I argue that qualitative relationships and top-management 
commitment are not sufficient. Again, having in mind that relationships are based 
on a series of reciprocating benefits, business units need to get rewards for their 
engagement regarding CVC activities. Besides the already mentioned strategic 
and financial incentives, the cases showed that especially the function of being 
the assigned contact person for CVC concerns needs to be complemented by 
social honor and personal status within a company. 
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Figure 3-15: Applicability of social exchange theory in the context of CVC, and 
additionally provided insights of this sudy 
• Strategic and financial incentives are    
additionally necessary
• The position of the designated contact 
partner in business units for CVC 
needs to be followed by social honor 
and personal status in the company
Yes(2c) Dyads develop through 
stages of commitment 
and reward
• Long existence of CVC programs in   
corporations supports collaboration
• Past employment of CVC managers is 
crucial to guide its judgments 
Yes(2b) Relational life is a     
process
• Co-creative collaboration is
necessary in order to achieve the 
supposed value add of CVC
Limited(2a) Relationships are      
interdependent
• Choose investments which are 
interesting in a specific time
• Select internally generated deals
• Collaboration preference concerning   
personal contacts of CVC manager
Yes(1c) The standards that 
humans use to evaluate     
costs and rewards vary 
over time and individuals
• Rational behavior of business units 
originates in their evaluation basis
• Consideration of CVC activities in 
balanced score-card of business units
• Strengthen strategic focus
Yes(1b) Humans are rational         
beings
• Long-term willingness of business  
units can only be perpetuated by   
financial incentives
• Internal drive mechanisms only  
sufficient for short-term collaboration
Yes(1a) Humans seek rewards
and avoid punishment
Additional insights 
of this study
Transferability to 
this study
Assumptions
Source: Author, based on interview results  
After having presented the major variables of social exchange theory and their 
applicability to this study, I will discuss some empirical findings which represent 
the basis for a further confrontation with this work. These empirical studies are 
grouped by their focus on different variables. The suggested impacts and 
initiators of these studies will be further confronted with my work.  
In general, social exchange theory has been applied at all levels of analysis, from 
the study of interpersonal relationships (Blau, 1964; Cook and Emerson, 1978), 
to complex organizations (Hickson et al., 1971), to interorganizational 
relationships (Jacobs, 1974; Baker, 1990), to intraorganizational relationships 
(Peffer and Salancik, 1974; Kanter, 1977; Bacharach and Lawler, 1980) and 
exchange networks (Marsden, 1983). In applying social exchange theory Levine 
and White (1961:584) defined “organizational exchange” as “any voluntary 
activity between two actors which has consequences, actual of anticipated, for 
the realization of their respective goals.” Blau (1964:21) found that activities are 
“motivated by the returns they are expecting to bring and typically do in fact 
bring.” In the opinion of Emerson (1976), an organizational exchange 
relationship is established when from activities a “temporal series of 
transactions” is followed. By defining a resource as an actor’s possession or 
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behavioral capability, which is valued by another actor, Emerson (1981) makes 
the difference obvious to the resource-based view of the firm. 
The connection between the concept of behavioral control in agency theory and 
the context of social exchange represents the concept of commitment (Cook and 
Emerson, 1978; Morgan and Hunt, 1994). Commitment has been discussed either 
as a firm’s willingness to exert effort on behalf of the relationship (Morgan and 
Hunt, 1994), or as the presence of emotional bonding and deep care about the 
fate of the other party (Steers and Mowday, 1977), or as the willingness to make 
short-term sacrifices in order to realize long-term benefits (Anderson and Weitz, 
1992).   
To what extent confirm or contradict these empirical studies the finding of this 
work? Regarding the personal obligation and gratitude claimed in these studies, I 
have to mention that while personal commitment exists regarding top-
management, it is not always a matter of course on the side of a business unit. 
Acknowledging, that personal commitment of corporate top-management is 
necessary in order to get the motivation of a business unit to collaborate 
(tentative hypothesis # 23), I argue that only the commitment of business units 
itself represents the sufficient condition for an efficient intraorganizational 
collaboration process. The better the social relationship between business units 
and CVC managers is, the more probable is the commitment of a business unit, 
and therefore the higher their willingness to collaborate (tentative hypothesis # 
13). In all cases, commitment has to be complemented by sufficient strategic and 
beneficial rewards that result from CVC for a business unit (tentative hypotheses 
# 21b, # 21c). This finding is therefore somewhat different to Anderson and 
Weitz’s (1992) assumption that individuals are willing to accept “short-term 
sacrifices.” Although I agree that the acceptance of personal “dis-profits” may be 
actively increasable by an emotional bonding between the CVC manager and the 
business unit employee, the findings suggest a very limited effect. One option to 
strengthen the intraorganizational bonding between CVC managers and involved 
operational units is a strong corporate culture (tentative hypothesis  # 22b). It is 
important to mention that a supportive corporate culture emerged as the biggest 
difference between the US and the German companies in this work.  
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Another stream of authors in social exchange theory emphasize the aspect of 
interdependent series of transactions (Emerson, 1962; Levine and White, 1961). 
Following these authors, the participants embark on a “quid pro quo exploration 
process” during which incremental risk taking and trial-and-error learning takes 
place (Emerson, 1962:33). It is expounded that through a “testing” process a 
sufficient number of exchanges and communications occur in order to evaluate 
the relationship’s business potential. The two sides learn about each other in both 
personal and organizational terms. Further, it is argued that since commitment 
also entails vulnerability, parties will seek to partner with trustworthy partners. 
Sharing an understanding of the conduct and content of their exchange 
relationships leads to stability and durability. At the more advanced stage of the 
relationship, the exchange process is characterized by norms regarding issues 
such as confidentiality, disclosure, sense of trust, reliability, fairness, mutuality, 
and norms of reciprocity (Zucker, 1986, Larson and Starr, 1993). According to 
social exchange theory, trust is not the result of contractual safeguards, because 
safeguards do not require a leap of faith (Zand, 1972). During this exploration 
and learning process, the actors build, test, and refine an increasingly complex 
social contract. The unique advantage of this social contract is that ‘social 
control’ in exchange relationships, for example the partner’s concern for 
preserving the relationship and protecting their reputation, offers strong 
protection against the risk of high dependence (Larson, 1992).   
Confronting the mentioned process of “trial and error learning” with my findings 
shows that development of relationship between the CVC unit and the business 
units follows the supposed patterns of social exchange theory. Speaking 
concretely, this study argues that the longer a CVC program exists in a 
corporation, the higher is the willingness of a BU to collaborate (tentative 
hypothesis # 9a). At the same time, the higher age of a CVC program is related 
with a higher number of reliable contacts between the investment manager and 
the people of the business units (tentative hypothesis # 9b). The case description 
shows that the better the relationship between the CVC unit and the business unit 
is, the higher is the existent mutual trust. In turn, trust positively affects the need 
for formal “protection” against the dependence on collaboration (tentative 
hypothesis # 16a). 
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These issues aside, the confrontation demonstrates one shortcoming of Larson’s  
(1992) findings. While she argues that the informal governance mode of social 
control is sufficient, this study shows that although social control becomes more 
important, in no way become formal agreements between the CVC unit and the 
business unit dispensable (tentative hypothesis # 16b). The case description 
indicates that although investment manager have their “favorite contacts” in 
business units, guaranteeing certain collaboration quality, the necessity of having 
collaborations agreements remains. 
One further shortcoming of social exchange theory emerged in the analysis of the 
collaboration between the CVC unit and the business unit: there are two types of 
dependence, formal and informal dependence. First, the ‘formal dependence’ of 
the CVC unit on the business unit collaboration results from structural 
imperatives of the business units in the investment process (e.g. go/no go- 
approvals). However, while formal dependency on business units may be critical 
or even harmful for the CVC unit’s progress in the process of investing, I found 
that only the formal dependency increases the willingness of a business unit to 
provide their required input (tentative hypotheses # 17, # 19a). Second, there is 
‘informal dependency’ that originates in asking the business units for an informal 
feedback regarding the technology of a start-up company (e.g. opinion obtained 
on the telephone or e-mail). Since ‘informal dependency’ allows the investment 
manager to continue in the investment process without or with a negative 
business unit feedback, it is less critical for fast decisions, which are 
indispensable in the CVC market. But, despite of this advantage, I argue that 
‘informal dependency’ does not fundamentally strengthen the motivation of 
business units to collaborate. Interestingly, the case descriptions shows that in 
spite of a higher ‘formal dependency’ of business unit throughout the investment 
process the intrafirm collaboration process seems to be less problematic than in 
the case of mainly independent CVC units. Figure 3-16 summarizes the main 
findings of this paragraph by applying it to the analyzed cases. 
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Figure 3-16: The positive relation between the level of formal dependency and 
the business units’ willingness to collaborate  
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Following the overall outline, before concluding this subchapter I will represent 
some criticism about social exchange theory. First, Sabatelli and Shenan (1993) 
criticize the theory as untestable, as the central concepts of costs and rewards are 
not clearly defined. A second criticism is related to the theory’s view that 
humans are rational calculators who are able to come up with numerical 
representations of their relational lives. Finally Duck criticizes (1994) that people 
are not as self-interested as the theory assumes.  
This expressed criticism poses the question to what extent they are congruent 
with my findings? The mentioned criticisms regarding the calculable rewards 
only maintain truth if the rewards of business units remain on a non-economic, 
sociological basis. Moreover, the claimed unprecise definition of costs is not 
confirmed in this work. The fact that on the one hand business units can measure 
their costs for CVC activities (e.g. spent time and resources), but on the other 
hand, their rewards remain undefined in their balanced score-card, characterizes 
the uniqueness of this study’s focus. The situation is aggravated by the almost 
not measurable strategic returns. Therefore, I conclude that top-management has 
to be alerted to consider the spent effort of business units regarding CVC 
activities in defining their operational balanced score-cards. Further, a corporate 
top management should pay attention to the corporate culture, since it positively 
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increases the perception of non-economic benefits on the side of business unit 
employees in order to overcome a very self-interested way of working 
conditions.  
In summary, social exchange theory provided sociological insights in the 
relationship between two actors. However, this takes place on a very superficial 
basis by treating dependence and power as “black-boxes” concerning the 
resource acquisition process. Social exchange theory failed in explaining 
potential mechanisms, which the CVC unit could utilize in order to strengthen 
the motivation of a business unit to collaborate. In this respect, my study goes 
beyond that. First, this work showed that tree types of incentives are necessary in 
order to maximize the collaboration of a business unit: “internal drive”, strategic 
and financial incentives have to be present. While social exchange theory focuses 
on “internal drive” mechanisms, this study developed important influence factors 
for each incentive component. In addition, the importance of each incentive 
component has been linked to the corresponding stage in the investment process.  
Secondly, and even more interesting, I showed that the higher the “formal (!) 
dependence” of a CVC unit on business unit feedback is by an early and strong 
business unit involvement, the higher is the willingness of a business unit to 
collaborate. The somewhat averse effect is that the CVC unit needs not be 
concerned that the dependency is harmful for their progress in the investment 
process, since the business units are motivated by “internal drive mechanisms”.   
With this concluding remark on the above theoretical discussion it is now 
warranted to tie together the findings of this chapter. So far the chapter has 
confronted the case findings with extant resource and exchange related theories 
and has discussed various strands of governance related literature in hopes of 
uncovering new insights into collaborating relationships. How can all these 
discussions be tied together in a useful contribution to an integrated theory of 
intra-organizational collaboration? The following and final chapter 4 of this 
study aims at providing an answer. 
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4 Constructing a new approach and directions for further 
research 
 
Section 3.2 of the previous chapter has established a need for an extension of 
resource-related theories of relationships to explain the case findings which were 
summarized in the set of tentative hypotheses at the end of the case study 
chapter. Furthermore, the third section of chapter 3 discussed exchange-related 
theories and demonstrated that a major cause for the shortcomings of this theory 
stream is the lack of explicit governance mechanisms and incentives in order to 
structure exchange-efficiency in relationships. Since the connection across an 
organization involves that the relationships need to be governed, the final section 
of the previous chapter focused on agency and social exchange aspects.  
This final chapter’s task is to combine the previous work. The so far applied 
procedure can be paraphrased as follows: Chapter 2 observes and condenses real-
life phenomena. Chapter 3 looks at resource-related theories (section 3.1), 
exchange-related theories (section 3.2) and theories about governance modes of 
relationships. This chapter is to take up and use the supportive inputs for 
reconciling the shortcomings of extant intra-organizational collaboration theory.  
In the terminology used by case study methodologists, chapter 3 has been 
engaged in the enfolding of conflicting and supportive literature. At the point 
where further discussions of extant literature do not produce additional support 
for the explanation of the case-based tentative hypotheses, theoretical saturation 
has been reached (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1984). This study has reached 
theoretical saturation concerning the discussion of resource-related, exchange-
related and governance-related theories. What remains to be done is to utilize 
what has been learned for an extension of extant theory capable of explaining 
intra-organizational collaboration between the CVC unit and the business unit. 
This is the ultimate goal towards which all previous deliberations have been 
working. The following three subsections present and discuss this theory 
extension. 
Section 4.1 constructs the new theoretical approach by tying together the diverse 
strands of theory. This represents the actual proposition of the extension of intra-
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organizational collaboration theory and is therefore more elaborate than other 
subsections. The following section (4.2) takes the theoretical arguments back to 
the level of the case study findings, i.e. to the set of tentative hypotheses, in an 
iterative loop. Thus, the step serves to ascertain the validity of the new 
contribution and to detect potentially remaining weaknesses of the new approach. 
Finally, section 4.3 opens up the discussion of the implications that this study’s 
contribution to the understanding of intra-organizational collaboration 
concerning CVC programs may have for management. In doing so, a model is 
proposed that holds the promise to explain the collaboration patterns witnessed in 
the cases. In Yin’s (1984, p. 21) terminology this inductively generated model, 
which is the result of case-based ‘analytical generalization’, can serve as a basis 
for future large sample ‘statistical generalization’ of intra-organizational 
collaboration theory. 
4.1  Framework for the merger of exchange resource-related, exchange- 
related and governance-related theories in the collaboration of CVC 
programs 
The objective of learning more about intra-organizational collaboration between 
business units and the CVC unit determined the choice of the case study 
methodology for this study. In addition to the in-depth descriptions of the 
collaboration process between investment manager and business units, this study 
also aims at generating an explanation for the observations in the cases. But how 
can the large and quite heterogeneous body of information discussed in the 
previous chapter be synthesized into such an explanation? As this chapter aims at 
providing explanations, it begins with a short summary of the key inputs of the 
previous sections. These inputs represent the central line of thinking leading to 
the proposition of this study’s inductively grounded extension of theory. 
In section 3.2, the set of tentative hypotheses was confronted with extant 
resource-related theories. The resource-based view of the firm was found to hold 
serious shortcomings in explaining the case observations. The resource-based 
view of the firm excessively focused on the role of resource complementarities. 
Further, the main reason for the lack of a consistent explanation of the case 
findings is the analyzed path-dependency of business units, which dominantly  
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influences the cooperativeness of a business unit with a CVC unit. Additionally, 
the resource-based view failed to explain the attractiveness of external 
investments in order to become less path-dependent by increasing the pool of 
business units’ resources. The main reason for this failure is the theory’s 
extensive focus on corporate internal resources. Moreover, the resource-based 
view also lacks insights how the CVC unit knows where the resources inside a 
corporation are and how to get access to them. Finally, the resource-based view 
does not consider the aspect of trust, although trust was found to be a decisive 
pre-requisite for a frequent and open interaction. 
 
The advantage of the resource-based view was that it supports the focus on 
strategic investment objectives when designing a CVC program, since 
strategically oriented CVC programs deliver complementary resources to a 
business unit. The exchange of complementary resources was found to act as a 
trigger for external investments attractive for business units. But not only the 
willingness of a business unit to collaborate is determined by complementary 
resources; also the business unit’s capability to collaborate is influenced. 
One unique difference emerged between interorganizational exchanging 
relationships and the focused intraorganizational relationship of this work. While 
in interorganizational settings a defined resource-exchange is necessary for the 
formation of the exchanging relationship, in the intraorganizational relationship 
of this work the resource-exchange is not exactly defined in advance. Two 
reasons emerged that limit the applicability of the resource-based view in this 
study: first, the business unit and the start-up company are partly “forced” to 
collaborate, although the beneficial outcome for the actors is incalculable. 
Second, since the main part of resources is exchanged between the portfolio 
firms and the business units, the CVC unit is only a mediator in realizing the 
exchange of resources.   
Nevertheless, the investment manager should be aware of the implications when 
selecting portfolio firms that maximize the willingness of a business unit to 
collaborate. Only if the CVC unit introduces the business unit to a “right” 
selected start-up company, any resource exchange is effected. In doing so, 
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complementary portfolio firms stimulate the ‘eco-system’ of a business unit.1 
However, complementarity per se is not the decisive factor that defines the 
willingness of a business unit to collaborate, but also whether the exchanged 
resources positively influence the success of a business unit. Direct competition 
is minimized when the selected portfolio firm can signal value-adding resources 
to a business unit. The more the exchanged resources are not direct substitutes 
for one another, the higher is the willingness of a business unit to collaborate due 
to a higher incentive for interaction in the purpose of value creation.  
The secondly discussed resource-related theory was the knowledge-based theory, 
including organizational learning. The depiction of a firm as ‘a repository of 
knowledge and competencies’ (Kogut and Zander, 1996) gives no adequate 
explanation for the individual knowledge inherent in business unit employees. 
The theory lacks additional insights for my argument ‘what a CVC managers 
knows is who he knows in a corporation’. Levinthal and March’s (1993) classical 
distinction of exploitation and exploration of knowledge does not adequately 
consider the interest the business unit has in knowledge acquisition.  
The concept of absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) has been shown 
as an important factor influencing organizational learning. This concept indicated 
that there is a relationship between the acquisition of knowledge and the 
recognition of its usefulness for a business unit. It has been shown that the 
involvement of business units along the investment process represents a way of 
exploring and exploiting knowledge with respect to involved business units. 
There is evidence that an early involvement increases the willingness of a 
business unit to collaborate, since a business unit can influence the learning 
process more efficiently. Further, the findings reveal that the involvement of a 
business unit along the investment process should go beyond a mere informative 
or consulting level. I found, that only by an involvement of a business unit on a 
realizing and deciding level the whole range of knowledge exploitation and 
exploration is enabled.  
                                              
1 I defined complementary investments by using two indicators. (1) complementarity of 
resources and capabilities, and (2), complementarity of products and resources. Both 
indicators refer to a business unit’s operational business (see section 3.1.1. of this work). 
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One of the key findings is that there is an interaction between investment stage 
and the aspects of exploitation and exploration, such as late stage investments 
lead to more collaboration in business units that prefer “leverage of strategic 
assets”, while early stage investments lead to more collaboration willingness in 
business units that look for “enhancement of innovation”. There is also evidence 
that the objective “enhancement of innovation” generates stronger rejection at 
business units, since they could fear the termination of their current business. 
This result is even more astonishing since at the same time the exploration of 
new knowledge increases. The diverging development of collaboration 
willingness, which is based on the possibility of immediate cash-generation of 
business units, and knowledge exploration, which is based on the perceived 
threat in a business unit, is shown in figure 4-1. The opposite situation regarding 
willingness of business units and exploration of new knowledge results out of the 
investment strategy “leverage of strategic assets”: high collaboration willingness 
but little exploration of new knowledge.  
Figure 4-1:  Exploration of new knowledge and the willingness of a business 
unit to collaborate resulting of an investment strategy 
„Enhancement of innovation“
Exploration of new knowledge 
for a business unit
„Leverage of strategic assets“
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Source:  Author
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This analysis has shown that corporations have a difficult balance to strike 
between the investment objectives “leverage of strategic assets” on the one hand, 
and “enhancement of innovation” on the other hand in order to determine the 
“optimal investment” that promises collaborative business units and exploration 
of new knowledge. This finding stands in contrast to the traditional 
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understanding of the knowledge-based theory that exploration and exploitation 
of knowledge increases the willingness of an actor to exchange knowledge.  
The advantage of the knowledge-based view is its explanations about common 
language concerning complementary investments. These aspects provide insights 
in the business unit’s ability and willingness to collaborate. There is evidence 
that the high disposition of a business unit results from a medium level of 
similarity between selected investments and business unit technology, 
guaranteeing a common language while facilitating the learning new knowledge. 
At the same time, pay-off for a business unit is maximized when portfolio firms 
are complementary to the business unit technology.  
But, since also the most learning takes place between the start-up company and 
the business units during the post-investment phase, the selection of most 
appropriate investments by the CVC unit is more important than the involvement 
of a business unit in the pre-investment phase. Since the CVC unit represents the 
“moderator” who brings together business unit and start-up companies, it is less 
critical for the investment manager to know “what” and “how”, than it is for 
them to know “whom” of the corporation they have to bring together with the 
portfolio firms. Concluding this paragraph, it can be stated that the knowledge 
based theory is mainly useful in forecasting a business unit’s capability to 
collaborate, while it partly neglects the willingness to collaborate.  
The second stream of theory (chapter 3.3) that was confronted with the cases 
consisted of social capital theory and network theory. Both approaches hold only 
partly explanatory power for the intra-organizational collaboration process 
between CVC units and business units. The findings reveal that the objectives of 
a CVC program determine the activity level of a business unit’s involvement 
along the investment process. The cases offer support that a position of high 
centrality in a corporation is a necessary but in no way sufficient requirement that 
facilitates access to critical resources in business units. It is rather the personal 
networks and contacts which the investment managers have. Therefore, the 
concentration on structural aspects did not have the power to shed light on the 
actual willingness of a business unit to collaborate. Moreover, structural aspects 
are only of little practical value for the CVC unit, since the resulting structure out 
of the defined CVC objectives, are only limited influenceable by CVC managers.    
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The multidimensional concept of social capital which suggests that the relational, 
structural, and cognitive dimension influence access to resources, the anticipation 
of value, the motivation to exchange resources, and the capability to combine 
resources maintains partial explanation power of relations. Particularly, the 
different types of analyzed trust represent interesting insights about willingness 
and ability of business units to subordinate their operational goals and associate 
actions to CVC activities. In doing so, especially dyadic and resilient trusts are 
found to be sufficiently efficient. However, the motives driving these types of 
trust require a different approach.  
The close analysis of social capital theory showed that in the case of intra-
organizational collaboration between the CVC unit and the business unit many of 
the assumptions are either not valid or not sufficient. Acknowledging an 
influence of the relational dimension (trust), I showed that also structural and 
cognitive dimensions are important drivers for the motivation of a business unit 
to exchange resources. While social capital theory lacks giving explanations 
about the triggers of the relational, structural, and cognitive-dimensions, the 
cases substantiate my argument that the cognitive dimension is strongly 
supported by corporate top management commitment, while trust is supported by 
positive experiences of business unit’s about CVC investments.  
In addition, social capital holds no explanatory power for the relationship 
between the anticipation of value and the motivation to exchange resources. Also 
concerning the explanation of the relation between the type of relationships and 
the kind of trust, social capital theory fails. This is not trivial, since the cases 
showed that CVC managers and the business unit employees develop different 
forms of trust, depending on the quality of their relationship, and, equally 
important, that the kind of trust is strongly influenced by the dimension of time. 
The search for further theories emerged, since social capital theory failed in 
explaining how the CVC unit achieves qualitative networks of relationships. 
Economic incentives are generally neglected in social capital theory. 
Acknowledging the importance of social capital, there is a need for an approach 
that explains the creation of social capital.  
Acting from the emerged necessity, section 3.3.2 discusses social network theory 
under an intraorganizational perspective. The findings reveal that networks of 
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relationships between the CVC manager and the business unit individuals can be 
conceptualized by nodes (or positions) and by ties (or links). Since this 
conceptualization is used to explain different kind of networks (tight and/or 
loose), it holds explanatory power for the adjustment of CVC programs to 
changing external (market, customer) and internal (business unit) conditions.  
While the sociologically oriented network theories focus on structural and 
relational dimension of ties, strategic management literature applies the network 
theory for the analysis of network forms for multinational companies. However, 
the theoretical discussion about the most appropriate network configuration 
characterized by the dimensions density, connectivity and hierarchical position 
was found to held insufficient explanatory power for this work. While network 
theory explains that the establishment of network linkages is beneficial for the 
creation and transfer of resources and knowledge, it did not have the power to 
shed sufficient light on the question how to create linkages them between the 
CVC unit and the business units. While Tsai’s (2000) recommendation regarding 
network centrality in linkage formation is useful for an investment manager 
during the pre-investment phase, a central position does not represent the most 
appropriate in the pre-investment phase.  
Due to different requirements and purposes depending on the investment phase, 
Hanson’s (1999) analyzed relationship between weak vs. strong ties and tacit vs. 
explicit knowledge was found to hold also only limited explanatory power for the 
case findings. The same is true concerning the discussion of network governance 
in relation to intra-organizational collaboration. The implications of theses 
mechanisms on the overall efficiency of collaboration remain unexplained by 
network theory. The components of trust, informality, and dependency partly 
explained the willingness of a business unit to collaborate. But network theory 
needs to include the relationship between trust and the necessity of collaboration 
agreements in networks. One explanation for this limited explanatory power is 
the theory’s focus on corporate top-management, which can make things happen 
in intra-firm network constellations. However, network theory fails in explaining 
the important role of the middle management in CVC programs. 
In search for a network form of organization that overcomes these difficulties, 
network theory presented Hedlund’s N-form (1994), which focuses on the role of 
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middle management combining the resources of different units. The presented N-
form, which is based on the fact that nodes have strategic, specialized roles holds 
explanatory power for the context of this study. The heterarchical N-form of 
network theory, which suggests a flat structure between the actors, was the first 
feasible concept of a structural setting ensuring that business units really want to 
collaborate. At the same time, the higher willingness of a business unit decreases 
the necessity of corporate top-management to intervene between CVC unit and 
business units. Therefore, the role of corporate top-management is limited to 
conflict management. In addition, network theory delivered insight in the steps of 
knowing, mobilizing and leveraging the network actors. These theoretical 
findings showed overwhelmingly support for the case description, which pointed 
to the sequencing challenges of a CVC manager of finding the attention, desire, 
interest, and action of a business unit.   
This explanatory support aside, network theory holds no explanatory power for 
additional financial incentives that have been repeatedly mentioned along the 
interviews as absolutely necessary for the long-term interest of a business unit to 
collaborate. In addition, there is no sufficient explanation about extrinsic or 
intrinsic incentives. 
Section 3.4 deals with the broad field of theories on governance mechanisms. 
The principal goal is to structure the exchanging relationship in order to increase 
its efficiency. This was pursued in the confrontation of the tentative hypotheses 
with agency theory and social exchange theory. Agency theory was largely able 
to explain the emerged aspects of high uncertainty, adverse selection, moral 
hazard and hold-up problems. However, agency theory holds no explanatory 
power for the changing constellation of agent and principal in the relationship 
between the CVC unit and the business unit. Further, the suggested monitoring 
devices of agency theory are only compatible regarding post-investment phase. 
While agency theory shed light on the necessity to implement congruent 
compensation systems, it failed in substantiating these ideas. By focusing on the 
hierarchical setting, agency theory missed in explaining the aspect of corporate 
socialization. 
Prompted by the apparent shortcomings of agency theory regarding the 
suggestibility of behavioral control, the last theory chapter focused on social 
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exchange theory. On the positive side, one key finding was, that besides strategic 
and financial incentives, business employees are partially motivated by some 
non-economic goals such as internally driven approval, status, or power.  
Furthermore, social capital theory holds explanatory power for the fact that the 
maintenance of social relationships is a time consuming process, through which 
the development of trust and norms of reciprocity is explained. On the negative 
side, social exchange theory failed in delivering explanations that internal drive 
mechanisms need to be supplemented by strategic and financial incentives in 
order to maximize the business units’ collaboration willingness. Finally, social 
exchange theory made no distinction between “formal-” and “informal 
dependency”, and its implications on the willingness of an actor to collaborate.  
In summary, agency theory and social exchange theory showed that trust and 
personal relationships as informal governance modes on the one hand, and 
collaboration agreements and control reports as formal governance mechanisms 
on the other hand, have to come together in order to effectively structure the 
collaboration between the CVC unit and the business unit. One of the key 
findings of this study is that formal governance modes cannot be completely 
replaced by trustworthy relationships.  
Since the objective of this study is to offer an extension of extant theory as 
opposed to proposing an entirely new theoretical approach, it was determined 
which aspects of the analyzed theories have been proven to be useful. Based on 
the earlier explanations, the findings from the enfolding of the literature are 
incorporated into this study’s proposition with the goal of increasing overall 
explanatory power for the case study results.    
The organization of corporate venturing units has been described in many studies 
by consultants as well as by researchers (for example Mackewicz & Partner, 
1997; Bain & Company, 2000; Gompers and Lerner, 1997; Murray and Maula, 
2001; Kann, 2001; Keil, 2001). All these models and concepts either generally 
focus on the most appropriate strategy or on organizational processes. A lot of 
tge empirical concepts focus on the relationship between the CVC unit and the 
start-up companies but neglect the intra-organizational aspect. Moreover, all 
these concepts stop after the analysis of the corporate venturing objectives or 
they start with the question how to tackle organizational processes. Even worse, 
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no influencing factors on the business units’ collaboration are considered. 
However, both, the set-up of a certain CVC strategy as well as the form and 
design of the ongoing investment process have undeniable influence on involved 
business units. This re-coupling refers on the willingness as well on the 
capability of business units. Since the literature also gives hints that the 
relationship of a CVC unit to its corporation is of crucial importance, it is even 
more surprising that no study embraces the impacts on business units of both 
stages of a CVC program. 
Following the central arguments generated by confronting the theory with the 
case study results as well as the literature on corporate venturing, this section 
addresses the proposal of the ‘intra-organizational collaboration model of CVC’. 
The supportive and conflicting literature have been reviewed at length and 
theoretical saturation has been reached. The set of ‘theory free’ tentative 
hypotheses is to be challenged, corroborated, and eventually refined in such a 
way as to extend extant theory. The need for such an improvement became 
obvious when the extant theory failed to offer explanation for the case findings. 
My framework tries to analyze important influence factors according to the stage 
of intra-firm collaboration. At this point, it is important to construct a new 
approach that combines both stages - the strategy/structure definition and the 
investment process – and with the conclusions drawn in chapter 3 to ask for the 
implications on the willingness and capability of a business unit to collaborate. 
Thus my model aims at generating a new conceptual framework that focuses on 
the intra-firm collaboration in order to close the gap in the existing literature. 
My study claims that the collaboration process between CVC unit and business 
unit is better understood when explaining the collaboration process between 
CVC unit and business unit along the three stages of (1) definition of CVC 
objectives, (2) maintenance of an organizational structure, and (3) involvement 
of a business unit in the investment process. Moreover, since these different 
stages can be considered as multi-layered steps, including applicable influencing 
factors, it is assumed that the application of this concept can easily be 
transformed. Figure 4-2 illustrates the main tenets of the ‘intra-firm collaboration 
model’ by summarizing the patterns of getting the willingness of a business unit 
to collaborate in each phase. 
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Figure 4-2:  Main tenets of the ‘intra-firm collaboration model’  
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The first stage of the framework includes the definition of the CVC objectives. 
The approach proposed here demonstrates that the first decision of the 
corporation has to be whether to prefer potentials of strategic investments or 
attractive financial returns of mainly financially motivated investments. In case 
of strategic investments the corporation needs to focus on informal relationship 
building mechanisms in order to facilitate collaboration; they do not need to 
implement additional incentives (i.e. financial bonus) for the CVC unit, since 
strategically motivated investments, assuming everything else being equal, are 
more easily to manage for the CVC unit. The reasons are: it is easier for them to 
get the business unit’s approval; in the case of financially unsuccessful 
investments, the CVC unit at least has strategic benefits to emphasize; the 
capability of a business unit to collaborate is higher. Financially motivated 
investments, that need the approval of the business unit, will probably be related 
with more rejection and less capability from a business unit. The approach 
proposed here demonstrates that the emphasis of the strategic focus is being used 
as a first step to get the willingness of a business unit to collaborate and that there 
are valid reasons why focusing on strategically intended investments is a 
rewarding strategy in the context of the intra-organizational collaboration.  
The second stage of the framework transforms the three analyzed CVC 
objectives into the most appropriate organizational structure. Based on empirical 
evidence, this study shows that the first objective “maximization of financial 
returns” is realized best in a centralized CVC unit within a corporation. This 
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means that there is only one unit within a corporation, subordinated to the board 
of a corporation, which is responsible for all CVC investments. In this 
organizational setting, CVC investments are completely separated from business 
units since there is no involvement of business units. Second, if corporate top-
management decides to prefer the strategic objective “leverage of strategic 
assets”, this framework shows that CVC units are also centralized within a 
corporation, but show an integration of business units concerning the evaluation 
and support of portfolio firms. Finally, this framework reveals that the purpose of 
“enhancement of innovation” is organizationally best realized by decentral CVC 
activities that are centrally coordinated. This approach means that CVC units are 
subordinates of corporate functions and that responsibilities emerging along the 
investment process are at corporate level. 
These findings of the study, that the structure of a CVC program follows its 
strategy, are summarized in the following figure. 
Figure 4-3: The structure of a CVC program follows its strategy 
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There is to say that independently of which investment strategy has been chosen, 
corporate top-management has to focus on removing collaboration obstacles and 
on providing incentive mechanisms for fine-tuning the collaboration performance 
between the CVC unit and the business unit. Furthermore, corporate top- 
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management has to create a corporate culture that focuses the attention of 
divisional managers on maximizing the efficiency of the collaboration rather than 
the performance of each division as an independent unit. More precisely in terms 
of performance measurement, as interdivisional collaboration between the CVC 
unit and the business units increases, corporate top management my de-
emphasize rate-of-return measures of divisional performance and emphasize 
more subjective modes of evaluating performance, e.g. ability to innovate. I 
found that the greater the degree of resource sharing among the CVC unit and the 
business units, the greater should be the reliance on subjective criteria in 
assessing the performance of involved business units. In all cases, top 
management should not accomplish incompatible objectives, such as supporting 
the existing strategy and, at the same time, generating attractive financial returns. 
While the first and second step pertain to strategic possibilities of the corporate 
top-management in influencing the collaboration between CVC unit and business 
unit, the third stage is characterized by more control/autonomy of the CVC unit 
and business units in shaping and implementing their collaboration process. 
Therefore, in this model there is a tendency that the responsibility of corporate 
top-management on the one side and the CVC/business unit responsibility on the 
other side represent two opposite directed developments. However, there is no 
defined border between the responsibility of corporate top-management and the 
responsibility of the CVC – and business unit. 
This framework can fulfill different purposes. The first and second step can be 
used for ex-ante decision when defining a CVC program in order to 
organizationally integrate a specific CVC purpose into a large corporation. In this 
context, this framework helps to analyze, classify, and compare the impacts of 
different CVC objectives on the organizational structure and the involvement of 
business units in the investment process.  
The third step - the involvement of a business unit in the investment process – 
goes further, because a strategy has to be realized for involving a business unit 
along the investment process. The theoretical discussion of networking theory 
showed that the design process of a network between the CVC unit and the 
business units involves three stages, of which CVC managers and business unit 
employees in sequence go through in developing their network: (1) knowing the 
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network, (2) mobilizing a network, and (3) leveraging the network. Interestingly, 
the corresponding impetus for each of these stages follows a kind of “AIDA”-
principle – a long established mnemonic trick in sales. In the final stage of this 
model where the strategy and the structure of a CVC program are defined, 
“AIDA” stands for attention, interest, desire, and action of a business unit.  
(1) Knowing the network is triggered by the CVC unit’s pursuit to find the 
attention of a business unit. While this pre-requisite is actively determined by 
personal networking contacts, passively it is influenced by a supportive 
infrastructure (e.g. databases, service-teams, competence centers), by the top-
management commitment, by an open corporate culture, by the locational 
position of CVC unit, and finally by the length of existence of a CVC program. 
The longer CVC activities are in place within a corporation, the better are these 
activities already visible and known within the parent firm. Having the attention 
of a business unit the next issue is to find their interest and their desire to 
collaborate. The business units’ desire and interest induces the (2) mobilization 
of the network possibilities. The main impetus for this mobilization is given by a 
strategic investment focus of the CVC unit, the amount of exchanged knowledge 
and the offered incentives for a business unit. Finally, (3) leveraging the network 
requires the collaborative action of the business unit. Business unit’s action is 
stimulated by the existence of collaboration agreements and by a concrete 
involvement throughout the investment process. Interestingly, I found that the 
possibilities to influence the network design process get less for a CVC unit 
towards the post-investment phase, since more collaboration directly between the 
portfolio firm and the business units takes place. These staged processes and are 
illustrated in figure 4-4. Additionally, the figure shows the influence possibility 
given within each networking-stage.  
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Figure 4-4: Process of involving a business unit along the investment process 
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The represented networking stages in figure 4-4 and its influencing factors could 
represent ‘guide-lines’ for the CVC program that try to design an appropriate 
networking system for a collaboration between the CVC unit and the business 
unit. Moreover, it includes recommendations for the selection of appropriate 
investment managers regarding the personal characteristics necessary in doing 
successful internal networking. In addition to reducing intra-firm transaction 
costs and securing the access to network resources, an appropriate network 
between the CVC unit and the business unit enhances the value created out of 
CVC activities. The enhanced value embraces benefits for the start-up company, 
the CVC unit, as well as the business unit. Moreover, well-conceived internal 
networks can decrease response time to market opportunities, which is even more 
important in the context of CVC. 
Concerning the actual involvement of a business unit in the investment process, it 
is important to consider the core-competencies2 of a business unit, due to two 
                                              
2 A core competency is a special skill or technology, embodied in the knowledge of its people 
and the organizational procedures that creates unique customer value. Investments in facilities, 
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reasons: the reference to business units’ core-competencies represents the 
competitive advantage of a corporate venture capitalist, since they are hard to 
imitate or substitute for traditional venture capitalists. Second, if the involvement 
of a business unit has a positive impact on the core-competencies of a business 
unit it supports the business unit’s collaboration. There are several ways how the 
aspect of core competency can be considered. In order to create an incentive for a 
business unit, the selection of appropriate portfolio firms is critical which either 
support, extend, or apply the business unit core-competencies. How much 
learning occurs in the post investment phase between the portfolio firms and the 
business units depends whether the focused investment stage and technological 
area of a CVC unit allow certain technological overlap between the portfolio 
firms and the business unit. While it increases the willingness of a business unit 
to collaborate, at the same time it determines the capability of a business unit to 
collaborate along the investment process. 
But the investments should not threat the current technology of a business unit. 
Corporate top-management and CVC managers should be aware that the decision 
to invest in start-up companies that represent “disruptive” technologies regarding 
the existing business units’ technologies may negatively affect the collaboration 
process between the CVC unit and the business unit. However, according to 
Christensen (1997) there are good reasons for corporate top-management to 
promote even “disruptive technologies” in order to guarantee the economic 
survival of the company in the long-term – even and especially if the business 
units refuse collaboration. By creating a new business around the “disruptive 
technology”, substitutive investments create internal unrest, as the established 
business units do not want to have their sales cannibalized. In this case, a 
company’s own resources and processes can become liabilities rather than 
capabilities. If the “disruptive” portfolio firm fare well, corporate top-
management has to evaluate whether and how to adapt its own technologies and 
processes to be more like those of the portfolio firm. Because investments in 
“disruptive technologies” could signal the emergence of new markets for a 
business unit, investment managers must create information about such markets – 
                                                                                                                                    
people, and knowledge that strengthen core competencies can create sustainable sources of 
competitive advantage (see Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). 
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what is the market potential, who the customers will be, which dimensions of 
product performance will mater most, etc. The business units of a corporation 
have to understand that their technological and market bases are of finite life 
spans. CVC has to be seen in the business units as a possibility to replace the 
businesses that must inevitably die. To do so, corporate top-management must be 
willing to see business units die in order to avoid that competitors kill them. 
Therefore, this framework additionally shows that the selection of an investment 
that calls for a high disposition of the business unit to collaborate is not the one 
that maximizes the long-term performance of a corporation (see investment 
strategy 1 in figure 4-5). The cases showed that investments representing a threat 
to a business unit or not immediately promising high cash possibility may 
maximize the performance potential of the corporation in the long-term (see 
investment strategy 2 in figure 4-5).  
Figure 4-5:  Collaboration willingness of a business unit and the long-term 
performance trajectory resulting from an investment strategy3 
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3 The concept of performance trajectory embraces the rate at which the performance of a 
product is expected to improve over time, see Bower and Christensen (1995). 
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A solution for the mentioned dilemma may be the “golden” investment strategy 
that is located in the intersection of the curves “willingness of a business unit to 
collaborate” and “exploration of knowledge”. This investment strategy lies 
between the performance potential of the mentioned investment strategy 1 and 2. 
The “golden-rule” for investment managers guaranteeing consideration of core-
competencies and new knowledge exploration, is to prefer investments that have 
been generated by business units. While internal deals maximize the willingness 
of business units to collaborate in the investment process, at the same time they 
decrease the negatively impacting “not invented here syndrome”. Overall, while 
the investment strategy must grant the exploitation of corporate resources, is also 
must guarantee the exploration of additional competencies.  
Apart from that, it has been shown that the involvement of a business unit to 
collaborate is also influenced by corporate top-management commitment in order 
to guarantee the access to critical business unit resources. The better corporate 
top-management succeeds in demonstrating its commitment for CVC activities as 
a core-competency of the corporation, the higher the willingness of a business 
unit will be to collaborate in the investment process. Corporate management 
itself has to encourage employees to believe that innovation is part of the role set 
for all members of the organizations.4 This is even more important since the 
history of CVC investing showed that even if top management embraced the 
CVC concept, middle management often resisted. Since it is the role of the 
middle managers to pull together the dispersed knowledge throughout different 
business units,5 the top-management’s responsibility is to provide passively 
direction and consistency to the CVC activities, and to build the infrastructure for 
interpersonal and technical communication between the investment managers 
and the business units. To assert and develop the new technologies, it is 
necessary that the top-management instructs the CVC unit to recourse 
mandatorily to business units’ capabilities throughout the investment process by 
“go/no go approvals.” Although this procedure hides the danger that an 
investment proposal will not get the 
                                              
4 Specific conditions are: quick adaptation of employee ideas, recognition of people who bring 
ideas forward, support for experimental projects, and money to get projects off the ground. 
5 In the cases, middle managers have been found to be ‘on the pulse’ of the specialized 
activities, and are mostly extremely competent due to their experience in the company. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
 
341
approval of a business unit, it impedes that a business unit refuses the 
collaboration after an investment has been made. Further, by considering CVC 
activities on the balanced score-card of business units, corporate top-
management has to guarantee that the business units’ middle managers not 
merely focus resources on fulfilling the requirements of existing and operational 
business.  
To innovate successfully by CVC investments corporate top management must 
follow pluralistic management practices adapted to the needs of both new and 
mature businesses, which require flexibility, responsiveness and resourcefulness. 
Perhaps the major adaptation challenge for corporate top management is to 
tolerate a mix of apparently contradictory policies and practices. Additionally, 
corporate top-management should not judge CVC investments only on the basis 
of financial returns, rather on their potential to positively affect the company’s 
own business. This is especially true in times of low or even negative financial 
returns of CVC investments. In all cases, to achieve synergies there is a need for 
an active management of the interface between the CVC unit and the business 
units by corporate top-management. Regardless of whether growth is desired in 
present or future businesses, corporate top-management needs a clear-eyed view 
of its CVC strategy and its operational capabilities. The CVC unit needs the 
discipline to build its investment portfolio with these parameters of top-
management in mind.   
Moreover, the more the corporation internally signals an open corporate culture, 
the more fruitful is the collaboration basis between the CVC unit and business 
units. Business units should be open and curious for technological innovation, 
since these technical insights can be profitable in their long-term performance. 
However, the longer it takes to transform a technological innovation into an 
advantageous output for a business unit, the harder it is to get their willingness to 
collaborate. Because of this, the border between responsibility of corporate top-
management and responsibility of CVC unit and business unit is fluent. 
However, figure 4-6 shows a tendency that while corporate top-management is 
highly important for defining the strategy and the organizational structure of a 
CVC program, its importance decreases at the moment when the CVC unit 
initiates the involvement of business units along the investment process. Further, 
the model shows that as soon as an investment is selected and financed, the main 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
 
342
responsibility shifts to the business unit. Only at the time of an exit of an 
investment, the importance of the CVC unit as a main actor increases. Figure 4-6 
illustrates the delayed trend of the mentioned considerations.  
Figure 4-6: Importance of involved actors along the investment process 
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Since the competitive advantage of the CVC unit – its access to business units’ 
resources - is lost if a business unit rejects the collaboration and refuses access to 
its resources, this framework must be complemented by governance-
mechanisms. After the investment managers selected the portfolio firms, formal 
and informal governance modes have to follow. Although the CVC manager 
backs out of the investment process throughout the support management from 
business units in the post-investment phase, he actively has to control and 
guarantee the ongoing collaboration between the portfolio firm and the business 
unit. On the side of informal governance mechanisms, its social interaction with 
the business units is necessary. While personal contacts between CVC managers 
allow the exchange of information about the development of investments, it 
simultaneously leads to the intensification of the relationship, characterized by 
dyadic trust. Trust-building efforts consist of the establishment of a tight web of 
qualitative contacts between the CVC unit and the business unit. The negative 
relationship between the quality of personal relationships and the importance of 
formal governance is mediated by trust; although trust makes formal 
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collaboration agreements between the CVC unit and the business unit less 
important, in no way it becomes dispensable. These statements remain true 
independent of any principal-agent constellations between the CVC unit and the 
business unit. 
 
The review of the network theory contributed to a closer understanding of the 
relationship a CVC unit depends on. While in the pre-investment phase it is 
important for the investment manager to have numerous and weak ties, in the 
post-investment phase it is advantageous for the CVC unit to focus on few and 
strong ties. The reasons are quite obvious: first, while in the pre-investment 
phase more general information is needed, technically detailed and sophisticated 
knowledge is essential in the post-investment phase. Second, while the purpose 
of intra-firm collaboration in the pre-investment phase is screening and selecting 
the most appropriate business units, nurturing and technical support is of interest 
in the post-investment phase. Thus and third, while numerous businesses are 
potentially of interest in the pre-investment phase, only few business units are 
required in the post–investment phase. Fourth, while the tasks in the pre-
investment phase ask for an overview within the corporation, close and personal 
relationships are critical in the post-investment phase. And finally, while the pre-
investment period is generally short and limited, the post-investment phase can 
be long - or perhaps unlimited. At the same time, the aspect of centrality in the 
corporate networks decreases.  
The described transformation process requires that a CVC unit choose the most 
efficient path from the position of many/weak ties in the pre-investment phase to 
few/strong ties in the post-investment phase. This study shows that there is no 
general solution about number and strength of ties a CVC unit should maintain 
along the investment process. It is more important for a CVC unit how the ties 
can be flexibly built if necessary. Therefore, the CVC unit should try to maintain 
its network contacts in a “sleeping” mode, while having certain company 
directories which facilitate the transformation process between “knowing the 
network” and “mobilizing the network” (e.g. organization charts, e-mail and 
telephone lists).  
The findings of this study represent an extension of the understanding of intra-
firm collaboration in the specific context between business units and CVC units. 
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This ‘integrated model of intra-organizational collaboration’ in CVC programs 
explicitly takes into account the strategy definition, the organizational structure 
and the concrete involvement of business units throughout the investment 
process as key variables influencing the collaboration between the CVC unit and 
the business unit. It has been found that the reason for lack of explanatory power 
of extant theories explaining collaboration phenomena between two mainly 
independent business units of a corporation rests in the fact that the theories are 
valid only for explaining one small part of the collaboration process. The 
incentive structures of collaboration have been found to be so profoundly 
different from the assumption of existing intra-firm collaboration settings. 
Finding the willingness of a business unit to collaborate  with a CVC unit follows 
the pattern of knowing the network, mobilizing the network and finally 
leveraging the network within a corporation. This means for a CVC unit to 
sequentially get the business units’ attention, interest and action. Influencing 
factors of each phase have been discussed. 
4.2 Revisiting the tentative hypotheses 
As indicated in the introductory comments to this section, the proposition of the 
‘integrated model of intra-organizational collaboration’ has to be followed by 
confronting this new approach with the set of tentative hypotheses formed at the 
end of the case study chapter. The objective of the subsequent paragraphs is to 
perform this confrontation. Following the juxtaposition of extant corporate 
venturing theory in section 3.1, this confrontation is the second instance of theory 
evaluation. 
Why do the tentative hypotheses have to be readdressed at all when the main 
objective of this study, the propositions of a grounded model, has already been 
achieved? Of course, it is true that the set of tentative hypotheses is already 
incorporated in the proposed ‘integrated model of intra-organizational 
collaboration’ in two ways. First, components of resource related theories were 
integrated in this study’s approach, because they demonstrate explanatory power 
for the hypotheses regarding the creation of value through the selection, creation, 
and combination of resources. Secondly, the confrontation of the theory with the 
set of tentative hypotheses found many shortcomings of extant models, because  
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often only small parts of these models could be used as an explanation for the 
observation made in the case studies. This was the reason for the search of inputs 
about efficient creation of value through common action between involved actors 
and through the governance of the connection across the organization. 
The answer for the need of revisiting the tentative hypothesis is a methodological 
one. As mentioned by Bortz and Döring (1995), the establishment of internal 
validity for any type of empirical work is an important factor. For the purpose of 
this study ‘internal’ can be paraphrased in the in the following way: is the 
‘integrated model of intra-organizational collaboration’ in CVC programs really 
explaining what has been observed in the case studies? This subchapter is 
concerned with increasing internal validity, and therefore, uses iterative loops. In 
doing so, the results of this study’s analytical generalizations are checked against 
the observations. This confrontation holds the ability to support what this novel 
approach explains, and shows where the model does not hold explanatory power.  
The tentative hypotheses are presented at the end of 2.5. For an easier 
confrontation with the ‘integrated model of intra-organizational collaboration in 
CVC units’ the tentative hypothesis are presented in the same order. Figure 4-7 
provides a classified overview of the tentative hypotheses. 
Figure 4-7: Classified summary of the tentative hypotheses 
 Number Tentative hypothesis 
Characteristics of CVC unit 
Objectives # 1a strategic CVC objectives/ willingness of BU to collaborate 
 # 1b strategic focus/ temptation to favor financial investments 
 # 2 strategic objectives/ involvement in the investment process 
Structure # 3 structurally position/ willingness  of BU to collaborate 
Focused investments # 4a investment stage/ willingness of BU to collaborate  
 # 4b, c investment stage/control and influence of BU 
 # 5 internally generated deals/ willingness of BU to collaborate 
 # 6a substitutive investments/ willingness of BU to collaborate 
 # 6b financial objectives/exposure of substitutive deals 
 # 6c substitutive investments/ capability of BU to collaborate  
 # 6d technological overlap/ willingness and capability of BU to collaborate 
# 7a previous positions of CVC managers/ efficiency of CVC unit Previous employment  
of CVC managers # 7b number of internal contacts in the corporation 
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 # 7c  quality of internal contacts 
# 8a distributional justice of compensation/ collaboration of BU  Compensation system  
of CVC managers # 8b consideration of strategic aspects in compensation/adherence of 
strategic focus 
 # 8c strategically motivation/ ‘corporate’ compensation of CVC managers  
 # 8d CVC unit effort to gain collaboration/ willingness of BU to collaborate
Length of existence of 
CVC program 
# 9a length of existence of CVC program/ willingness of BU to collaborate. 
 # 9b  length of existence of CVC program/ number of internal contacts in 
the corporation  
 # 9c length of existence of CVC program/ number of internal deals 
Governance mechanisms  
Informal modes # 10a overall communication/efficiency of CVC unit 
 # 10b overall communication/ number of contacts  
Formal modes # 11a early existence of collaboration agreements/capability of CVC unit to 
control, influence collaboration 
 # 11b early existence of collaboration agreements/easiness to achieve the 
agreements 
 # 12a supportive infrastructure/capability of CVC unit in pre-investment 
phase 
 # 12b supportive infrastructure/capability of CVC unit in post-investment 
phase 
Knowledge sharing 
 # 13 number of contacts/level of knowledge exchange 
 # 14  amount of knowledge exchange/ willingness to collaborate 
 # 15  quality of contacts/ impact of substitutive investments 
 # 16a quality of contacts/ importance of contractual control 
 # 16b trust/importance of formal governance mechanism 
 # 16c  number of interacting persons/ collaboration efficiency 
Characteristics of business units 
# 17  structural imperatives/ willingness of BU to collaborate. Involvement in the  
investment process # 18 time of involvement of BU/ willingness of BU to collaborate 
 # 19a realizing BU-involvement/ willingness of BU to collaborate 
 # 19b early realizing BU-involvement/ capability of BU to collaborate 
 # 19c realizing BU-involvement/ consulting CVC-involvement 
 # 19d consulting CVC-involvement/ number of overseen investments 
 # 19e consulting CVC-involvement/ capability of CVC to focus on pre-
investment activities 
Hierarchy level of  # 20a  post-investment phase/ hierarchy level of contacted  BU-persons 
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contact partners # 20b hierarchy level of contacted BU-persons/ capability of BU to authorize 
resources, to control, or to solve problems 
Incentives for a BU # 21a incentives of BU/ willingness of BU to collaborate 
 # 21b financial gains for BU/ inventive for BU to collaborate 
 # 21c strategic gains for BU/ incentive for BU to collaborate 
 # 21d involvement of BU in advisory boards of investment/ incentive for BU 
to collaborate 
 # 21e Intra-firm co-investments/ incentive for BU to collaborate 
 # 21f quality of networks/impact of incentives on BU-collaboration 
 # 21g organizational learning/ impact of financial incentives on BU- 
collaboration 
Characteristics of the corporation 
 # 22a open and curious culture of corporation/ willingness of BU to 
collaborate  
 # 22b open and curious culture of corporation/ not-invented here syndrome 
 # 23  Top-management commitment for CVC/willingness of  BU to 
collaborate 
 
The hypothesized characteristics of CVC units do not represent a homogenous 
group. The focused objectives by CVC units can be grouped into the categories 
financial and strategic investors (tentative hypotheses # 1a, # 1b). These 
objectives determine the involvement of a business unit along the investment 
process (tentative hypothesis # 2) and the structural position of a CVC unit 
within a corporation (tentative hypothesis # 3). The intended motives of CVC 
programs in combination with the structural embeddedness of a CVC in a 
corporation affect the willingness of the business unit to collaborate with the 
CVC unit. In order to realize the strategic objectives, an early and deep 
involvement of business units is recommendable, whereas voluntary and weak 
involvement of business units is useful for the realization of financial objectives.  
The confrontation of the hypothesized investment focus with the model’s 
proposition concerning the willingness of a business unit to collaborate is 
straightforward. Tentative hypothesis # 4a mentions interaction between the 
investment stage and the willingness of a business unit to collaborate. Therefore 
the willingness of a business unit depends on the preference of a business unit 
regarding the collaboration goals. However, the selected investment stage by a 
CVC unit also determines the control and influence possibilities of a business  
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unit throughout the investment process (tentative hypotheses # 4b, # 4c). The 
investment stage, in return, depends on the underlying motives of the CVC 
program (tentative hypothesis # 1). Not only the investment stage determines the 
willingness of a business unit to be involved in the investment process, but also 
the number of CVC investments in internally generated deals by business units 
(tentative hypothesis # 5). Internal deals facilitate the mobilization of the intra-
firm network and the leverage of the corporate benefits.  
As a logic consequence from analyzing CVC objectives, tentative hypotheses # 
6a to # 6d define the effects of investing in substitutive investments. By this, the 
resulting willingness of a business unit to be involved in CVC activities in order 
to leverage the firm’s assets can be determined. Tentative hypothesis # 6a claims 
that the higher the exposure of a CVC unit is to invest in substitutive 
technologies, the less is the willingness of a business unit to collaborate. To a 
certain extent this is true, as it reflects the overall CVC strategy (tentative 
hypothesis # 6b), and is especially valid for the interest of a business unit to be 
involved in the investment process. This involvement must be considered in 
close connection with the issue of knowledge transfer. However, the increased 
business unit capability resulting of the technological overlap of substitutive 
investments is not valid as far as the willingness of a business unit is concerned 
to be involved in the investment process (tentative hypotheses # 6c, # 6d).  
The characteristics of a CVC unit contained in tentative hypotheses # 7a to # 7c 
constitute the previous employment of CVC managers. Knowing the relevant 
people, mobilizing potential business units in order to leverage the corporation’s 
assets depends on the number and the quality of internal contacts a CVC manager 
has within a corporation. Tentative hypothesis # 7a emphasizes the increased 
efficiency of a CVC unit that results from having CVC managers that previously 
worked in other positions within the parent company. The reasoning for this is 
quite simple. Previous employments of CVC mangers in other positions lead to 
more and qualitative better contacts within various business units (tentative 
hypotheses # 7b, #7c). 
Tentative hypotheses # 8a to # 8d can be considered as a recommendation for an 
efficient compensation structure for the CVC managers. Distributional fairness 
must be evident in the compensation of CVC managers compared to business 
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unit employees in order to increase the collaborative attitude of a business unit 
along the investment process (tentative hypothesis # 8a). In the case of strategic 
objectives, strategic aspects must be considered in the compensation basis of 
CVC managers in order to guarantee strategic orientation when selecting 
portfolio companies (tentative hypothesis # 8b). The more strategically motivated 
a CVC program is, the more similar to the “corporate” compensation must be the 
compensation system of the CVC managers. Precisely spoken, this means a base 
salary which is added by a bonus based on corporate performance. However, the 
statement of distributional justice is not valid as far as incentive of the CVC 
managers is concerned to gain the collaboration of a business unit (tentative 
hypothesis # 8d). The payment of carried interest is considered as being an 
integral part of a compensation system of investment managers. The 
establishment of a compensation system is a strategically and politically difficult 
decision which must be decided by corporate top-management. 
Finally, the last mentioned characteristics of a CVC unit dealing with the length 
of existence of a CVC program (tentative hypotheses # 9a to # 9c), are 
straightforward as they provide support for the phase of “knowing the network” 
along the involvement of business units. Since “knowing the network” covers the 
knowledge about the CVC purposes, tentative hypothesis # 9a emphasizes a 
higher willingness of a business unit to be involved.  The higher willingness of a 
business unit to collaborate is mediated by a higher number of internally existing 
contacts between the CVC unit and business units (tentative hypothesis # 9b). 
Tentative hypothesis # 9c is a logic consequence of tentative hypotheses # 9a and 
# 9b. The high recognition of the purposes of CVC activities within a corporation 
increases the number of internally generated deals by business units. 
The confrontation of the hypothesized governance mechanisms with the model’s 
proposition concerning intra-organizational collaboration is straightforward. To 
start with, tentative hypothesis # 10a is compatible with the models’ overall 
involvement steps of a business unit to know the ‘decisive persons’ in a 
corporation as a prerequisite of mobilizing the actors. Thus, a higher overall 
social interaction between the CVC unit and the business unit, aiming at 
increasing the number of contacts in a corporation, is in all cases recommendable 
(tentative hypothesis # 10b). Tentative hypotheses # 11a and 11b put the used 
governance mode in relationship between business units and the CVC unit in 
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another light and emphasize the necessity of early formal collaboration contracts 
as critical. This is consistent with the new model since it states a decreasing 
direct involvement and importance of a CVC unit later in the investment process. 
Since the model argues that the main responsibility of a CVC unit lies in 
selecting the most appropriate portfolio firms in the pre-investment phase, 
tentative hypotheses # 12a and # 12b, which emphasize supportive infrastructure 
(e.g. service-teams, venture units) are compatible with the new framework.   
The accordance between the tentative hypotheses concerning the knowledge 
sharing (# 13, # 14, # 15, # 16a-c) and the new model is not as apparent as it is 
between the hypotheses discussed so far. Some of these hypotheses have more in 
common with the model than others, which merely are not explained by the 
framework. Tentative hypothesis # 13, which claims that there is a higher level of 
knowledge transfer between the CVC unit and business units, is more or less an 
effect that results from the model. Tentative hypothesis # 14 is not directly linked 
to the framework. Although a higher knowledge transfer increases the 
willingness of a business unit to collaborate, it first requires the interest and 
desire of the business unit to be involved. As far as tentative hypothesis # 15 is 
concerned, the same logic applies as in the discussion of the previous tentative 
hypothesis. While the model may be useful to establish qualitative relationships, 
it does not explain the moderation effect between the existence of qualitative 
contacts within the corporation and the exposure to substitutive deals, such that 
substitutive technologies have less impact on the willingness of a business unit to 
collaborate. Finally, tentative hypotheses # 16a to 16c, which describe the effects 
of having established numerous contacts, are again compatible with the model, 
since the establishment of numerous contacts quasi results from following the 
frameworks’ recommendations about getting a business unit involved in CVC 
activities. The advantage of qualitative relationships is the reduced necessity of 
collaboration agreements when leveraging the corporate network (tentative 
hypothesis # 16a). The reason is quite simple: it is the existence of trust (tentative 
hypothesis # 16b). However, only indirectly linked to the model is the suggestion 
that trust in no way makes formal control mechanisms dispensable. The final 
hypothesis # 16c dealing with knowledge sharing in qualitative relationships can 
be explained properly by the developed model. The theory about network ties 
showed that in order to get the attention of business units, it may be 
recommendable for CVC 
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managers to expand the contacts when selecting the most appropriate business 
unit. As soon as one business unit has been selected, the step of leveraging the 
corporate assets is suggested to be most efficient when reducing the number of 
contacts and focusing in the post-investment phase on few contacts. 
Tentative hypotheses # 17, # 18, # 19, # 20, and # 21 relate to characteristics of 
business units. To begin with, hypothesis # 17 is fully congruent with the model. 
The hypothesized structural imperatives along the investment process are 
captured by the model’s statement that concrete action by a business unit is 
necessary in order to leverage the corporate assets. Tentative hypothesis # 18, 
which deals with the fact that there is a curvilinear relationship between time of 
the business unit involvement and its willingness, is only indirectly related to the 
model. While an involvement of business units before the investment decision 
prevents investing in strategically irrelevant deals, it increases the number of 
inquiries of a CVC manager transferred to a business unit. This issue is expressed 
in the increasing importance of business unit’s characteristics in the previous 
section. Tentative hypotheses # 19a to # 19e cope with the level of business unit 
involvement in the investment process. Since the overall purpose of the new 
model is to get the business unit actively involved in CVC activities, tentative 
hypothesis # 19a is supported. It is hypothesized that a realizing and deciding 
level of business unit involvement increases the willingness of a business unit to 
collaborate. Tentative hypotheses # 19b and # 19c are expressed by the delayed 
curve of the business unit’s importance throughout the investment process, which 
follows the curve of CVC unit’s importance in a time-lag. The more a business 
unit gets actively involved in the investment process, the higher is the capability 
of a business unit to collaborate, and at the same the more passive gets the 
involvement of the CVC unit. In return, the time-delayed importance of the 
business unit following the CVC unit importance in the model allows a CVC unit 
to observe a higher number of investments in the post-investment phase 
(tentative hypothesis # 19d). The same logic applies to the possibility of the CVC 
unit to focus its resources on financial issues along the pre-investment phase 
(tentative hypothesis # 19e).  
The situation concerning tentative hypotheses # 20a and # 20b is different. While 
the model merely suggests that the importance of the business unit generally 
increases in the post-investment phase compared to corporate top-management 
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and the CVC unit, it disregards the hierarchy level of persons which are 
contacted in a business unit. This is at odds with tentative hypothesis # 20a. 
Tentative hypothesis # 20b dealing with the advantages of contacting the high-
level management within a business unit cannot really be explained by the 
developed model, but it also has no impact on the validity of the framework. 
Tentative hypotheses # 21a to # 21g deal with the subject of existing incentives 
for a business unit necessary to mobilize their resources and to leverage business 
unit assets. The issue of hypothesis # 21b, that financial incentives such as profit 
sharing are necessary needs to be considered when mobilizing a business unit to 
be involved in the investment process. The interest and desire of a business unit 
has to be confirmed by strategic gains for a business unit (tentative hypothesis # 
21c). In return, potential “enhancement of innovation” or “window on 
technology” is related to the first stage of the new model: the definition of 
objectives of a CVC program. Since the new model suggests an increased 
involvement of a business unit in the post-investment phase, it is compatible with 
tentative hypothesis # 21d. There, it is hypothesized that the business unit’s 
interest to be involved in CVC activities increases if they are involved in the 
advisory boards of a portfolio firm. The same logic applies to tentative 
hypothesis # 21e that suggests an even stronger interest of business units in CVC 
by intra-company accounted co-investments. As far as tentative hypothesis # 21f 
with the moderation of quality of contacts on the relationship between financial 
incentives and the willingness to collaborate is concerned, it is rather some kind 
of recommendation that is not directly linked to the framework. However, the 
hypothesized moderation effect of organizational learning (tentative hypothesis # 
21g), is in so far directly related to the new model, since organizational learning 
strongly depends on the objectives of a CVC program and its resulting focused 
investments; this is defined in the first stage of the model.  
The last paragraph is focusing on the characteristics of the corporation. Besides    
the insignificant emerged differences between the German and the American 
companies, the cross-country analysis has also developed two tentative 
hypotheses (# 22a, # 22b) that rather treat cultural aspects. Tentative hypothesis # 
22a claims that an open and ‘curious’ culture of a corporation increases the 
willingness of a business unit to be involved. This type of corporate culture was 
predominately found in the case of the American companies. However, while this 
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kind of culture doubtlessly facilitates the involvement of a business unit in the 
investment process there is no real explanation for this in the model. To a certain 
extent, this neglect in the new framework is related to the difficult task of 
operationalizing a company’s culture. The same logic applies to tentative 
hypothesis # 22b. The last tentative hypothesis deals with the fact that the 
involvement of a business unit in CVC activities should have the support and 
commitment of corporate top-management, because the attention and interest of 
business units about CVC investment needs to be directed and initiated from the 
very top of the company already when defining strategy and structure of a CVC 
program. Thus, CVC programs are a way of creating rents and new real options 
either by providing “strategic feelers” to disruptive technologies, or by co-opting 
through minority investments. Such strategic decisions are not made by middle-
management. Tentative hypothesis # 23 is supported due to the fact that the 
model considers the high importance of corporate top-management especially in 
the first two stages of the framework.     
The preceding confrontation of the ‘integrated model of intra-organizational 
collaboration’ in CVC programs with the set of tentative hypothesis has found 
overwhelming support for the explanations the new model offers. Most of the 
tentative hypotheses that were derived immediately from observations and 
analysis of the intra-firm collaboration cases can be thoroughly explained by the 
new model. Some questions remain concerning the applicability of this 
framework across all types of corporate venturing activities as different venturing 
objectives ask for an adaptation. The relationship and interaction between the 
CVC unit and the business units was clearly the focus of this study.  Because of 
this limited focus, the extension of this model to other influencing relationships 
(e.g. between the start-up company and the business unit) is required.   
The aim of this subjection was to check the newly ‘integrated model of intra-
organizational collaboration’. As the iterative loops offered profound 
explanations for the majority of the hypotheses, it results in a substantial 
corroboration of the new model. Since the results of exploratory research are 
often not as clear as one would like them to be, the detection of shortcomings and 
the uncovering of needs for future refinement is one of the reasons why this 
iteration was performed. The subsequent section 4.3 will deal with these topics 
more in detail.    
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4.3 Implications and directions for further research 
This study has explored the intra-organizational collaboration between the CVC 
unit and business units in corporations that maintain a CVC program. Six cases 
about these collaboration activities were described in detail in the context of the 
investment process. The rich description has demonstrated how the objectives of 
CVC programs influence the organizational setting of CVC units in corporations, 
which both critically influence the involvement of a business unit throughout the 
investment process. Within- and cross-case analyses were performed to 
substantiate the analyses. By using the methodological procedures of 
comparative case-study research the study succeeded in identifying several 
common patterns concerning the objectives of CVC programs, their 
organizational structures and the concrete involvement of business units along 
the investment process. These patterns where then assembled to form a set of 
tentative hypotheses.  
Starting with the tentative hypotheses, the body of extant theories has been 
confronted. In doing so, first resource-based and knowledge-based theory looks 
at the creation of value through the selection and combination of tangible and 
intangible resources. Second, social capital and network theory gave insights in 
the creation of value through common action between different actors. Finally, 
social exchange and agency theory tell us how different governance modes affect 
the outcome of resource exchange. Some of the propositions from the theories 
offered partial explanations for the case findings. However, because of numerous 
shortcomings, the study resulted in the construction of an ‘integrated model for 
the collaboration between the CVC unit and business units’, that pursues in a 
high willingness of a business unit to collaborate.   
This framework ties together the characteristics of CVC units, business units and 
corporate top-management and thus generates a novel extension of CVC theory 
capable of explaining the intra-firm collaboration in CVC programs. The model’s 
explanations were cross-checked with the tentative hypothesis and were found in 
accordance with the case findings. The model can be used in two ways. On the 
one hand, it can be used as a method how to define the strategy and the 
organizational structure of a CVC program. On the other hand, and even more 
important, it is a tool how to manage the concrete involvement of a business unit 
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along the investment process, which guarantees the willingness of a business unit 
to collaborate.  
Apart from the theoretical contribution, this model of intra-firm collaboration 
also shows several implications for managers. Which are these? The study 
brought up two scenarios. On the one side, there are strategically motivated CVC 
programs which follow a well defined integration process of business units along 
the investment process. Mandatory involvement of business units ensures the 
alignment of CVC and business unit strategies. This is important for the overall 
strategy of the corporation. On the other side, there are CVC programs that are 
not actively pursuing business unit involvement along the investment process. 
The success of these CVC programs, which mainly focus on financial objectives, 
could be explained by two reasons: First, the CVC unit is entirely independent 
from business unit preferences and strategies when screening the market for the 
most promising portfolio firms in financial terms. Second, a voluntary 
involvement possibility of business units to collaborate with portfolio companies 
only in the case of high interest and strategic importance lead to a higher 
willingness of a business unit to collaborate than it would be in the case of 
mandatory involvement. In other words, if a business unit sees potential to 
collaborate they may, but they do not have to nurture the start-up company. Out 
of these two scenarios, I argue that both approaches are viable ways for CVC 
programs. The strategic decision has to be made by corporate top-management 
whether the corporation favors financial or strategic objectives with their 
venturing activities. However, if the company orients itself on financial 
objectives, a mandatory business unit involvement is not recommendable, since 
financially oriented investments that need the approval of the business unit, will 
probably encounter more rejection from a business unit. 
Another key implication is that the willingness of a business unit to collaborate 
along the investment process is influenced by the characteristics of three actors: 
the CVC unit, the corporate top-management and the business unit itself. All 
these actors have impacts on the process of the involvement by ‘knowing the 
network’, ‘mobilizing the network’, and ‘leveraging the network’. Analogies 
have been found to the ‘AIDA’ principle of sales. While the first and second 
stage mainly lies in the responsibility of corporate top-management, the control 
and responsibility is taken over by the CVC unit and business unit in the third 
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stage of the model, the actual involvement of a business unit along the 
investment process.  
This study has been explanatory in nature and does not claim to offer final truths, 
and some problems remain unresolved. Although through repeated confrontation 
of the traditional models with the case findings it has been shown that this study 
offers the most appropriate explanations of intra-firm collaboration, an important 
problem of this study is that it does not explicitly look at the collaboration 
between business unit and portfolio firms. However, that collaboration strongly 
influences the relationship under focus of this work, since the majority of 
resources and knowledge is exchanged between the business unit and the 
portfolio firms. Including portfolio companies in the research in order to get 
information about the amount of realized and transferred value added to the 
investee would be doubtlessly useful. Nevertheless, it has to be mentioned that 
the focused relationship between the CVC unit and the business unit is an 
important initiator for the ongoing relationship between the portfolio firm and the 
business unit. As far as the relationship between the CVC unit and corporate top-
management is concerned, this study only indirectly focuses on the collaboration 
between the investment managers and the top-management of the corporation. 
Especially, the definition process of CVC objectives, which has been shown to 
have impacts on the collaboration process between the CVC unit and the 
business unit, is not analyzed in detail. Another issue that deserves to be 
mentioned in the context of unresolved questions concerns the neglect of the 
relationship between CVC unit and other VCs. It can be assumed that co-
investments with other VCs have their impacts on the collaboration between the 
CVC unit and the business unit. 
In the process of this research some light has been shed on the previously 
unexplained patterns of intra-firm collaboration in CVC programs. With the 
CVC model of intra-firm collaboration, I hope that future research may be able to 
build on these results. An issue that deserves special attention in future research 
is the performance measurement of CVC. In order to develop normative 
statements from the integrated model of intra-organizational collaboration 
between the CVC unit and the business unit it is inevitable that quantitative 
measurements of the performance of much collaboration willingness should be 
conducted.  
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The use of specific strategies, organizational structures and concrete business 
unit involvement can only be recommended after more is known about their 
success. What kind of financial incentives for business units are viable ways? 
How big must the financial incentives be in order to maximize the willingness of 
a business unit to collaborate with a CVC unit? Which specific form of CVC 
compensation overcomes the dilemma of migration of investment managers and 
the perpetuation of the business unit’s collaboration? To what extent is it possible 
to implement the American corporate culture in German CVCs, which is 
beneficial for an open and curious attitude of the business units?  How can the 
strategic pay-backs for business units and the corporation be measured? 
All of these questions represent interesting courses for further research. Clearly, 
what is needed for performing such inquiries is large-scale quantitative analysis. 
This may not be easy, since such studies would face some considerable 
difficulties concerning the operationalization of variables and data availability of 
CVC programs. The difficult problems concerning the ‘contact trails’ of 
collaboration come to mind in this context. These difficulties may be exacerbated 
by the sensitivity of financial success resulting from collaboration. Apparently, I 
can finish this study in the words of Zaby (1999) that exploratory studies open at 
least as many questions as they answer.  
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Appendices 
List of Interviews and Affiliations of Interviewees1 
 
 
CVC 
Program 
Investment 
manager 
Place Date/ 
Duration 
Investment
manager 
Place Date 
Duration 
Business 
Unit 
Affilitate 
Place Date/ 
Duration 
T-
Venture 
Mr. Dr. 
Schwegler 
Bonn, 
Germany 
19.07.01 
1,5 Hrs. 
Mr. Kögler Bonn, 
Germany 
19.07.01 
2 Hrs. 
Not possible --- --- 
Daimler 
Chrysler 
Venure 
Fr. Dr. 
Tümpen, 
Mr. 
Albrecht 
Stuttgart, 
Germany 
20.07.01 
2 Hrs. 
Mr. Henzler Stuttgart,
Germany 
06.08.01
2,5 Hrs. 
Mr. 
Strohkirch 
Stuttgart, 
Germany 
06.08.01
1,5 Hrs. 
Intel 
Capital 
Mr. Offner Munich, 
Germany 
23.07.01 
2 Hrs. 
Mr. Krumm Munich,
Germany 
07.08.01 
2,5 Hrs. 
Mr. Al-
Shamma 
Munich, 
Germany 
08.08.01
1,5 Hrs. 
General 
Electric 
Equity 
Mr. Rossi London, 
UK 
24.07.01 
3 Hrs. 
Mr. Sanchez London,
UK 
28.06.01 
24.07.01 
Not 
Possible 
--- --- 
Siemens 
Venture 
Capital 
Mrs. Blasel Munich, 
Germany 
08.08.01 
2 Hrs. 
Mr. Steis Munich,
Germany 
22.08.01 
1,5 Hrs. 
Mrs. Dr. 
Wiggenhorn 
Munich, 
Germany 
20.08.01 
1,5 Hrs. 
Motorola 
Ventures 
Mr. Estes Chicago, 
USA 
23.10.01 
2 Hrs. 
Mr. Mark Chicago,
USA 
USA 
23.10.01 
1,5 Hrs. 
Mr. Lodato 
 
Mr. Lacal 
Chicago, 
USA 
Chicago, 
USA 
28.11.01
1 Hrs. 
03.12.01
1 Hrs. 
 
Different characteristics of the companies available at Venture Economics 
 
Characteristic American CVCs German CVCs 
Date of foundation Motorola Ventures  1992, 
central since 1999 
Daimler Chrysler  
Venture 
1997, since 2000 
open for ext. deals 
                                              
1 Only for the purpose of the evaluation process of this work at the university 
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 Intel Capital 1990 T-Venture 1997 
 GE Equity 1990 (informal), 
formal since 1995 
Siemens Venture  
Capital 
1984 (TVM),  
since 1999 SVC 
Number of 
managed funds 
Motorola Ventures  1 Daimler Chrysler  
Venture 
1 
 Intel Capital 5 T-Venture 4 
 GE Equity 4 Siemens Venture  
Capital 
4 
Capital under 
management 
Motorola Ventures  150 US$ million 
annual fund 
Daimler Chrysler  
Venture 
120 € million 
 Intel Capital 7500 US$ million  T-Venture 500 € million 
 GE Equity 8000 US$ million Siemens Venture  
Capital 
US$ 180 million,  
(thereof 60 % go in 
funds) 
Number of 
investments 
Motorola Ventures  3 Daimler Chrysler  
Venture 
21 
 Intel Capital Ca. 350 T-Venture 70 direct invest.,  
+ ca. 30 fund inv.  
 GE Equity Ca. 375  
+ 86 indirect fund 
investments  
Siemens Venture  
Capital 
55 direct invest., 
+ investm. in 9 
funds 
Number of Exits Motorola Ventures  3 Daimler Chrysler  
Venture 
No exit 
 Intel Capital n.a. T-Venture 1 
 GE Equity n.a. Siemens Venture  
Capital 
8 
Nation breakdown Motorola Ventures  96,8 % USA Daimler Chrysler  
Venture 
53 % Germany, 
43 % USA 
 Intel Capital 78,4 % USA T-Venture 51,4%  USA,  
11,8 % Germany 
 GE Equity 45,9 % USA Siemens Venture 
Capital 
86,8% USA 
Investment stage 
breakdown 
Motorola Ventures  Expansion 68,3%, 
Late stage 17,7%, 
Early stage 14,5%  
Daimler Chrysler 
Venture 
Early stage 56,1%, 
Later stage 25%, 
Expansion 18,9% 
 Intel Capital Expansion 56,5%, 
Later stage 20,6 %, 
Early stage 15,5% 
T-Venture Expansion 66,6%, 
Early stage 18,3%, 
Late sate 15,1% 
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 GE Equity Buyout/Acq.47,5/% 
Expansion 29,6%, 
Later stage 11,5% 
Siemens Venture  
Capital 
Expansion 50,3%, 
Late stage 35,9%, 
Early stage 11,9% 
Industry breakdown Motorola Ventures  Internet spec. 34,6% 
Comm/Med. 23,9% 
Comp softw. 21,5% 
Daimler Chrysler  
Venture 
Financ Serv 38,1%, 
Comp softw. 28,4%
Internet spec. 25% 
 Intel Capital Internet spec. 32,5% 
Comp softw. 23,8% 
Comm/Med 19,2% 
T-Venture Internet spec 57,1% 
Comm/Med 35,5%, 
Comp softw. 5,3% 
 GE Equity Financ. Serv. 41,6% 
Internet spec. 25,9%
Comm/Med 10,9%  
Siemens Venture  
Capital 
Comm/Med 59,2%,
Comp softw. 16,9% 
Internet spec 13,8% 
 
Summary of the within case-cross country analysis 
Charac-
teristics 
Motorola 
Ventures 
Intel 
Capital 
GE Equity Daimler 
Chrysler 
Venture 
Siemens 
Venture 
Capital 
T-Venture 
General 
Aspects 
      
Investment 
model 
1. strategic focus  
2. financial 
returns 
1. strategic 
purpose 
2. financial 
attractiveness (as 
pre-requisite for 
strategic deals) 
1. financial focus
2. strategic 
purposes  
1. Strategic intra-
preneurship 
2. financial 
goals; 
irrelevant are 
enhancement of 
demand or 
potential 
acquisition 
candidates 
 
 
1. Financing 
2. Consulting 
/Coaching: 
Venture 
Nurturing by 
providing use of 
the links of 
Siemens 
3. Networking: 
Central contact 
partner, Info-
know how 
center, VC Best 
Practice 
1. Financial 
returns 
2. Strategic 
objectives; 
3. Social 
objectives: 
positive, 
innovative and 
responsible 
image of 
Telekom 
75 % direct 
investments, 
25% in indirect 
fund models 
CVC 
locations 
Corporate 
headquarter, 
important BU-
locations 
(Chicago, 
Boston, Silicon 
Valley) 
22 offices in all 
5 continents 
10 offices in all 
5 continents 
Stuttgart 
(Germany), Palo 
Alto (USA); no 
office at the 
American 
headquarter 
Corporate 
headquater,  
Santa Clara 
(CA), 
Burlingthon 
(MA) 
Darmstadt, 
Bonn, Berlin, 
Munich, 
Redwood City, 
Boston, 
Favored 
Exit 
 
Depending on 
the market  
Everything that 
generates liquid 
funds (IPO, 
Trade Sale on 
cash) 
Trade sales, buy-
outs 
- usually after 3-
5 years:IPO (buy 
back or trade 
sale are also 
possible) 
No preference - usually after 5-
7 years: IPO or 
Trade sale 
Investment 
focus: 
- 
Investment 
stage 
 
- Early stage and 
expansion (no 
seed investm.)  
- strategic areas 
of Motorola, but 
also outside of 
 
- Early stage 
(first or second 
round financing)
- technology 
areas along the 
computing 
 
- Late stage and  
‘buy-outs’. 
(1) financial 
services, auto 
and healthcare,  
(2) technology, 
 
-preferably 
Seed/Early stage 
(start-up) and 
Growth stage 
- electronics, 
sensors, electro-
 
- Seed, Early, 
and Mezzanine 
(1) Information/ 
Communication 
(2) Automation 
and Control, 
 
- Seed, Early-
stage, first 
growth round. 
- TIMES markets
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- 
Investment 
area 
corporate core 
business 
spectrum media, 
healthcare 
(3) Enterprise 
services 
mechanics, e-
business, 
telematics, m-
commerce, 
mobility 
services, 
software 
development, 
material 
technology, fuel 
cell technology. 
(3) Medical 
Solutions and 
Power 
Structure       
Structure of 
CVC unit 
within the 
company 
Central 
embedded in 
Motorola, falls 
under corporate 
headquarter  
Business-
department of 
Intel, not any 
legal 
independent 
company 
Subunit from GE 
Capital, that 
itself is an 
affiliate of GE 
Subsidiary of 
DaimlerChrysler 
in the form of a 
limited liability 
company, 
affiliated to the 
M&A 
department, a 
sub-unit of 
Corporate 
Development 
Subsidiary of 
Siemens in the 
form of a limited 
liability 
company, 
affiliated to 
Corporate 
Finance 
Subsidiary of 
Telekom in the 
form of a limited 
liability 
company, 
affiliated to 
Production and 
Technology 
Capital 
source 
Corporate 
balance  
Corporate 
balance  
Corporate 
balance 
Corporate 
balance  
Corporate 
Finance 
Corporate 
balance  
Internal 
organizatio
n structure 
of CVC unit 
Subdivided into 
(1) Geography 
(2) Technology 
areas 
Two modes of 
subdivision: 
a.) in the USA: 
into technology 
b.) in Europe:(1) 
by geography 
                      (2) 
by technology 
 
Subdivided into:
(1) Geography 
(2) Technology 
areas 
Reorganization 
is planned by 
competence 
centers 
Matrix-
organization: 3 
Business areas 
and 4 cross-
sectional 
functions  
3 levels: 
1. management 
board 
2. investment 
directors 
3. investment 
managers 
Processes       
CVC 
incentive 
structure 
Corporate-
common +1 % 
bonus, no carry 
of interest 
Corporate-
common 
Corporate-
common 
Corporate 
common 
Carried interest Corporate with 
variations 
(Carry under 
discussions) 
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Intra-group 
cost 
charging 
No No Corporate rate 
for DD and long 
lasting projects 
No No: regarding 
BU, cost 
charging with 
Legal-, Tax-
departments 
No, as far as it 
doesn’t 
transcend 
‘normal’ projects
Inter-company 
prices exist 
regarding the 
technology 
expert centers 
Possibility 
of Co-
investment 
with BU 
No No Only corporate 
internal co-
investment, but 
CVC unit 
remains sole 
investor against 
investment 
No Yes, but limited 
interest of BU 
Yes, diverse 
fund models are 
applied 
Company 
Board seats 
by BU 
Yes No Yes No No,  
only if a BU co-
invested 
Yes, or the 
investment 
directors want to 
be represented 
Actors       
Origin of 
CVC 
Managers 
Mainly external 
hired 
Mainly previous 
Intel employees 
70 % out of 
corporate M&A 
department 
Mainly previous 
DaimlerChrysler
employees 
(intern. career 
partnership 
porgram) 
2/3 internal of 
Siemens, 1/3 
external 
60 % external, 
40 % internal 
The set of hypothesis is summarized in the following figure. 
Awareness
Willingness
Length of existence
Characteristics   of CVC  unit
Strategic focus
Capability
Involvement in the 
investment process
Characteristics of business unit
Incentives out of CVC 
Governance mechanisms 
of CVC-BU relationship
Formal
Existence of agreements or 
control reports
Existence of 
Support Teams
Overall Interaction
between CVC and BU
Informal
Trust/
social networks
Knowledge Sharing
Many qualitative 
relationships
Amount of Knowledge 
exchange (Learning)
Internally generated 
deals
Previous employments
of CVC managers
Compensation system
Distributional Justice
Evaluation basis
Culture of 
openness in the 
Corporation
Top Management 
Commitment for CVC 
program
Structural imparatives
Early involvement
Realizing level
Focused investments
Stage of investments
Complementary deals
Technological
knowledge overlap
Aspects of BU cooperation
Efficiency of CVC
Characteristics of corporation
+
+/-
+
+
+ +
+
-
-
+
+
+
+
-
+ ++
+
+
+/-
+
+
+
+
+
-
Hierarchical Structure:
level of centralization
-
+
Level of contacted persons
+/-
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Interview Transcripts 
Please see separate volume. 
 
 Siemens Venture Capital  
• 2Ram,Inc. • Graviton,Inc. • Packet Video Corporation 
• Accelerated Networks,Inc. • Hyperchip,Inc. • PowerNetrix 
• Agilience Group GmbH • InterLink Networks • RADVision,Inc 
• Agility Communications,Inc. • Interactive Silicon,Inc. • SignalSoft Corporation 
• Appitude,Inc. • Kenetec Inc. • Sitara Networks,Inc. 
• Aprisa • Kestrel Solutions,Inc. • SmartSynch,Inc. 
• Asera,Inc. • Knowledge Junction Syst. • Stockaccess.com 
• BeamReach Networks • LightLogic,Inc. • Strix Systems,Inc. 
• Blue Pumpkin Software.Inc. • LuxN,Inc. • SupplyForce.com 
• Caly Corporation • Maple Optical Systems • Sycamore Networks 
• Cambridge Positioning Syst. • Mediatrix Telecom,Inc. • TeleKnowledge Inc. 
• Cambridge Silicon Radio • More Magic Soaftware,Inc. • Time Domain Corporation 
• Chiaro Networks,Ltd. • Morphics Technology,Inc. • Unidosclosed Company 
• Clustra Systems.,Inc. • NetContinuum,Inc. • Undisclosed Company 
• Codeon Corporation • Network Photonics,Inc. • Venetec International,Inc. 
• Cyras Systems,Inc. • Nishan Systems,Inc. • Virata Corporation 
• Digital Envoy • Novasonics • Workstation AG 
• Dynamicsoft,Inc. • Novermber AG • Zight Corporation 
• ElekSen Ltd • OMM,Inc. • eYak,Inc. 
• Floware Wireless Syst. • Oblix,Inc. • emWare 
• FoloWAP • Openwave Systems,Inc. • webwasher.com AG 
 Motorola Ventures  
• 4thpass,Inc. • GMP Companies,Inc. • Nuance Communic. 
• Advent Networks • GoAhead Software,Inc. • NxView Technologies,Inc. 
• Aerocast • Gotuit Media,Inc. • Online Anywhere 
• AirClic,Inc. • Graviton,Inc. • OpenGrid,Inc. 
• Aura Communications • Home Director,Inc. • Orchid Bioscience,Inc. 
• Balze Network Products,Inc. • ICTV • PacketVideo Corporation 
• Broadband Innovations • Iconix Pharmaceuticals,Inc. • Paratek Microwaves,Inc. 
• Broadband Services,Inc. • Identix,Inc. • Point.com 
• Cacheon,Inc. • Intellon Corporation • ReplayTV Inc. 
• Centerpost Corporation • Interactive Enterprise,Ltd. • SecureOps 
• Clinical Micro Sensors • Internet Appliance Network • Shellcase 
• CodeOnLine • Ipix,Inc. • SimpleDevices 
• Command Audio Corp. • Kitchen Etc. • SportVision,Inc. 
• Commerce.TV,Inc. • Linuxcare,Inc. • Symbian Ltd. 
• Cynergy Systems Design • LinuxWorks • Tao Group Ltd. 
• DevLab One,Inc. • Magis Networks,Inc. • TissueInformatics,Inc. 
• E Ink Corporation • Media Station,Inc. • Tarq Wireless 
• Echelon Systems Corp. • MeetChina.com • Undisclosed Gearmany 
• Eclipsys Corporation • Mobileye Vision Techn. • V-Span,Inc. 
• Entera,Inc. • Molecular Imprints • Virtus Entertainment 
• Epicentric,Inc. • Morphics Technology,Inc. • WorldGate  Communic. 
• First International Digital • Nanovation Technologies • Xanboo,Inc. 
• FitSense Technology • Next Level Communications • broadcast.com 
• Foundstone • Nextel Partners,Inc. • EmWare,Inc. 
• FreeDrive,Inc. • Nonvolative electronics,Inc.  
 DaimlerChrysler Venture  
• Augeo Software • IDM Infrarot Sensoren • Venturepark AG 
• BS Biometric Systems • Iteris • Workscape,Inc. 
• Definiens AG • NanoMuscle,Inc • benelog.com AG 
   • mcn tele.com AG 
 Intel Capital  
• 2nd Century Communic. • Formus Communications • Radiant Networks PLC 
• 3DSP • Framework Technol. Corp. • Radiant Phonetics 
• 3Path • Frictionless Commerce,Inc. • RadioLAN,Inc. 
• 80-20 Software Pty Ltd. • G2 Networks,Inc. • RadioWave.com 
• 911 Entertainment,Inc. • Galian Phonetics,Inc. • Radish Communications 
• @Comm Corporation • Gemfire,Inc. • Raindance Communications
• @Motion,Inc. • GeoCities,Inc. • RangeStar Wirelss,Inc. 
• @Road • Geodesic Systems,Inc. • RealTimeImage 
• Abaton.com,Inc. • Get2Chip.com,Inc. • Realviz SA 
• Absolute Software,Inc. • GigaNet,Inc. • Recourse Technologies,Inc. 
• Accelerated Encryption • Gilian Technologies,Inc. • Red Hat Software 
• AccessLan Communications • Global Groupware Solutions • Red Hat Ventures 
• Accordion Networks,Inc. • Gloss.com,Inc. • Rell.com,Inc. 
• Adero,Inc. • GoAhead Software • Relativity,Inc. 
• Aduva,Inc. • Grant Investrade Private • Resonate,Inc. 
• Advanced Data Exchange • Groove Networks,Inc. • RiskMetrics 
• Airoam Wireless technology • Group Sense (International) • Ritechoice Technologies 
• Airslide Systems • Helios Health,Inc. • Rivals.com 
• AllBusiness.com • HellosAsio.com • RiverLogic 
• Allegis Corporation • HelloBrain.Com • Rosenbluth Interactive 
• Altitude Software BV • HeyAnita.com,Inc. • SMS Managm. and Techn. 
• AltoWeb,Inc. • HighTecnology Solutions • SSKI Investor Services Pvt. 
• Alvesta Corporation • Homestead.com,Inc. • STSN 
• Amoeba Telecom Limited • HotOffice Technologies,Inc. • Sanctum,Inc. 
• Ancestry.com • Hubspan,Inc. • Sasken Telecommunicat. 
• Antrim Design Systems,Inc. • Hybrid Networks,Inc. • SearchButton.com 
• Anystream • IMO Communications Priv. • SelfCare.com 
• Aplion Network • IMX Exchange,Inc. • Sendmail,Inc. 
• Apogee Networks,Inc. • IP Dynamics • Sente,Inc. 
• AppGenesys,Inc. • IP Infusion,Inc. • Sentica 
• AppStream,Inc. • ITXC Corporation • Servicesoft Inc. 
• Applied Psychology Res. • Ikanos Communications,Inc. • ShareWave,Inc. 
• Arabia Online • Illustra Information Techn. • SightPath 
• Aristo Technology • ImpactXoft • SignalSoft Corporation 
• Articulate Systems Inc. • Incanta,Inc. • Silicon Access Networks 
• Asera,Inc. • Ind-Telesoft Private Limited • Silicon Image,Inc. 
• Asia Mail.com,Inc. • Index.hu Rt • Silicon Wave,Inc. 
• Asiacontent.com • Indiainfoline.com Limited • Silknet Software 
• Assentive Solutions,Inc. • Indra Networks Private • SilverStream Software,Inc. 
• AssetHouse Technology • Indus Software Pvt Ltd • Simplex Soputions,Inc. 
• AtomFimls Coporation • IndusInd Entertainment Pvt. • SmartPipes 
• Audible Words Corporation • IndusInd Media & Comm. • Sohu.com 
• Aurema Pty Ltd • Ineto • Solid 
• Atuthentia,Inc. • InfoGear Technology Corp. • Solidum Systems Corp 
• Auxora Inc. • Inktomi Corporation • Solsoft Inc. 
• Avalon Phonetics Ltd • Instill Coporation • Soltima,Inc. 
• Aveo,Inc. • Insyde Software • Speech Machines,Inc. 
• Avid Sports,Inc. • Integrated Telecom Express • SpeechWorks Internat. 
• Avigna Technologies • Interactive Video Systems • Spinner.com 
• Axeda Systems,Inc. • Intercyclone • Sportvision,Inc. 
• BabyCenter • International Financial Syst. • StarMedia,Inc. 
• Banderacom • Intertrainer Inc. • Steeleye Technology  
• Banyan Networks Private  • Intro Networks,Inc. • Stratify,Inc. 
• Baobab Technologies • Invenmtion Machine Corp. • Stratus Computer Systems 
• BaySpec • Iridigm Display Corp. • Streamline Solutions 
• Be Here Corporation • JAMDAT Mobile • SuSE Linux AG 
• Be.Inc. • Jungo Software Techn.  • Supertracks.com 
• Berkley Networks,Inc. • Juno Online Services Inc • Supresoft 
• Black Pearl,Inc. • K2 Optronics • Surf Communications Sol. 
• Blaze Network Products,Inc. • LIFEMASTERS Supported  • Susa,Inc. 
• BlueStar Communications • lightconnect,Inc. • SyChip,Inc. 
• Bluecurve,Inc. • Lane15 Software,Inc. • Sycon Design,Inc. 
• Bluesocket,Inc. • LaserBit Communications Rt • Synchronicity,Inc. 
• Bluesoft,Inc. • Launch Media • Syndeo Corporation 
• BoostWorks,Inc. • LearnLinc • T-Networks,Inc 
• Braxtel,Communications • Legend Silicon Corp • Teachscape 
• BroadLogic,Inc. • Ligos Corporation • Teja Technologies,Inc. 
• BroadbandLiving,Inc. • LinkAir Communications,Inc. • Tejas Networks India Pvt. 
• Broadbase Software,Inc. • Liquid Audio,Inc. • Telera,Inc. 
• Broket Infosystems AG • Loudeye Technologies,Inc. • TelesciCOM Ltd. 
• Bullant Technology Pty,Ltd. • Lutris Technologies,Inc. • Templex Technology Corp. 
• C Level Design,Inc. • LynuxWorks • TheBeast.com 
• CDT,Ltd. • Lytek Corporation • Thin Film Electronics 
• CIE Corporation Sdn Bhd • MaMa Media,Inc. • ThingWorld.com 
• Cambridge Positioning Syst. • Magma Design Automation • Ticketmaster 
• Cambridge Silicon Radio • Marvell Technology Group • TicketsLive 
• Capacity Technologies • Maya Entertainment Limited • Times Ten Perform. Softw. 
• CardoNet • Mediadome • Tonic Software,Inc. 
• Career Launcher • Mellanox Technologies,Inc. • Tornado Development,Inc. 
• Cash-U Mobile Technolog. • Miaxis Biometrics Co Ltd • Torrent Systems,Inc. 
• Celion Networks,Inc. • Miradores.Com Argentinia • Torrex Equipment Corp. 
• Celoxia • Moai Technologies,Inc. • Total Shopping Network 
• CenterBeam,Inc. • MobileAware Ltd • TriVium Systems 
• Cereva Networks,Inc. • Molecular OptoElectronics  • Troika Networks,Inc. 
• ChannelPoint,Inc. • Monet Mobile Networks,Inc. • Tru-Si Technologies 
• Chiaro Networks,Ltd. • MontaVista Software • Turbo Squid,Inc. 
• China Weal Business Mach. • Monterey Design Systems • TurboLinux,Inc. 
• ChinaCast Technology (BVI)  • MuTec Ltd. • Umachines,Inc. 
• ChipPAC,Inc. • MusicMatch • UTStarcom,Inc. 
• Chrysalis-IST • My Family.com,Inc. • Undisclosed Company 
• Cidera,Inc. • MY Simon,Inc. • Unicast,Inc. 
• Clarent Corporation • NARUS,Inc. • Unicorn Solutions,Ltd. 
• Classroom Connect • NC-Virtual Systems • United Devices,Inc. 
• Clear Commerce Corp. • NFR Security • United Teleshopping & Mark
• Co-Design Automation Inc. • Navini Networks • Uprizer,Inc. 
• Colibrys SA • Neocera,Inc. • VA Software Corporation 
• Collab.net,Inc. • NetBoost Corporation • VSK Phonetics,Inc. 
• Color-Link,Inc. • NetCentrex,Inc. • VSYS,Inc. 
• CommerceRoute,Inc. • NetCentrum,s.r.o. • ValiCert,Inc. 
• Connected Corporation • NetDynamics,Inc. • VeloCom,Inc. 
• Consign Technologies • NetOctave,Inc. • Ventirx Systems,Inc. 
• Consystant Design Techn. • Netodium,Inc. • Venturcom Inc. 
• Contech Engineering&Cons • Network Elements,Inc. • VeriCenter,Inc. 
• Co Ltd. • Network Physics,Inc. • Veridicom,Inc. 
• Convergelabs,Inc. • New Edge Networks • Viacore,Inc. 
• Copper Mountain Netw. • NewMonics,Inc. • ViewSonic Corporation 
• CopperCom,Inc. • NextPage,Inc. • Village Networks,Inc. 
• Core Networks Inc. • NobleNet,Inc. • Virtuak I-O 
• Corona Optical Systems • Nomadix,Inc. • Virtual Ink Corporation 
• CosmoCom,Inc. • Northern Lights Computer • Visual Insights,Inc. 
• Covad Communications  • Nova Crystals,Inc. • Volterra Semiconductors 
• Conventor,Inc. • Novalux,Inc. • Vordel 
• Cronos Integrated Microsyst • Nover Optics • VxTel 
• CrossWorlds Software,Inc. • Nuance Communicat. • WANWall Ltd. 
• Crossrads Systems,Inc. • NyView Technologies,Inc. • WebGain,Inc. 
• CyOptics,Inc. • Nxt Wave Communications • WebLine Communications  
• Cyber India Online Limited • Oasis Technology,Ltd. • Webridge,Inc. 
• Dartfish • Oblix,Inc. • WellMed,Inc. 
• DataCore Software Corp. • Octiv,Inc. • Wildfire Communications 
• Data Play,Inc. • Omneon Video Networks • Wipcore AB 
• DataSynapse • OnLive! Technologies,Inc. • XLNT Designs 
• Deccanet Designs Ltd. • One Touch Systems,Inc. • XUMA Inc. 
• Damantra,Ltd. • Onset Technology Inc. • Yodlee.com,Inc. 
• DevelopOnline.com,Corp. • Open Loop Inc. • Your Voice 
• Digia Oy • Orchstream,Ltd. • Zayante,Inc. 
• Digital Entertainment Netw. • P-Cupe,Inc. • Zight Corporaiton 
• Digital F/X,Inc. • POPcast Communications  • Zone Labs,Inc. 
• Digital Media On Demand • PacketVideo Corporation • Zope 
• Digital Optics • PakNetX Corporation • Zygon,Ltd. 
• Digital Optics Corporation • Palace • Actzero 
• Digital Persona • Paramoney Investment Man • broadcast.com 
• Dotcast,Inc. • Services Pvt Ltd • cadMOS Design Techn. 
• ENBA PLC • PassCall Advanced Techn. • cap-XX Proprietary Limited 
• Eastern Software Systems  • PenPower Technology • eFusion,Inc. 
• Eysa Systems Inc. • Peregrine Semiconductors  • eKIT.com,Inc. 
• Ecutel,Inc. • Persistent Systems Pvt. Ltd. • eOriginal 
• Elind Computers • Phasebridge Inc. • eSoft 
• Embrace Networks • Philsar Semiconductors,Inc. • eTel Group,Ltd. 
• Enfish Corporation • PhotoBit • eToys 
• Engenia Software,Inc. • PhotomEx Corporaiton • eVector (India) Pvt Ltd 
• Engenious Software,Inc. • Phonetic Materials Ltd. • enmail.com Pvt Ltd 
• Ensemble Communications • Pictuere IQ • epicRalm,Inc. 
• Entercept Security Techn. • Pingtel Corporaiton • gForce Systems 
• Envox Group AB • PlateSpin,Inc. • iBeam Broadcasting Corp 
• Epylon Corporation • Plumtree Software,Inc. • iBuyLine,Inc 
• Esterel Technologies SA • Portland Software,Inc. • IFlyTech 
• ExaNet,Inc. • Portola Systems • iMediation SA 
• Extricity Software,Inc. • Power X Ltd • iPASS,Inc. 
• FONS Corporation • Pramati Technologies (P) • iPrint,Inc. 
• FamilyEducation Network • Preview Systems,Inc. • iShip.com 
• Fantastic Corporation,The • Primarion,Inc. • iTelo Communications,Inc. 
• Fast-Chip,Inc. • Primavera Systems • iVillage,Inc. 
• FeedRoom.com,Inc.,The • Princeton Optronics,Inc. • nLine Corporaiton 
• Fenestratee BV • Prio,Inc. • Pasia 
• Fiber Optic Network Solut. • Prisa Networks,Inc. • vPakcet Communications 
• Corporations • Prover Technology • webplan Corporation 
• Financial Engines,Inc. • Pseudo Programs Inc. • yIPes Communication,Inc. 
• FirstLook.com • Quokka Sports,Inc.  
• FlexICs Inc. • R Systems,Inc.  
• Fogdog,Inc. • RAINfinity,Inc.  
• FormFactor,Inc. • RAW Communications,Ltd.  
  GE Equity  
• 80-20 Software Pty Ltd. • Hydra Mining Tools Intern. • Quintus Corporation 
• @Link Networks,Ltd. • I-Quest Corp. • Quisic 
• Agilera,Inc. • IP Communicaitons.Inc. • R2 Technology,Inc. 
• AirCell,Inc. • Imparta Ltd. • Raindance Communiations 
• AirPrime • Improbe,Inc. • Ranpak Corporation 
• Alteon Websystems • InfoLibria,Inc. • Redfern Phonetics Pvt. Ltd. 
• AmericasDoctor.com • Information Management  • RedsondTV 
• Amobea Telecom Ltd. • InterCom • RiTdisplay Corporation 
• Andritz AG • InterWise  • Rodriguez Cantieri Navali 
• AnnuityNet,Inc. • Internet Appliance Network • SAQQARA Systems,Inc. 
• AppGate AB • Intertainer Inc. • Santera Systems,Inc. 
• Appro Systems Inc. • Intraspect Software  • SciQuest.com 
• Aptegrity • Ipix,Inc. • SecureWorks,Inc. 
• Arch Capital Group ltd. • Ironside Technologies,Inc. • Sensitech,Inc. 
• Asera,Inc. • Italtel • Sharepeople Group,plc. 
• Asia Online Ltd. • Kamtronics Ltd • Silicon Energy Corporation 
• Asiacontent.com • Keynote Systems,Inc. • Silicon Motion,Inc. 
• Astral Point Communic. • KnowledgePlanet.com • Simulis 
• Axya Medical,Inc. • Korea First Bank • Soft SwitichingTechn. 
• BFinance.com Ltd. • LaserComm,Inc. • SoftBook Press,Inc. 
• Beacon Power Corporation • Launch Media • SoftPro 
• BetaSphere,Inc. • LeadScope • Sontoma Systems,Inc. 
• Plaxxum Interactive Inc. • LendingTree,Inc. • Space Fitters,Inc. 
• Bluestone Software ,Inc. • Lexar Media Corporation • StarMedia Networks,Inc. 
• Bowstreet Software ,Inc. • LinkGuard Ltd. • StarOne AG 
• BroadLogic,Inc. • LipoScience • StorageWay,Inc. 
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Summary in German1 
Die vorliegende Arbeit trägt den Titel „Value Added of Corporate Venture Capi-
tal- How do CVC units benefit from their organizational core?“ und beschäftigt 
sich mit den Problemen und Fragen, die sich im Kontext der intraorganisationa-
len Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) - Einheit 
und strategischen/operativen Geschäftseinheiten in großen Industriekonzernen 
ergeben. Ausgangspunkt der Überlegungen ist dabei einerseits die Erkenntnis, 
dass eine die Entwicklung des Corporate Venture Capital Marktes dem traditio-
nellen Venture Capital Markt zeitlich verschoben folgt, und andererseits die Tat-
sache, daß trotz dieser Einsicht und der hohen Bedeutung, die dem CVC Markt 
zugeschrieben wird, dieses Phänomen wissenschaftlich noch nicht ausreichend 
erfaßt ist.  
Für die Erklärung der deutlich ausgeprägten Auf- als auch Abwärtsbewegungen 
muß das zentrale Charakteristika von Corporate Venture Capital untersucht wer-
den: seine Einbettung in ein Industrieunternehmen. Auf der positiven  Seite ver-
schafft diese Einbettung verschafft der Corporate Venture Capital Einheit Zu-
gang zu konzerneigenen Einrichtungen wie z.B. Distributionskanälen, For-
schungseinrichtungen, und Hilfestellungen im Prozeß der Bewertung von Start-
up Unternehmen. Auf der negativen Seite ist die  oft nicht eindeutig festgelegte 
Mischung von strategischen und finanziellen Zielen, der eingeschränkte Grad 
and Autonomie und Unabhängigkeit der CVC Einheit, und die angessenen Ent-
lohnungssysteme der CVC Manager zu erwähnen.  
Der zentrale Untersuchungsgegenstand dieser Arbeit ist die Zusammenarbeit der 
CVC Einheit und den Geschäftseinheiten eines  Industriekonzerns im Investiti-
onsprozeß. Diese Perspektive wurde gewählt, da (1) diese Beziehung für die 
Realisierung (1) des Value Added von CVC von zentraler Bedeutung ist und (2) 
die Zusammenarbeit zwischen der CVC Einheit und den Geschäftseinheiten auf-
grund der erheblichen Zielkonflikte eine nicht selbstverständliche Kooperations-
                                              
1  Diese Zusammenfassung in deutscher Sprache dient zur Erfüllung der Anforderung gemäß 
§6 Abs. 6 der Promotionsordnung für die Fakultät Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften 
der Universität Bamberg vom 14. Juli 1982, zuletzt geändert durch die „Siebte Satzung zur 
Änderung der Promotionsordnung für die Fakultät Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften 
der Universität Bamberg vom 2. April 2001“. 
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basis mit besonders großen Herausforderungen dar. Eine systematische Analyse, 
wie diese Herausforderungen gemeistert werden können, führt zu Einsichten und 
Handlungsempfehlungen, die auch bei anderen intra-organisationalen Kooperati-
onskonstellationen fruchtbar genutzt werden sollten. Das zentrale Forschungs-
anliegen dieser Arbeit ist es daher darzulegen, wie es den CVC Einheiten gelingt, 
die interessanten Geschäftseinheiten des Konzerns in den Investitionsprozeß zu 
integrieren, um einerseits Zugang zu dem dort vorhandenen Wissen und den 
Technologien zu erhalten, gleichzeitig aber auch den unternehmerischen Geist 
sowie die Innovationskraft der Start-up Unternehmen in die Geschäftseinheiten 
zu  transferieren. Die CVC Einheiten sehen sich dabei dem Paradoxon gegen-
über, dass sie auf der einen Seite die Geschäftseinheiten auf irgendeine Art zur 
Zusammenarbeit bewegen müssen, um Zugang zu das vermarktete „Smart Mo-
ney“ von CVC zu realisieren, während sie auf der anderen Seite aber keine ge-
eigneten Anreizsysteme und Hierarchien zurückgreifen können, um die Ge-
schäftseinheiten von der Vorteilhaftigkeit einer Zusammenarbeit mit der CVC 
Einheit zu überzeugen. 
Zur genauen Untersuchung dieses Forschungsrätsels ist die Wahl einer geeigne-
ten Forschungsmethodologie erforderlich, die wiederum stark von der Formulie-
rung der Forschungsfrage abhängt. Auf dieser Basis hat sich die Fallstudienana-
lyse als sinnvollste Vorgehensweise herauskristallisiert. Durch Auswertung von 
durchgeführten Interviews, basierend auf einem halbstrukturierten Fragebogen, 
einer ausführlichen Analyse des Branchenkontextes sowie durch Einbeziehung 
umfangreichen Sekundärmaterials wurden die folgenden Fallstudien im Hinblick 
auf CVC Aktivitäten erstellt: 
• Siemens AG– Siemens Venture Capital, GmbH 
• Deutsche Telekom - T-Venture, GmbH 
• DaimlerChrysler – DaimlerChrylser Venture, GmbH 
• Motorola Inc. - Motorola Ventures 
• General Electric – GE  Equity 
• Intel Corp. - Intel Capital 
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Im Rahmen dieser Fallstudien wurden dabei insbesondere die Motive der Zu-
sammenarbeit, die übergeordnete Investmentstrategie, das Management des In-
vestmentprozesses (Deal  Screening, Deal Evaluation, Deal Structuring, Invest-
ment decision, Portfolio-Management, Exit-Management), sowie relevante As-
pekte der organisatorischen Zusammenarbeit, des Wissens- und Know-how 
Transfers, und einzelner Kontext- und Unternehmenskultur bezogener Problem-
bereiche erörtert. Nach Untersuchung dieser Aspekte im Rahmen der Einzelfall-
analysen wurde eine komparative Fallanalyse zur Identifikation von Gemein-
samkeiten und Unterschieden durchgeführt. Die gewonnenen Erkenntnisse wur-
den in vorläufigen Hypothesen zusammengefasst, welche die zentralen Aspekte 
der 
 intraorganisationalen Zusammenarbeit von CVC Einheiten und strategi-
schen/operativen Geschäftseinheiten von großen Industriekonzernen charakteri-
sieren.  
Diese aus der komparativen Fallanalyse gewonnenen Hypothesen bilden die Ba-
sis für einen ausführlichen Vergleich der erzielten Erkenntnisse mit den entspre-
chenden Empfehlungen der bestehenden Literatur. Hierzu wurden unterschiedli-
che Literaturströmungen und Studien herangezogen, die nicht nur auf die CVC 
Thematik begrenzt sind, sondern z.B. auch den Ressourcentransfer, die Ermögli-
chung intra-organisationaler Zusammenarbeit sowie die Steuerung der Zusam-
menarbeit miteinbeziehen. Dabei wurden die unterschiedlichen Dimensionen 
untersucht (Motive der Zusammenarbeit, die übergeordnete Investmentstrategie, 
das Management des Investmentprozesses, sowie relevante Aspekte der organisa-
torischen Zusammenarbeit, des Wissens- und Know-how Transfers, und einzel-
ner Kontext- und Unternehmenskultur bezogener Problembereiche), die sich im 
Rahmen der Fallstudienanalyse als wichtig herausgestellt haben. Ziel der Kon-
frontation der in den vorläufigen Hypothesen zusammengefassten Fallstudiener-
gebnisse mit der existierenden Theorie ist es aufzuzeigen, inwieweit diese Hypo-
thesen mit den bestehenden Konzepten erklärt werden können. Das Ergebnis die-
ses Abgleichs ist, dass die bereits existierenden Konzepte nicht in der Lage sind, 
die im Rahmen der Fallstudienanalyse gewonnenen Erkenntnisse ausreichend zu 
erklären. 
Aufgrund der herausgearbeiteten Unzulänglichkeiten der existierenden theoreti-
schen Konzepte wird im Rahmen dieser Arbeit ein neues Konzept entworfen, 
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welches für das Management der intra-organisationalen Zusammenarbeit von 
CVC Einheiten und Geschäftseinheiten geeignet ist. Dieses Konzept basiert auf 
zwei weiteren, weit verbreiteten und anerkannten Konzepten (Formulierung der 
Organisationsstrategie sowie Organisationsstruktur). Zentraler Punkt des neuen 
Konzepts ist die Forderung nach einer Verknüpfung zwischen den Investitions-
motiven, der korrespondierenden organisationalen Einbettung der CVC  Einheit, 
sowie der expliziten Involvierung der Geschäftseinheiten im Investitionsprozeß. 
Dies bedeutet, dass unterschiedliche  Investmentstrategien gleichzeitig zwei sehr 
unterschiedliche, sogar entgegengerichtete Auswirkungen auf Kooperationswil-
ligkeit und langfristigem „Pay-off“ für das Unternehmen. Einerseits verfolgen 
CVC Einheiten  Investmentmöglichkeiten, die Verkaufs- und Implementie-
rungsmöglichkeiten gewährleisten, ein „Leverage of Strategic Assets“, während 
andererseits CVC Einheiten auf Forschungsmöglichkeiten und technische Syner-
gie-effekte für die Geschäftseinheiten abzielen, ein „Enhancement of Innovation“  
verfolgen, welche eine gegenläufige Kooperationsbereitschaft der Geschäftsein-
heiten und Wissenserforschung nach sich ziehen. Dies führt im Ergebnis auch 
häufig dazu, daß CVC Programme eine gemischte Investitionsstrategie, eine 
„Goldene Investmentstrategie“ innerhalb der Großunternehmen  entwickeln soll-
ten. Desweiteren verdeutlicht das Konzept, daß das Top-Management für die 
Formulierung der CVC Strategie und deren organisatorischen Struktur verant-
wortlich ist, während ihre Bedeutung im eigentlichen Involvierungsprozeß  der 
Geschäftseinheiten nur zweitrangig ist. Entlang des Investitionsprozesses sind 
dann vielmehr einzelne Charakteristika der CVC Manager als auch der Ge-
schäftseinheiten von ausschlaggebender Bedeutung. 
